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This thesis will explore and elucidate how Britain managed sterling through 
mobilisation of monetary and fiscal measures, focusing on the period from 1958 
to 1972. This thesis will also provide an examination of Anglo-American 
monetary and fiscal policy co-ordination from the British perspective, in the 
context of currency management, in order to explore the political economic 
dynamics of the period.  
 
The late 1950s saw the beginnings of a turbulent decade in which the post-
World War II economic regime, the so-called Bretton Woods system, became 
destabilised. The gold outflow from the United States that emerged in 1958 was 
detrimental to the dominant position of the dollar. Perennial crises befell sterling, 
in turn causing profound repercussions within the international market, 
resonating throughout world politics. Cohesive response to defend the existing 
economic structure ensued and the international financial community set out to 
forge and strengthen various schemes and countermeasures, the primary aim 
of which was to stabilise the value of the two reserve currencies without 
hampering economic growth. Countermeasures emerged which consisted of 
monetary policies including direct and indirect market intervention, targeted 
fiscal policies, and regulation on capital movement. The economic issues and 
attempts at stabilisation of the currencies caused reverberations through 
domestic politics and international relations.  
 
Through analysis of currency management and monetary and fiscal policies, 
this thesis uses archival sources to explore and clarify how sterling was 
managed in the period between 1958 and 1972, focusing mainly on the British 
perspective. This thesis delineates the link between the co-ordination of 
monetary and fiscal policies as a defining feature of the management of sterling. 
This thesis also explores ways of comprehending theoretical positions and 
arguments of international political economy and state theory, through the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction: History, theories of international 
political economy, and state theory 
 
 
This thesis reinvestigates the political process of economic policy formation 
under the late Bretton Woods system between 1958 and 1972. It aims to 
elucidate how, in this period, UK domestic economic policies and international 
currency management were mutually shaped and reshaped in the political 
arena. Then, this thesis will compare these historical aspects with the theories 
of international political economy and state theory, in order to reconsider the 
frameworks from a detailed historical perspective.  
     The interaction between domestic economic policies and international 
economic relations, congruent with liberalised markets, has become an 
analytically challenging issue with the haunting here of a ‘spectre’, referring to 
the endogenous instability of capitalism as graphically depicted in the 2008 
Great Financial Crisis.1 Analytical challenges have arisen from tremors in the 
paradigm of international economic relations and economic policies as bound to 
liberal market discipline, and founded on rule-based institutions leading to 
stable economic growth and sound markets.2 This disillusion with the ‘great 
moderation’ upheld by the liberal agenda has triggered not only economic 
turmoil but also divisive internal and external conflicts. Arising from this turmoil, 
                                                       
1 Andrew Gamble, The Spectre at the Feast: Capitalist Crisis and the Politics of 
Recession (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), Introduction. 
2 This account, in relation to the liberal international order, is detailed in section 
2 of this chapter.  
10 
 
fiscal and monetary policies, and international co-operative or harmonised 
economic relations are caught within the momentum of change.  
     This raises the colossal question: how should interrelations amongst aspects 
of international political economy and domestic fiscal and monetary policies of 
states be understood? Here, reinvestigation of the management of currencies 
under the late Bretton Woods system from 1958 to 1972 provides proper 
context for examination of these complex interrelations. During the period of the 
late Bretton Woods system, while uncertainty surrounding the currencies in the 
global financial market heightened, states embarked on co-ordinating their own 
fiscal and monetary policies to navigate the financial turmoil in which confidence 
in sterling and the dollar waned. Simultaneously, global governance through 
international financial institutions gained momentum in the 1960s, and co-
operative monetary relations in the international arena accelerated. In other 
words, fiscal and monetary policies conducted by states playing different tunes 
harmonised on the international political stage, reverberating in the domestic 
economic and political terrain, and vice versa. In this sense, revisiting the late 
Bretton Woods era and untangling the intricately woven history of political 
economy might provide a useful new perspective on the interrelation between 






1.1 Currency management through fiscal and monetary policies 
1958-1972 
 
The defects of the Bretton Woods system and its global issues became 
apparent in 1958: the gold drain from the US saw the dollar’s status as a ‘key 
currency’ wane, with international financial turbulence occurring intermittently in 
the years that followed. US foreign aid, military expenditure, and foreign private 
investment since the end of World War II had been the main factors behind the 
capital outflow, and with the expanding trade deficits, provoked distrust of the 
dollar.3 Consequently, the US balance of payments shifted from surplus to 
deficit.4 To make matters worse, the expansion of the Euro-dollar market and 
the preference of monetary authorities for the accumulation of gold heightened 
after de facto currency convertibility began among Western European countries 
in 1958, accelerating gold and capital outflow from the US. Eventually, 
confidence in the dollar as a reserve currency of the Bretton Woods system 
waned, and with it confidence in sterling, which had been under strain since 
World War II, wavered. 5  Meanwhile, with the US at the epicentre, this 
contagious turmoil transmitted to the international financial market.   
                                                       
3 Allan H. Meltzer, A History of the Federal Reserve, Vol.2: Books 1-2, 1951-
1986 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), p.26. Fred L. Block, 
The Origins of International Economic Disorder, A Study of United States 
International Monetary Policy from World War II to the Present (London: 
University of California Press, 1977), chapter 7. 
4 Harold James, International Monetary Cooperation Since Bretton Woods (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp.154-5. 
5  For the establishment of currency convertibility, see James Ellison, 
Threatening Europe: Britain and the Creation of the European Community, 
1955-58 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), chapter 8. For UK attitudes towards 
convertibility, see Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State 
(London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 347-56. Milward emphasised that the UK 
prioritised restoring the worldwide role of sterling, and that it paid less attention 
to advancing Anglo-Six economic relations. See also P. L. Cottrell, ‘The Bank of 
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     As an early measure to tackle this instability, in the late 1950s, US President 
Dwight Eisenhower attempted to put pressure on West Germany to share the 
burden of US military foreign expenditure in order to reduce public spending, 
which proved largely unsuccessful. 6  As the global market observed these 
unsuccessful negotiations and the hiatus of US projects for forging a 
breakthrough on the balance of payments stalemate, the speculative 
momentum around the dollar surged, entailing volatility in gold prices and 
exchange parities, and international financial instability became a growing 
concern. The issue of volatility of gold prices was the crux of this instability 
since most currencies maintained their exchange parities against the dollar, 
which was backed by gold. Therefore, fluctuation in gold prices created 
international instability in exchange rates. As gold prices increased, dollar prices 
decreased, causing concern for official and private holders of dollars in reserves 
or assets. Thus, fiscal management mindful of the foreign reserves position 
continued into a new administration in the following decade.7   
     In 1960, the incoming Kennedy administration aimed to defend the gold price. 
Due to high foreign investment and overinflating public expenditure abroad, US 
foreign liabilities exceeded its gold reserves and the ‘gold rush’ occurred in 
1960. 8  In the analysis of Robert Triffin, the matter of the dollar shortage 
                                                                                                                                                                  
England in its International Setting, 1918-1972’, in Richard Roberts and David 
Kynaston (eds.), The Bank of England: Money, Power and Influence, 1694-1994 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp.130-1.  
Federico Romero, ‘Interdependence and integration in American eyes: from the 
Marshall Plan to currency convertibility’, in Alan S. Milward, Frances M. B. 
Lynch, Ruggero Ranieri, Federico Romero and Vibeke Sørensen, The Frontier 
of National Sovereignty: History and theory 1945-1992 (London: Routledge, 
1993), p.179. 
6  Francis J. Gavin, Gold, Dollars, and Power, The Politics of International 
Monetary Relations, 1958-1971 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 2004) pp.34-5, 45-50. 
7 Gavin, Gold, Dollars, and Power, pp. 55-7. 
8 Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary 
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transformed into the issue of how to control the dollar ‘glut’ accumulated by 
countries in a trade surplus against the US.9 This global overflow of dollars 
inevitably stimulated the reform of currency management in the international 
arena.  
     Notwithstanding incessant currency crises rampant in Western Europe, the 
US and Canada, a variety of statistics indicate that the later years of the Bretton 
Woods system, particularly from 1959 to 1971, can be characterised as a stable 
period and its ‘heyday’.10 This paradox of a financial system that was apparently 
tranquil, at least by the cursory observation of the broad statistics, while at the 
same time plagued by the reality of intermittent serious currency crises, was the 
artefact of international and domestic management of monetary and fiscal 
policies, out of which came schemes such as the gold pool and Federal 
Reserve swap lines. With this series of measures, the US embarked on 
stabilising the currency values. 11  Other co-operative international monetary 
schemes were gradually introduced through the IMF to provide international 
liquidity, such as General Arrangements to Borrow in 1962 and Special Drawing 
                                                                                                                                                                  
System, Second Edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), p.114. 
9 Robert Triffin, Gold and the Dollar Crisis: The Future of Convertibility (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1960). Benjamin J. Cohen, Organizing the 
World’s Money: The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations 
(New York: Basic Books, 1977), pp.98-9. Robert Triffin pointed out that the 
preservation of confidence in the dollar was incompatible with satisfaction of the 
international demand for dollar liquidity. Paradoxically, rather than result in the 
occurrence of this ‘Triffin Dilemma’, the burst of international liquidity in the 
Euro-dollar market caused speculative pressure surrounding the dollar and 
sterling. Kathleen Burk and Alec Cairncross, Goodbye Great Britain: The 1976 
IMF Crisis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), p.8.  
10 Michael D. Bordo, ‘The Bretton Woods International Monetary System: A 
Historical Overview’, in Michael D. Bordo and Barry Eichengreen (eds.), A 
Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for International 
Monetary Reform (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp.4-28. 
11 Charles A. Coombs, The Arena of International Finance (New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, 1976), pp.71-2. Anna J. Schwartz, Money in Historical 
Perspective (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), p.340. 
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Rights in 1968.12 In spite of these measures, speculation lingered surrounding 
the currencies, particularly the dollar and sterling. This provoked several 
devaluations and revaluations, and resulted in the demise of the gold pool 
subsequent to the emergence of ‘two-tier’ gold prices. Consequently, at the 
point when the US abdicated from its role to underpin the dollar value, which 
reflected in the closure of the ‘gold window’ and the commencement of a 
floating exchange rate system or ‘dirty float’, the Bretton Woods system’s de 
facto implosion was heralded.  
     Although the above general account is mainly presented based on the 
chronological developments of economic policies, currency management had a 
great impact on policies in the broader sense. In the existing research, a 
perspective on this era has been deepened from the point of view of 
international relations and the Anglo-American relationship. Dobson assessed 
that ‘the fortunes of sterling, the US dollar, the Bretton Woods system, and 
Western defence were all interconnected and they all affected the special 
relationship.’13 Following this, Gavin asserted that the ‘dollar and gold question 
was the most important issue of American foreign economic policy from the late 
1950s to the early 1970s […] these monetary questions influenced fiscal policy’ 
                                                       
12 A great deal of existing research has analysed the SDRs and GAB. For a 
major work regarding these schemes, see James, International Monetary 
Cooperation Since Bretton Woods. For the SDRs, see Paul Volcker and Toyoo 
Gyohten, Changing Fortunes: The World’s Money and the Threat to American 
Leadership (New York: Times Books, 1992); Robert Solomon, The International 
Monetary System, 1945-1981 (New York: Harper and Row, 1982). 
13  Alan P. Dobson, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: of 
friendship, conflict and the rise and decline of superpowers (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 1995), p.125.  
Gilpin argued that American hegemony was based on dollar supremacy in the 
Bretton Woods system, and the nuclear deterrent. Robert Gilpin, The Political 




and ‘debates over America’s military strategy in Europe’.14 Hence, there is no 
doubt that currency management was not only part of foreign economic policy 
or international monetary co-operation but was also intertwined with wider state 
strategies in the global political arena, including fiscal policies and military 
strategies.  
     Despite these assessments, there remains a considerable gap in analyses 
relating to currency management, fiscal policies and monetary policies.15 This 
gap has produced conflictive views, however, analysis of UK economic history 
of the late Bretton Woods era reveals how these components were inextricably 
intertwined.  
     The history of the UK economy in the post-war era can be delineated as 
perennial crises and ensuing ad hoc economic management, and ‘relative 
decline’.16 In this climate, economic policies became embroiled in the ‘stop-go’ 
                                                       
14 Gavin, Gold, Dollars, and Power, p. 197. 
15  A notable exception is Catherine R. Schenk, The Decline of Sterling: 
Managing the Retreat of an International Currency 1945-1992 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010). Also, Rajarshi Roy, The Battle of the 
Pound: The Political Economy of Anglo-American Relations, 1964-1968 
(unpublished PhD thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 
2000). 
16 Andrew Shonfield, British Economic Policy Since the War (London: Penguin 
Books, 1958), pp. 254-9. Shonfield focused on ‘technical deficiencies’ and 
inadequate levels of investment in UK industries from the 1870s, which caused 
limited growth of productivity. 
Rubinstein played down the decline of the British economy because of the 
existence of the City’s special presence, in W. D. Rubinstein, Capitalism, 
Culture and Decline in Britain 1750-1990 (London: Routledge, 1993). This 
argument linked with research focusing on the continuity of British global 
financial supremacy, which emphasised national interests and assessed the 
UK’s national economy, see P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: 
Crisis and Deconstruction 1914-1990 (London: Longman, 1993), chapters 11 
and 12. Contrary to this, Wiener asserted that the British economic structure, 
which had strongly relied on financial markets, caused the decline of its 
industrial competitiveness and resulted in the low-performance of the British 
economy, in Martin J. Wiener, English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial 
Spirit 1850-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). A similar 
argument can be seen in Robert Bacon and Walter Eltis, Britain’s Economic 
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dichotomy, and its failure, at least in hindsight, led to drastic measures in the 
form of devaluation in 1949 and 1967 to rectify the ‘fundamental disequilibrium’. 
Both Conservative and Labour governments struggled to tackle balance of 
payments deficits through fiscal and monetary policies, tinkering with various 
regulations to check aggregate demand, wage increase and inflation.17 From 
the late 1950s to 1964, the Conservative government repeatedly endeavoured 
to suppress aggregate demand through incomes policy, credit restraints and 
regressive taxation, such as increase in duties, and relied on international 
monetary schemes to stabilise the currencies. Although the succeeding Labour 
government led by Harold Wilson failed to desert the ‘stop-go agenda’, it also 
mobilised various fiscal measures to tackle the balance of payments issue, and 
sought to reconcile the trade unions to accept legalised incomes policy.   
     However, divergent characterisations can be ascribed to the economic 
policies of these governments. Bale pointed out that the Wilson Labour 
government held that British long-term economic problems ought to be solved 
with long-term ‘organisational or structural solutions’, and the delay of 
devaluation.18 If the account of Bale holds significant credence, it is key to 
analyse such ‘long-term’ solutions (such as taxation), as interconnected with 
currency management including international monetary co-operation, which 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Problem: Too Few Producers (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1976). This work 
emphasised de-industrialisation and low productivity as the cause of ‘decline’. 
On the other hand, Tomlinson argued that the UK economy was measured by 
various benchmarks such as standards of living and economic performance. In 
the context of 1960s, the term ‘decline’ was used in political rhetoric. Therefore, 
the definition of ‘decline’ is a contentious issue in itself. Jim Tomlinson, 
‘Inventing ‘decline’: the falling behind of the British economy in the postwar 
years’, The Economic History Review, Vol.49, No.4, 1996, pp.731-57.  
17 Although there are numerous accounts on the economic and political climate 
of the 1960s, for a general narrative, see Alec Cairncross, Managing the British 
Economy in the 1960s: A Treasury Perspective (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996). 
18 Tim Bale, ‘Dynamics of a Non-Decision: the ‘Failure’ to Devalue the Pound, 
1964-7’, Twentieth Century British History, Vol.10, No.2, 1999, pp.192-217. 
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were designed to avoid detrimental effects on the international monetary system 
and to tackle the domestic economic issues.19 
     Notwithstanding Bale’s account, taking the devaluation of 1967 as an 
example, the existing research has paid little attention to the links amongst 
fiscal, monetary and international aspects and has produced divergent analyses. 
Oliver has suggested that the Labour government took inadequate measures 
without felicitous external economic strategy in the face of the proposals of 
officials at the Bank of England and Treasury, who urged the government take 
action to cement confidence in sterling.20 This argument contended that the 
Labour government’s policy actions ultimately failed to defend the sterling parity.  
     In stark contrast to the argument of Oliver, Schenk explicated from the 
perspective of international monetary relations that the ‘risk of a collapse of the 
sterling exchange rate […] posed dangers not only for Britain but for the system 
as a whole’ and ‘sterling’s weakness could be an effective source of bargaining 
power for Britain, in international financial relations and in Anglo-American 
strategic negotiations alike’.21  
     It is clear that there exists distance in the analyses offered by Schenk and 
Oliver. Schenk argued that sterling’s weak position created favourable 
international political milieu for achieving successful international support for 
sterling and that this shaped international relations. On the other hand, Oliver 
emphasised the failure of the Labour government that took little effective action 
                                                       
19 There is no doubt that these long-term solutions included industrial policies 
for modernisation or administrative reform such as establishment of the 
Department of Economic Affairs, however, these issues are out of scope of this 
thesis. 
20 Michael J. Oliver, ‘The Management of Sterling, 1964-1967’, The English 
Historical Review, Vol.126, No.520, 2011, pp.582-613. 
21 Schenk, The Decline of Sterling, pp.418, 204. 
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to defend sterling’s position. This discrepancy between above two arguments is 
caused by the difference in their analytical perspectives and scope. Schenk has 
focused on international monetary relations, emphasising how sterling was 
supported, whereas Oliver has looked into the domestic aspect of currency 
management, drawing attention to the failure to defend the parity. In order to 
overcome the constraints arising from a singular perspective, this thesis will 
place focus upon the economic policies that were undertaken by UK 
governments, highlighting the links between the fiscal and monetary aspects in 
the context of currency management. This, it will be argued, provides a clearer 
image of what the UK governments in the late Bretton Woods era prioritised and 
intended to defend or achieve, what obstacles arose, and what got lost along 
the way.  
     Further consideration should be given to the links between domestic 
economic policies and international currency arrangements. Schenk’s 
examination of IMF primary sources revealed a key aspect of currency 
management of the period. She delineated the negotiating power and position 
of the UK in relation to the US as one of ‘interdependence’ rather than the 
‘supplicant’ argued in existing research, in Schenk’s criticism of Boyle.22 This 
inevitably leads to two fundamental questions. The first is how such 
‘interdependence’ was secured, and what the governments aimed to mobilise 
this power to achieve, then what policy outcomes, including both domestic 
economic policies and international monetary co-operative schemes, emerged 
through the political process of co-ordinating domestic and international 
interests. The second question is located in the difference of scope in the work 
                                                       
22 Ibid., p.205. Kevin Boyle, ‘The Price of Peace: Vietnam, the Pound, and the 




of Schenk and others, such as Boyle. The former has focused largely on 
international institutional arrangement and negotiation, such as via the IMF, 
whereas the latter has placed significance on negotiations led by governmental 
officials and state ministries, such as the Foreign Office and Treasury 
Department. This difference in scope might lead to the paradoxical view that the 
UK’s economic policies or politics were restrained, or its sovereignty eroded 
because of, or perhaps in order to maintain, its ‘interdependent’ or strong 
sovereign position in international politics.  
     Therefore, it is imperative to disentangle the complicated decision-making 
process behind economic policy formation, and to reveal the links amongst 
currency management, and fiscal and monetary policies. As seen above, it is 
paramount to reinvestigate fiscal and monetary policies in the context of 
currency management in the late Bretton Woods era, a statistically tranquil 
‘heyday’ riddled with incessant crises. To do this, this thesis will mainly focus on 
the centre of the decision-making process in which all aspects are reflected: the 
government and the Bank of England. 
 
1.2 International political economy: theoretical perspectives 
 
This thesis aims to provide clarification of how the aspects of international 
currency management, and domestic fiscal and monetary policies interacted in 
the late Bretton Woods era. In this section, consideration is given to the 
development of influential theoretical arguments of international political 
economy and international relations, for later comparison of the history with 
these theories. As Günter Schmölders has argued, the essence of public 
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finance and political economy is embodied within the interrelations between the 
management of currencies (currency issue) and taxation (public finance).23 
Even If this holds credence, it should not be neglected that from the late Bretton 
Woods system, currency was managed increasingly in the international sphere 
having both a direct and indirect impact on domestic economic policies 
including public finance, and vice versa. This section considers what can be 
gleaned from analysis of the interrelations of the three components of currency 
management, and fiscal and monetary policies, in the context of theories of 
international political economy.  
 
1.2.1 Coercion or concord? Realism and ‘embedded liberalism’ 
 
As a starting point, this section explores theories that focus on harmonisation 
between the international liberalised market and domestic economic policies, 
beginning with the ‘embedded liberalism’ by Ruggie. As a premise, Ruggie 
embraced the argument of Karl Polanyi that liberal states and the equilibrium of 
national powers based on a self-regulating market during the gold standard era, 
dubbed ‘utopia’, created a force for the achievement of internationally stable 
periods, such as ‘Pax Britannica’. Then, Ruggie delineated the post-World War 
II economy as a compound of international multilateralism, or inclination 
towards free markets, and domestic economic policies incorporating ‘social 
objectives’ with economic stabilisation schemes through ‘Keynesian’ policies. 
According to Ruggie, this led the international economic regime not to ‘utopia’ 
                                                       
23 Günter Schmölders, Finanzpolitik (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1955), translated 
by Tadao Yamaguchi et al. into Japanese, Zaisei seisaku dai ippan (Tokyo: Toyo 
Keizai Inc., 1957). 
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but to ‘embedded liberalism’, which gained political legitimacy.24 Many hold that 
this framework is still influential and applicable to historical research.25     
     In contrast to this theory of concord between the international and domestic 
economic aspects, neo-Marxists emphasised the crisis of ‘embedded liberalism’. 
This group saw political legitimacy, based on Herbermas’ concept, as 
underpinned by social policies for the capitalist class, which caused the gradual 
expansion of dependency on public deficits. In their theoretical argument, this 
accumulated deficit precipitated ‘fiscal crises’, which led to erosion of the 
legitimacy sustaining embedded liberalism and the emergence of ‘disorganized 
capitalism’.26 
     In contrast to the arguments of neo-Marxists, which stressed the 
endogenous demise of the internal components of ‘embedded liberalism’,  
‘hegemonic stability theory’ and realism put forth a differing perspective on 
                                                       
24 John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International 
Institutionalization (London: Routledge, 1998), pp.62-76. For the explanation of 
post-world war II ‘social objectives’ in UK policies, see Richard M. Titmuss, ‘The 
Role of Redistribution in Social Policy’, Social Security Bulletin, Vol.28, No.6, 
1965, p.16. For Titmuss, the two major objectives of social policies were based 
on redistributive and non-discriminatory aims, referring to national insurance, 
education, medical care, housing and so on.  
25  Scott Newton’s argument concerning the decision behind the sterling 
devaluation of 1967 can be considered as applying the theory of ‘embedded 
liberalism’. Scott Newton, ‘The Sterling Devaluation of 1967, the International 
Economy and Post-War Social Democracy’, English Historical Review, Vol. 
CXXV, No.515, 2010, pp.912-45. 
26  For contradictions between the expansion of social policies and political 
legitimacy, see Claus Offe, Contradictions of the Welfare State (Massachusetts: 
The MIT Press, 1984); and Claus Offe, Disorganized Capitalism: Contemporary 
Transformations of Work and Politics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985). James 
O’Connor also argued that increasing public expenditure was mobilised in order 
to prop-up capitalism with various social policies, leading to fiscal crises. James 
O’Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1973). 
These views gathered academic attention in the highly inflationary era of the 
1970s for analysing ‘fiscal crises’. Wolfgang Streeck extended this view to 
current fiscal states, arguing that mounting public and private debts with a 
neoliberal agenda pushed states towards fiscal consolidation, the so-called 
‘consolidation state’. Wolfgang Streeck, Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of 
Democratic Capitalism (London: Verso, 2014). 
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internal and external conflicts. An approach of realism arising from emphasis on 
national sovereignty of the Westphalian system since 1648 has assumed that 
nation states rationally pursue maximisation of their public interests. This 
causes the occurrence of perennial conflict or anarchical relations amongst 
states. 27  This theoretical assumption, underpinned by the work of Dahl, 
emphasised that states hold a relative degree of power and exert influence 
upon others to change their decisions or behaviour.28 Therefore, as seen in the 
explanation of Stephen Krasner, realism has focused on how nation states 
reach international concord, achieve sound international relations or orders, and 
how this situation is maintained within anarchical international relations.29  
     In a similar framework to realism, Kindleberger has asserted that the stable 
international order was created by hegemonic power. He placed significance on 
both World Wars breaking out during an ‘interregnum’, or transitional period, of 
national power in which UK hegemony transferred to the US. Then Kindleberger 
stressed that the hegemon, backed by aggrandised economic supremacy with 
military power, had upheld the stable international order.30 To be more precise, 
                                                       
27 In the classical account, reductionism and methodological individualism by 
Morgenthau identified human nature as a power maximiser and extended this 
account to the field of international politics, see Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics 
Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1948). A similar view that recognised the state as an ‘irreducible unit’ akin to an 
individual person was seen in the work of Nettl. See J. P. Nettl, ‘The State as a 
Conceptual Variable’, World Politics, Vol.20, No.4, 1968, pp.559-92. 
28 Robert A. Dahl, ‘The concept of power’, Behavioral Science, Vol.2, No.3, 
1957, pp.201-15. 
29  Stephen D. Krasner, Power, the State, and Sovereignty: Essays on 
international relations (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), p.5. Hedley Bull defined the 
order as ‘a pattern of human activity that sustains elementary, primary or 
universal goals of social life.’ Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of 
Order in World Politics, Fourth Edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 
originally published 1977, p.4. Bull amplified this definition to international 
politics and claimed that international order consists of preservation of the 
system, independence and external sovereignty, and pursuit of peace to 
alleviate or avoid international anarchic milieu.  
30 Hegemon refers to a nation or government with hegemonic power, which 
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Kindleberger made the assertion that the key currency and internationally open 
market as ‘collective goods’, provided by the hegemonic nation, fostered sound 
international relations.31 According to this theory, however, the hegemonic state 
risks collision between internal and external interests, because of the 
prerequisite to supply ‘collective goods’ to meet foreign demand and maintain 
an existing regime, which easily clashes with internal economic interests. This is 
the prototype of ‘hegemonic stability theory’.  
     Since Kindleberger’s work, numerous commentators have, within the 
frameworks of realism or structural realism, placed focus on military and 
economic aspects. The influential theorist, Robert Gilpin, assessed that US 
hegemony, based on nuclear weapons and anchored by the key currency under 
the dollar-gold standard, created hierarchical relations amongst nation states, 
which led to a stable international system in the post-World War II era.32 
     However, an incongruous phase for realism and hegemonic stability theory 
occurred surrounding the Nixon shock in 1971, which exposed the waning, or at 
least fundamental change, of US economic supremacy.33 The question arose: 
how were stable international relations maintained with the decline (whether in 
                                                                                                                                                                  
consists of economic or military supremacy. The concept of hegemony was 
developed from the work of Antonio Gramsci in the context of Italian Marxian 
politics. According to Gramsci, hegemony is a product of ‘intellectual and moral 
leadership’ and the ‘direction’ of society is set by the dominant group. Theories 
of international political economy amplify this concept to the analysis of global 
political and economic balance. Some theories consider this concept of 
hegemony a source of international order. 
31 Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1973), chapter 14. 
32 Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations. 
33 On 15 August 1971, the US Treasury closed the gold window and terminated 
the convertibility of dollars into gold. Joanne Gowa analysed the Nixon shock 
from the perspective of the conflicts between the co-ordination of domestic 
economic interests and internationally liberal market policies. Joanne Gowa, 
Closing the Gold Window: Domestic Politics and the End of Bretton Woods 
(London: Cornell University Press, 1983). 
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absolute or relative terms) of US economic supremacy? 34  In conjunction, 
understanding of coercive US hegemony has been revised from multiple 
perspectives. For example, Lundestad has argued that the US did not forcefully 
exercise its own power but was an ‘invited empire’, because continental 
European countries and the UK required military and foreign aid, such as the 
Marshall Plan or Anglo-American financial co-operation, not only for economic 
reconstruction but also to contain social and political movement toward 
extremism immediate after the second World War.35 Moreover, it can be seen 
from Keohane’s work that not only conflict or collision of the interests of nation 
states but also international co-operation or harmonisation became apparent as 
a consequence of the creation of various international economic co-operative 
schemes.36 
 
                                                       
34 Of course the collapse of Bretton Woods system cannot solely be considered 
as the decline in US economic supremacy. Rather, one argument, dubbed 
‘Bretton Woods II’, in the context of ‘global imbalance’, stressed the significance 
of US external deficits in a global economy. This argument has put forward that 
emerging economies in East Asia and Latin America have pegged to the dollar 
at undervalued rates, and the US has been playing a role in providing these 
countries’ reserves with dollar-denominated assets. Here, this system has 
underpinned export-led growth in emerging economies, and the US dollar or its 
deficit play a pivotal role in the global market as seen in the Bretton Woods era. 
Therefore, US deficit and the decline in the dollar value cannot simply be judged 
as a sign of decline in US economic supremacy. See Michael P. Dooley, David 
Folkerts-Landau and Peter M. Garber, ‘The Revived Bretton Woods System: 
The Effects of Periphery Intervention and Reserve Management on Interest 
Rates and Exchange Rates in Center Countries’, NBER Working Paper, No. 
10332, March 2004. Also see Michael P. Dooley, David Folkerts-Landau and 
Peter M. Garber, ‘Bretton Woods II Still Defines The International Monetary 
System’, NBER Working Paper, No. 14731, February 2009.  
35 Geir Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From 
“Empire” by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003), p.55. 
36 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World 
Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp.46, 51-64. 
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1.2.2 Structural realism, the liberal international order, and the 
institutional approach 
 
As historical research has revealed co-operative aspects and the relative 
decline of the US economy, the schema within the international political 
economy of so-called neorealism or structural realism has endeavoured to 
refine its understanding. This school maintains the concept of nation states in 
pursuit of their own interests within ‘anarchic international society’, while nation 
states passively, systematically and rationally incorporate into international 
security systems to protect themselves against physical external threats.37 This 
can be understood as a product of the ‘Nash equilibrium’, making the best 
choice possible, taking into account the decisions of other players.  
     From an institutional economics perspective, transaction costs arising from 
non-participation in international co-operative schemes are greater than the 
benefits from membership of such schemes. Hence, states incorporate 
themselves into international co-operative schemes.38 This methodology can 
also be applied to incremental change and path-dependence of international 
relations. Douglass North defined institutions as ‘humanly devised constraints 
                                                       
37 Kenneth Waltz presented the systematic theory or so-called balance of power 
theory. He focused on the international political system as the most significant 
aspect in deciding the correlation and mechanisms amongst nation states. This 
is defined by the principle which creates international orders, the specification of 
functions and distribution of capabilities. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International 
Politics (Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1979), chapter 5. See also Robert O. 
Keohane, ‘Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond’, in Robert 
O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1986), pp.163-70. 
38  Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.3. 
For the concept of transaction costs, see O. E. Williamson, The Economic 
Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting (London: 
Macmillan, 1985).  
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that shape human interaction’, which metamorphose according to relative 
changes in transaction costs. The institutions stabilise while agency costs are 
below increasing returns from the membership of institutions, then this self-
enforcing mechanism creates path-dependence. On the other hand, when 
transaction costs exceed the increasing returns, institutions undergo change. In 
other words, if transaction costs exceed the benefits produced through the 
membership of institutions, nation states in pursuit of maximising national 
interests would change their policies or institutional frameworks. 
     In the context of structural realism, Stephen Krasner provided theoretical 
frameworks focusing on sovereignties, which can be used for analysis of 
correlations between the international system and domestic field. Although his 
description can be considered ambiguous, Krasner classified the sovereignty 
structures of nation states into Westphalian sovereignty; domestic sovereignty; 
interdependence sovereignty and international legal sovereignty, then 
discerning that these types might covary or undermine each other.39 The most 
important classifications for this thesis are domestic sovereignty and 
interdependence sovereignty.40 The former refers to the ‘organization of political 
authority within the state and the ability of public authorities to exercise effective 
control within the borders of their own polity’ and the latter is defined as ‘the 
ability of public authorities to regulate the flow of information, ideas, goods, 
                                                       
39  Krasner, Power, the State, and Sovereignty, pp.179-80. Krasner’s 
explanation of four types of sovereignty presents as unclear. While he 
suggested that these four types ‘do not necessarily covary’ and a ‘state can 
have one but not the other’, he recognised the possibility that one type of 
sovereignty may undermine others and a state has a set of sovereignties. 
Therefore, this should be interpreted to imply that the four types of sovereignty 
can covary and affect one another. 
40  Ibid., p.184. The other types of sovereignty are outlined as follows. 
Westphalian sovereignty is ‘exclusion of external actors from authority 
structures within a given territory’, and international legal sovereignty refers to 
‘the practices associated with mutual recognition, usually between territory 
entities that have formal juridical independence’. 
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people, pollutants, or capital across the borders of their state.’41 Which is to say, 
combining the implication of Katzenstein’s work that foreign economic policies 
are distanced from domestic politics and society, these two types of sovereignty, 
backed by political legitimacy and the ability to control the global movement of 
capital and labour, are separate yet covary and affect one another.42  
     However, how these two sovereignties ‘covaried’ and interacted should be 
further examined due to the lack of detailed analysis from a historical 
perspective, notwithstanding the conceptual issues in Krasner’s description of 
sovereignty structures as both static and ‘covarying’, in a trade-off fashion. In 
other words, from a historical perspective on the interrelations between 
international and domestic politics and economic management, the question 
arises: how did governments in the late Bretton Woods era mobilise domestic 
sovereignty in order to achieve political goals within interdependence 
sovereignty, and vice versa? Did the governments intentionally change the 
structure of such ‘covarying’ sovereignties in order to achieve their political 
objectives and desired balance of sovereignties? 
     Distinguished from structural realism, with the expansion of the free market 
and stable international relations in the post-World War II era, the analytical 
schema of structural liberalism or the liberal international order regained the 
spotlight. Ikenberry, the most significant advocate of the liberal international 
order, has side-lined coercive equilibrium, one of the key analytical points of 
structural realism and realism, and focused on five elements which construct 
                                                       
41 Ibid. 
42 Peter J. Katzenstein, ‘Introduction: Domestic and International Forces and 
Strategies of Foreign Economic Policy’, in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), Between 
Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States 
(Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), pp.17-9. 
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the liberal international order.43 The first element that Ikenberry outlined was 
‘security co-binding’ which creates a sound international order. Secondly, the 
liberal international order ‘penetrates reciprocal hegemony’. This is 
characterised as US federalism, which provides an open access system to 
guarantee participation and involvement in the decision-making process, thus 
aggrandising legitimation of the system in a co-operative, integrative and 
proactive way. Thirdly, in stark contrast to the Westphalian system, Ikenberry 
stated the significance of the presence of ‘semi-sovereign and partial great 
powers’, which complement the system, such as Japan and Germany. The 
fourth element Ikenberry presented is ‘economic openness’, or an open market, 
conducive to comparative economic advantages. The final element of the liberal 
international order is defined as ‘civic identity’, which alleviates international 
conflict and strengthens integration within the order.  
     In Ikenberry’s theory, these systematic substructures bestow mutual benefits 
unto members, then establishing an open and non-discriminative rule-based 
foundation, which warrants national autonomy and attracts nation states to 
integrate into or remain part of the liberal international order. 44  Here, 
understanding of open access systems can be enriched with a theory of new 
institutional economics. Douglass North and others emphasised that ‘open 
access orders’ could prevent disorder, and presented one of the greatest 
causes of economic growth, hence the disparities of growth among nations. 
According to North, these ‘open access orders’ feature impartiality; no 
constraints on entry into economic, political, and cultural activities; 
                                                       
43 G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Order and Imperial Ambition: Essays on American 
Power and World Politics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), pp.90-105. 
44 G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation 




organisational guarantee; and non-discriminatory law enforced upon all citizens, 
ensuring impersonal exchange.45  Combining the concepts of Ikenberry and 
North leads to understanding of open access polity and economic openness as 
rule-based and non-discriminatory liberal economies with states’ governance for 
and of orderly society.46 
     Of great theoretical importance en route to explanation of the foundations of 
the liberal international order and for identification of the heterogeneous facets 
of structural realism, is how to construe and re-examine the auspicious 
appraisal of the international liberal market that has been considered to 
permeate the post-World War II era.47  
     There is little doubt that, for re-examining the liberal international order, Dani 
Rodrik has presented a useful account, which delineated internal and external 
conflict arising from a globally liberalised political economy. His argument is well 
known as the ‘political trilemma’, relating to the incompatibility of three 
elements: national sovereignty, democracy and hyper-globalisation.48 In other 
words, Rodrik’s argument has challenged the credence of the liberal 
international order and suggested inconsistencies between the theory and an 
                                                       
45 Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis and Barry R. Weingast, Violence and 
Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human 
History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp.112-5. 
46 ‘Neoliberal’ governments, at least partially, share a similar concept. For an 
account on the ‘strong state’ and the rule-based free economy, see Andrew 
Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong State: The Politics of Thatcherism 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988).  
47 Amitav Acharya, The End of American World Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2014), and G. John Ikenberry, ‘The end of liberal international order?’ 
International Affairs, Vol.94, No.1, 2018, pp.7-23, expressed an optimistic view 
on the liberal international order. Post-Great Financial Crisis, this liberal 
international order faces a period of coercive protectionism. However, Ikenberry 
emphasised the continuity of international liberalism as emanating from the 
nineteenth century, while Acharya assumed that minor changes would occur. 
48 Dani Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the 
World Economy (New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 2011), chapter 9. 
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unfolding situation in which a rampant global financial market has disintegrated 
domestic politics composed of democratic processes and eroded national 
sovereignty. In this sense, analysis with the ‘political trilemma’ refocused upon 
and reassessed conflict between international markets and nation states.  
     The scope of the ‘political trilemma’ is also extended to the Bretton Woods 
era. Rodrik assessed that the confined and constrictive ‘globalisation’ of the 
Bretton Woods era could achieve compatibility with national sovereignty and 
democracy, and that they were consonant with each other: the so-called 
‘Bretton Woods Compromises’. 49  However, careful consideration should be 
given to these ‘compromises’, particularly the extent to which these three 
components affected each other. As it will be outlined in this thesis, analysis of 
sequential historical events under the late Bretton Woods era delineates and 
highlights that currency management in the international political arena, which is 
perceived by some commentators as a turning point towards financial 
‘globalisation’, affected the adjustment and reform of domestic monetary and 
fiscal policies, and vice versa.50 There is little doubt that in this political process, 
some form of coercive change in political direction with a rise in global 
governance of currency management occurred, periodically deepening internal 
conflicts. Furthermore, it will be shown that nation states used and contributed 
                                                       
49 Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox. Rodrik has also argued that economic 
integration erodes sovereignty over redistributive taxation and social 
expenditures, leading to a dilemma, or conflict in a society that demands an 
expanding governmental role so as not to be exposed to greater external risks, 
and governments which seek economic integration. See Dani Rodrik, Has 
Globalization Gone Too Far? (Washington DC: Institute for International 
Economics, 1997). 
50  For a notion on financial ‘globalisation’, see Philip G. Cerny, ‘Capturing 
Benefits, Avoiding Losses: the United States, Japan and the Politics of 
Constraint’, in Susanne Soederberg, Georg Menz, and Philip G. Cerny (eds.), 
Internalizing Globalization: The Rise of Neoliberalism and the Decline of 




to these international monetary schemes in order to circumvent domestic 
political and economic issues, which is to say that nation states brought their 
own political and economic agendas to the international arena for arrangement 
of diverse domestic interests.  
     Therefore, it is challenging to categorise this factor within Rodrik’s trilemma, 
and further detailed analysis of the interconnection between domestic and 
international economic policies is necessary. There is no question of the 
necessity to focus not only on systematic factors but also on the political 
process, including the development of the ideas of officials in order to portray 
the dynamic historical process. 
     From the above survey, developments of theories from realism to the liberal 
international order can be considered to present ad hoc modification of the 
concepts of ‘hegemony’ or sovereignties, and their elements according to the 
unfolding historical events, integrated with advanced economic and institutional 
theories.51 However, although the framework of structural realism presumes that 
the international economy and domestic sovereignty ‘covary’, its depiction of the 
dynamic process of the interaction between these two factors has remained 
static due to the lack of detailed historical research. This has failed to describe 
                                                       
51 One of the prominent arguments on ‘hegemony’ was raised by Gramsci. 
Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci 
(London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971). According to Gramsci, the ‘intellectuals’ 
as representatives of dominant groups exercise coercive power through political 
society or the state, and achieve the consent of the masses or the subaltern 
class in order to govern and command society and political government. This 
consent is a product of ‘hegemony’, which takes the form of ‘intellectual and 
moral leadership’. The ‘direction’ of society is set by the dominant group. The 
theories of international political economy can be considered to partially reify 
and embed this abstract concept of ‘hegemony’ into theoretical frameworks 
such as the coercive systematic theory and structural centripetal force. For a 
brief explanation and account of the political ideology of Gramsci, see Eric 
Hobsbawm, How to Change the World: Tales of Marx and Marxism (London: 
Abacus, 2012), chapter 12. 
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the mutual relations amongst covarying sovereignties, and aspects of strategic 
governmental interventions which hypothetically affect the structure of 
sovereignties. Also, given that the liberal international order disregards conflict 
between the international market and nation states, it can be considered to 
overly and unduly place significance on the benefits gained from a liberalised 
economy as the source of a stable global order.  
     Therefore, it is necessary to utilise historical analysis to revisit the 
‘covariation’, conflict and harmonisation of domestic economic policies and 
international aspects. This is also key for overcoming the dichotomy between 
subservient and spontaneous integration into the international system.  
 
1.2.3 Economic perspectives 
 
In order to analyse the currency management of the Bretton Woods era, it is 
imperative to refer to the economic perspective. Robert Mundell’s work linked 
domestic monetary policies, fiscal policies and foreign exchange.52 This theory 
presented the ‘impossible trinity’ of international finance, which refers to the 
incompatibility of a fixed foreign exchange rate system, free capital movement 
and the independence and discrepancy of monetary policies. This theoretical 
framework, founded on the Mundell-Fleming model, has significant analytical 
power when considering effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policies under 
floating or fixed exchange rate systems.53  
                                                       
52  Robert A. Mundell, International Economics (London: Macmillan, 1968), 
pp.250-62. 
53  For example, see Michael D. Bordo, Owen F. Humpage and Anna J. 
Schwartz, Strained Relations: US Foreign-Exchange Operations and Monetary 
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     Michael Bordo applied this trilemma of international finance, asserting that 
currency market intervention in the Bretton Woods era was inextricably 
intertwined with the objectives of the management of currencies without overt 
regulation on international capital movement. Bordo’s analysis then explicated 
that the interventions taken during this era amounted to an attempt to 
meticulously bypass the trilemma of the ‘impossible trinity’ and did not 
encumber the anti-inflationary policies of central banks. However, Barry 
Eichengreen proposed that it is necessary to examine the management of 
currencies in the post-World War II era as an intricately co-ordinated web of 
schemes, involving a multitude of international and domestic institutions.54 It 
should be noted that Bordo’s analysis did not explore the management of 
currencies during the Bretton Woods era in the same way as Eichengreen 
suggested, who assessed it as a highly political matter. Therefore, this thesis 
will endeavour to reassess the political process of currency management, 
including domestic economic policies, focussing mainly on the UK, and will then 
investigate the ‘covariable’ co-operation or conflict between nation states and 
the international political arena. 
 
1.2.4 Perspectives in this thesis 
                                                                        
In sum, it can be argued that the theories of international political economy and 
arguments drawn from economic theories are mired in dichotomy, in which 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Policy in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
2015), pp.3, 34-6. Also see Catherine R. Schenk, International Economic 
Relations Since 1945 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011). 
54 Alec Cairncross and Barry Eichengreen, Sterling in Decline: The Devaluations 
of 1931, 1949 and 1967 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983). 
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states are subordinate or at Nash-equilibrium, have independence or loss of 
sovereignty, and exhibit conflict or harmonisation. On the other hand, 
arguments emphasising ‘bypass’ or ‘covary’ neglect the history of the decision-
making process, failing to provide constructive assessment. In this thesis 
investigation is made of the interactions surrounding currency management by 
governmental and non-governmental actors, and cabinet level politicians.  
     In conjunction, exploration will be made of an additional, supplementary 
perspective: how the international management of currency worked both as a 
buffer and driving force to ameliorate or exacerbate conflict with and within 
domestic economic management. It will be also examined how, vice versa, 
domestic economic management was also mobilised in the international political 
arena surrounding currency management to mitigate domestic political and 
economic conflict over fiscal and monetary policies. In other words, this thesis 
emphasises the paradoxes of sovereignty, where currency management at 
least partially intended to enhance state sovereignty or capacity in the terrain of 
fiscal policies and the international political arena. This might have obscured 
internal political conflicts through which distribution in internal political power 
was restructured, inadvertently resulting in the erosion of the effectiveness of 
fiscal policies, or at least narrowing the path of domestic economic policies. 
When these interrelated facets encountered turmoil, such as the failure of 
currency management, the previously obscured political conflicts became 
apparent in the political agenda, which might have accelerated reform in 
domestic economic policies including social security.  
     Here, in order to clarify its originality, it is necessary to delineate the 
difference of this argument from that of sovereignty through transnational 
networks, two-level game theory, and ‘internalizing globalization’. Keck and 
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Sikkink’s concept of ‘transnational advocacy networks’ featuring ‘voluntary, 
reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange’, notably by 
non-governmental organisations, ‘transform the practice of national 
sovereignty’.55 In contrast to their argument, this thesis emphasises national 
sovereignty centralised into governments and monetary authorities that are 
transnationally and mutually influenced. In this reciprocal process, within the 
sphere where states hold asymmetrical economic influence, institutions are 
dynamically changed.  
     On the other hand, Putnam’s two-level game theory assumes that policy 
makers can see their own and their counterparts’ marginal utility curves. Then, 
within the negotiation process, one aims to maximise domestic economic 
benefit, and the other aims to maximise national ability in the international field 
to satisfy domestic interests. In this process, domestic and international policies 
are statically determined at the equilibrium point.56 In contrast to Putnam’s 
theory, this thesis emphasises the bearing of uncertainty on the political process, 
in which the superimposed policy makers cannot predict future outcomes and 
distribution of others’ utilities. Here emphasis is placed upon policy makers 
attempting to achieve, reconcile, and even change domestic interests, or their 
own interests, via the international monetary field. This dynamic process did not 
only satisfy or converge the diverged domestic interests, but also hid the 
conflicts or frontiers of these interests.  
     The essence of this dynamic international political economic process is also 
significantly distanced from the concept of ‘Empire’ of Negri and Hardt, which 
                                                       
55 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy 
Networks in International Politics (London: Cornell University Press, 1998), 
chapter 1. 
56 Robert D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level 
games’, International Organization, Vol.42, No.3, 1988, pp.427-60. 
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emphasised the notional network of global sovereignty underpinned by modern 
capitalism.57 In contrast, analysis of the history of fiscal and monetary policies in 
the context of currency management will indicate that the actors were not 
incorporated, but used such supranational networks within the political process 
of their nation state. Moreover, the arguments of this thesis are distanced from 
the concept of an interstate system composed of a set of rules through which 
any states’ sovereignty is constrained and secured.58 Rather, focus should be 
placed upon the ceaseless spiraling political process of mutual adjustments 
within domestic and international aspects.  
     Finally, in contrast to the sweeping and over-general argument of 
‘internalizing globalization’, in which domestic politics change within complicated 
economic, social and political interactions across borders, this thesis pays 
consideration to how international currency management contributed to 
determination of aspects of fiscal and monetary policies.59 
 
 
                                                       
57 Hardt and Negri defined this ‘Empire’ as an open rather than closed, rule-
based supranational network and ‘a new inscription of authority and a new 
design of the production of norms and legal instruments of coercion that 
guarantee contracts and resolve conflicts,’ Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, 
Empire (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2000), p.10. Also see Michael Hardt 
and Antonio Negri, Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire 
(London: Penguin Books, 2005). 
58 For explanation of the interstate system, see Immanuel Wallerstein, Historical 
Capitalism with Capitalist Civilization (London: Verso, 1995), pp.56-7. 
59  See Philip G. Cerny, Georg Menz, and Susanne Soederberg, ‘Different 
Roads to Globalization: Neoliberalism, the Competition State, and Politics in a 
More Open World’, in Soederberg, Menz, and Cerny (eds.), Internalizing 
Globalization, pp.1-30. ‘Internalizing globalization’ views globalisation not as an 
external force but as forged within the domestic political climate. This 
emphasises international and domestic politics as ‘an interpenetrated set of 
webs of politics and governance’. 
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1.3 Questions arising from state theory  
 
The above section has delineated the need to reinvestigate how domestic 
economic policies and international currency management were mutually 
shaped and reshaped, from the perspective of international political economy. 
Analysis of this would present as lacking without clarification of the link with 
state theory. 
     This section attempts not to describe the whole picture of the development of 
state theory, but to clarify the meaning of focus on the political process behind 
monetary and fiscal policies in its context, and to attempt to find a step to 
converge state theory and theories of international political economy, then 
extracting a research focus.60 In relation to the late Bretton Woods era, state 
theory has three methodologies significant for this thesis. The first focuses on 
the ‘elements’ of policies conducted by states, such as taxation and money. The 
second emphasises the decision-making process and ‘power’ distribution. The 
third highlights the impact of institutions. This thesis suggests that these three 
aspects were significantly affected by external forces, especially during the rise 
of international monetary co-operative schemes observed in the 1960s.  
 
1.3.1 States from perspectives of economics 
 
For analysis of the history of political economy, an economic perspective is a 
useful starting point for surveying state theory. There is no doubt that the 
provision of public goods, in the field of public finance, is the most significant 
                                                       
60 This chapter does not consider ‘welfare states’. 
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aspect for considering the state from an economic perspective. Here, Masaru 
Kaneko’s critique has presented crucial points for considering states and the 
provision of public goods. He asserted that economics, particularly mainstream 
public economics and neoclassical economics, does not hold endogenous logic 
to explain the raison d’être of states since it cannot describe states’ active roles 
from the theoretical basis of a Walrasian concept of markets.61 According to 
Kaneko’s critique, if mainstream economics has little explanatory power for the 
role of states, the theoretical and logical gap must be bridged, because states 
do exist. This has led to economists arbitrarily attributing features to modern 
public goods of ‘non-rivalry and non-excludability’, ex post facto or at least a 
posteriori recognition of the expanding governmental role. Then, the concept of 
public goods was formed and became a priori assumption, which eventually 
determines or constrains the level of provision of public goods.62  
                                                       
61 Masaru Kaneko, Shijyou to Seido no Seiji Keizaigaku (Tokyo: University of 
Tokyo Press, 1997), chapter 1.  
It can be argued that the governmental role in the economy was replaced by 
strict economic discipline and methodology, which resulted in the 
oversimplification of public goods. Albert O. Hirschman pointed out that moral 
aspects of politics were gradually replaced with the virtue of economic 
transactions, which can be interpreted as limiting the role of governments. See 
Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for 
Capitalism Before its Triumph (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). 
William Davies, from the perspective of ‘convention theory’, argued that 
‘neoliberal economics’ poured measurable physics into economics, attempting 
to ‘disenchant’ politics. See William Davies, The Limits of Neoliberalism: 
Authority, Sovereignty and the Logic of Competition, Revised Edition (London: 
SAGE Publications Ltd, 2016). For general argument on the development of the 
rebirth or rise in a neoliberal agenda and decline in collectivism, see Rachel S. 
Turner, Neo-Liberal Ideology: History, Concepts and Policies (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press Ltd, 2008).  
62 Here, so as to simplify the discussion, value goods and ‘quasi-public goods’ 
are not considered. However, regarding issues of quasi-public goods, such as 
the tragedy of the commons, it is necessary to refer the work of Ostrom. The 
tragedy of the commons is the excessive consumption and depletion of 
resources in a market without private ownership. It had been considered that to 
resolve the tragedy of the commons, there were two means: direct control by 
the government of consumption of the commons, or the setting of private rights 
in this field. Ostrom argued that this issue could be resolved through the co-
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     Moreover, it should also be noted that neoclassical and mainstream public 
economics hold unrealistic dogmatic assumptions of rational human 
behaviour.63 Although recent behavioural economics has attempted to take into 
account irrational individuals, it cannot to be assessed as overcoming the 
constraints of this theoretical premise. For example, Thaler and Sunstein’s 
concern was with the alteration of people’s behaviour ‘in a predictable way’ via 
encouraging not the people’s ‘reflective’ thinking but their ‘intuitive and 
automatic’, even rational thinking. 64  Therefore, these arguments can be 
considered a sophisticated theory of incentive effects to induce behaviour or 
resolve disequilibrium, which are recognised as social issues. 65  These 
unrealistic assumptions have faced repeated criticism, however, they remain 
strongly maintained.66 More importantly, this theoretical premise provided the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
management of the common pool of resources at community level. Elinor 
Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective 
Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Later, her theoretical 
argument was combined with co-operative game theory, in which co-
management within the community alongside punishment of persons who do 
not abide to the self-set rules would be the most efficient means to manage the 
commons. 
63 The assumptions of rational individuals and homo-economicus, and profit-
benefit-maximisers, can be considered as developed with a scientific aspect, 
such as genetic science. See Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1976). Also see Itai Yanai and Martin Lercher, The 
Society of Genes (London: Harvard University Press, 2016). The latter work 
accepted the complex co-operative and conflictive interactions among genes, 
however, it maintained the view on genes as reducible units and ‘selfish’ actors. 
64 Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About 
Health, Wealth and Happiness (London: Penguin Books, 2009), pp. 6, 21. Here, 
limited rationality as seen in Hayek’s philosophy is not considered. For a brief 
argument in the context of uncertainty, see chapter 3 of this thesis. 
65 Attempts have been made to extend the framework of game theory toward 
‘altruistic’ behaviour. For a recent work, see Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, 
A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and its Evolution (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2011). 
66  Below are notable works that have revealed aspects conflictive against 
rational individuals. For decisions and behaviour over consumption, see 
Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), originally published 1899; Jean Baudrillard, The Consumer 
Society: Myth and Structures (London: Sage Publications Ltd., 1998), originally 
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foundation for understanding of the ‘discipline’ of the provision of public goods 
as a means to correct market and government failure, such as the free rider 
problem or information asymmetry, and eventually limited the role of the 
government. Of great importance here is that mainstream economic theory 
lacks endogenous logic to explain the existence of states or their roles in reality, 
however, it strongly influenced and somewhat determined public policies. This 
inevitably leads to the necessity to reconsider the state from a historical and 
institutional point of view. 
 
1.3.2 States with ‘infrastructural power’ 
 
In a very narrow and classical sociological definition, the state has been 
recognised as a ‘human community’ with ‘the monopoly of legitimate physical 
violence within a particular territory’. 67  This monopoly partially reflected in 
classical Marxian politics as a dominant capitalist class, and states are identified 
by class structures, modes of production and the class struggle. However, this 
view has faced repeated criticism, and pressure for revision according to the 
development of historical and theoretical studies.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
published 1970. Also see David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the 
Changing American Character (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950). For 
anthropological research on the structure of marriage among tribes to 
unintentionally avoid incestuous relations, see Claude Lévi-Strauss, The 
Elementary Structures of Kinship (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969). For overall 
critique on the theoretical assumptions of neoclassical economics, see Geoffrey 
M. Hodgson, Economics and Institutions: A Manifesto for a Modern Institutional 
Economics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988). 
67  Max Weber, The Vocation Lectures (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 2004), originally published 1919, p.33. On the other hand, Hall and 
Ikenberry identified three elements to states: a set of institutions with violence 
and coercion governed by personnel, a centre of bounded territory, and 
monopoly over rule-making within its boundaries. John A. Hall and G. John 
Ikenberry, The State (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1989), pp.1-2. 
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     The below attempts to classify the elements of states with a very brief 
account of their long history. There are numerous accounts on the origins of 
states, however, Charles Tilly presented one of the most influential works. He 
defined states as ‘coercion-wielding organizations’ which includes ‘city-states, 
empires, theocracies, and many other forms of government, but excludes tribes, 
lineages, firms, and churches as such’, and defined national states as having 
‘centralized, and differentiated sovereign organizations’. 68  These coercion-
wielding states were forged in preparation for and during war, and developed 
‘coercive means’ to extract fundamental resources such as soldiers, supplies 
and money.69 Historical research, in line with the argument of Sombart, has 
deepened analysis on the link between war and development of capitalism and 
economies, in which wars even fostered capitalism.70 Emphasis here lies on the 
interplay between warfare and the expansion of organisational control of 
resources as fostering the formation of modern states, which can also be seen 
in the arguments of the ‘fiscal military state’.71 
                                                       
68 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992 (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1993), pp. 1-2. See also, Charles Tilly, ‘Reflections on the History of 
European State-Making’, in Charles Tilly (ed.), The Formation of National States 
in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 3-83. 
69 Tilly, Coercion, pp.54-8. According to Tilly, coercive means were used in 
attacking external enemies (warmaking); attacking internal enemies 
(statemaking); attacking enemies on behalf of the state’s clients (protection); 
extracting resources, such as through taxation, from the population of the 
territory (extraction); and settling internal disputes amongst the population 
(adjudication). 
70 Werner Sombart, Krieg und Kapitalismus (München: Duncker & Humblot, 
1913), translated by Kanamori Seiya into Japanese, Sensou to Shihonsyugi 
(Tokyo: Ronsosha, 1996). 
71 Recent research focusing on the fiscal-military state revealed the interplay 
among taxation, finance and war. Various works have focused on this fiscal 
military state, including that which makes international comparison. John 
Brewer has presented arguably the most influential work. He clarified that the 
demand of financing preparation and command of war created centralised 
parliamentary political control, taxation and administrative reform and vice versa. 
Accumulated public deficits then set the foundation of a thriving financial market. 
See John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 
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     Meanwhile, other analysis of the origin of states or nations has placed 
emphasis on the ideological aspect. Benedict Anderson asserted that nations 
are ‘imagined political’ communities based on ‘linguistic-nationalisms’ that 
sprang from ‘print capitalism’, the technological advancement of the printing 
industry.72 In line with this, Eric Hobsbawm cited the argument of Ernest Gellner, 
suggesting that ‘nationalism comes before nations. Nations do not make states 
and nationalisms but the other way round.’73 Here, focus was placed on nation-
ness as a source of the creation of states. 
     Michael Mann attempted to combine into the theory ideological aspects, 
coercive means, institutionalised administrative and tax structures, and the 
emergence of financial communities. He presented this as so-called ‘social 
power’, with the concepts of ‘infrastructural’ and ‘despotic’ power. Here, the 
important point is that ‘infrastructural power’, defined as ‘the capacity of the 
state actually to penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political 
                                                                                                                                                                  
1688-1783 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989). For tax and administrative reform for 
conducting warfare and its prerequisite condition, tax legitimacy, between the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see Martin Daunton, ‘The politics of British 
taxation, from the Glorious Revolution to the Great War’, in Bartolomé Yun-
Casalilla, Patrick K. O’Brien and Franciso Comín Comín (eds.), The Rise of 
Fiscal States: A Global History 1500-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), pp.111-42. 
Before the concept of fiscal military states gathered academic attention, there 
already existed research focusing on fiscal-military and international aspects. 
Masaru Kaneko exemplified with primary sources the viability and doom of the 
British ‘laissez-faire state’ or ‘cheap government’ in the nineteenth century as de 
facto financed through the fiscal resources extracted from colonised India. See 
Masaru Kaneko, ‘Anka na Seihu to Syokuminchi Zaisei: Ei-In Kankei wo 
Chushin ni shite’, Fukushima University Syougaku Ronsyu, Vol. 48, No.3, 1980, 
pp.97-163. 
72 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983). In Anderson’s analysis, 
languages are ‘emblems of nation-ness, like flags, costumes, folk-dances’, and 
are the origin of ‘capacity for generating imagined communities, building in 
effect particular solidarities.’ Ibid., p.133. 
73 Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, 
Reality, Second Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 
originally published 1990, p.10. See also Ernest Gellner, Nations and 
Nationalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), pp.48-9. 
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decisions throughout the realm’ and its increase will also ‘increase the territorial 
boundedness and social interaction’. 74  This infrastructural power would be 
enhanced by literacy, communicative infrastructure, the currency system and 
taxation. It can be interpreted that Mann extended the framework of state theory 
to include ‘infrastructural power’, and revised its composition for analysis of 
contemporary state history.75 
     Here, for the purpose of this thesis, it is necessary to consider ‘money’ and 
taxation in the context of state theory. With respect to state development, 
currency can be categorised into two groups, ‘Chartalist’ and ‘Metallist’. 76 
Charles Goodhart identified that in the former, ‘the use of currency was based 
essentially on the power of the issuing authority [...] with the insignia of 
sovereignty’, and the value of the latter depended on the ‘intrinsic value of the 
backing of that currency’. Goodhart argued that the ‘Metallist’ currency 
transformed into ‘Chartalist ‘money’, while once money has been introduced, 
‘poll, income, and expenditure taxes, as well as taxes on the production of 
services become easier to levy.’77 Later, Randall Wray extended this concept, 
providing a perspective on public deficits with the use of Knapp’s argument that 
the value of banknotes is derived not from reserves or utility value of conversion 
but rather from ‘a function of “acceptation” at the bank and public pay offices.’78 
                                                       
74 Michael Mann, ‘The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms 
and Results’, in John A. Hall (ed.), States in History (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1986), p. 113. 
75 Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power: Volume 4, Globalizations, 1945-
2011 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
76 Charles A. E. Goodhart, ‘The two concepts of money: implications for the 
analysis of optimal currency areas’, European Journal of Political Economy, 
Vo.14, 1998, pp.407-32.  
77 Ibid., p.416. Goodhart also highlighted that governments receive two types of 
benefit from creating money: they can obtain seigniorage, and can easily 
impose taxes. 
78 L. Randall Wray, ‘From the State Theory of Money to Modern Money Theory: 
An Alternative to Economic Orthodoxy’, Levy Economics Institute of Bard 
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He concluded that ‘the state determines the nominal value of money. This is 
done when the state establishes what it will accept at public pay offices, as well 
as the nominal value of the thing accepted.’79 Setting aside the inherent logical 
and theoretical issues within Wray’s modern money theory and its policy 
implications, from the survey of this argument, the inclusion of money and 
taxation into the ‘infrastructural and despotic power’ of Mann can be endorsed, 
because they have been sole governmental means to extract resources from 
markets or societies.80 
     In the above assessments, the state and its development have been 
analysed from the perspective of its function (taxation, money, literal education) 
and institutionalised apparatuses (administrative reform, official ideology, 
military). However, of great importance here is how these elements, particularly 
money and taxation, are controlled, managed or influenced, not solely by the 
government, but also through transnational interrelations. How did international 
monetary co-operation or co-ordination influence the ‘infrastructural power’ of 
the government, composed of the monetary and fiscal policies? The late Bretton 
Woods era, with the emergence of international monetary co-operative 
                                                                                                                                                                  
College, Working Paper, No.792, March 2014, p.7. Regarding money and bond 
issue, Wray argued that ‘spending logically comes first before government 
obtains tax revenue or sells bonds. If the government receives in tax payments 
its own IOUs, it must first supply them before taxes can be paid. And if bond 
purchasers must use the government’s IOUs to pay for the bonds they buy, then 
government must have spent (or lent) its IOUs before it sold the bonds.’ Ibid., 
p.29. This attempt to reconceptualise the link between money and public 
deficits, so-called modern money theory, provided fresh perspective on the 
discipline of budget constraint. 
For the categorisation of money, see Georg Friedrich Knapp, The State Theory 
of Money (London: Macmillan, 1924). 
79 Wray, ‘From the State Theory’, p.18. 
80  Ibid., p.23. Wray cited Ingham’s assertion that money is part of the 
infrastructural and despotic power of Mann’s analysis. Geoffrey Ingham, ‘The 
Nature of Money’, Economic Sociology, European electronic newsletter, Vol.5, 
No.2, 2004, p.20.  
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schemes, provides important context for reconsideration of the function and 
apparatuses of modern states. 
 
1.3.3 States, power and institutions 
 
States should also be considered in the context of the distribution of power, the 
decision-making structure, and institutionalised organisations. This analytic 
trend arose from critique on classical Marxian politics. In the backdrop, with 
mass consumption society and economic growth, particularly seen with ‘affluent 
workers’ and the development of ‘welfare states’ after World War II, primitive 
class conflict was mitigated and inapplicable for identifying states.81  
     This heralded the rise of pluralistic state theory. Under pluralistic government, 
divided and conflictive interests emerge, however, these conflicts would be 
resolved through negotiation or competition amongst actors that seek to 
                                                       
81 In the 1960s, workers were not integrated into ‘middle class’ society and did 
not hold its preference for ‘status differentiation’. John H. Goldthorpe, David 
Lockwood, Frank Bechhofer and Jenifer Platt, The affluent worker in the class 
structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), chapters 1 and 6. 
Rather, it is argued that ‘the structure of social advantage and power’ came not 
from change in the market economy, but from a change in the interplay of the 
market economy with other stratifying forces. This provoked change in the form 
of stratification as ‘a determinant of the distribution of advantage’. This enabled 
‘less advanced groups’ to pursue their interests which eventually heightened 
social conflict and paved the way to the inflationary era. John H. Goldthorpe, 
‘The Current Inflation: Towards a Sociological Account’, in Fred Hirsch and John 
H. Goldthorpe (eds), The political economy of inflation (London: Martin 
Robertson, 1978), pp. 194-6. It is also necessary to mention the philosophy of 
Pierre Bourdieu in the context of France and continental Europe. Bourdieu 
emphasised that ‘taste’, referring to cultural and economic preferences, is 
identified from the education received and ‘social origin’. This taste, which 
changes within the interplay among strategic individuals or ‘groups’ against 
counterparts, provided the ‘distinction’, identification, and ‘marker’ for individuals 
and ‘class’. Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of 
Taste (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984).  
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maximise their interests through the channel of the parliamentary democratic 
process.82 This theory can be interpreted as limiting the role or function of the 
government into the arena in which pressure groups allocate their interests, and 
make compromises in order to achieve their demands as output.83  
     In contrast to the pluralistic methodology, a global trend of increase in trade 
union membership and capability to negotiate for public policies became 
apparent from the early twentieth century. With this trend, the framework of 
corporatism, including social and state corporatism, was raised. This concept, in 
which the representatives of capital, labour and the state attempt to reach 
compromise for resolving the conflicts amongst them, was somewhat 
recognised as eventually protecting the capitalist mode of production. However, 
alongside the development of corporatism, tripartite interests gradually 
separated from the interests of individuals and each industrial sector. Moreover, 
in the context of the UK, the applicability of corporatist aspects has been 
repeatedly criticised.84 Notable critique has been made by Tomlinson, that the 
UK’s ‘tripartism’ was not for ‘sharing of decisions by government, but was 
                                                       
82 Arthur F. Bentley, The Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressures 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908). David B. Truman, The 
Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1951). This equilibrium approach was also employed in mainstream 
economics for analysis of government outlays. Buchanan and Tullok combined 
economic concepts, such as the choices of rational individuals and rational 
expectations, with political analysis and stressed that fiscal policies are the 
consequence and result of the accumulated choices of individuals. James M. 
Buchanan and Gordon Tullok, The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan 
Volume 3, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional 
Democracy (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999), originally published 1962. James 
M.Buchanan, Public Finance in Democratic Process: Fiscal Institutions and 
Individual Choice (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967). 
83 David Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political 
Science (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953); David Easton, ‘An Approach to the 
Analysis of Political Systems’, World Politics, Vol.9, No.3, 1957, pp.383-400. 
84 For an argument in the context of comparison of the political economy of 
France and the UK, see Peter A. Hall, Governing the Economy: The Politics of 
State Intervention in Britain and France (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986). 
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basically a mechanism of trying to secure consent for decisions made by 
ministers.’85 This thesis does not intend to deepen this argument, however, 
mention must be made that the argument of corporatism led to demand for 
creation of multi-layered administrative structures and institutions.86 
     As the eclipse of the golden age of welfare states rose from stagflation and 
fiscal crises in the 1970s, a different academic agenda gathered attention within 
the terrain of politics. In particular, the neo-Marxian theory of the welfare state 
gained focus, and the aspect of socio-political structure was placed on the 
research agenda. Influential theorist for neo-Marxism, Louis Althusser, who 
divided the function of the state into the ideological state apparatuses and 
repressive state apparatuses, occupied by the dominant class and reflected in 
the class struggle, tried to revise the simple Marxian concept of states 
represented by class struggle and the dominant class.87 In this analysis, he 
described ‘two floors’, consisting of the ‘politico-legal’ and the ‘ideological’, 
situated on the ‘base’, or ‘infrastructure’. Here, outcomes arise from multiple 
‘determinants’ within the interrelations among these two floors and the base, 
though the base is the ‘determinant in the last instance’. Althusser expanded his 
theoretical argument and emphasised the existence of the ‘relative autonomy’ of 
states between these two floors, and to some extent the base.  
     In line with Louis Althusser, Nicos Poulantzas drew upon the concept of the 
state as a reflection of condensed social class or social formation.88 These 
                                                       
85 Jim Tomlinson, Democratic socialism and economic policy: The Attlee years, 
1945-1951 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p.296. 
86 Walter Korpi, The Democratic Class Struggle (London: Routledge, 1983), 
chapters 1 and 2. 
87 Louis Althusser, ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards 
an Investigation)’, in Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, 
translated by Ben Brewster (London New Left Books, 1971). 
88 Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (London: Verso, 1978), 
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methodologies resonated in a range of analyses on the relations between 
policies and the state.89 Advancing the arguments of Poulantzas, Bob Jessop 
categorised state autonomy into relations between the state and the economy, 
relations between the state and class, and the extent to which the state has 
social relations of domination.90 In this sense, Jessop expanded the concept of 
the state as ‘qua structural’ or a ‘contingent institutional ensemble’, as reflected 
in the social relations. He concluded that this ‘functioning’ state takes ‘strategic 
selectivity’, identified by the social relations, while it relatively autonomously 
places ‘differential impact on balance of political forces’.91 
                                                                                                                                                                  
originally published 1968. See also Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism 
(London: Verso, 2000), originally published 1978, Introduction. Poulantzas 
created the divide between ‘le politique’ and ‘la politique’ which respectively 
refer to the legal political structure and the practical arena of class struggle. 
Poulantzas asserted that the state retains relative autonomy from class struggle 
but is constrained by the mode of production. Therefore states are inevitably 
determined in the long-term to support the capital class through policies, which 
results in the collapse of the integration of the labour class. 
89 James O’Connor argued that public outlays have two purposes: to bolster 
private profit accumulation, and provision of social expenditure in order to 
bolster political or capitalist legitimation. See O’Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the 
State. ‘Social expenditures’ refers to social investment and social consumption. 
Ian Gough further stressed the constraints of the modes of production and class 
conflict on the state role. See Ian Gough, The Political Economy of the Welfare 
State: Critical Texts in Social Work and the Welfare State (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1979). In line with O’Connor, political sociologists such as Claus 
Offe used this theory to explain the crises of capitalism. Offe argued that self-
contradictory policy aporia, unpalatable for the capital class and which aims to 
exert negative impact on private profit accumulation through social policies, 
triggers crisis within the subsystems of the economic system, political 
administrative system and normative (legitimation/mass royalty) system. See 
Offe, Contradictions of the Welfare State. Offe, Disorganized Capitalism. 
90  Bob Jessop, State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), pp.85-94. 
91 Ibid., pp.7-10. Jessop propounded the argument, termed the Strategic-
Relational Approach, in which the core apparatus of state is interdependent with 
institutions and social practices. In this respect, the state is embedded in 
society. On the other hand, power relations are reified within the complex social 
relations and affected by the autonomous power of the state. See Bob Jessop, 




     However, this neo-Marxist theory has received criticism from academics 
focusing on institutional aspects. Theda Skocpol provoked critiques and 
revisions of functional and equilibrium, and neo-Marxian state theory. She 
combined the multi-layered administrative organisations into state theory and 
considered the state as a set of administrative institutions managed by use of 
‘power’, drawing on resources in order to self-enhance.92 Following Skocpol’s 
argument, numerous commentators have endeavoured to reinvestigate the 
historical development of states, particularly in the terrain of welfare states, and 
highlighted the institutional configuration, such as the power distribution 
amongst monetary authorities and the development of the ideas of 
governmental officials.93  
     Curiously enough, these very different concepts of the state of Skocpol, and 
Althusser and Poulantzas, have led to the similar concept of ‘relative autonomy’ 
and ‘reciprocal action’. One significant methodological gap between the two 
schools is that for Skocpol, the state is a self-enhancing organisation that draws 
on resources, whereas Althusser and Poulantzas acknowledge multiple 
determinants, as constrained by the base. In this sense, academic interest 
                                                       
92 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of 
France, Russia and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 
pp.28-31. See also, Theda Skocpol, ‘Bringing the State Back in: Strategies of 
Analysis in Current Research’, in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and 
Theda Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back in (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), pp.3-37.  
For the difference between the theories of Skocpol and Moore, showing the 
distance between Skocpol’s work and Marxist methodology, see Ira Katznelson, 
‘Structure and Configuration in Comparative Politics’, in Mark Irving Lichbach 
and Alan S. Zuckerman (eds.), Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and 
Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp.81-112. 
93  Margaret Weir, Ann Shola Orloff and Theda Skocpol, ‘Introduction: 
Understanding American Social Politics’, in Margaret Weir, Ann Shola Orloff and 
Theda Skocpol (eds.), The Politics of Social Policy in the United States 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp.3-27. Peter A. Hall (ed.), The 
Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1989). 
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transferred from the class structure or purely pluralistic view towards focus on 
the state as interaction among institutions or social relations.  
     With the concept of states as a set of institutions consisting of complicated 
bureaucracy and administrative organisations, or the reflection of social 
relations, clarification became necessary of how decision-making was made 
within such complex institutional organisations. However, it can be said that this 
requirement has still not been fulfilled; rather, institutional approaches lacking 
detailed historical analysis have been influential. In a notable example in the 
field of political economy, Peter Hall has focused on institutional factors for 
theorising analysis of public policies. Hall defined institutions as ‘formal rules, 
compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the 
relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy.’94 
Then, he asserted that the institutions ‘bind the components of the state 
together and structure its relations with society’, ‘structure the interactions of 
individuals’ and that they put their ‘own image on the outcome’.95  
     Following the argument of Hall, so-called ‘historical institutionalism’ gathered, 
though perhaps ephemeral, academic interest. Ikenberry identified the main 
arguments of historical institutionalism thus: political structures and institutional 
configurations determine policy outcomes and orientations (the historical 
process is key for analysis of this), while emphasis is placed on the impact of 
institutional structures on the actions of individuals and groups. This interacts 
with other factors, such as ideology and policy ideas. 96 This argument stressed 
the importance of extending analytical scope towards meso-level institutions, 
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such as the representatives of trade unions and adversarial politics, and their 
impact on political actors.97  
     However, these assumptions, in which static institutions set actors’ 
behaviour and utility functions, risk becoming mired in partial equilibrium. 
Analysis must be made alongside the change of institutions, then description 
can be made of the dynamics of institutional change. Although Ikenberry has 
stressed the importance of a historical perspective, this methodology was 
gradually taken by institutional economics and detailed historical analysis 
waned. For this, a significant contribution can be found in North’s work 
expanding Oliver Williamson’s theory analysing the behaviour of firms through 
transaction costs. As seen above, North suggested that transaction costs and 
increasing returns from institutions are crucial for institutional path dependence 
and change.98  
     Subsequently, Paul Pierson has applied this institutional economic analysis 
to the terrain of politics.99 Pierson concluded that the process of increasing 
returns arising from institutions, which has self-reinforcing and positive feedback 
effects, would be ‘prevalent in politics’ through the central role of collective 
actions; the high density of institutions; the possibilities for using political 
                                                       
97 Notable research includes: Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, ‘Historical 
institutionalism in comparative politics’, in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and 
Frank Longstreth (eds.), Structuring politics: Historical institutionalism in 
comparative analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp.1-32. 
Monica Prasad, The Politics of Free Markets, The Rise of Neoliberal Economic 
Policies in Britain, France, Germany, and the United States (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2006). Peter A. Hall, ‘Central Bank Independence 
and Coordinated Wage Bargaining: Their Interaction in Germany and Europe’, 
German Politics and Society, Vol.31, 1994, pp.1-23. Also see Paul Pierson and 
Theda Skocpol, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science’, in 
Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner (eds.), Political Science: The State of the 
Discipline (New York: W. W Norton & Company, 2002), pp. 693-4. 
98 North, Institutions. 
99  Paul Pierson, ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of 
Politics’, The American Political Science Review, Vol.94, No.2, 2000, pp.251-67. 
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authority to enhance asymmetries of power, and intrinsic institutional complexity 
and opacity. Here, the certain time scale of relations of this self-enforcing 
process backed by positive feedback, termed path-dependence, determines the 
multiple outcomes of institutional change or its inertia. 100  This institutional 
approach was advanced by Avner Greif, who offered the critique that the theory 
of institutional economics did not adequately consider motivation consisting of 
expectations, belief and internalised norms. Greif then emphasised that this 
motivation has a critical effect in enhancing institutional behaviour.101  
     This argument can be considered an attempt to include the important 
concepts of ‘original institutionalism’, and a more realistic assumption of 
individuals, and to encompass the concept of ‘idea’, which has been focused on 
academically since the 1980s to explain historical continuity and change.102 
However, as Avner Greif and Joel Mokyr have assessed, there is no doubt that 
these theories are based on neoclassical assumptions, in which transaction 
costs and rational individuals under uncertainty are embedded.103 The issue 
arises here that this methodology can delineate only one-way or linear history, 
                                                       
100  For a comprehensive explanation of path-dependence and institutional 
change combining the concept of time, see Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: 
History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2004). 
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monetary reform, see John S. Odell, U.S. International Monetary Policy: 
Markets, Power and Ideas as Sources of Change (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1982). 
103 Avner Greif and Joel Mokyr, ‘Institutions and economic history: a critique of 
Professor McCloskey’, Journal of Institutional Economics, Vol.12, No.1, 2016, 
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not drastic but incremental change, in which institutions are the driving force to 
constrain the behaviour and interests of individuals. 
     On the other hand, some institutional analysis has applied game theory, and 
attempted to describe the interplay of institutions and its impact on the economy, 
deepening the argument of ‘varieties of capitalism’. Peter Hall and Daniel 
Gingerich used the concept of ‘complementarities’: one set of institutions would 
provide additional benefits available for others, in order to describe more 
complicated interactions among institutions or actors. There is no doubt that the 
main target of varieties of capitalism can be perceived as to create a more 
tenable typology focusing on the various institutional configurations or 
complementarities, such as labour regulations, fiscal policies, fringe benefits, 
central banking structures, and so on.104 However, this research cannot be 
assessed as escaping from the assumption that behaviour of individuals and 
firms is fundamentally constrained by institutions. The assumptions made limit 
the conclusions reached, becoming mired into a tautology in which institutions 
create a heterogeneity of capitalism constrained and characterised by its 
institutions. As seen in the work of Peter Hall, capitalism with a liberal market 
economy tends to achieve a higher economic growth rate with liberal economic 
policies.105 It is necessary to highlight here that, surprisingly, history played a 
                                                       
104 Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, ‘An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism’, 
in Peter A. Hall and David Soskice (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism: The 
Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), pp.1-68. Peter A. Hall, ‘Central Bank Independence and 
Coordinated Wage Bargaining: Their Interaction in Germany and Europe’, 
German Politics and Society, Vol.31, 1994, pp.1-23. Peter A. Hall and David 
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Debating Varieties of Capitalism: A Reader (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), pp. 21-74. 
105  Peter A. Hall and Daniel W. Gingerich, ‘Varieties of Capitalism and 
Institutional Complementarities in the Political Economy: An Empirical Analysis’, 
British Journal of Political Science, Vol.39, No.3, 2009, pp. 449-82. This paper 
acknowledged the statistical significance of co-ordinated market economies 
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marginalised role in the theoretical arguments of historical institutionalism and 
varieties of capitalism, which has contributed to the resulting static research 
outcomes and methodology. 
 
1.3.4 Foci for this thesis: state theory 
 
As seen in the survey above, state theory and the development of institutional 
approaches are analysed through the lens of elements conducted by states 
(money and taxation), the decision-making process and ‘power’ distribution in 
concrete and abstract terms (pluralism, corporatism, Marxian politics), and 
systematic institutional factors (Marxian politics and institutionalism). It will be 
shown in this thesis that of great importance, in the context of the late Bretton 
Woods era, is, firstly, that the components of ‘infrastructural power’, such as 
money and taxation, were not managed by a sole state’s own government, but 
were internationally co-ordinated and mutually affected. If focus is placed on 
international monetary co-operative schemes, the value of money was 
controlled both through the domestic terrain and international co-ordination.  
     Furthermore, if focus is placed upon the decision-making process, it 
becomes clear in the context of the late Bretton Woods era that domestic 
economic policies were not or could not be determined by a sole government, 
because economic policies and currency management were inextricably 
intertwined. State theory ought not to neglect this aspect in its framework, as 
can be perhaps seen in the focus on states as social relations, because 
international monetary relations somewhat determined states’ social relations. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
adapting to non-liberal economic policies. 
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Finally, institutionalism provides a useful framework, however, there is an 
unclear aspect when it comes to ‘crisis’ or significant economic shocks. During 
the late Bretton Woods era, such crises influenced or changed the actors’ utility 
functions, ideas, political calculations and policy goals, prompting institutional 
change. These changes are not adequately described by the institutional 
approach, which is based on relatively static assumptions of economics. 
Therefore, it is necessary to reinvestigate the interplay among international 
monetary relations and fiscal and monetary policies, through the lens of the 
historical decision-making process which provides the strongest methodology to 
clarify the complexity. 
 
1.4 The structure of this thesis 
 
This thesis is formed of eight chapters. The first chapter presents an 
introduction, orienting the present work in the existing research and theoretical 
frameworks.  
     Chapter 2 considers how the UK and US conducted management of gold 
prices between 1960 and 1964, focussing on the creation of the gold pool and 
the establishment of the Federal Reserve swap lines. This chapter reveals the 
significant conflicts over the management of gold prices between the US and 
the UK. It will be shown that both sides reached agreement due to their political 
calculations and ambitions to take the reins of international and domestic 
political economic agendas.  
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     Chapter 3 investigates UK long-term interest rates policies from 1962 to 
1965, and elucidates divergence between UK and US policy, making 
comparison to ‘Operation Twist’. This chapter explores theoretical arguments 
concerning interest rates policy and how the UK government came to water-
down the manipulation of long-term interest rates during this period. 
     Chapter 4 moves on to explore the management of sterling and tax reform in 
the 1965 budget, with close focus on the formation of corporation tax. This 
chapter examines the dynamic political arena in which corporation tax was 
formed, considering the context of managing the balance of payments deficit 
and external pressures.  
     Chapter 5, closely linked to Chapter 4, considers debt management and 
defence of sterling in Labour’s tax reform of 1965, focusing on long-term capital 
gains tax. This chapter investigates the decision-making process behind this 
aspect of tax reform, considering the discussions, disputes and rationale within 
the Labour government and across financial institutions. Chapters 4 and 5 
clarify how ‘socialist tax’, focusing on corporation tax and long-term capital 
gains tax, emerged as reduction in the revenue generated by company taxation 
and with the existence of a loophole within capital gains tax. 
     Chapter 6 explores preparation for the devaluation of sterling in 1967, 
considering the accompanying measures and the road to Labour’s ‘draconian’ 
budget. This chapter explores how the quantity and quality of Labour’s fiscal 
policies were affected by the devaluation. This chapter also considers ‘British 




     Chapter 7 covers the period after the devaluation of sterling, focusing on the 
transition to a floating exchange system in 1972. This chapter considers the rise 
of European monetary co-ordination, and the Anglo-American relationship. It 
also explores the UK’s monetary strategy to achieve maximum benefits from 
relations with the US and EEC, focussing on the transitional period between the 
Nixon shock and the decision to float sterling.  
     Each of the above chapters two to seven close with a conclusion. Chapter 8 








Chapter 2: Anglo-American co-ordination during formation of 
the gold pool and the dollar swap arrangement between 1961 
and 1962 
‘Watch and pray – and sell dollars’ 106 
 
2.1    Economic background 
 
The fragility of the Bretton Woods system was revealed in 1958. With the 
emergence of a persistent US balance of payments deficit, the credibility of the 
US dollar faltered when the proliferation in US foreign aid, defence expenditure 
abroad, overseas private investment and excess of imports became 
prominent.107 Consequently, the $3,556 million current account surplus in 1957 
plunged into a deficit of $2,138 million in 1959 and liquidity based balance of 
payments deficits amounted to $3,365 million in 1958 and $3,870 million in 
1959.108 In parallel, the introduction of the de facto convertibility of currencies in 
1958 encouraged foreign central banks to retain their reserves as gold and 
accelerated the outflow of the US gold reserve. This period represented the shift 
from dollar shortage to dollar glut.109 
     However, the nominal and variable indicators, including numeraire, 
demonstrate that the period from 1959 to 1971 is considered the most ‘stable 
                                                       
106  The National Archives, Kew (henceforth, TNA), PREM11/4203, Prime 
Minister to the Chancellor: The Almighty Dollar, 22 May 1962. 
107 Meltzer, A History of the Federal Reserve, Vol.2, p.26. 
108 James, International Monetary Cooperation Since Bretton Woods, pp.154-5. 




era’ and is discerned as the ‘heyday’ of Bretton Woods.110  This fallacy of 
composition existed between concerns over potential crises and figures which 
were statistically steady, both inextricably intertwined with political co-ordination 
among industrialised countries. 
 
Figure 2-1: Interest Rates and Foreign Reserves (£ Millions, $ Millions) 










1958 2.15% 4.00% 3,105 2,807 19,951 
1959 3.36% 4.00% 2,801 2,514 19,164 
1960 3.53% 5.00% 3,719 2,801 17,479 
1961 3.00% 6.00% 3,318 2,267 16,615 
1962 3.00% 4.50% 3,308 2,581 15,696 
1963 3.23% 4.00% 3,147 2,484 15,237 
1964 3.55% 7.00% 2,316 2,136 15,075 
1965 4.04% 6.00% 3,004 2,265 13,436 
1966 4.50% 7.00% 3,100 1,940 12,674 
1967 4.19% 8.00% 2,695 1,291 11,481 
1968 5.17% 7.00% 2,422 1,474 10,026 
1969 5.87% 8.00% 2,527 1,471 10,036 
1970 5.95% 7.00% 2,827 1,349 10,457 
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin and Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System. 
 
     US President Eisenhower was faced with the substantial balance of 
payments deficit and began tough and bitter negotiations with West Germany to 
                                                       
110  Bordo, ‘The Bretton Woods International Monetary System: A Historical 
Overview’, in Bordo and Eichengreen (eds.), A Retrospective on the Bretton 
Woods System, pp.4-28. 
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unencumber the military burden with meticulous care in the context of the Cold 
War.111 In spite of these efforts, the gold market plunged into a period of 
turbulence. In March 1960, the Bank of England (henceforth, the Bank) sold 
gold to maintain gold price stability when the London gold price exceeded the 
existing $35.00 per ounce US gold parity. However, the US Treasury was 
reluctant to cover the gold spent by the Bank in order to manipulate the gold 
price.112 Due to this, the Bank did not intervene in the gold market significantly 
when on 20 October 1960, during the US Presidential campaign, the London 
gold price touched $40.00 an ounce.  
     This ‘gold crisis’ provoked presidential candidate Kennedy to promise 
stalwart countermeasures to manage the balance of payments deficit. On 31 
October, Senator Kennedy made a statement in which he pledged to maintain 
the value of the dollar.113 Subsequently, in November, the US and seven other 
                                                       
111  Gavin, Gold, Dollars, and Power, pp.34-5. In July 1960, Adenauer, 
Chancellor of West Germany, informed the US government that he was less 
concerned about the settlement of the balance of payments than strengthening 
the West alliance by nuclear armament. Adenauer’s intransigent stance 
disrupted US intentions to reduce the balance of payments deficit through 
reduction in US forces stationed in West Germany. See ibid., pp.45-50. 
Regarding the negotiation process between the US and Germany, see ibid., 
pp.59-75. 
112 This friction was one of the causes behind the non-intervention of the Bank. 
See Schwartz, Money in Historical Perspective, pp.339-42. In the late summer 
of 1960, Humphrey Mynors, Deputy Governor of the Bank, alerted Alfred Hayes, 
President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to the possible surge in 
gold price. See Forrest Capie, The Bank of England 1950s to 1979 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp.160-1. 
113 A Statement by Senator John F. Kennedy on the Balance of Payments, 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, October 31 1960 in Rovert V. Roosa, The Dollar 
and World Liquidity (New York: Random House, 1967), Appendix I, pp.265-70. 
This statement pointed out that the principal causes of the deficits were the 
expansion of foreign expenditure including military and economic aid, the 
existence of trade barriers against US goods and capital controls blocking 
investment in the US, inadequate interest rates policy operated by the Federal 
Reserve pursuing bills-only policy, and so on. Additionally, this statement 
enumerated the removal of artificial barriers against US goods, flexible 




countries embarked on the impromptu sale of gold in London, which was 
conducive to the formation of the ‘gold pool’. 114  Concomitantly, European 
central banks established an ‘informal pact’ not to purchase gold in London for 
monetary purposes above the gold point, which was $35.20.115  
     On 27 December, President-elect Kennedy’s task force, chaired by George 
Ball, Under Secretary of State, prepared what was considered an audacious 
report, however, it was shelved because it contained a drastic proposal of 
international monetary reform.116 In place of this report, on 18 January 1961, an 
alternative special report made by former President of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York (henceforth, FRBNY) Allan Sproul, and the economists Roy 
Blough and Paul McCracken was handed to Kennedy.117 Consequently, on 6 
February Kennedy announced his intention to defend the dollar parity, and 
                                                       
114 Susan Strange, International Monetary Relations (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1976), p.76. Solomon, The International Monetary System, p.36. This 
was known as the ‘gentleman’s agreement’, see also Capie, The Bank of 
England, p.162. 
115 Schwartz, Money in Historical Perspective, p.342. Schenk points out that this 
‘informal pact’ was the foundation of an institutionalised gold pool, see Schenk, 
The Decline of Sterling, p.246. 
116 Robert Solomon, The International Monetary System, 1945-1981 (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1982), p.38. This report suggested informal consultation with 
companies over their overseas investment, legislative restraint on cost-price 
structures, income support for agriculture, and the shift in the burden of US 
foreign aid to beneficiaries through compulsory expansion of imports from the 
US. This plan was viewed as audacious because of its potential to place 
significant restraint on market discipline, conflicting with liberalising trade and 
transactions under the influence of GATT. 
117  Report in Bank of England Archive, (henceforth, BoEA), OV31/76, and 
Roosa, The Dollar and World Liquidity, pp.271-99. This report covered a broad 
range of topics such as the declaration of intention to defend the dollar, the 
abandonment of Regulation Q, export promotion, tax reduction rather than 
expansion of government expenditure, debt management including Operation 
Twist, increase in productivity, removal of tax incentives to discourage capital 
outflow, and elimination of discriminatory practices against the US. 
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intermittently established a series of domestic policies with great attention to the 
balance of payments.118 
     Meanwhile, industrialised countries and central banks co-operated to bolster 
the fissured international monetary system, in a move which was known as the 
‘outer perimeter defences’. In March 1961, the FRBNY, having commenced 
sale of West German marks in the forward market, required the acquisition of 
foreign currencies in order to bolster the value of the dollar through purchase.119 
Following this, the gold pool was established to directly contain its price within 
the shipping parity, the FRBNY used the three-month credit swap lines to obtain 
foreign currencies for foreign exchange intervention to restore confidence in the 
dollar, and absorbed the dollar spread through the European financial 
market.120 In addition, the US issued the foreign-currency-denominated non-
marketable bond which was convertible into the US Treasury bill, and attempted 
to repay the swap liability without putting pressure on US short-term outflow. 
This chapter explores the political process of formation of notable central bank 
co-operative schemes: the gold pool and Federal Reserve swap lines. 
 
                                                       
118 These policies included a credit guarantee from the Export-Import Bank, a 
reduction in the duty free allowance from $500 to $100, and the prohibition of 
the retention of gold abroad by US corporations and individuals. Kennedy 
prioritised management of the balance of payments deficit and avoidance of 
nuclear war. See Arthur Schlesinger, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the 
White House (New York: Fawcett Premier, 1971), originally published 1965, 
p.601. 
119 The FRBNY began to sell West German marks on 13 March 1961 in the 
forward market, and was authorised to conduct foreign exchange operations in 
both spot and forward markets by the Federal Open Market Committee on 13 
February 1962. The US Treasury had the authority to veto the operation of the 
Federal Reserve, and the Federal Reserve could also refuse to take any 
operation related to its own fund. See Coombs, The Arena of International 
Finance, pp.71-2. 
120 Schwartz stated that this swap served to provide forward cover to official 
foreign dollar holders and discourage them from converting their own dollars 
into gold. See Schwartz, Money in Historical Perspective, p.340. 
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2.2    In the context of international relations 
 
Bordo has argued that one of the distinctions of the ‘convertible’ Bretton Woods 
system from 1959 to 1971 was US dominance over the international monetary 
order.121 This prestigious position, backed by the dollar and combined with the 
power of the nuclear deterrent, embodied US international hegemony.122 From 
this account, some have emphasised that with this hegemonic power, the US 
played a paramount role in resolving conflicts in the international sphere and 
establishing institutions, including the free trade area and international monetary 
co-operative schemes.123  These liberal multilateral economic relations were 
espoused with ‘Keynesian’ policies, and configured as ‘embedded liberalism’ 
                                                       
121  Bordo, ‘The Bretton Woods International Monetary System: A Historical 
Overview’, in Bordo and Eichengreen (eds.), A Retrospective on the Bretton 
Woods System, p.48. Bordo gave four other characterisations of the Bretton 
Woods system after 1958: decline in the standing of the IMF; rise of the dollar 
and decline of sterling as reserve currencies; transformation of the exchange 
rate system from the adjustable peg to de facto fixed; and heightened capital 
movement. 
122 Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, p.134. 
123 For the arguments of realism or hegemonic stability theory, which emphasise 
the order as maintained through somewhat coercive means or hierarchical 
power structures, see chapter 1 of this thesis. For a general account on the 
chronological developments of US foreign economic policies, see Krasner, 
Power, the State, and Sovereignty, pp.58-61. Contrary to the argument 
highlighting the hegemonic power of the US, there is an argument that stressed 
US power as ‘weaker’ than other industrialised countries due to its 
decentralised political system. See ibid., pp.42-8. However, it should be noted 
that foreign economic policies were distanced from the political system and 
domestic factors diluted their formation. Katzenstein, ‘Introduction: Domestic 
and International Forces and Strategies of Foreign Economic Policy’, in 
Katzenstein (ed.), Between Power and Plenty, p.18, Therefore, even if the 
description of the US domestic administrative system as ‘weaker’ is applicable, 
it does not directly describe the status of the US in international society. The 
behaviour of the state in pursuit of objectives which are not reflective of the 
demands of social groups is reinterpreted by Skocpol in the argument of ‘state 
autonomy’. See Theda Skocpol, ‘Bringing the State Back in: Strategies of 
Analysis in Current Research’, in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and 
Theda Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back in (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), p.9.    
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which came to characterise the post-war economic climate.124 This ‘embedded 
liberalism’ perceived harmonisation between domestic economic policies, 
represented by Keynesian policies, and a liberal international market which was 
driven by multilateral international economic relations. 
     However, when focus is placed upon the economic hegemony of the US, 
which is considered to have created the foundation of post-World War II 
multilateral international relations, a contrasting facet can be observed. This 
was seen in the paradoxical aspects of the late Bretton Woods system, such as 
the waning of US economic hegemony with decline in the dollar and emergence 
of international monetary co-operation, which showed statistical stability and 
provoked perennial ad hoc contingency management. With this economic 
instability, the dominant paradigm of US hegemony shifted and was exposed to 
rebuttal, leading to the need to reinvestigate the unilateral US economic and 
political power in the international sphere.125  Here, the US’s inclination for 
achieving external support or international co-operation gathered academic 
attention. In the context of the 1960s, the US, under the early stages of the 
Kennedy administration, sought to sacrifice the dollar’s prominent payment role, 
relying on concessions from its counterparts.126 From the British perspective, 
the US was forced to defend sterling with the sacrifice of its reserves for military 
support from the UK, and the UK was able to draw on US support partly 
because the US was concerned with the switching of sterling into dollars and its 
                                                       
124 Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity, pp.72-8. For a brief account of the 
development from the original work of Keynes to Keynesian economics, see 
chapter 6 of this thesis. 
125 For example, Lundestad argued that the US in the decades following World 
War II was an ‘invited empire’, forged by European demand for economic and 
military assistance in the context of reconstruction and the Cold War in order to 
thwart the resurgence of extremism. Lundestad, The United States and Western 
Europe since 1945, p.55. 
126 Gavin, Gold, Dollars, and Power, pp.80-8. 
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conversion into US gold. 127  In addition, various international monetary co-
operative schemes were established in order to bolster the value of the dollar, 
and in the last instance, protecting the dollar-gold standard of the Bretton 
Woods system.  
     These aspects shifted academic interest to international co-operation, 
harmonisation and concord, as opposed to coercive means of resolving conflict 
amongst ‘rational states’ backed by the concept of equilibrium theory under the 
hegemonic state. International political economic perspectives have gravitated 
towards unfolding historical developments, ipso facto, the coercive means of 
hegemony that the US maintained in the post-war era was reinterpreted as a 
co-operative system providing mutual interests for member countries.128  
     Despite the conceptual shift to a system which provided mutual or reciprocal 
benefits, in historical analysis there still existed a non-negligible counter-
hegemonic current and international political conflicts, interspersed with co-
operative aspects.129 Simultaneously, a great deal of existing historical research 
describing Anglo-American or international relations from a strategic or political 
                                                       
127 Schenk, The Decline of Sterling, p.204. 
128 The argument of mutual economic interests arising from membership of an 
international system or order can be seen in theories of structural realism and 
the liberal international order. For a general explanation of mutual economic 
interests, see Ikenberry, Liberal Order and Imperial Ambition, pp.88-107. Also 
see chapter 1 of this thesis.  
129 For example, on the Suez crisis in Diane Kunz, The Economic Diplomacy of 
the Suez Crisis (London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991). 
European integration and the sterling position in Milward, The European 
Rescue of the Nation-State, and in Ellison, Threatening Europe. The Dillon 
Round in Alan P. Dobson, The Politics of the Anglo-American Economic Special 
Relationship, 1940-1987 (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1988). The conflict over 
military armament in Andrew Priest, Kennedy, Johnson and NATO: Britain, 
America and the dynamics of alliance, 1962-68 (London: Routledge, 2006); de 
Gaulle’s challenge in James Ellison, The United States, Britain and the 
Transatlantic Crisis: Rising to the Gaullist Challenge, 1963-68 (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
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point of view has also provided analysis describing international co-operation.130 
Thus, both aspects of conflict and co-operation have been dominant within the 
theories of international relations and in historical research, especially in works 
which have focused mainly on military and political perspectives. However, the 
aspect of international economic and political relations within the broader 
context of currency management lacks investigation, or has at least been side-
lined in existing research.131 There is no doubt that this economic aspect played 
a significant role within Anglo-American and international relations. As Dobson 
suggests, ‘In short, the fortunes of sterling, the US dollar, the Bretton Woods 
system, and Western defence were all interconnected and they all affected the 
special relationship’.132 Which is to say, it is of great importance to comprehend 
and deepen understanding of the interconnection between countries concerning 
matters such as international economic factors, which in this chapter are 
investigated through analysis of international monetary schemes.  
     This chapter will focus on the UK’s gold strategy, in particular the formation 
process of the gold pool and Federal Reserve swap lines from 1961 to 1962. 
O’Hara has delineated the conflict surrounding gold from 1960 to 1963 between 
the UK and the US from the perspective of foreign policy. 133  However, 
clarification of the negotiation process remains elusive. As such, it is imperative 
to decipher the conformity, compromise and discord in Anglo-American 
                                                       
130 Young, for example, reinvestigated the origin of the ‘special relationship’, 
and shed light on the pragmatic political collaboration and operational level of 
co-operation in the military field. Ken Young, ‘A most special relationship: The 
origins of Anglo-American nuclear strike planning’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 
Vol.9, No.2, 2007, pp.5-31. 
131 Notable exceptions to this are Roy, The Battle of the Pound, and Schenk, 
The Decline of Sterling. 
132 Dobson, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century, p.125. Also, 
Gavin, Gold, Dollars, and Power, p. 197. 
133  Glen O’Hara, Governing Post-War Britain: The Paradoxes of Progress, 
1951-1973 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp.53-72.  
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negotiations in order to comprehend the link between conflict and co-operation, 
which can provide a fresh perspective on what these political interactions 
resulted in within the domestic politics, and vice versa. Thus, this chapter 
attempts to break the dichotomy of conflict or co-operation in the international 
political arena, and to deepen understanding of what impact this complex 
political process had on domestic economic policies and politics. 
 
2.3    Dollars or gold? The ‘economic rational choice’ of the gold 
pool 
 
In July 1961, Anglo-American consultation hastened to form countermeasures 
amidst mounting pressure on gold prices in the London gold market which 
emanated from rising tensions over the Berlin crisis.134 With the increase in gold 
prices in London, arbitrage transactions to convert dollars into gold at the US 
Treasury and to sell in London dragged down US gold reserves. On 17 July, 
Charles Coombs of FRBNY telephoned Maurice Parsons, Executive Director of 
the Bank, enquiring whether the facility of loans to the Bank against gold 
collateral would be possible.135 He also enquired whether central banks could 
operate in gold only with each other.136 Thus, the US side sought to defend the 
value of the dollar by putting direct influence on the London gold market.  
     However, Parsons at the Bank of England opposed the FRBNY’s Coombs’ 
suggestion. John Stevens, Executive Director of the Bank, expressed his 
                                                       
134 Bordo, Humpage and Schwartz, Strained Relations, pp.177-8. 
135 BoEA, ADM13/4, Memorandum, Parsons to the Governor, 17 July 1961. 
136 BoEA, ADM13/4, Note of a conversation with Hayes and Coombs on 27 July, 
1 August 1961. 
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misgivings about the prospect that the US might rush into imprudent 
schemes. 137  In line with John Stevens, Cromer, Governor of the Bank of 
England, took the US proposal of direct intervention to indicate emergence of a 
dual price system of central banks and ‘hoarders’, with potential to cause a 
disorderly situation in the gold market and damage confidence in the dollar.138 
Cromer additionally warned that although the US may please European central 
banks through provision of the right to influence the London gold market, the 
Bank should carefully avert provoking their ‘ganging-up’ against the UK.139 
Despite this resistance presented by the Bank, the US proceeded to initiate its 
proposals.140 It is clear that the Bank was reluctant to accept this US influence 
on the London gold market and keen to defend the interest of the UK’s 
autonomy over the gold market. 
     On 19 September 1961, Robert Roosa, Under Secretary for Monetary Affairs 
of the US Treasury, raised the discussion as to whether European central banks 
ought to buy gold in order to limit its price within the gold shipping parity of 
below $35.20 per ounce, which would result in the birth of the gold pool.141 He 
also questioned whether the UK should hold its reserves in dollars rather than 
gold. Roosa asserted that maintenance of gold prices would have a ‘mutual 
advantage’ for the UK and US, both of which faced significant speculative 
pressure on their foreign reserves. He also stated that the central banks ought 
                                                       
137 BoEA, G1/100, Report, Stevens to Cromer, 12 September 1961.  
138 BoEA, G1/260, Cromer to Rickett, 13 September 1961. 
139 Ibid. Cromer understood the US suggestion as ‘partial inconvertibility of the 
dollar by persuasion’. 
140 President Kennedy stressed the significance of the co-operation of Western 
countries in dealing with the problem surrounding gold, in BoEA, G1/100, 
Extract from note of a meeting in Sir Frank Lee’s room on 27 September 1961. 
141 TNA, T312/312, Note of a Meeting held at the Palais Palffy on Tuesday 
September 19 1961, 4.30 p.m. The gold shipping parity or US gold export point 




to stay out of the gold market, and their gold transactions should be confined to 
the range defined by the shipping parity. In contrast to the enquiry of Coombs, 
Roosa emphasised the mutual interest of the US and UK in order to defend 
both currencies. Cromer responded that the amount of gold held by the UK was 
‘abnormally high’, and with this in mind, he would carefully consider Roosa’s 
suggestions.142  
     Despite Cromer’s receptive response, Parsons argued that since the dollar 
portion of the UK reserves was high, it ought to increase the gold reserves for 
the use of purchasing dollars (Figure 2-1). In addition, he asserted that it would 
be more preferable to the UK if the US were to hold sterling in its reserves.143 At 
this stage in negotiations, opinions within the Bank were split over whether the 
UK should yield to the demand to hold more dollars and reduce its gold 
reserves at this point. However, the preference for holding gold was relatively 
strong. 
     As the US sought to manipulate and control gold prices, the negotiation to 
form an institutionalised scheme gradually advanced. However, the Bank 
expressed its sceptical view of the establishment of a scheme that would see 
the direct manipulation of gold prices in London by central banks. With regard to 
the formation of a gold pool, the Bank asserted that central banks of such 
circuits were intrinsically ‘buyers’, and it would achieve ‘nothing positive’ without 
the natural selling members.144 Moreover, the Bank anticipated that if these 
                                                       
142 Ibid. 
143 TNA, T312/312, Note of a Meeting in Sir Frank Lee’s Room on 27 September 
1961. Regarding the increase of the sterling proportion in the US reserves, 
Roosa pointed out the inadequacy of the resources of the US Exchange 
Stabilization Fund and that wider powers were prerequisite for the acquisition of 
more sterling. 
144  TNA, T312/312, London Gold Market, paper provided by the Bank of 
England, 10 October 1961. 
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ideas leaked to the public it would prompt another dollar crisis, which would in 
turn affect the whole international exchange structure. The Bank recognised the 
US suggestions to increase dollar holdings and constrain central banks to 
contain gold prices within the shipping parity, as amounting to a two-tier gold 
market with a dual price system. Conclusively, the Bank remained sceptical of 
the US suggestion to form a coercive scheme to hold dollars as a 
‘useless/dangerous illusion’.145 The main concern of the Bank was that if the US 
would not show its willingness to sell US gold, the market doubt surrounding the 
official parity price would intensify.146 It is clear that the misgiving of the Bank 
was that the manipulation of the gold prices would cause or accelerate the 
demise of the international monetary system. 
     The Bank was also unwilling to accumulate large dollar holdings. Hence, the 
Bank suggested that the formation of a gold consortium based on a specific 
short-term loan would be ‘indefinitely preferable’.147 Concerning the scale of the 
gold pool, $200 million, which had been proposed by the US, was considered 
inadequate to contain the turbulence of the gold market, and was evaluated as 
‘chicken feed’.148 Thus the Bank pursued increase in the gold ratio in its foreign 
reserves, while it also sought a loosely consolidated gold pool scheme.149 
                                                       
145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid. 
147 TNA, T312/312, Gold-Talks with the Americans, the paper provided by the 
Bank of England, 10 October 1961. Concomitantly, the longstanding misgivings 
of the UK over the possibility of the change in gold price overshadowed 
incentive to increase its dollar holding. In addition, Parsons considered the 
possibility of floating the dollar and conceivable countermeasures in late 1960, 
see BoEA, ADM13/3, Letter to H.M. Treasury, attached note on International 
Exchange Relationships, 30 November 1960, and International Exchange 
Relationships, 30 November 1960. 
148 TNA, T312/312, Note of a meeting held in Sir Frank Lee’s room, H.M. 
Treasury, Thursday 19 October 1961, 4.30 p.m. ‘Chicken feed’ in: TNA, 
T312/312, Vienna, report, Cairncross to Rickett, 13 October 1961. 
149 TNA, T312/312, Note of a meeting held in Sir Frank Lee’s room, H.M. 
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     On 20 October 1961, Sir Denis Rickett of the UK Treasury confirmed that 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Selwyn Lloyd was determined to repay the Fund 
Drawing, backed by the buoyant reserves that had been predicted to increase 
over £100 million between August and October. The repayment amount was 
envisaged at £75 million.150 The objective of the UK Treasury was to maximise 
UK gold reserves, and to circumspect setting the level of gold holdings and 
flaring up a US backlash that sought the increase in UK dollar holdings. 
According to Rickett and Sir Frank Lee, Permanent Secretary to the UK 
Treasury, the UK was engaged in an initial reduction in gold liabilities.151 In line 
with the advice of the Treasury, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan agreed the 
necessity to increase gold assets or reduce gold liabilities, and a £75 or £100 
million repayment was permissible.152 However, he meticulously prescribed,  
 
 I hope this will not, repeat not, have a bad effect on the wage pause and 
 all that. There is a danger that this repayment, coupled with the bank rate 
 reduction may produce the wrong impression.153 
 
While the Bank and the Treasury were preoccupied with the level of gold 
reserves or dollar holdings, the Prime Minister was highly concerned with the 
possible influence of monetary easing or repayment of gold liabilities to the IMF 
on society which was under strict incomes policy. The UK government faced the 
necessity to avoid domestic social or industrial conflict arising from the link 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Treasury, Thursday 19 October 1961, 4.30 p.m. 
150 TNA, PREM11/4203, Foreign Office to Washington, 20 October 1961. On 3 
October, the Chancellor indicated setting a policy of repayment, in BoEA, 
G1/252, Note of a Meeting held in the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s Room, 
Tuesday 3 October 1961, 3.00 p.m. 
151 TNA, PREM11/4203, Rickett to Bligh, 21 October 1961. 




between the wage pause and the reduction in the Bank Rate and repayment of 
foreign debt.154 For this reason, Macmillan postulated a ‘technical change’, 
which was to disguise the transaction as a stand-by, rather than loan 
repayment. 155  He attempted to distract public attention from international 
monetary affairs by presenting this issue as a highly financially technical matter. 
Thus, foreign and domestic economic management was intertwined with 
adjustment of the UK gold holding collateral to the auspicious reserves 
circumstance.  
     On 23 October, the discussion progressed further. In a meeting at the 
Treasury, Roosa stated that central banks should contribute to confinement of 
the gold price into the parity on an ‘ad hoc basis’.156 He added that the US 
would conceive this measure as a ‘conscious exercise of responsibility to the 
system as a whole and without any loss of the formal right to earmark gold’.157 
In this way, the US proposed a compromise in order to meet the UK gold 
preference and threatened a possible forfeiture of the right of gold earmarking 
should the UK decline this compromise. Following the above statement from 
Roosa, Parsons raised three questions over the adequacy of the scale of the 
gold pool: the reasonability of the prospect of 40-50 per cent of the pool as 
contributed by European central banks; the situation in which consortium would 
be implemented; and the duration of the gold pool. Roosa responded that he 
                                                       
154 On 21 July 1961, the UK government introduced a ‘July measure’ with an 
indirect tax regulator including a 10 per cent surcharge on existing customs, 
purchase tax and excise duties. The Bank Rate was raised to 7 per cent and 
the pay pause was announced. On 5 October, the Bank Rate was reduced to 
6.5 per cent and to 6 per cent on 2 November. Meanwhile, the pay pause and 
indirect tax regulator remained. 
155 Ibid. 
156  TNA, T312/312, Gold and the International Monetary System, Note of 
Meeting Held in Sir Frank Lee’s Room, H.M. Treasury, London, Monday 23 




calculated the size of contributions ‘on the basis of preliminary indications of 
attitude on the part of Germany, France and Switzerland’.158 Concerning the 
scale of the pool and the originally proposed $200 million fund, he confessed 
that it might not be sufficient. However, Roosa insisted that when the agreement 
should become apparent in the financial market, it would be propitious to 
unencumber the speculative pressure on the gold market.159 Finally, Roosa 
implored UK officials to obscure the agreement with minimum procedure and no 
formal written agreement, requesting only simple agreed minutes of 
conversation. 
     In response to the above, misgivings over the international monetary 
situation and responsibilities fulfilled by the UK were expressed. Parsons 
contended that while the UK had formally undertaken $300 million working 
balances and $450 million from the IMF for repayment to the US, it had sold 
$1,700 million worth of gold, which meant that the UK held $1,000 million more 
than the agreement.160 In his assertion, Parsons elucidated the UK’s desire to 
hold gold, and explained that the UK should be entitled to earmark $450 million 
of gold, which was calculated as the $1,000 million Fund Drawing and $300 
million working balance subtracted from the $1,750 currency balance. In turn, 
Roosa conceded, ‘if at any time the United Kingdom wanted to present its $450 
million dollars for conversion into gold the claim would be met without 
question’.161 Moreover, he added,  
 
                                                       
158 Ibid. 






 …the Bank of England could continue to intervene in the market and 
 then, when the time came to earmark gold, the United States could bring 
 its bilateral arrangements into effect with the result that the Bank of 
 England would, to the extent agreed, collect gold from Europe rather 
 than from New York.162 
 
As a result of these negotiations, the UK successfully secured US concession of 
the right to earmark $450 million worth of gold and the right to increase the gold 
reserves in exchange for joining the gold pool.163 Moreover, the Bank gained 
the implicit right to absorb gold from European countries.  
     On the other hand, US officials at the US Treasury and the Federal Reserve 
had a different ‘chief objective’: utilising the establishment of the gold pool to 
show Congress that European central banks were co-operative to US 
authorities.164 At the Basle meeting held on 11 and 12 November 1961, Alfred 
Hayes, President of the FRBNY, hastened to promulgate the gold pool scheme 
since US monetary authorities would, at will, be investigated by the Congress 
Committee on the subject of gold.165 Hayes stated that he would like to testify to 
Congress, ‘not only that the major countries were willing in principle to come 
into a gold pool scheme but that the scheme had in fact already operated’.166 
Thus, he proposed that ‘the scheme should be given a trial run of a month’.167 It 
is clear that the FRBNY sought an established fait accompli to show Congress 
                                                       
162 Ibid. 
163 Parsons asserted that maintenance of the reserves in gold should be a ‘long 
established policy’ and the corollary must be ‘to earmark up to the hilt at other 
times’, in BoEA, ADM13/4, Conversations at the Treasury on 23 October with 
Roosa and Martin, 25 October 1961. 
164 BoEA, ADM13/4, Gold Syndicate Scheme, 15 November 1961. 
165 See also in TNA, T312/312, U.S / European Gold Pool, from Sir Denis 
Rickett to Sir Frank Lee, 7 November 1961, and Coombs, The Arena of 
International Finance, p.52. 
166 TNA, T312/312, Gold, 14 November 1961.  
See also TNA, T312/312, J. Anson to D. J. Mitchell, Draft Minute to the Prime 
Minister: Gold, 14 November 1961. 
167 TNA, T312/312, Gold, 14 November 1961. 
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that the Federal Reserve held the initiative to control the gold price in the 
international monetary field. Interestingly, records indicate that the gold pool 
consisting of buying and selling syndicates came into force on 6 November, 
almost a week ahead of this Basle meeting.168 
     Here, it is of value to explain the situation surrounding the complex US 
political economic circumstances while the above negotiations were unfolding. 
In the wake of the Berlin Crisis, President Kennedy sought to finance military 
expenditure with a $3 billion tax increase. However, in July 1961, Walter Heller, 
Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), harshly opposed this 
idea of tax increase and preferred tax reduction. Thus Heller sent Paul 
Samuelson of Massachusetts Institute of Technology to the President and 
successfully persuaded Kennedy to shelve this proposal to raise tax for the 
financing of growing military expenditure. In exchange for his shift in policy to 
finance the Berlin Crisis, Kennedy was forced to announce plans for a balanced 
budget in 1962.169  
     In this situation, the US monetary authorities composed of the US Treasury 
and the Federal Reserve came under pressure to mitigate the turbulence as 
confidence in the dollar faltered with the expansion of Federal government 
spending. 170  Political conflict surged between the US Treasury and CEA 
                                                       
168 TNA, T312/312, Gold, 14 November 1961. 
TNA, T312/312, From Sir Denis Rickett to Sir Frank Lee: Gold, 23 January 
1962.  
169 Interview with Walter Heller in: Erwin C. Hargrove and Samuel A. Morley 
(eds.), The President and the Council of Economic Advisers: Interviews with 
CEA Chairmen (Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), p.199. 
170 Domestic political conflict over increase in government expenditure and tax 
cuts was ignited when Kennedy became President. In 1961, President Kennedy 
pursued balancing the budget and stimulating the economy, which crystallised 
in the introduction of investment tax credits and loosened depreciation 
guidelines, dubbed an ‘anti-recession cut’. These measures were evaluated as 
having the effect of a 10 per cent tax cut on corporations. Kennedy was forced 
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surrounding the assumption of initiative over the course of domestic fiscal 
policies. While the CEA contacted representatives of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (henceforth OECD), and requested 
they encourage President Kennedy to reconsider and repeal the tax increase, 
the US Treasury and the Federal Reserve sought to take the initiative towards 
international financial co-ordination and contain the movement toward tax 
reduction. Heller reflected on this period in an interview: 
 
 The OECD people in Paris were part of our leverage on Kennedy. We 
 had Van Lennep and others […] urging us to cut taxes in the U.S. rather 
 than lower interest rates. So we got some leverage out of Paris and the 
 OECD, and Kennedy was enough of an internationalist so that carried 
 some weight with him.171  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
to present the fully balanced budget in January 1962 as a quid pro quo for 
eluding the tax increase to finance expenditure surrounding the Berlin Crisis. 
Thereafter, the CEA mobilised OECD representatives to whip Kennedy toward a 
tax cut. In this situation, a tax cut rather than increase in expenditure was 
enacted primarily through the compromise between the CEA and Treasury 
seeking tax reform. Regarding the increase in expenditure and tax cut 
according to archival documents, see Margaret Weir, ‘Ideas and the politics of 
bounded innovation’, in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth 
(eds.), Structuring politics: Historical institutionalism in comparative analysis 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p.202. See also Schlesinger, 
A Thousand Days, p.598, and the interview with Walter Heller in Hargrove and 
Morley (eds.), The President and the Council of Economic Advisers, p.171-215, 
and Herbert Stein, The Fiscal Revolution in America (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1969), p.422-53. Concerning the US inner-governmental 
discussion over monetary reform, see Gavin, Gold, Dollars, and Power, p.80-8, 
and Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Smithmark, 1965), p.406-8. 
For the influence of the role of international monetary co-ordination and 
schemes for managing currencies, and for the global context in the participation 
in General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB), taking Japan as an example, see 
Yusuke Kashiwagi, Gekidouki no Tsuuka Gaikou (Tokyo: Kinyu Zaisei Jijyou 
Kenkyukai, 1972), and Keikichi Honda and Tadao Hata, Kashiwagi Yusuke no 
Shougen: Sengo Nihon no Kokusai Kinyuushi (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1998). 
171 Interview with Walter Heller in Hargrove and Morley (eds.), The President 
and the Council of Economic Advisers, p.202. 
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Heller’s line as given in the interview is also evident in documents held by the 
Bank. In 1962, Roosa struggled against Heller, who was supported by George 
Ball and Walt Rostow, Director of Policy Planning, to prevent increase in 
government expenditure through drawing Kennedy’s attention to the Canadian 
dollar devaluation.172 Roosa orchestrated offsetting Heller’s long-cherished tax 
reduction with the support of Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the US Treasury.173 
This inner conflict affected political configuration. When Kennedy considered 
the potential replacement of William McChesney Martin, Chair of the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, who also sought to establish central 
bank co-operation, his line was suddenly reversed as co-operative international 
monetary schemes were forged. Heller delineated his suspicion over the 
involvement of Dillon in this matter: 
 
 In mid-1961, in fact, until fairly late in 1961, Kennedy was still thinking of 
 replacing Martin, but as the date for reappointment or new appointment 
 came up, Martin’s standing in the domestic and international financial 
 community kept rising—I’m sure Doug Dillon had something to do with 
 this—and by the time the date arrived, Kennedy had decided to reappoint 
 Martin.174 
 
     From the above arguments, it is evident that the US Treasury and Federal 
Reserve were mired in conflict with the CEA and Congress over the issues of 
taxation and the initiative for international monetary co-ordination. This affected 
the position of the Federal Reserve in US politics. This conflict can be 
understood as a driving force that led the Federal Reserve, FRBNY and US 
                                                       
172 BoEA, ADM13/5, Note of a conversation with Roosa, 25 June 1962. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Interview with Walter Heller in Hargrove and Morley (eds.), The President 
and the Council of Economic Advisers, p.191. 
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Treasury to hasten the establishment of the gold pool. The formation of the gold 
pool provided a route for officials at the Federal Reserve and US Treasury to 
push through political obstacles in pursuit of their chief objective, ‘hard-
currency’.175 Therefore, the objectives of the US monetary authorities, which 
were to avoid interference by Congress and to enhance their role in foreign 
economic policy in domestic and international political arenas, were achieved by 
establishment of the gold pool. While these monetary authorities, the Federal 
Reserve and the US Treasury, got involved in political strife, the UK retained its 
right to earmark $450 million worth of gold and secured its independent 
discretion to intervene in the London gold market. 
     Here, it is useful to consider the difference in Anglo-American political 
structures. While the US political configuration described above, in part, drove 
the establishment of international co-operative monetary schemes, a key 
difference between the UK and US is evident in divergent policy outcomes. A 
notable difference can be seen in the influence of the CEA, an agency not in the 
web of bureaucratic structures but within the Whitehouse itself, which can 
sometimes create vertical rather than horizontal power relations with 
governmental departments. The chairmen of the CEA are nominated by the 
President and required to achieve Senate confirmation. In addition, CEA 
members are appointed by the President. Margaret Weir has asserted that this 
feature provided ‘open recruitment procedures’, and proved a significant driving 
force for drastic policy change.176 On the other hand, UK economic advisors are 
                                                       
175 Meltzer, A History of the Federal Reserve, Vol.2, pp.290-301. For Heller’s 
evaluation of the ‘hard money men’ at the Fed, see chapter 3 of this thesis. 
176  Margaret Weir, ‘Ideas and Politics: The Acceptance of Keynesianism in 
Britain and the United States’, in Peter A. Hall (ed.), The Political Power of 
Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1989), pp.53-86. Weir argued that difference in the structure of 
government between the US and the UK was one of the decisive factors behind 
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required to serve within bureaucratic departments, amongst which the Treasury 
has had significant influence on economic policy making. For Weir, this created 
a rigorous bureaucratic structure in which ideas are brought forth by civil 
servants rather than economists in the American sense. This amounts to a limit 
on the power of economists and creates a path of incremental and linear rather 
than drastic and non-linear change.  
     Of great importance here is that the US political structure can be considered 
as bestowing great power to the economists of the CEA, chosen by the 
President. In the US, at least under the Kennedy administration, the President 
could mobilise the significant influence of the CEA, and use it as a bulwark 
against the pressure of the US Treasury and Federal Reserve. This political 
configuration and conflict created a path towards the international monetary co-
operative schemes, which were essential for the US Treasury and Federal 
Reserve to limit the influence of Congress and the CEA within the political arena. 
In contrast, the UK Prime Minister did not possess such political arms with 
which to buffer the influence of the UK Treasury and the Bank.177  
     Therefore, divergent Anglo-American political interests, the UK’s preference 
for gold and the US’s moves for dollar management, driven in part by the 
political institutional configuration of both countries, converged to form the gold 
pool. In other words, the gold pool can be considered the product of the UK’s 
desire to retain gold and the Federal Reserve and US Treasury’s political 
calculation to take the reins in currency management and fiscal policies. The 
resulting gold pool consisted of a buying syndicate and selling syndicate, and 
                                                                                                                                                                  
policy divergence over the acceptance of ‘Keynesian’ economic policies. 
177 This difference will be explored further in chapter 3 of this thesis, with focus 
on the political divergence between the UK and the US over the manipulation of 
long-term interest rates. 
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was inaugurated with a $270 million contribution from its members. 178 
Concomitantly, members, including the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), 
reached the agreement not to purchase any gold in London above the price of 
the $35.20 per ounce shipping parity, with of course, exception applying to the 
Bank of England and Federal Reserve Bank (FRB). This protocol was called 
‘self-denying ordinance’. The Chancellor reported to the Prime Minister 
regarding the gold pool: 
 
 …our earmarking would far exceed the likely expenditure of our 
 contribution to the gold pool. Moreover, if at any time we thought it right 
 to contract out of the gold pool scheme altogether, we could reverse our 
 contribution entirely by means of further earmarking in New York.179 
 
     After the establishment of the gold pool, the Chancellor embarked on the 
increase of UK gold holdings through earmarking dollars in New York (Figure 2-
2).180 At a discussion with the US side, represented by Roosa and Martin, the 
decision over gold holdings was consigned to the UK, though the US urged 
consideration of the stability of the two reserve currencies, sterling and the 
dollar. The Chancellor notified Hayes of his approval for earmarking $250 
million worth of gold for the succeeding six to eight weeks, and of retaining the 
right to earmark $200 million.  
     As seen above, to assuage the backlash of the US and to secure gold 
earmarking during these negotiations, the Chancellor suggested a contribution 
                                                       
178  The breakdown of the contribution was as follows: US ($135 million), 
Germany ($30 million), the UK ($25 million), Italy ($25 million), France ($25 
million), Netherlands ($10 million), Belgium ($10 million), Switzerland ($10 
million). 
179 TNA, T312/312, Chancellor to the Prime Minister: Gold, 20 November 1961. 
180 TNA, PREM11/4203, Chancellor to the Prime Minister, 9 November 1961. 
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from the UK of $25 million worth of gold to the gold pool. Behind this decision 
was the intention to retain gold rather than dollars. On the other side of Atlantic, 
the US Treasury and the Federal Reserve endeavoured to avoid Congressional 
interference in the field of foreign monetary policy, while maintaining the ‘outer 
perimeter defences’.181  While the UK side sought to hold gold, the Chancellor 
also sought to avoid excessively displaying the preference for bolstering the 
foreign reserves. At this stage, the Chancellor considered the fortuitous timing 
of the reduction in the Bank Rate as conducive to articulating unambiguously 
the intention not to absorb a dispensable amount of reserve.182 Therefore, these 
multifaceted conflicts, that provoked political calculations amongst actors, were 
intrinsically within the co-operative schemes from the outset. The gold pool was 
established at the point that actors reached economic compromise, with not a 
long-term, but short-term, myopic political outlook. This entailed the creation of 









                                                       
181 TNA, PREM11/4203, Chancellor to the Prime Minister, 20 November 1961.  
182 TNA, PREM11/4203, Chancellor to the Prime Minister, 9 November 1961. 
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Figure 2-2: Composition of the UK Reserves (£ Millions) 
 
 
2.4    Gold, and establishment of the Federal Reserve swap lines 
 
One month after the commencement of gold pool operations, the selling 
syndicate entered a period of abeyance, termed ‘cold storage’.183 At this stage, 
the UK and the US were in dispute over the issue of ‘self-denying’, or central 
bank exclusion from the London gold market. 184  On 12 December 1961, 
                                                       
183  BoEA, ADM/13/24, Discussions in Basle on Operations in London gold 
market, 20 December 1961. 
184 BoEA, ADM/13/4, Memorandum, Parsons to the Governor, 12 December 
  




1961           
  July 77 12 787 876 89.8% 
  August 371 134 740 1,245 59.4% 
  September 454 101 714 1,269 56.2% 
  October 463 89 709 1,261 56.2% 
  November 416 45 808 1,270 63.6% 
  December 337 39 810 1,185 68.4% 
1962           
  January 366 39 813 1,218 66.7% 
  February 374 15 834 1,223 68.2% 
  March 360 15 859 1,233 69.7% 
  April 324 6 910 1,240 73.4% 




Coombs called for the extension of self-denying ordinance, as its termination 
‘would be difficult to explain to Congress’.185 Parsons responded that London 
should remain open for central banks that wanted to purchase gold in Europe, 
conceding that any self-denying ordinance should only last one month.186 It is 
clear from these communications that the London good pool was a major point 
of focus in both the US and UK political spheres. Furthermore, maintaining gold 
pool arrangements was a prerequisite for the Federal Reserve and US Treasury, 
who did not wish to provoke a backlash from Congress or prompt the extension 
of Congressional power into the international monetary field.  
     While the US desired the continuation of self-denying in gold operations, UK 
officials tried to keep the London gold market open for purchases by Basle 
central banks. Concerns were expressed that transactions that would benefit 
Basle central banks if conducted in London, would be pulled to New York. Thus, 
Parsons highlighted that it would be profitable for Basle central banks to sell 
gold in London, for example, earmarking at $35 and selling at $35.16. However, 
Parsons advised that he would be   
 
 very reluctant to inject this thought into the discussions because it will 
 immediately lead on to a suggestion by the Americans that if Basle
 Central Banks, having earmarked at $35, need to dispose of gold, they 
 should do so by offering it to the New York Federal.187  
 
In the face of pressure from the UK, which was concerned with market freedom 
in gold transactions, the US proposed removal of the 0.25 per cent commission 








on both sales and purchases in New York by members of the syndicate.188 With 
this proposed removal of the 0.25 per cent commission of 8 cents per ounce 
shipping cost, the US gold export point applied to member central banks would 
decrease from $35.20 to $35.08.189 In the backdrop, it had been decided that 
Basle central banks should refrain from buying in London until the price fell 
under the parity.190 The waiving of the commission charge on central banks 
would provide them with a lower price market. Through this scheme, the US 
aimed to reduce the gold held in private and reconcile the member central 
banks to their exclusion from the London gold market.  
     At this time, UK officials were keen to commit to the gold pool due to 
concerns that should the UK not participate, it would become excluded from 
international monetary co-ordination and possibly cause loss of initiative to 
forge schemes for the management of the currencies. 191  With respect to 
operation of the gold pool, the Bank, on behalf of the syndicate, would conduct 
buying operations and its purchases would be distributed according to the share 
of contributions.192 For this reason, the ‘two-price system’ in London and New 
York for a limited number of central banks emerged, and ‘self-denying,’ with the 
exception of the Bank, continued.193 
     Thereafter, while the London gold market was in a temporary lull, the 
syndicate accumulated over $70 million worth of gold by May of 1962, and 
                                                       
188 Ibid. 
189 At this stage, the estimated shipping point was $35.10, however, it was 
changed to $35.08 according to the recalculation of shipping costs. 
190 Ibid. 
191  BoEA, ADM13/5, Parsons to Cromer, 25 January 1962. Parsons was 
reluctant to oppose the removal of the commission charge. He was concerned 
that, if the UK should reject this proposal, the US would dispose of gold, and the 
Bank would be excluded from the rule.  
192 TNA, T312/312, Meeting at the US Treasury on Thursday, 4 January 1962. 
193 TNA, T312/312, Gold Talks in Basle, 6 and 7 January 1962. 
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purchases of gold accelerated due to the large sale by the Soviet Union.194 
Negotiation ensued as to the management of accumulated gold: whether it 
should be used for further sale, held in reserve, or distributed amongst the 
contributors. At this stage, accumulated gold was used for further sale.195   
     However, a sudden and unexpected financial upset occurred in May and 
June of 1962. The Canadian dollar was devalued in May, and in June conflict 
between Kennedy and the steel industry provoked a ‘Flash Crash’ of the US 
stock market. As a result, the buying syndicate suddenly lost gold holdings. On 
20 July, under significant pressure from Washington, the Federal Reserve 
reactivated the selling syndicate, which had been in abeyance.196 Following this 
reactivation, the pool sold for net $50 million worth of gold. Despite the 
unfolding of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, the large gold sale from 
the USSR saw through the successful suppression of the price of gold in 
London below the US gold shipping point of $35.20 per ounce.197 
     As seen above, concessions over the earmarking of gold were made, 
however, the UK’s intransigent gold preference provoked further US opposition, 
                                                       
194 Between 1963 and 1964, the Soviet Union suffered a poor harvest and faced 
the need to sell gold in order to import grain. This continued inflow of gold 
towards the London gold market satisfied the demand for gold and caused a 
decrease in its price. See Meltzer, A History of the Federal Reserve, Vol.2, 
p.360. 
195 TNA, T312/949, The Gold Consortium, 24 December 1962. However, the 
gold pool was frozen until 20 July. Roosa argued that the principle of distribution 
would depend on the share of contribution and the future fluctuation of shares in 
the pool.  
196 TNA, T312/949, Note of a telephone conversation between the governors 
and Hayes, 26 July 1962, and Cable: Hayes to Cromer, received on 9 August 
1962. 
197 IMF, Annual Report, 1964, pp.131-2, and IMF, Annual Report, 1965, pp.100-
1. See also Bordo, Humpage and Schwartz, Strained Relations, pp.178-81. 
While the London gold price was effectively controlled by the gold pool, 
speculative movement of sterling surged and the Bank decided to increase the 
Bank Rate from 5 per cent to 7 per cent on 23 November 1963. 
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including from President Kennedy, in early 1962.198 In February, Roosa made 
the assumption that Britain should hold dollars since the US had lost $150 
million worth of gold early the same year due to accumulation of gold by the 
UK.199 The US singled out the UK’s drawing of dollars from the IMF and its 
conversion to gold as the cause behind the drain on US gold.200 The US 
demanded the UK interpret the ‘July undertaking’, which was to refrain from the 
purchase of gold with the Fund Drawing, as ‘to hold in currencies the whole of 
our outstanding liability to the Fund plus a notional working balance of $200 
m’.201 With the then foreign reserves position, this meant that the UK could hold 
the earmark for just $100 million. Treasury Joint Permanent Secretary, Sir 
Frank Lee and the Chancellor urged Prime Minister Macmillan to accept the US 
proposal, as the US had made this concession regarding earmarking.202 The 
dispute over the gold reserves continued. 
     From early 1962, the US pursued extension of its ‘outer perimeter defences’. 
In March, the Federal Reserve established a swap line, the beginning of the so-
called Federal Reserve swap lines, with the Bank of France, and sold $50 
million at the spot rate to the Bank of France against the French franc on a 
three-month swap basis. Coombs explained that the main aim of this 
arrangement was to bolster the dollar through sale of franc, in conjunction with 
securing the French holding of $50 million additional dollars in its reserves until 
the swap matured.203 Coombs termed this arrangement a ‘symbolic transaction’, 
                                                       
198 TNA, PREM11/4203, Washington to Foreign Office, 19 February 1962. The 
US President warned the British foreign exchange policy ‘put a most 
unwelcome and uncomfortable strain upon the dollar’. 
199 TNA, PREM11/4203, Washington to Foreign Office, 20 February 1962. 
200 TNA, PREM11/4203, Washington to Foreign Office, 21 February 1962. 
201 Ibid. 
202 TNA, PREM11/4203, Earmarking of Gold, 13 March 1962 and 14 March 
1962. 
203 TNA, T312/201, Basle, 10-12 March 1962, 14 March 1962. 
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and proposed extension of this swap web to the UK, at $100 million.204 Parsons 
stated that the ‘only real risk in the foreseeable future was a rise in gold price’, 
and this swap line, sale of sterling and purchase of dollars, would not protect 
UK economic interests.205 Therefore, Parsons expressed his unwillingness to 
accept this swap arrangement, and Coombs attempted to find an acceptable 
common ground for both parties.206  
     Here, conflict existed between the management of sterling and the swap 
arrangement. Rickett pointed out the danger of a situation in which the UK were 
to hold a vast amount of dollars. He asserted, ‘could it not be said that these 
facilities would mean that both sides were giving up the possibility of acquiring 
gold when they were in surplus’, and would also mean the Federal Reserve 
would hold $100 million worth of sterling not for exchange to gold, but to 
dollars.207 Rickett recognised this arrangement as the sale of gold to the US and 
restoration of the UK dollar balance. He pointed out that this would result in the 
UK being forced to hold $300 million as a minimum working balance, even if the 
Fund Drawing were repaid. Therefore, in the eyes of the Bank of England and 
UK Treasury, the swap arrangement was akin to forcing the UK to hold dollars 
without gold collateral. Despite this deep-seated concern expressed by the 
Bank and Treasury, on 27 March, the Chancellor authorised the Bank to join the 
swap arrangement under ‘suitable terms and conditions’.208  
     Behind this decision, concerns were held on the UK side surrounding the 
danger of inhibiting gold accumulation, and harming relationships between the 




207 TNA, T312/201, Proposal for a Sterling/Dollar Swap, 19 March 1962, and 
Proposal for a Sterling/Dollar Swap, 23 March 1962. 
208 TNA, T312/201, Sir Denis Rickett to Sir John Stevens, 30 March 1962. 
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Treasuries and central banks by rejecting the swap proposal, risking potential 
exclusion from the international monetary community. Conversely, anticipation 
of the possible benefit that the UK could use this scheme to enhance its foreign 
reserves position was perceived as an advantageous aspect. 209  In these 
circumstances of concern and anticipation, the US made a revised proposal of a 
$50 million swap line as a ‘pilot operation’ which was analogous to a trial run of 
the gold sales scheme, and additional $250 million swap facilities were 
proposed following this trial. Roy Bridge, of the Bank, analysed the development 
of the US policies as ‘exchange conscious’.210  
     Meanwhile, Coombs purported that the swap arrangement was ‘for the sake 
of uniformity in pattern for presentation to Congress’.211 It should be noted that, 
while a vote in Congress was necessary to enlarge the Exchange Stabilization 
Fund, the Federal Reserve swap lines were operated at the discretion of the 
Federal Reserve under the influence of the US Treasury, while the Bank of 
England had a significant role along with the Federal Reserve in the operation 
of the gold pool. There is no doubt that Federal Reserve intervention 
encompassed intentions to circumvent the arduous democratic process.212 This 
is congruent to the analysis of Bordo, Humpage and Schwartz: the Federal 
Open Market Committee (FOMC) members saw the Federal Reserve swap 
lines as a scheme that was designed to ‘bypass the Congressional 
appropriations process and, therefore, represent an abuse of the Fed’s off-
budget status’. 213  Although the US Treasury was essentially controlled by 
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210  BoEA, OV31/125, American exchange operations with European central 
banks, 9 March 1962. 
211 Ibid. 
212 TNA, T312/201, Derek Mitchell to Carey, Proposed Sterling/Dollar Swap 
Operation, 13 April 1962. 
213 For the concern of the members of the Federal Open Market Committee 
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Congress, the discretion of the Treasury, which conducted international 
monetary co-ordination through this swap scheme with the Federal Reserve, 
was ipso facto reinforced within the international monetary field. 
     The UK side discussed three points that required consideration for the swap 
scheme.214 The first was the setting of interest rates which would result in 
uneven costs borne by the Bank of England and Federal Reserve. The US 
demanded use of a flat interest rate based on the US Treasury bill, or 2 per cent. 
This scheme entailed that the US would be able to obtain funds at a subsidised 
rate. Rather than suggest a proposal equally favourable to the UK, the Bank 
compromised to accept the flat 2 per cent rate. Secondly, UK officials were 
aware of the potential for detrimental effects on the UK reserves from the use of 
the swap facility at unpropitious timings. The UK sought a consolidated term of 
swap facility, three months, with fresh negotiation necessary for its renewal. 
Thirdly, the UK side fixated on the right of earmarking and demanded a gold 
value guarantee: it was held that earmarking and drawing on swaps should be 
separate in order not to offset swap withdrawal with earmarked gold. Although 
the risk of the revaluation of gold could not be ignored, the UK agreed to accept 
the swap line of up to $300 million ‘in the interest of fostering mutual co-
                                                                                                                                                                  
(FOMC) on Congressional influence on the Fed’s ‘off-budget status’, see 
Michael D. Bordo, Owen F. Humpage, and Anna J. Schwartz, ‘The Evolution of 
the Federal Reserve Swap Lines since 1962’, NBER Working Paper Series, 
No.20755, December 2014. This research covers the Federal Reserve Swap 
Lines and the ESF, and revealed the institutional power balance over 
international monetary policies amongst Congress, the Treasury and the 
Federal Reserve.  
Bordo, Humpage and Schwartz,‘The Evolution of the Federal Reserve Swap 
Lines since 1962’, pp.25-6. This outlined the case whereby the US Treasury 
and the Federal Reserve forcibly conducted a monetary rescue operation 
through the Federal Reserve swap lines although Congress had rejected this 
plan during the Mexican Peso crisis between 1994 and 1995. 
214 TNA, T312/201, Proposed Sterling/Dollar Swap Operation, 1 May 1962. 
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operation in the management of the international monetary system’.215 Despite 
these negotiations, the concessions that the UK secured were that fresh 
negotiations would occur prior to the renewal of swap facilities and that interest 
rates would be set in an ad hoc manner, to start at the US’s preferred rate of 2 
per cent.216 
     On 9 May 1962, Prime Minister Macmillan questioned the Chancellor 
regarding the dollar holdings position, and ordered that the UK ‘must not be 
caught with dollars when we might have gold’.217 A week later, the Chancellor 
reported the swap arrangement proposals, one of which was a $50 million 
actual swap transaction as a pilot operation, the other another $250 million 
further swap transaction.218 The Chancellor expressed readiness to accept the 
first proposal, which was conveyed to the US side the same day. However, he 
advised the Prime Minister not to accept the second requirement until 
substantial repayment to the IMF was made.219 As a result of this discussion, 
the Prime Minister took to the Chancellor’s line on this.220 Thus, the swap 
arrangement between the UK and US was set on 31 May. Subsequently, 
Federal Reserve swap lines expanded from $800 million with 100 million Swiss 
                                                       
215 Ibid. 
216 TNA, T312/201, Minutes of a meeting held at the Treasury on Monday 7 May 
1962. 
217 TNA, PREM11/3764, Prime Minister’s Personal Minute to the Chancellor, 9 
May 1962. 
218 TNA, T312/201, The Chancellor’s minute to the Prime Minister, 14 May 
1962. 
219 Ibid.  
On 14 May, it was reported that Dillon stated that ‘the swap arrangements had 
been made with the French and the Italians and so far as an arrangement with 
the United Kingdom was concerned the United States was mainly interested in 
developing the necessary mechanism through a pilot operation of $50 million’, 
in T312/202, Anglo-American Discussions, Note of a meeting held at the 
Treasury on Monday 14 May 1962. 
220 TNA, PREM11/3764, Bligh to Hubback, 16 May 1962. 
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francs in 1962 (Figure 2-3), to $11.7 billion, and 14 central banks joined the 
scheme at the closure of gold window in August 1971.221  
 
Figure 2-3: Federal Reserve Swap Arrangement 1962 





Bank of France 50 4-Mar 3 months 
Bank of England 50 30-Mar 3 months 
Netherlands Bank 50 14-Jun 3 months 
National Bank of Belgium 50 20-Jun 6 months 
Bank of Canada 250 26-Jun 3 months 
Bank for International 
Settlements 100 16-Jul 3 months 
Swiss National Bank 100 16-Jul 3 months 
German Federal Bank 50 2-Aug 3 months 
Bank of Italy 50 18-Oct 3 months 
Austrian National Bank 50 25-Oct 3 months 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Monthly Review March 1963, p.39.                                                                                                              
Note: Bank for International Settlements data is denominated in Swiss franc. 
 
As elucidated above, the UK had a remarkable preference for gold, and there is 
no doubt that this provided the impetus for challenge against the US demand on 
it to hold dollars. The Prime Minister clarified the rationale behind preference for 
gold to the Chancellor, in a remark which summarises the UK’s tactics and 
objectives over international monetary arrangements, and its scepticism 
towards the US: 
                                                       
221 Bordo, Humpage and Schwartz,‘The Evolution of the Federal Reserve Swap 
Lines since 1962’, p.4. 
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 In the early months of 1961, I got into disgrace with you and the Treasury 
 for telling the new American Administration that the easiest way to 
 enlarge the credit base and get us out of our difficulties of trying to 
 finance more and more production and trade with insufficient money was 
 to raise the price of gold […] So the City is buying gold shares because 
 they know that the Almighty Dollar must yield in turn to world forces. 
 They also suspect that President Kennedy has some of the Roosevelt 
 power of rapid, ruthless action, without consultation and without divulging 
 his purpose (and that is how his father made so many millions). So 
 please be more and more careful - especially of Dillon (who is used as 
 the simple boy in the three card trick). I know you have got a lot of gold. 
 But it would perhaps be worth while selling all the dollars you have in 
 order to pay back the Bank (which is a gold loan). […] Finally, in spite of 
 Keynes and all the chatter of modern economists, remember that we are 
 all on a gold standard in effect, although the old way of operating it has 
 been changed. Meanwhile, watch and pray – and sell dollars.222  
 
From this, it is beyond doubt that the UK side, including the Prime Minister and 
the Treasury as shown above, strengthened its preference to accumulate gold 
with the prospect of devaluation or depreciation of the dollar in mind, and that 
the Prime Minister remained sceptical of the US Treasury and Kennedy, who 
had relentlessly demanded the UK hold more dollars and less gold, and to 
broaden the international monetary scheme. 
     Despite the above communication from the Prime Minister, the Chancellor 
responded that sudden large repayment in dollars to the IMF would be 
interpreted as the UK’s prediction of the devaluation of the dollar, and would 
therefore have a detrimental effect on the relationship between the UK and 
US.223 The Chancellor also asserted that a weak dollar would have a harmful 
effect on sterling. His conclusion was that the UK faced two risks: one was the 
                                                       
222 TNA, PREM11/4203, Prime Minister to the Chancellor: The Almighty Dollar, 
22 May 1962. Regarding the divergence in views on the price of gold between 
the Prime Minister and the Chancellor, see also TNA, PREM11/3302, Gold 
Exchange Standard: A danger to the West, 7 July 1962, also TNA, 
PREM11/3302, Bligh to Hubback, 9 July 1962. 




exchange risk and the other was the management of its own reserves. The 
Chancellor emphasised that he would not act to provoke ‘exchange risk arising 
from our gold liability’.224 Moreover, the Chancellor elucidated that if devaluation 
of the dollar or fluctuation in the gold price were to occur, it would inflame the 
strain on the sterling area through the decrease of the sterling balance value 
denominated in gold. 225  This would result in provocation of demands for 
compensation. For this reason, the Chancellor advocated defence of the 
dollar.226 It is clear that the UK was not a monolith unreceptive to change. The 
Prime Minister’s defiant stance against the US was mediated by the Treasury, 
the Chancellor and the Bank, but his preference for gold remained, resulting in 
a compromised co-operative scheme with the US: the gold pool and swap 
arrangement.227 
 
2.5    Conclusion 
 
In delineating the formation process of the gold pool and Federal Reserve swap 
lines, this chapter has revealed that both schemes, which emerged 
paradoxically under the premise of promulgating international monetary co-
operation, burgeoned within divergent and conflictive Anglo-American interests, 
arising from multifaceted internal political and economic interests.  
                                                       
224 Ibid. 
225 TNA, PREM11/4203, Chancellor to the Prime Minister: The International 
Situation and the Price of Gold, 4 July 1962. 
226 Ibid. 
227  The fissure between the Prime Minister and the Chancellor widened, 
escalating to a critical level whilst the Prime Minister sought a scheme to reduce 
long-term interest rates in 1963. See chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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     The UK side was dubious of the prestigious position of the dollar and was 
concerned with its possible devaluation. With a modest level of ambition for 
reinstatement of sterling’s position, the UK Treasury and the Bank of England 
sought to accrue gold rather than dollars as a means of managing sterling and 
the foreign reserves. On the other side of the Atlantic, the US Treasury and the 
Federal Reserve were confronted with mounting pressure to manipulate the 
London gold price in the immediate wake of the Berlin Crisis in the summer of 
1961. This resulted in the gold pool and Federal Reserve swap lines proposal 
as a corollary, which graphically animated the collision in economic interests 
between the US and UK.  
     Although the UK was disinclined to accept the US proposal to hold dollars, 
backed by the Prime Minister’s intransigent gold preference and wary 
scepticism of the US, mediation by the UK Treasury and the Bank saw through 
the establishment of the gold pool and Federal Reserve swap lines. Behind the 
creation of the gold pool lay concessions in the earmarking of $450 million 
worth of gold to the UK in exchange for joining the scheme. Meanwhile, the UK 
Treasury and the Bank sought to take the initiative of the gradual establishment 
of international monetary schemes, particularly concerning the London gold 
market, and feared exclusion from these schemes if the UK neglected to 
participate. On the other hand, the US side, including the Treasury and Federal 
Reserve, sought to deflect the surge of Congressional interference in their 
international monetary policy by central bank co-operation as a fait accompli. 
This motivation of the US monetary authorities drove them to rush into the 
forging of alternative international monetary schemes. Therefore, the gold pool, 
one of the prominent co-operative monetary schemes of the period, emerged 
paradoxically from conflict in the arena in which the US and the UK pursued 
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their own interests. To be more precise, it can be argued that the gold pool was 
the product of economic compromise, or economic rationality of UK and US 
monetary authorities both in pursuit of their own economic and political interests. 
On one side, the UK sought to accumulate gold, potentially risking a backlash 
from the US. On the other side, US monetary authorities sought to ameliorate 
the decline in the dollar, to mitigate Congressional pressure, and to self-
enhance their political influence through the international monetary field. This 
complicated structure of interests led both governments to explore solutions in 
the international monetary arena and resulted in the gold pool. It has also been 
shown that both compromise and the incentive of the seductive prerogative to 
hold the reins of international monetary reform were factors that contributed to 
the formation of the gold pool.  
     It should also be emphasised that the difference in political institutional 
configuration limited the policy outcomes and paths of the US and the UK. In 
the US, the President could maximise and utilise the influence of CEA 
economists and their ideas as a bulwark against the US Treasury and Federal 
Reserve, and for ushering towards his favoured policies. This political structure, 
associated with the influence of Congress, provided the impetus for the US 
Treasury and Federal Reserve to create external, international institutions, in 
this case the gold pool and Federal Reserve swap lines, as a political economic 
channel through which to inject their influence into the political arena, bypassing 
domestic political obstacles. 
     The negotiation for the Federal Reserve swap lines differed in quality. This 
scheme did not meet the UK’s preference for gold and amount of dollar holdings, 
and in terms of interest rates, this scheme was considered to be more beneficial 
for the US than for the UK. However, given that the swap lines between the US 
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and France had already been established, bargaining power escaped the UK. 
The UK was aware of the potential impact if it opted out of the Federal Reserve 
swap lines and the possibility of deterioration of its relationship with the US if 
the UK neglected to support it, while remaining hopeful of future enhancement 
of its foreign reserves position. Therein lies the historical process, obscured by 
the rhetoric of co-operation in order to defend the international monetary system. 
     The above perspective provides a different view to that presented in the 
disciplines of international relations and economics, which have focused on the 
dichotomy of co-operation or conflict, or the benefits of membership, known as 
feedback of positive network externality, where participants were locked-in to 
co-operative schemes. In stark contrast to this, this chapter has described how 
the gold pool was the product of compromise mainly between the UK’s 
economic rational choice and the political economic rational choice of the US. 
This compromise arose from institutional configuration, international and 
internal political conflicts, policy preferences or ambitions, and ideas over the 
management of currencies, which were somewhat restricted by the international 
monetary system, and speculative political and economic calculations due to 
uncertainties in the effects of the co-operative monetary schemes.  
     Meanwhile, the swap lines arrangement was accepted by the UK amidst fear 
of exclusion from the scheme and ensuing loss of opportunity, although some 
aspects of the UK’s demands were reflected in this scheme. Then, the 
formation process and outcomes of these international co-operative currency 
management schemes provided a supranational domain, channel and 
battleground, through which members formed ideas, extracted political power 
against foreign and internal policy contestants, and competed to seize initiative 
for, and foster prestige of, their own currencies. From a historical perspective, it 
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is important to point out that these two schemes significantly expanded the 
presence of the Bank of England, US Treasury and Federal Reserve against 
the power and governability of the UK Parliament and the US Congress. The 
Bank successfully gained and intensified its own discretional right and power to 
intervene in and control the London gold market, which was considered ‘risk-
free intervention’.228 The Federal Reserve obtained the independence in the 
international monetary field to operate various measures with other central 
banks without interference from Congress. Furthermore, the US Treasury, 
theoretically subject to Congressional authority and Federal Law regulations, 
accessed the legal loophole to exert its influence on the international monetary 
field through the Federal Reserve system.  
 
  
                                                       




Chapter 3: Manipulation of the structure of interest rates from 
1962-64: How the British government discarded ‘Operation 
Twist’ 
 
3.1    Introduction 
 
In the context of historical institutional factors and the development of ideas in 
politics, this chapter explores how, from 1961 to 1964, the UK came to pursue 
watered-down manipulation of long-term interest rates. 
     The outflow of gold from the US in 1959 led to the development of counter-
measures in order to avert the dissolution of the international monetary system, 
which was anchored by the US dollar. Under President Kennedy’s 
administration, the US pursued tax reform, reduction in government expenditure 
and mobilisation of monetary policy. 229  One of the innovative monetary 
schemes, known as ‘Operation Twist’, aimed to encourage business investment 
through reduction of long-term interest rates. Operation Twist also aimed to 
avoid creation of inflationary pressure, and to attract short-term funds from 
overseas with the increase in short-term interest rates.230 Therefore the US 
intended to break its economic aporia of expansion of the domestic economy 
                                                       
229 BoEA, OV31/76, The Economic Situation and the Balance of Payments: A 
Special Report to President-elect Kennedy by Allan Sproul, Chairman, Roy 
Blough, and Paul W. McCracken, 18 January 1961. See also Roosa, The Dollar 
and World Liquidity, Appendix II, pp.271-99.  
This report covered a broad range of topics. See Chapter 2 of this thesis.  
230 John H. Wood, A History of Central Banking in Great Britain and the United 
States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.257.  
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and defence of the dollar, through the theoretical effects of an eclectic debt 
management scheme without slowing down its economy or deteriorating 
confidence in the dollar.  
     On the other side of the Atlantic, the UK grappled with a similar dilemma: to 
enhance sterling and the foreign reserves position, and encourage export to 
mitigate the balance of payments deficit. In order to tackle these matters, the 
Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, and his government considered short-term 
interest rates manipulation and long-term interest rates reduction.231 Evidently, 
UK debt management and the manipulation of the structure of interest rates 
were inextricably connected to currency management. However, whilst the US 
was able to introduce Operation Twist, in the UK, control of long-term interest 
rates largely escaped the government in the process of policy formation. In a 
divergence of policies, in the early 1960s, the US embarked on controlling long-
term interest rates while the UK relied on the manipulation of short-term interest 
rates, such as the Bank Rate.  
     This chapter explores how the UK came to pursue a watered-down 
manipulation of long-term interest rates and had to concentrate its efforts on 
short-term interest rates policy. Capie has described the argument within the 
Bank over long-term interest rates in great detail. However, exploration in the 
context of the management of currency, including the involvement of the 
government and the Treasury, is lacking.232 Furthermore, existing research has 
neglected direct governmental arrangement of the structure of interest rates. 
Given this lack of comprehensive research of UK interest rates policies, this 
chapter focuses on the political process, particularly concerning the UK long-
                                                       
231 Peter Catterall, The Macmillan Diaries Vol. II: Prime Minister and After, 1957-
66 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2011). 
232 Capie, The Bank of England, pp.282-6. 
100 
 
term interest rates between 1961 and 1964. To provide effective analysis of this, 
it is paramount to consider the political process in the context of the economic 
background and economic theoretical aspects. In order to deepen 
understanding of how divergence in interest rates policy between the US and 
UK occurred, and how the UK failed to implement mobilisation of long-term 
interest rates, prior to analysing the historical process, the two succeeding 
sections of this chapter will delineate economic theoretical development and 
provide a brief economic background of this period. 
      
3.2    The development of monetary theory  
 
Operation Twist is considered a product of debt management policy. Given that 
in the 1960s ‘Keynesian’ economics increasingly gained influence in the arena 
of fiscal and monetary policy, debt management policy, which had previously 
aimed to minimise the cost of issue, refinance and redemption of government 
bonds, transformed to subsume economic stimulating measures. 233  This 
morphological change is known as the shift from pro-cyclical or neutral debt 
management, keeping debt borrowing and debt service costs low, to counter-
cyclical debt management policy and economic fine-tuning.  
                                                       
233 The Bank officially detailed the chief aims of its debt management policies 
and operations. The Bank identified its objectives as: to strengthen demand for 
the stock of gilt-edged securities; to widen the gilt-edged security market for 
various investors so as to secure the long-term holding of government debts; 
and to keep down the costs of government borrowing. See Bank of England, 
The Development and Operation of Monetary Policy 1960-1983 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1984), pp.79-80. For the incrementally growing influence of 
Keynesian economics and its ideas during this period, see Stein, The Fiscal 
Revolution in America, chapters 15 and 16. See also Sorensen, Kennedy, and 
Schlesinger, A Thousand Days. 
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     Pro-cyclical debt management policy refers to efforts to minimise issue or 
debt service costs, according to market interest rates. Typically in this debt 
management policy, Treasury departments have a propensity to issue bonds 
and lengthen the structure of debt maturities during periods of low interest rates. 
Central banks would then support the Treasury through open market operations. 
On the other hand, counter-cyclical debt management, including in the context 
of currency management, requires co-operation and collaboration between 
Treasuries and central monetary authorities in order to conduct economic fine-
tuning, which, in the context of the 1960s, was to achieve ‘full employment’ or 
the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU), and hampering 
short-term capital outflow. For example, when lower long-term interest rates for 
the promotion of business investment and higher short-term interest rates in 
order to check capital outflow were sought, the Treasury tended to issue more 
short-term debts. In conjunction, central banks lower long-term interest rates 
through repurchasing bonds. On the other hand, in periods of economic boom, 
Treasuries issue debt to absorb excess funds from the market, and central 
monetary authorities seek to increase interest rates.  
     One quintessential means of counter-cyclical debt management can be 
considered to have manifested as Operation Twist. As turbulence surrounding 
confidence in the dollar became apparent, from the late 1950s, the UK and US 
faced new difficulties in short-term capital outflow and encountered the 
necessity to expand economic activity. This situation led central monetary 
authorities and Treasuries to conduct co-ordination over debt management 
policy seamlessly adjusted to the business cycle and management of 
currencies. This US counter-cyclical debt management was chiefly advanced by 
the theory of economist James Tobin, who was also a member of the CEA 
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between 1961 and 1962. On the other side of Atlantic, in the UK the Committee 
on the Working of the Monetary System, dubbed the Radcliffe Committee, 
evaluated a somewhat similar theoretical aspect to that presented by Tobin: the 
interest incentive effect and general liquidity effect. Although both the US and 
UK sides were significantly influenced by the original work of Keynes and had 
similar arguments in the development of debt management theory, the resulting 
policies were divergent. Therefore, this section considers the theoretical 
development from Keynes to Tobin, especially focusing on two theoretically 
significant factors: uncertainty and provision of money. This section will then 
attempt to clarify the shared theoretical arguments of Tobin and the Radcliffe 
Committee. 
     The Radcliffe Committee published a guideline in 1959 for the direction of 
the financial system and fiscal monetary policy after a two year research period 
on monetary policies, gathering academic attention. This Committee sought 
extension of the role and means of the Bank beyond the lender of last-resort.234 
This report placed less emphasis on monetary policies as effective economic 
measures, rather suggesting that monetary policy could be mobilised in order to 
influence aggregate demand through, at least partially, the interest incentive 
effect and general liquidity effect.235 This theoretical mechanism sees change in 
                                                       
234 Committee on the Working of the Monetary System; Her Majesty’s Stationery 
Office, (hereafter, HMSO), Cmnd., 827, 1959, (hereafter, Radcliffe Committee, 
‘Report’). Sayers identified central banks as a source of liquidity known as the 
lender of last-resort during financial crises, see Richard S. Sayers, Modern 
Banking, Seventh Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), originally published 
1938. Regarding the role of a lender of last resort, it is widely known that the 
work of Bagehot influenced the account of Sayers, see Walter Bagehot, 
Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market (Connecticut: Hyperion 
Press, 1964), originally published 1873. 
235 To what extent the Radcliffe report placed emphasis on the interest incentive 
effect or general liquidity effect is unclear. For an account on the incentive effect 
of the structure of interest rates on the overall liquidity position, see Nicholas 
Kaldor, ‘The Radcliffe Report’, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol.42, 
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interest rates influencing the value of various securities, which provokes 
restructuring in the portfolios of financial institutions, through changing the 
liquidity level of such institutions facing uncertainty. This affects the credit 
availability of financial institutions and ought to influence the condition of the 
credit market and eventually the goods market. The Radcliffe Committee can be 
interpreted as a trial to advance and incorporate the liquidity preference theory 
derived from Keynesian economics into the complex mechanism of interest 
rates and liquidity preference with portfolio choice and credit availability.236 
However, there is controversy amongst the original works of Keynes, the 
Radcliffe Committee, and Tobin’s portfolio rebalancing theory, which provided 
the theoretical basis for justification of US debt management policies (such as 
Operation Twist). The development of controversies that will be examined here 
are the concepts of uncertainty and endogenous money supply. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
No.1, February 1960, p.15, paragraph 4. 
236 For the arguments of liquidity preference theory, see John Maynard Keynes, 
The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (London: Macmillan, 
1967), originally published 1936, chapters 13-15. It should be noted that the 
uncertainty in The General Theory was dealt mainly within portfolio choice, and 
its concept varied within the works of Keynes.   
There is a sceptical view on how much the UK government applied Keynesian 
economics to policies. See Roger Middleton, Government versus the Market: 
The Growth of the Public Sector, Economic Management and British Economic 
Performance, c.1890-1979 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996), p.532. In the 
argument of Middleton, since the post-World War II economy necessitated 
production of unemployment to manage unstable international currencies, there 
is a view questioning the occurrence of a Keynesian revolution. For detailed 
consideration of this matter, see chapter 6 of this thesis.  
In addition, it has been pointed out that the means of accommodating 
Keynesian economics in the UK and US were divergent. See Weir, ‘Ideas and 
Politics’, pp.53-86. Weir has emphasised that the infiltration of Keynesian 
economics depended on the extent to which the configuration of political 
institutions, such as the influence and openness of the Treasury department, 
oriented the theory. On the other hand, Hall explained that ‘the permeability of 
the civil service’, ‘the degree to which power over macroeconomic management 
was concentrated’ and ‘the power of central banks over policy making’ were 
decisive components adding to the influence of economists and politicians, see 
Peter A. Hall, ‘Conclusion: The Politics of Keynesian Ideas’, in Hall, The Political 
Power of Economic Ideas, p.378.  
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     Firstly, consideration must be made of how to apply the practical feature 
apparent within the market, known as ‘uncertainty’, to the monetary theory. 
Hicks, known for the IS-LM model, discarded the original meaning of uncertainty 
described in Keynes’ work, which can be interpreted as the anthropological or 
psychological human instinct.237 This simplified understanding of uncertainty 
inherited by ‘Keynesian’ or new-Keynesian economics presented a contrast to 
the Austrian School, post-Keynesian School and institutional economics. These 
latter groups can be considered to have attempted to incorporate more realistic 
and incalculable uncertainty into their theoretical frameworks.238 Meanwhile, 
others, in particular US new-Keynesian economists, abandoned the original 
interpretation of uncertainty, adjusting it into a predictable form as calculable 
risk or expected returns, sharing a common foundation with neoclassical 
economic assumptions.239 Therefore, one of the significant differences between 
                                                       
237 John R. Hicks, ‘Mr. Keynes and the “Classics”; A Suggested Interpretation’, 
Econometrica, Vol.5, No.2, April 1937, pp.147-59. For a critique on the theorem 
connected to the neoclassical economic assumption of Keynesian economics, 
as by Hicks, see Hodgson, Economics and Institutions. See also chapter 6 of 
this thesis. 
238 For an account on the Austrian School, which emphasised psychological 
effects within investment motives, see Gottfried Haberler, Prosperity and 
Depression: A Theoretical Analysis of Cyclical Movements, Third Edition (New 
York: United Nations, 1946), originally published 1937, chapters 3 and 6. It 
should be noted that even if uncertainty were removed from the market or 
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limited individual rationality, see Friedrich A. Hayek, Individualism and Economic 
Order (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), chapters 1 and 4. 
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Theoretical Psychology (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952).  
239  Over time, various theories emerged which were founded in theoretical 
reductionism and rational individuals, taking a dominant position in economics. 
For an influential paper of the period advancing the theories of rational 
expectations, see Robert E. Lucas Jr., ‘Expectations and the Neutrality of 
Money,’ Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.4, No.2, 1972, pp.103-24. For 
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the original work of Keynes and Keynesian economics applied to monetary 
policy was uncertainty. This change created a path to subsequent development 
of monetary and debt management policies, such as those connected to Tobin’s 
theories, which applied modified concepts of uncertainty. 
     Secondly, there existed dispute over whether money is supplied 
exogenously by monetary authorities or endogenously created in the banking 
structure. The Radcliffe Committee placed little emphasis on the role of money 
velocity and money supply. This is broadly recognised as the central work of 
Milton Friedman, who advanced Fisher’s equation of exchange, MV=PT.240 
Friedman argued that velocity (V) and the volume of transactions (T) remain 
historically and empirically stable, at least for the short term, so that price level 
(P) would be derived from money supply (M). The Radcliffe Committee denied 
the hypothesis of stable money velocity. Just as Keynes had suggested the 
fluctuation of Marshal’s k (1/V), the Radcliffe Committee showed its reluctance 
to accept the quantity theory of money. Therefore, the Radcliffe Committee had 
somewhat of a role in the succeeding development of endogenous money 
supply theory. 241  This endogenous money supply theory presented a 
contradiction to then-nascent exogenous monetary theory advanced by 
Friedman, which was a revival of the contention between the banking school 
                                                                                                                                                                  
information asymmetry, see G. A. Akerlof, An Economic Theorist’s Book of 
Tales (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). 
240 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1962), and Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, A monetary History of 
the United States 1867-1960 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). 
241 Nicholas Kaldor, ‘The New Monetarism’, Lloyds Bank Review, July 1970, 
pp.1-18, and Nicholas Kaldor, The Scourge of Monetarism, Second Edition 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), originally published 1982. Endogenous 
money supply theory emphasises that the level of circulated money or liquidity 
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and currency school in the nineteenth century.242 This controversy repeated 
historically and eventually re-emerged in Nicholas Kaldor’s critique on 
monetarism in the 1970s, and it’s rebuttal from ‘post Keynesian economics’, 
such as in Hyman Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis.243 
     Overlapping with the Radcliffe Committee’s suggestions, and overcoming 
the controversy over uncertainty and money supply, economist James Tobin 
advanced his academic monetary and debt management theory. Tobin’s theory 
first divides the market into money, bond and capital markets, then insists that 
the cost of a variety of assets consists of interest rates, asset yield and credit 
availability. These factors play a decisive role in reaching a new equilibrium. If 
central banks provide additional credit, resulting in the increase in free reserves 
of the banking industry, they then create additional money stock through the 
chain of increase in the amount of lending. 244  This created money would 
increase debt prices accompanied by reduction in its interest yield, eventually 
fostering stock market investment. This translates into the reduction in the yield 
                                                       
242 For critique on the currency school during the Bullionist Controversy, see 
Thomas Tooke, An Inquiry into the Currency Principle: The Connection of the 
Currency with the Prices, and the Expediency of a Separation of Issue from 
Banking (London: Longman, 1844). For exploration of the argument of Tooke, 
see Matthew Smith, ‘Thomas Tooke on the Bullionist controversies’, The 
European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Vol.15, No.1, 2008, 
pp.49-84. For the background of the dispute over the Bank Charter Act 1844, 
see Walter Bagehot, Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market 
(Connecticut: Hyperion Press, 1964), originally published 1873. 
243  Kaldor, The Scourge of Monetarism. Hyman P. Minsky, John Maynard 
Keynes (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975). Hyman P. Minsky, Can 
“It” Happen Again? Essays on Instability and Finance (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 
Inc., 1982). One of Minsky’s notable contributions to monetary theory is that 
uncertainties and non-perfect humans who cannot predict future events present 
determinant factors of investment and causal factors of volatile markets. These 
incalculable uncertainties share a common foundation with the theory of Frank 
Knight, who combined incalculable risk with market profits. Frank H. Knight, 
Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1921). 
244 This explanation of Tobin’s transmission mechanism of debt management 
policies is owing to the work of Keiji. Keiji Ida, Kokusai Kanri no Keizaigaku 
(Tokyo: Shinhyoron Publishing Inc., 1978), pp.192-4. 
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on shares, provoking investment demand. As interest rates change, financial 
institutions, that may take risks or precautions, choose optimal portfolios 
according to their liquidity preference, known as the ‘rebalancing portfolio effect’, 
and this decision changes credit availability for non-financial institutions. In the 
context of the US in the 1960s, Operation Twist shortened the maturity structure 
of government debt and increased outstanding balances of short-term debt. 
This short-term debt is more compatible with money (ultimate liquidity) than 
long-term bonds, therefore, it can increase free reserves of banks, which can be 
used for lending. Thus, in this theory, monetary authorities and Treasuries 
influence the goods market through change in interest rates of debt and the 
liquidity preference in financial markets. 245  In this sense, Tobin’s theory 
contributed to or enhanced the notion that debt management policy could be 
mobilised and controlled for managing the economy. 
     One of the major differences between Tobin’s theory and post-Keynesian or 
Keynes’ original economics is how uncertainty is dealt with in the theories. 
Tobin’s uncertainty refers to the macrocosm of safe and risky assets, with 
investors able to calculate the probability of the distribution of future risk and 
build a preferable portfolio. Therefore, Tobin’s uncertainty can be considered as 
calculable, whereas post-Keynesian uncertainty is applied in a broader sense 
and is the driving force behind financial instability. In addition, it should be noted 
that Tobin emphasised the money creation process within banking 
organisations in his theory, as opposed to the monetarist approach. 
                                                       
245 For an explanation of portfolio rebalancing theories, see James Tobin, ‘A 
general equilibrium approach to monetary theory’, Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking, Vol.1, No.1, pp.15-29. Regarding Tobin’s debt management theory, 
see James Tobin, ‘An Essay on the Principles of Debt Management’, in James 
Tobin, Essays in Economics Volume 1: Macroeconomics (Oxford: North-
Holland, 1971), pp.378-455, chapter 21.  
108 
 
     Tobin’s theory, however, gradually decreased in explanatory power in the 
wake of the monetarist theory that money supply plays a decisive role in the 
credit availability of the market.246 In the current context, empirical inconsistency 
is observed during periods of unconventional monetary easing, such as the 
quantitative easing succeeding the Great Financial Crisis.247 
     Returning to the context of the 1960s, theoretically and politically influenced 
by Tobin, the US introduced robust long-term interest rates policy. Of great 
importance here is that Tobin simplified the uncertainty developed by Keynes 
into calculable and safe or risky assets, which identified the liquidity effect. This, 
combined with the development of Keynesian economics rejecting exogenous 
money supply theory, was employed for monetary policies. As a consequence 
of the work of Tobin, with the great influence of Paul Samuelson on US policy 
formation, Keynesian economics enjoyed an era of high profile particularly in 
the US within monetary policies such as Operation Twist.248                  
                                                       
246 Notable monetarists Brunner and Meltzer emphasised ‘loan-rationing’ and 
‘non-Keynesian channels’ for the process of portfolio adjustments and relative 
asset pricing instead of the effect of interest rates, the so-called ‘Keynesian 
channel’. See Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer, ‘Money and Credit in the 
Monetary Transmission Process’, The American Economic Review, Vol.78, 
No.2, 1988, pp.446-51, and Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer, Money and the 
Economy: Issues in Monetary Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993), pp.53-103. 
247 There is extensive research on the effects of quantitative easing. However, 
there is no consensus on the effects on bank lending and structures of interest 
rates through portfolio rebalancing arising from quantitative easing. For a 
comprehensive survey of the effects of quantitative easing, see Claudio Borio 
and Anna Zabai, ‘Unconventional monetary policies: a re-appraisal’, BIS 
Working Papers, No.570, July 2016. For casework on quantitative easing and 
portfolio rebalancing, see Johannes Tischer, ‘Quantitative Easing, Portfolio 
Rebalancing and Credit Growth: Micro Evidence from Germany’, Bundesbank 
Discussion Paper, No.20, 2018. 
248  Under the Kennedy administration, Paul Samuelson and Walter Heller 
played a significant role within the policy making process. Samuelson and Allan 
Sproul, former President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, supported 
Operation Twist. See Meltzer, A History of the Federal Reserve, Vol.2, p.316. 
Sproul is well known for his role in the Accord between the Federal Reserve and 
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     Conversely, in spite of the Radcliffe Committee’s assertion of the impact of 
general liquidity effects within the interest rates structure, which can be 
considered not conflictive with Tobin’s theoretical components, major control of 
the interest rates structure, in the US sense, was not implemented in the UK. 
Rather, there was reluctance to mobilise the long-term interest rates, especially 
from the Bank of England.249 Thus the unavoidable question looms of why the 
UK was not able to introduce its own Operation Twist, or mobilise change in 
long-term interest rates so as to enhance the balance of payments and 
encourage business investment. This chapter will investigate this through 
analysis of the political process of monetary policy formation. 
 
3.3    Economic background 
 
In 1958, gold outflow from the US became prominent. The gold certificate held 
by the Federal Reserve plummeted by approximately 25 billion dollars between 
1958 and 1960 (Figure 3-2). As Figure 3-3 indicates, the US basic balance of 
payments significantly worsened throughout the entire period of the 1960s with 
the exception of the years 1961 and 1964. Under the Bretton Woods system, 
the gold drain from the Treasury’s gold window caused unrest surrounding the 
prestige of the dollar pegged with gold.250  Moreover, President Kennedy’s 
                                                                                                                                                                  
the US Treasury in 1951, which was the turning point from bolstering the prices 
of federal debt by the purchase of FRBs towards bills-only policy. 
249  John G. Gurley, ‘The Radcliffe Report and Evidence’, The American 
Economic Review, Vol. 50, No. 4, September 1960, pp. 672-700. 
250 The link between the amount of issued Federal Reserve notes and real 
assets, such as silver and gold, gradually weakened. Congress abrogated the 
Silver Purchase Act in 1963, and the Kennedy administration phased out the 
holding of silver. Succeeding this change, on 3 March 1965, Congress 
discarded the rule regulating the holding of gold reserves at 25 per cent of 
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administration faced a high unemployment rate inherited from President 
Eisenhower’s administration (Figure 3-1). The target unemployment rate was 4 
per cent, so-called ‘full employment’, however, this target was not met until 
economic expansion and inflation occurred, driven by escalation of the Vietnam 
War. With an unfavourable economic condition and outlook, the administration 
succeeding Eisenhower was faced with the necessity to break the international 
and domestic economic impasse.  
 
Figure 3-1: US Price Index and Unemployment Rate 
 
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Federal notes and deposit liabilities. On 18 March, Congress abolished these 
reserve requirements on Federal notes. For a historical account, see Raj Roy, 
‘The Battle for Bretton Woods: America, Britain and the international financial 
crisis of October 1967-March 1968’, Cold War History, Vol.2, No.2, 2002, pp.33-
60. Roy argued that the Treasury reduced its dependency on gold holdings to 
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Figure 3-3: Overall Payments Balance ($ Millions) 
















1960 -3,620 2,846 1,157 -567 -3,711 -1,211 
1961 -3,312 3,175 1,668 -656 -2,432 -20 
1962 -3,058 2,018 2,080 -1,085 -2,865 -1,043 
1963 -2,865 2,342 1,754 -1,396 -2,554 -1,339 
1964 -2,882 3,769 2,085 -2,177 -3,088 -100 
1965 -3,125 1,999 1,384 -1,166 -1,421 -1,817 
1966 -3,802 665 654 762 -2,165 -2,621 
1967 -4,601 277 1,944 -95 -4,890 -3,973 
1968 -4,420 -2,711 2,552 3,750 -2,169 -2,287 
1969 -4,456 -2,487 3,476 2,315 -5,919 -3,949 
1970 -4,992 -507 2,947 1,816 -4,466 -3,760 
1971 -5,887 -5,590 2,258 530 -23,779 -10,367 
1972 -7,050 -9,381 4,539 3,082 -15,786 -11,113 
1973 -6,538 -2,416 7,878 2,489 -9,602 -977 
Source: Derived from Fred L. Block, The Origins of International Economic 
Disorder, A Study of United States International Monetary Policy from World 
War II to the Present (London: University of California Press, 1977), p.160. 
      
     President Kennedy unveiled several strategies to decrease the 
unemployment rate and defend the dollar. One of the main strategies proposed 
was to control the structure of interest rates. The Kennedy government 
calculated that reduction in long-term interest rates would foster business 
investment, and that an increase in short-term interest rates would alleviate the 
gold outflow. This scheme was considered as a means of breaking through the 
impasse of economic upswing leading to a deficit in the trade balance and 
inflation, which would be detrimental on the export market through the 
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difference of Purchasing Power Parity. Under this guideline, the US Treasury 
department issued more Treasury Bills (TB) and less medium and long-term 
bonds while the Federal Reserve absorbed long-term bonds through open 
market operations.  
     This co-ordinated debt management pushed up short-term interest rates of 
US government securities and the interest rates of long-term bonds remained 
low. The yield of government bonds moved along the aim of Operation Twist, 
which was to flatten the yield curve (Figure 3-4). However, incredulous eyes 
were cast on Operation Twist regarding its effect. Tobin argued that increase in 
Regulation Q, which capped various interest rates on deposits at commercial 
banks, significantly affected the interest rates structure and was the most 
prominent factor of the success of the interest rates policy.251 Moreover, the 
interest rates of US long-term government bonds were regulated under the 
Second Liberty Bond Act, with a cap of 4.25 per cent, which might have 
contributed to lowering or maintaining long-term interest rates.252 In this respect, 
Operation Twist can be considered a policy that provided a means of financing 
the government through containing the interest rates of bonds below this ceiling, 
which entailed circumstance for the issue of bonds.  
                                                       
251  Tobin, Essays in Economics Volume 1, p.343. Tobin asserted that ‘the 
greatest triumphs of Operation Twist were due to increase in Regulation Q, 
which eased the markets for mortgages and long-term securities while short-
term rates were kept at an internationally safe level’. Regulation Q applied to 
bank deposit accounts, not to savings and loan associations. 
252 The Second Liberty Bond Act Section 1 regulated interest rates on the US 
governmental medium and long-term bonds, the maturities of which were longer 
than 5 years, up to 4.25 per cent. In 1959, the interest rates on medium and 
long-term bonds exceeded this limit. The US Treasury contrived to repeal this 
regulation and drew the concession from the Attorney General that this 
regulation covered not discount government bonds but coupon rates on the 
bond, which was written in Section 20. During the high interest period of the 
Vietnam War, this legal limit curtailed coverage on the bonds, applied to 
maturities over 7 years in 1967. In 1971, Congress determined that the issue of 
bonds up to 100 million dollars were excluded from this interest rates regulation. 
114 
 
Figure 3-4: US Yield Curves (%) 
 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Selected Interest Rates. 
 
     Meanwhile, the UK focused on the Bank Rate in order to control short-term 
capital outflow and did not embark on manipulation of long-term interest rates. 
In the UK, the spread between the TB (Treasury Bill) rate and consols widened 
during the span of the Kennedy era under Operation Twist from 1961 to 1963 
(Figure 3-5). This graph shows that in the UK, the gap widened from 1 per cent 
in 1961 to 2 per cent in 1963, contrasting with movements in the US under 
Operation Twist. In this period, the UK relied on traditional monetary and fiscal 
measures for economic management. During the Berlin Crisis of July 1961, the 
Bank increased the Bank Rate from 5 per cent to 7 per cent, and increased the 
rate on special deposits by 1 per cent. On the fiscal side, in the same year, 
Selwyn Lloyd, Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced a 10 per cent surcharge 
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government announced strict incomes policy, setting a six-month pay-pause in 
the public sector, and declared a further reduction in public expenditures of 
£300 million for the period covering 1962-63. This band of policies were 
collectively termed the ‘July measures’.253  
 
Figure 3-5: UK TB Rate and Yield on Consols 
 
Source: N. H. Dimsdale, ‘British Monetary Policy since 1945’, in N. F. R. Crafts 
and Nicholas Woodward, (eds.), The British Economy Since 1945 (Oxford: 
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TB 4.63 6.69 6.50 3.69 4.69 6.63 5.63 5.50 
Short- 
dated 4.99 6.55 5.80 4.51 5.64 6.23 6.95 6.55 
Medium- 
dated 5.72 6.64 6.18 4.82 5.72 6.05 6.81 6.47 
Long-dated 5.58 6.54 6.33 5.05 5.85 6.03 6.69 6.17 
2.5% 
Consols 5.33 6.59 6.36 5.38 6.05 6.15 6.66 6.20 
Source: TNA, T326/371, Debt Management. 
 
Figure 3-7: UK Yield Curves (%) 
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Figure 3-8: UK Bank Rate 1958-1973 
 
Source: The Bank of England, Official Bank Rate History.  
Note: From October 1972 the rate refers to the Minimum Lending Rate. 
      
 
     In November 1963, the succeeding Chancellor Reginald Maudling 
announced fiscal measures known as the ‘dash for growth’ and embarked on 
expansionary policies, with the decrease in purchase tax on motors, increase in 
investment allowances and depreciation rates on the industrial sector.254 This is 
considered the transition point from ‘stop’ to ‘go’.255 As a preliminary monetary 
measure, the Bank had decreased the Bank Rate to 4 per cent in January 
1963.256  
                                                       
254 Cairncross, Managing the British Economy, pp.65-7. 
255 Paul Mosley, The Making of Economic Policy: Theory and Evidence from 
Britain and the United States since 1945 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), 
p.98. 
256 Maudling also proposed a new international currency swap scheme, the 
Mutual Currency Account. However, this proposal was declined by the US. As 



























































































































     In order to ameliorate the balance of payments deficit and to encourage 
economic expansion, the UK government relied on various fiscal measures and 
manipulation of the Bank Rate with the ancillary special deposit scheme.257 
Meanwhile, the UK did not directly intervene in the long-term interest rates to a 
significant scale, and the Bank reiterated its stance to maintain a sound gilt-
edged market. Capie has detailed that Cameron Cobbold, Governor of the Bank 
from 1949 to 1961, was reluctant to intervene in the gilt-edged market. The 
Governor stated that he would enhance and maintain the sound gilt-edged 
market if a situation where this was necessary emerged.258  In sum, while 
common ground was found in fiscal measures between the UK and the US, UK 
monetary measures, particularly in the terrain of debt management, did not 
undertake direct manipulation of the long-term interest rates under 
governmental schemes, whereas the US did so under Operation Twist. The 
cause of this diversion is considered below, from the British perspective. 
 
3.4    Direct control of interest rates 
3.4.1    The attempt to establish preferential interest rates to encourage 
exports 
 
Before the UK government considered manipulation of long-term interest rates 
through debt management, in 1961 Prime Minister Harold Macmillan sought the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
a currency swap market by establishing the Dollar Swap Agreement in 1962.  
257 N. H. Dimsdale, ‘British Monetary Policy since 1945’, in N. F. R. Crafts and 
Nicholas Woodward, (eds.), The British Economy Since 1945 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 116, and C. A. E. Goodhart, ‘Monetary policy in the 
United Kingdom’, in Karel Holbik (ed.), Monetary Policy in Twelve Industrial 
Countries (Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1973), pp.465-524. 
258 Capie, The Bank of England, pp.107-8. 
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means to encourage exports through change of the structure of market interest 
rates. The proposed scheme was called ‘finance for exports’. On 24 October 
1961, in a telegram to the Chancellor, the Prime Minister mentioned differential 
interest rates for exports, and he expressed that he was ‘most anxious’ this 
scheme be introduced.259 Just months prior to this, an interim report by the 
Treasury concerning the cost of export finance had been circulated.260 This 
report asserted that the rise in the Bank Rate discouraged exports. However, it 
also expressed a dim view of the possibility of persuading banks to offer 
medium-term fixed interest rate credit or concessionary rates for a specific area 
of exporters. Conversely, the interim report considered a ‘special cheap rate of 
interest’ which was considered at 0.5 per cent below the Bank Rate, and ‘would 
have to be made good’ by the government.261 
     On 13 September 1961, the Working Group on the Cost of Export Finance 
discussed export finance based on the interim report.262 First, this working 
group put forth the disadvantageous effects of high long-term interest rates on 
exporters. Long-term interest rates were considered not to be affected by the 
changes in the Bank Rate, and it was outlined that reduction of long-term 
interest rates would foster investment overseas, which could be detrimental to 
the position of the foreign reserves. Focusing on short-term interest rates, the 
working group concluded that a scheme should be designed to shield exporters 
                                                       
259 TNA, BT213/145, Prime Minister’s Personal Telegram to the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, 24 October 1961. 
260 TNA, T312/260, Cost of Export Finance, Sir William Armstrong to Leslie 
O’Brien, 17 August 1961. 
261 Ibid. 
262 TNA, T312/260, Working Group on the Cost of Export Finance, Note of a 
meeting held at the Treasury, 13 September 1961, 3 p.m. This working group 
consisted of staff representing the Treasury, Bank of England, Board of Trade, 




from the effects of short-term interest rate fluctuations. 263  Evidently, while 
Operation Twist was conducted in the US in the early 1960s, the UK Treasury 
perceived that high long-term interest rates would constrain export activity, 
whereas lower long-term interest rates would potentially foster capital outflow. 
     On 6 October 1961, the working group investigated possible methods to 
increase exports. These methods consisted of concessional rates provided by 
the banks, export finance from public funds and a subsidy from the Treasury to 
the commercial banks. 264  Concerning concessional rates from commercial 
banks, the working group discussed the difficulties of persuading or compelling 
the banks to provide cheap money. Regarding establishment of public funds, 
the working group was concerned that this would entail the necessity for 
legislation and that such institutions would become permanent. In addition, 
necessary fiscal funding, possibly £600-700 million, was seen to put significant 
pressure on the gilt-edged market.  
     In terms of a subsidy from the Treasury, the working group concluded that its 
main practical advantage manifested in lower costs to manage the scheme, 
however, this scheme presented limited effects and a possible breach of 
international rule.265 Under European Free Trade Association (EFTA) guidelines, 
grants of export credit from the government and governmental agencies were 
prohibited. EFTA also prohibited governments to bear the costs incurred by 
exports. In addition, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
prohibited export subsidies for manufacturers. While the UK was considering 
accession to the EEC and played a leading role in elimination of trade barriers 
                                                       
263 Ibid. 
264 TNA, T312/261, Working Group on the Cost of Export Finance: Report to 




in the world market, subsidies were not considered the course to be pursued. 
Furthermore, regarding the establishment of public funds in order to provide 
export finance, the working group was concerned that this scheme would create 
additional fiscal burden, and that the legislative process would be 
controversial.266  
     While the working group demonstrated its reluctance to create a 
governmental scheme to provide cheap money through the financial market or 
public agencies, at this stage, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan put significant 
pressure on the Treasury and the Bank. He suggested that if the Bank were 
sluggish to consider preferential interest rates, he would summon the Governor, 
Chancellor and the President of the Board of Trade.267 At the end of October 
1961, Frederick Erroll, President of the Board of Trade, requested the 
Chancellor establish an institution to foster export finance.268 Under pressure 
from the Prime Minister and the Board of Trade, the Chancellor reported to 
Macmillan that resulting from his meeting with Frederick Erroll, they were in 
agreement that international rule overriding the government subsidy scheme 
was ‘formidable’ and they would seek a lending scheme, as opposed to a 
subsidy, with interest rates that would be government borrowing rates plus a 
margin.269 Export finance was on course to be managed, not by a governmental 
institutional scheme, but rather conducted in the market as lending in order not 
to breach the international commercial treaties. On 13 January 1962, the Bank 
                                                       
266 Ibid. 
267 TNA, T326/405, Extract from the minutes of a meeting between the Prime 
Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sunday 24 September 1961, 9 
p.m. 
268 TNA, BT213/145, The Cost of Export Finance, President of the Board of 
Trade to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 24 October 1961 and Export 
Incentives, Note of a meeting held in the Chancellor’s Room, Tuesday 31 
October 1961, 10 a.m. 
269 TNA, BT213/145, Differential Interest Rates for Export Credits, Chancellor to 
the Prime Minister 31 October 1961. 
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reached an agreement with the London Clearing Banks, Scottish Banks, and 
insurance companies over preferential interest rates. The agreement was to 
provide credit for exporters at a fixed rate of 5.5 per cent for between three and 
five years. In addition, insurance companies also agreed to provide credit at 6.5 
per cent up to £100 million for longer than five years.270  
     As seen above, the Prime Minister’s attempt to forge a scheme to encourage 
exports through reduction in medium and long-term interest rates for exporters 
was embodied in its management within the financial market through the 
initiative taken by the Bank. However, the proposed scheme in which the 
government or governmental agencies would take initiative was dropped due to 
rules set by international trade organisations, and in order to avoid permanent 
burden on public finance. 
 
3.4.2    Two-tier interest rates to defend the foreign reserves 
 
Following President Kennedy’s suggestion of differential short-term interest 
rates for non-residents, foreign governments and monetary authorities to 
encourage official holders of dollar balances and hamper conversion of dollars 
to gold, the UK government began considering ‘two-tier interest rates’.271 On 14 
                                                       
270 TNA, T312/261, The Cost of Export Finance, Sir Frank Lee (Permanent 
Secretary to the Treasury) to Hubback (Principal Private Secretary to the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer) 15 January 1962. Statement by the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer on Tuesday 23 January 1962. As Figure 3-8 indicates, the range 
of Bank Rates between 1961 and 1963 was between 4 and 7 per cent (the 
highest rate was 7 per cent in January 1961, which then dropped gradually to 4 
per cent in January 1963).  
271 In October 1962, the amendment was passed and differential interest rates 
were introduced in the US. This scheme applied to foreign governments, 
monetary and financial institutions and international institutions of which the US 
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March 1961, Frederick Erroll proposed a scheme to set higher interest rates on 
foreign deposits in London to attract foreign capital and enhance the foreign 
reserves position.272 In response to this proposal, the Bank confessed little faith 
in this scheme, citing the following reasons: if devaluation were expected by the 
market, high interest rates could not keep funds in London; the scheme would 
potentially insulate the domestic sector from the foreign sector and would be 
understood as the UK not taking sufficient measures to protect sterling in the 
domestic field; it would discriminate between domestic and foreign official and 
unofficial sterling holders which would impair the ‘strength and breadth of the 
markets in London’ as an international financial centre; the scheme would be 
kept outside the market and it would be necessary to provide monetising 
opportunities which would lead to further liquidation of UK gilts; under such a 
scheme sterling holders would hedge their exchange risk by forward exchange 
sale of sterling which would require the Bank to intervene in the forward 
exchange market to keep sterling attractive for investors; there would be 
difficulties in setting effective special rates.273 This discussion reflected various 
aims of the Bank that sought sound gilt-edged markets and maintenance of 
confidence in sterling, especially for the holders of sterling balances and the 
internationally high profile of financial institutions in the City. 
     On 8 October 1962, Reginald Maudling, Chancellor of the Exchequer, also 
considered the above preferential interest rates for foreign depositors.274 On 18 
                                                                                                                                                                  
had been a member. BoEA, C43/321, U.S.A – Privileged Rates for Deposits of 
Central Banks, 22 October 1962. 
272 TNA, T326/405, President of the Board of Trade to the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, 16 March 1961. 
273 TNA, T326/405, Differential Interest Rates, 27 April 1961, and Differential 
Interest Rates, Sir William Armstrong to Sir Denis Rickett, 9 May 1961. 




October 1962, the Bank once again criticised this scheme. 275  From its 
perspective, this scheme would disturb the structure of market interest rates 
and would incur ‘inescapable practical impediments’.276 The London clearing 
banks would be in a weaker position due to the necessity to pay higher interest 
rates to foreign depositors. Even if a ‘special security’ bearing higher interest 
rates were issued, the Bank was concerned that the conversion of existing 
investment from overseas in gilt-edged securities to the newly issued special 
securities would disturb the gilt-edged market. In his conclusive remark, 
Governor Cromer asserted that such a scheme would ‘threaten to make the 
cure worse than the disease’.277  Although the Bank was preoccupied with 
measures to tackle the balance of payments deficit, it also represented the 
interests of the City and a preference for a sound gilt-edged market. This stance 
of the Bank, which was also seen in the Radcliffe Committee, was a contributing 
factor to the intensification of the conflict between Chancellor Maudling and 
Governor Cromer surrounding fiscal mobilisation towards economic growth.278  
     Rather than establish preferential interest rates for foreign depositors, 
Cromer proposed his own schemes, the ‘Governor’s Technical Device’ and 
forward market operation.279 This proposed that the Bank would lend to the 
discount market at 0.5 per cent above the Bank Rate in circumstances that the 
Bank Rate reduced, in a similar idea to the scheme currently termed ‘dirty’ 
                                                       
275 TNA, T326/405, Governor of the Bank of England to Sir William Armstrong, 
18 October 1962, and Differential Interest Rates, 18 October 1962. 
276 Ibid. 
277 Ibid. 
278  For the bitter relationship between Chancellor Maudling and Governor 
Cromer, see Lewis Baston, Reggie: The Life of Reginald Maudling (Stroud: 
Sutton Publishing Limited, 2004), p.184. Governor Cromer repeatedly warned 
Chancellor Maudling regarding the increase in public expenditure, however, this 
was ignored, resulting in the Governor directly contacting Prime Minister 
Macmillan rather than going through the Chancellor. 
279 TNA, T326/405, Governor of the Bank of England to Sir William Armstrong, 
18 October 1962, and Differential Interest Rates, 18 October 1962. 
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interest rate targeting. Cromer asserted that this would keep the cost of the 
discount market high and increase the TB rate. Its influence would be placed 
upon the short-dated gilts and local authority borrowing, which were linked to 
the movements of the TB rate, therefore, the drain on foreign funds would be 
abated. In addition, Cromer explained that the bank advance was strongly 
connected to the Bank Rate rather than the discount rate, so that this scheme 
would not hamper credit provision of banks. Furthermore, the Bank considered 
intervention in the forward dollar market. The aim of this proposal was that the 
Bank would sell dollars in the forward market to reduce the cost of risk hedging. 
However, it noted that the operation would have to be used meticulously so as 
not to provoke a backlash from the US, which had sought to unencumber the 
sale of dollars.280  
     Therefore, this ‘Governor’s Technical Device’ aimed to increase short-term 
gilt-edged securities in order to attract foreign capital without hampering bank 
lending. However, the prevalent view was that it would sacrifice local authority 
finance, and that it would be paramount to manage these schemes in order to 
circumvent a backlash from US. 
     On 20 December 1962, the Chancellor rejected the attempt to establish an 
institutionalised higher interest rates system for foreign funds and took on the 
above two schemes proposed by the Bank, which would be operated at the 
discretion of the Bank. 281  This decision represented the initiative of the 
manipulation or management of the interest rates structure being taken by the 
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Bank, and with this, the influence of Prime Minister Macmillan and the Treasury 
faded away. 
 
3.5    Debt management 
3.5.1    Operation Twist in Britain? 
 
Harold Macmillan noted in his diary on 19 October 1962 that Cromer and 
Maudling sought to lower long-term interest rates.282 On 19 April 1962, the 
discussion over long-term interest rates had begun within the Treasury.283 One 
of the main points of this discussion was whether the UK government should 
decrease long-term interest rates to support business investment, finance local 
authorities, and foster home ownership. Sir Frank Lee, Joint Permanent 
Secretary to the Treasury, noted that the monetary policy of the preceding two 
years had sought reduction in the issue of short-term debt, represented by the 
TB, and pushed up long-term interest rates in order to create a favourable 
milieu for funding government debt. With this analysis, it was stated that 
relatively high long-term interest rates would be key for ‘attracting increased 
investment and in discouraging borrowing by overseas countries’. It was noted 
that succeeding 4-5 years government expenditure was ‘built in’, so it became 
necessary to consider means of funding government debt. Consequently, this 
discussion admonished further reduction in the Bank Rate or special deposit 
                                                       
282 Catterall, The Macmillan Diaries Vol. II, p.507. In fact, the most enthusiastic 
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283 TNA, T326/39, The Long Term Interest Rates, Sir Frank Lee to Hubback, 19 
April 1962. The requirement to embark on reducing long-term interest rates by 
Harold Macmillan was seen in 1959, in TNA, PREM11/4772, Prime Minister’s 
Personal Minute to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 30 January 1959. 
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rate when economic stimulus policies were required, and concluded that 
‘somewhat’ of a fall in long-term interest rates in the circumstances ‘may be 
appropriate’.284 While the US concluded that through Operation Twist lower 
long-term interest rates would encourage business investment, the UK 
predicted that lower long-term interest rates would lead to increase in the costs 
of public finance through hampering capital inflow. 
     On 25 April 1962, the Bank provided a new perspective, considering 
potential impact of change in interest rates on local authorities’ finance.285 
Cromer pointed out that high interest rates for local governments suppressed 
the funding condition of local authorities, whereas conversely, it attracted 
‘possibly £100 million of foreign money’. Cromer continued that while the 
situation was precarious for the exchange market and local authorities, ‘some 
modification’ for local authorities should be considered. The meeting weighed 
arguments over the reduction in long-term interest rates, however, it was 
agreed that the further issue of long-term government bonds would be 
necessary to enable the Bank to control the end market in the long-term and to 
continue funding policy.286 Here it should be noted that the new issue of long-
term bonds would put rising pressure on long-term interest rates. 
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     In line with the Bank, William Armstrong, Permanent Secretary to the 
Treasury, argued that an attempt to pull down the long-term interest rates to 
between 5 and 5.5 per cent would be ‘a mistake’ and that rates should be let be 
in the markets which would force them ‘towards a gradual fall’.287 In stark 
contrast to the opinion of Armstrong, characterised by advocacy of market 
forces, the Prime Minister stressed that a government interventional scheme 
was required due to the ‘political importance of trying to get down mortgage 
rates on houses’. 288  At this time, building societies competed with local 
authorities over funding, and their borrowing rates were linked to gilt-edged 
rates, hence the dispute over long-term interest rates also related to the 
arrangement of interests amongst building societies and local authorities.  
     In terms of housing policies under the Macmillan government, the 
Conservative Party is considered to have strongly pushed free market forces 
into the housing market, which was crystallised into the abolition of Land Tax on 
imputed rental income, dubbed Schedule A, and deregulation of the private 
rental market.289 Eventually, the post-World War II ‘property-owning democracy’ 
or ‘home-owning society’ gained momentum, at least under the Conservative 
government, contrasting to the previous trend of the expansion of social 
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housing and various regulations on the private rental housing market.290 As 
existing research on the housing policies has also suggested, Prime Minister 
Harold Macmillan tried to push mortgage interest rates down and expand the 
private housing market, however, it will be delineated below that this attempt 
was attacked by Cromer in advocacy of free market forces. 
     The Prime Minister expressed clearly his position over the long-term interest 
rates on 14 June 1962.291 He asserted to the Chancellor, ‘You know how keen I 
have been to try to get the long term interest rate down. This has been largely 
for social and political reasons. I was thinking of mortgage etc.’. As an 
‘additional reason’, he pointed out that  
 
 if industrial investment is really beginning to fall it is very important to try 
 to get a reduction in its cost. [...] I hope therefore you will most seriously 
 consider the necessary technical steps to achieve a lower long term 
 interest rate, even if it is not possible yet to make any further reduction in 
 the bank rate 292  
 
The Prime Minister detailed the additional factor that lowering long-term interest 
rates would bolster the economy through reduction in the costs of industries. 
Furthermore, he implied it would also reduce the cost borne by local authorities 
in a critical market condition to raise funds in the era of high long-term interest 
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rates.293 As such, by advocating a policy which partially mirrored the US debt 
management policies in the same field of long-term interest rates, the Prime 
Minister sought the UK’s own version of the US scheme. However, it should be 
noted that the UK government also considered reduction in the Bank Rate. 
     Spurred by the Prime Minister’s ardent recommendation of long-term interest 
rates manipulation, the Bank and Treasury began investigations into its 
plausibility. On 12 June 1962, the draft version of their report on the Prime 
Minister’s proposed scheme predicted long-term interest rates would not fall 
very far due to the strong demand for capital, and pointed out that inappropriate 
government handling would lead to ‘the loss of monetary control through the 
inflation of the market Treasury Bill issue’ and provoke ‘the danger of the loss of 
public confidence’.294 The report concluded that ‘the right policy’ was not to 
accelerate, but to let the long-term interest rates take a ‘gradual fall’. It again 
stressed the importance of letting market forces determine the prices and rates 
of gilt-edged securities, and the necessity to avoid possible disruption from a 
change in the interest rates structure. 
     Concerning building societies and local authorities, this draft report argued 
that building societies determined borrowing rates according to their chief 
competitors: local authorities. Conversely, local authority rates offered to 
investors were influenced by gilt-edged rates. The structure of the competition 
was recognised in the report as one of the elements which would encumber the 
funding of local authorities. It was asserted that even if the lowering of long-term 
interest rates were accomplished, the rate offered by building societies would 
decrease along its trend so that the effect of lowering long-term interest rates 
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would be limited to foster favourable circumstance for local authority funding. 
Moreover, it was stated that the lowering of interest rates by building societies 
would lead to the reduction of income tax relief on interest for borrowers, such 
as mortgage interest relief, which would not benefit mortgagors.295 This report 
cast a sceptical view on the effect of lowering long-term interest rates for 
mortgage borrowers and local authorities on the grounds of these potentially 
paradoxical results.  
     This investigation moved on to consider taxation on building societies in 
order to provide lower mortgage rates. At the time, building societies were 
subject to income tax and profits tax. However, building societies sought 
exemption from profits tax due to their public nature and the fact that any 
surplus went to reserves for re-lending, thus in their assertion making them not 
profitable. If this tax exemption were implemented, it was calculated that the 
lending rate of building societies would reduce by 0.25 per cent. However, this 
would cost the government budget £15 million and possibly reach £40 million if 
other co-operative societies were included in this scheme. This proposed 
taxation reform was previously considered at committee and rejected by the 
government in 1962, hence the investigation reiterated that this scheme would 
not be suitable for reduction in the cost for borrowers purchasing houses.296 
     The balance of payments deficit and its influence on sterling were also 
significant aspects for concern, and were brought to the Chancellor’s attention 
through a draft investigation on 25 June 1962. However, as this draft strongly 
criticised the Prime Minister’s suggested schemes, the Chancellor requested 
that the report to be presented to the Prime Minister should be made ‘much 
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shorter’ and ‘more positive’.297 Thus, the brief version was handed to the Prime 
Minister on 11 July 1962.298 It raised the potential advantageous points of low 
long-term interest rates as beneficial for government finance, nationalised 
industries, local authorities, private industries through cost reduction, and 
individual mortgagors. The report also pointed out that low long-term interest 
rates would be compatible with international co-operation over foreign exchange, 
and would be beneficial if the UK joined the European Economic Community 
(EEC).  
     However, potential disadvantageous effects of lowering long-term interest 
rates were also detailed in the report. It pointed out that lowering long-term 
interest rates would make the City markedly less attractive for foreign investors. 
If interest rates were to swiftly take the opposite turn, it would ‘destroy’ the 
appeal of gilt-edged securities and make management of monetary policy 
‘needlessly more difficult’. In addition, the Chancellor predicted an increase in 
income and overseas interest rates, with further difficulties to emerge 
surrounding the dollar.299 In other words, the Chancellor expected potential 
inflation driven by the increase in wages in the UK, combined with the possible 
loss of foreign reserves and deterioration of the balance of payments with the 
internationally wider gap of interest rates. The Chancellor took the stance that if 
this were to occur, the UK exchange market and gilt-edged market would be 
difficult to manage. In the conclusive remark of this report, the best course was 
deemed ‘to continue to allow the increasing demand for gilt-edged to be 
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reflected primarily in rising prices rather than in sales by ourselves’ and ‘to 
maintain firmly our anti-inflationary policies’.300 
     In response to this assessment of his proposal to lower long-term interest 
rates, the Prime Minister asserted that he was ‘not very much impressed by 
either of the documents.’ Rather than assert his proposals a second time in the 
same manner, Prime Minister Macmillan sought to avoid ‘embarrassment with 
the officials of both the Treasury and the Bank of England’, and ordered 
Timothy Bligh, Principal Private Secretary, to consider this matter.301 However, 
the issue of long-term interest rates left a significant rift between the Prime 
Minister and the Chancellor. In September 1962, the Prime Minister denounced 
the Chancellor’s attitude toward long-term interest rates. He stated, 
 
 I think it was the Treasury who brought great pressure on Conservative 
 Chancellors to force the local authorities on to the market. No doubt they 
 expected them to go on to the long term market and not to borrow money 
 from day to day. However, it would be as well to see what Mr. Butler or I 
 said when we held your present post, not because it should alter the 
 present decision but because we shall have to put the best face on it we 
 can and the line of defence should be thought out ahead.302  
 
     From the above arguments and this dispute between the Prime Minister and 
the Treasury, chiefly Selwyn Lloyd, it is clear that the Prime Minister sought to 
lower long-term interest rates in order to create favourable circumstances for 
various aims, including funding local authorities in a less costly manner, 
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encouraging business investment, reduction of mortgage rates and to 
ameliorate the balance of payments by increasing exports through fostering 
industrial investment. In this situation, some Treasury officials echoed the Prime 
Minister’s view that reduction in long-term interest rates was paramount. 
Thomas Padmore, of the Treasury, expressed his view that a fall in long-term 
interest rates was more important than the ‘marginal effect of a small reduction 
in short-term rates.’303 However, although the Bank and Treasury recognised 
the significance of long-term interest rates, they did not follow Prime Minster 
Macmillan’s line of express necessity to take any measure to manipulate rates, 
mainly so as not to disrupt the gilt-edged market and potentially harm the 
standing of the City as an international financial centre. Cromer in particular was 
preoccupied with defending financial markets, and stated that he was anxious 
not to jeopardise the trend of falling long-term interest rates.304 In addition, 
Cromer was reluctant to increase the Bank Rate so as not to damage the price 
of long-term bonds. In sum, the Prime Minister’s proposal was denied in a 
backlash from the Chancellor, Treasury and the Bank, who sought to defend 
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3.5.2    September 1962: debt management and low interest rates  
 
With the New York Stock Exchange in doldrums and the US economy slowing, 
the circumstances surrounding the UK gilt-edged market significantly altered. 
The UK attracted foreign funds and its bond prices continued to rise over the 
course of 1962. As Figure 3-9 indicates, the prices of all maturities of gilt-edged 
securities including long-term bonds continued to rise (interest yield decreased). 
 
Figure 3-9: Interest Yields of Gilt-edged Securities in 1962 










(Consols)   
January 1st 6.0 6.3 6.4 6.6 
July 1st 5.3 6.1 6.3 6.2 
September 
1st 4.4 4.9 5.2 5.5 
Source: TNA, T326/40, Slater to Burdett, 15 October 1962. 
      
     This trend of lower long-term interest rates was sceptically considered by 
officials of the Treasury. 305  Sir William Armstrong analysed this trend as 
‘equilibrium’, and asserted that the range should be kept between 5 and 6 per 
cent. On the other hand, Slater, of the Treasury, accepted that tighter credit 
control would ‘make investment by companies more dependent upon external 
finance and marginally more responsive to changes in long-term rates’. Slater 
continued to explain that if long-term rates were to fall to the region of 4.5 per 
cent, the private construction industry or local authorities might invest 
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substantially and it would create favourable circumstances for tax reduction and 
increase in employment. Furthermore, Slater pointed out that this trend would 
ease public finance which would prove beneficial politically and electorally. 
However, he suggested that due to inflationary pressure residing in this trend, 
the ‘proper’ long-term interest rate ought to be 5.5 per cent. As such, Slater 
raised an argument to stop the trend of lowering long-term interest rates.306 The 
trend of low interest rates was recognised as the driving force in expanding 
business investment and employment, which could aid Conservative election, 
whereas the Treasury considered that such expansive economic policies risked 
potential inflation. Therefore, the Treasury favoured stopping or leaving the 
trend of low interest rates to the market arbitrage force. 
     At this stage, a sceptical view in relation to the Radcliffe Committee’s report 
was cast by the Treasury that, although the increase in liquidity would 
encourage consumption expenditure, investment was ‘interest-inelastic’.307 This 
critique can be interpreted as conceiving that an increase in liquidity in the 
period of low interest rates would foster an inflationary force rather than 
investment. With the spread of this sceptical view of lowering long-term interest 
rates, the Bank expressed its preference for slowing the rise in long-term gilt-
edged prices.308  
     Within the trend of the fall in long-term interest rates, the government 
increased issue of long-term and medium-term bonds and lengthened the 
maturity structure of the national bonds as below (Figure 3-10). While this 
doubtlessly contributed to the cheap financing of the government, this operation 
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disproportionately affected the medium and long-term gilt-edged markets. Due 
to the breadth of the long gilts market being relatively shallower than the 
medium gilts market, the debt management operation had a greater impact on 
long-term gilts. This provoked a wider gap between the rates of long and 
medium term bonds (Figure 3-9).  
 
Figure 3-10: Change of the Structure of Debts (£ Millions) 
  TB  Short-term Medium-term Long-term 
July, 1962 -24 -40 +37 +49 
August, 1962 -44 -63 +74 +72 
September, 1962 +61 -95 +96 +90 
Change -7 -198 +207 +211 
Source: TNA, T326/40, Bell to Sir Alec Cairncross, 16 October 1962. 
 
     As a consequence of the high demand on gilt-edged securities surpassing 
supply, Leslie O’Brien, of the Bank, informed the Treasury that the Bank lost 
stock of long taps, decreasing from £260 million to £120 million in just two 
weeks from September to October. The Bank then considered new issue of 
long-term bonds.309 This indicates that the Bank potentially lost control of the 
long-term gilt-edged market through depletion of its long-term gilts, which might 
have led to inability to sell long-term gilts or increase its rate. Consequently, 
Alan Whittome, Chief Cashier of the Bank, explained the strategy that the Bank 
would, if necessary, purchase short-term against sales of long-term gilts within 
a range of 5 to 5.5 per cent and fill the gap of interest rates between medium 
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and long-term gilts in order to maintain the yield curve.310 This operation by the 
Bank was perceived by the Treasury to ‘soften’ long-term interest rates and 
‘stiffen’ short-term rates.311 Behind this argument, the high demand for gilts 
stemmed from the decline in attractiveness of equities and the prospect that if 
demand and private profits continued to grow, increasing bond prices would 
reverse.312 
     As a result of this fall in long-term interest rates, funding costs of local 
authorities decreased. On the other hand, although building societies had not 
changed lending rates of 6.5 per cent, except for Halifax and Leicester 
Permanent, Dunham, Chairman of the Building Societies Association, stated 
that they would provide longer-term lending. 313  Thus, Prime Minister 
Macmillan’s proposal to lower long-term interest rates, which had been rejected 
by the Bank and Treasury to be let be in the market, ironically came about 
through the market demand on gilts. Then the Bank somewhat attempted to 
maintain this trend of lower long-term interest rates. 
     On 3 January 1963, the Bank Rate was reduced from 4.5 per cent to 4 per 
cent. This was predicted to provide further reduction of long-term interest rates. 
Although momentum continued towards lower rates, the Bank sought to apply 
the brakes. O’Brien analysed that this lowering in long-term interest rates would 
create capital gains.314 This would be more acceptable to the public than an 
equity boom with increase in interest rates. He also pointed out a fall in home 
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mortgage costs and increase in expenditure from capital gains would be 
favourable in the eyes of the public.315 O’Brien asserted that drastic reduction of 
rates could cause the paradoxical outcomes of supporting or disturbing the 
market outlook which would weaken the position of gilt-edged securities. He 
also suggested that visible target setting should be avoided as it would be 
‘conspicuous’ if the Bank attempted to stabilise the weak market. Therefore, 
O’Brien resisted further commitment to lowering interest rates.316 In March, the 
Treasury and the Bank agreed to pull the long-term interest rates back from 
5.75 per cent to 5.5 per cent. While its rates reached approximately 5.25 per 
cent, the Bank had been ‘net sellers’.317 Cromer expressed his view, 
 
 their agreement early in March to try and bring down the long rate from 
 its then level of 5.75% did not postulate a specific figure like 5.5% at 
 which it should be held. I said my understanding of our agreement was 
 that if and when the rate had been brought back to 5.5% we would 
 consider the matter further.318  
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Therefore, the Bank accepted neither the firm target rates nor further 
commitment required by the Treasury. Rather, the Bank had been playing the 
role of the brakes in the low interest rates era and used this agreement to 
increase long-term interest rates. 
     In early 1964, discretion over control of short-term interest rates by the UK 
Treasury and the Bank was suppressed due to an impending increase in 
Federal Reserve discount rates and the co-ordination of short-term interest 
rates became vital. Concomitantly, international monetary co-ordination affected 
domestic politics. One of the prominent examples of this co-ordination or 
coalition was seen when Prime Minister Alec Douglas-Home, succeeding 
Harold Macmillan, informed the Chancellor that Lyndon Baines Johnson, the US 
President, expressed his concern over the possible increase in the Bank 
Rate.319 The President told the Prime Minister not to increase the Bank Rate by 
one per cent rather than 0.5 per cent due to substantial unemployment, 
underutilised industrial capacity and the absence of inflationary pressure. In 
order to avoid this ‘unpalatable choice’ of either defending the dollar or 
expanding the domestic economy, the President put direct pressure on the UK 
government.320   
     The Chancellor maintained that he advocated the course of a one per cent 
increase, which would create ‘elbow room’ in the UK Budget.321 On 27 February 
1964, the Prime Minister held a meeting with Walter Heller, Chairman of the 
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CEA.322 Heller argued that a one per cent increase in the Bank Rate would 
provoke repercussions for the US foreign reserves and become a ‘comfort’ to 
William McChesney Martin, Chair of the Federal Reserve, and ‘the other hard-
money men in the United States’. This, Heller stated, would have a harmful 
effect on the US economy. It is clear that the co-ordination of interest rates both 
in the UK and the US did not only aim to adjust the burden sharing of the 
balance of payments, but also both governments had intrinsic domestic political 
problems to tackle.323 The UK, under the Douglas-Home government, tried to 
expand the scale of the budget prior to the general election in 1964. On the 
other hand, the US side, particularly the CEA, sought to suppress interest 
groups that pursued maintaining confidence in the dollar, and would potentially 
become a significant impediment for tax reduction or expanding the budget.324 
     As a result of these discussions, even with significant pressure from the US, 
the Prime Minister did not change his course to increase the Bank Rate from 4 
per cent to 5 per cent in February 1964. This co-ordination and collision of the 
US and UK over short-term interest rates was inherited by the succeeding 
Labour government.325 
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3.6    Conclusion 
 
It is evident that the UK government sought to exert influence on the structure of 
interest rates, particularly under Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, who 
intermittently attempted to lower long-term interest rates. Through direct 
manipulation in lowering long-term interest rates, Macmillan sought to stimulate 
business investment, easily finance local authorities and spur building societies 
to lower mortgage rates. UK authorities, such as the officials of the Treasury, 
also explored the practicality of employing an increase in short-term interest 
rates through two-tier rates, providing higher interest rates for foreign depositors 
in order to attract foreign funds. This move can be argued as one endeavour to 
conquer the ‘stop-go’ stalemate and can be considered the UK’s version of 
‘Operation Twist’. While UK authorities, supported by the Bank, succeeded in 
setting concessionary interest rates for exporters rendered from the clearing 
banks and insurance companies, other aspects of ‘Operation Twist’ such as 
debt management policies and two-tier interest rates were discarded.  
     The attempts by Prime Minister Macmillan to develop a structure of interest 
rates were fettered, and subject to a backlash from the Treasury and the Bank. 
These institutions perceived potential disarray of the gilt-edged market, 
recurring inflation and the outflow of foreign reserves caused by the artificially 
established structure of interest rates. These institutions sought to maintain the 
financial supremacy of the City, and above all there existed a recusant attitude 
of the Bank towards direct market intervention by the government. When the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
promised not to devalue sterling so as not to put great pressure on the dollar. 
Moreover, when Wilson became Prime Minister, he sent a telegram to Johnson 
stating that the UK would manage its interest rates according to the US 
economic situation, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-68, Vol.XII, 
Doc. 233, Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson, November 19 1964. 
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Bank and Treasury agreed to control the long-term bonds rate within 5 and 5.5 
per cent, the Bank used this rate to stabilise the gilt-edged rate. Subsequently, 
Cromer retracted the agreed rates and rejected any further coercive target rates 
imposed by the government.   
     Furthermore, regional or free market international institutions, through which 
the UK government aggrandised in the world market, placed constraints upon 
the UK’s own policies. The GATT or EFTA, which regulated and prohibited 
governmental provision of subsidies to companies, forced the UK to relinquish 
direct promotion of export finance, thus locking it into the path leading to a 
scheme not managed through direct manipulation but conducted within the 
market.  
     As a result of the political manoeuvres between the Prime Minister and the 
Treasury, with involvement of the Bank, the forged scheme subsequently fell 
into the hands of the Bank, to be conducted within the market. One of the 
primary examples of this were the Governor’s Technical Device and forward 
exchange market operation, which would be conducted at the discretion of the 
Bank. In terms of debt management policies, the Bank and Treasury pursued 
keeping costs of public finance low and demand for gilt-edged securities high as 
their primary objectives, rather than mobilisation of the structure of interest rates 
to manage the economy.  
     Concerning the causal factor behind the limited acquisition of Macmillan’s 
aim, it can be argued that this partly hinged on the configuration of the UK’s 
political structure. The Prime Minister failed to secure concession from the Bank 
and the Treasury over the manipulation of long-term interest rates partly due to 
the absence of an institution to counteract or balance them. As existing 
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research has already delineated, in the US, the CEA under the Kennedy 
administration was in perennial competition with the Federal Reserve and the 
US Treasury, which aimed to repudiate Congressional influence over 
international monetary co-ordination, thus forming a balance.326 When Prime 
Minister Macmillan faced a backlash from the Treasury and the Bank, he sought 
the means to counteract against them, however, he had no effective options to 
employ. 
     Regarding the link between policies and theory, the ideas of officials within 
the political process affected the formation of monetary policies. UK officials did 
not adopt the Radcliffe Committee report’s components of the interest incentive 
effect and ‘general liquidity effect’, nor the portfolio rebalancing theory. This was 
intrinsically and inextricably intertwined with institutional factors. In addition, 
these ideas were connected with institutional market factors including lending 
customs. When officials considered the impact of change in the structure of 
interest rates, they paid significant heed to the institutional aspect. Decrease in 
long-term interest rates was considered not directly influential on lending rates 
of building societies and clearing banks due to their lending customs and 
institutionalised structure. Furthermore, it should be noted that the condition of 
UK’s gilt-edged market was a causal factor behind the determined policy course. 
There is no doubt that, for the Bank, the ‘depth’ of the long-term bond market 
was not enough to manipulate the structure of interest rates. 
     As explored above, the UK government could not fully manipulate interest 
rates due to the interplay of a range of factors: its domestic political structure; 
the ideas of officials somewhat reflecting social demand; indigenous institutional 
factors within the financial market including the gilt-edged market; the need for 
                                                       
326 For a detailed account, see chapter 2 of this thesis.	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favourable conditions for financing government and local authorities; and 






Chapter 4: Management of sterling and tax reform in the 1965 
budget: political economy of the introduction of corporation tax 
and direct capital controls 
 
4.1    Introduction 
 
This chapter examines a key aspect of currency management neglected in 
existing research: the correlation between the 1965 budget and the 
management of sterling. 
     On 15 October 1964, Labour won the general election by a hair’s breadth 
and Harold Wilson had become Prime Minister of the UK. However, his triumph 
was marred by turmoil that emanated from the international financial market. 
Just two weeks after Labour’s victory, on 26 October, the balance of payments 
deficit would be announced, forecasting a colossal £800 million for 1964. This 
announcement was followed by the release of the slightly stringent autumn 
budget on 11 November.327  Scepticism ensued surrounding the tumultuous 
market and the ‘sterling crisis’ – or ‘sterling crises’ – was triggered.328 
                                                       
327 Scott Newton, ‘The two sterling crises of 1964 and the decision not to 
devalue’, The Economic History Review, Vol.62, No.1, 2009, pp.73-98. Oliver, 
‘The Management of Sterling, 1964-1967’, p.589. Charles A. Coombs, The 
Arena of International Finance (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976), p.113. 
328 There is discrepancy between Newton and Oliver as to whether the ‘sterling 
crisis’ emerged once or twice from October to November 1964. Newton, ‘The 
two sterling crises of 1964 and the decision not to devalue’, and Michael J. 
Oliver, ‘The two sterling crises of 1964: a comment on Newton’, The Economic 
History Review, Vol.65, No.1, 2012, pp. 314-21. If the broad definition of 
currency crises by Bordo, MacDonald and Oliver of a market-based attack on 
the exchange value of a currency accompanied by devaluation including a 
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     The Labour government attempted to withstand this whirlwind with a credit of 
$3,000 million from the central banks of 16 countries and the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS); a rise in the Bank Rate from 5 per cent to 7 per 
cent, and the introduction of an import surcharge ‘as a radical measure, in 
breach of international trade agreement’. 329  Despite these measures, the 
government required a new scheme to manage the balance of payments deficit 
and its foreign reserves. However, international constraints hindered monetary 
policy. The UK government and the Bank faced difficulties in manipulating the 
Bank Rate due to significant pressure from the US government to keep rates 
low, the maintenance of which aimed to underpin the value of the US dollar and 
                                                                                                                                                                  
change in the peg and international bailout, is assumed, the difficulty emerges 
that the process of seeking international support under the outflow of foreign 
reserves should be deemed part of the currency crisis. Michael D. Bordo, 
Ronald MacDonald and Michael J. Oliver, ‘Sterling in Crisis, 1964-1967’, 
European Review of Economic History, Vol.13, 2009, pp.437-59. There is also 
controversy surrounding the definition of crisis, however, ‘sterling crisis’ is used 
in this paper for the sake of argument. For recent definition of currency, 
sovereign and bank crises, see Luc Laeven and Valencia Fabian, ‘Systemic 
Banking Crises Database: An Update’, IMF Working Paper, No. 12/163, 2012. 
This classification is still problematic in that it does not define the ‘credit crisis’ 
that emanated from the Lehman Shock of 2008. 
329  Jim Tomlinson, The Labour Governments 1964-1970: Economic Policy, 
Volume 3 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), p.50. For the 
process of introducing the import surcharge, see Richard Roberts, ‘‘Unwept, 
unhonoured and unsung’: Britain’s import surcharge, 1964-1966, and currency 
crisis management’, Financial History Review, Vol.20, No.2, 2013, pp.209-29. 
From the theoretical point of view, many economists held that the import 
surcharge or general taxation on imports and subsidies on exports would have 
disturbing effects on each sector, branch and eventually on the whole market. 
There was great concern surrounding the import surcharge and it was opposed 
not only in the political arena but was also criticised by economists. This 
doctrine, the ‘comparative advantage’ of David Ricardo, still holds a dogmatic 
position within mainstream economics. See, Gottfried Haberler, ‘Appendix: 
Taxes on Imports and Subsidies on Exports as a Tool of Adjustment’, in Robert 
A. Mundell, and Alexander K. Swoboda (eds.), Monetary Problems of the 
International Economy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969), 
pp.173-9. Also see David Ricardo, On the Principles of Political Economy and 




avert the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system.330 Therefore, devaluation 
and the mobilisation of monetary policy proved a difficult path for the Labour 
government to pursue. 
     In contrast to the monetary measures, Labour’s incomes policy, the raising 
of taxation and direct price controls, such as hire-purchase restrictions, were 
considered effective means to ameliorate the balance of payments and ward off 
inflation.331 However, in the field of direct regulation on prices and incomes, the 
import surcharge was not considered a permanent and reliable measure for 
management of domestic demand due to the firm opposition of members of the 
international monetary community, such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF).332 This led the Labour government to seek alternative measures in order 
to tackle the balance of payments deficit. 
     In this situation, Labour pushed its first tax reform of the 1965 budget, two of 
the main features of which were the introduction of corporation tax and the 
renewal of the capital gains tax. Assessment of these two taxations is diverse in 
existing research. One group of arguments emphasised that these tax 
measures encompassed the aims to modernise the UK economy and 
                                                       
330 For the pressure from the Johnson administration on the UK government 
over the UK interest rates, see chapter 3 of this thesis. For the attitude of 
officials of the Johnson administration towards the UK Bank Rate and the 
decision not to devalue, see Schenk, The Decline of Sterling, pp.157-8. For 
Wilson’s statement to Johnson on controlling the UK Bank Rate according to 
the US economic situation, see Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-
68, Vol.XII, Doc. 233, Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson, November 
19 1964. See also William Davis, Three Years Hard Labour: The Road to 
Devaluation (London: Andre Deutsch, 1968), p.6. Henry Brandon, In the Red, 
pp.17-8, 60. 
331 Cairncross, Managing the British Economy, p.243. 
332 The import surcharge was also widely opposed in the international monetary 
community as such measures were against General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) regulation. TNA, T171/ 801, EAC (65) 4, Economic Assessment 
Committee, Balance of Payments Prospect to end 1966,16 February 1965. 
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encourage export in order to reduce the balance of payments deficit.333 Echoing 
this argument, Pemberton asserted that the objective of Labour’s tax reform 
was to achieve economic growth, and that this taxation was the product of the 
growth advocacy network with influential power within the political process.334 In 
addition, it is supposed that the general principal aims of corporation tax were to 
raise revenue and distribute resources, influencing financial flow through 
incentive effects.335 This group of arguments focused heavily on the economic 
impact of corporation tax. 
     On the other hand, there are accounts from the political point of view. 
Pemberton stated that corporation tax was formed to convince the trade unions 
to accept incomes policy.336 Meanwhile, Whiting analysed the 1965 budget in 
the context of the development of ‘socialist’ taxation. He emphasised that the 
aims of the 1965 budget, including capital gains tax, were to tackle tax 
avoidance and create greater equality.337  
     Issues remain in these assessments from the political perspective on the 
1965 budget. Regarding the link to incomes policy, when Labour won the 
general election in 1964, incomes policy was a prerequisite measure for the 
Bank, Labour government and US monetary authorities (such as the Treasury) 
                                                       
333 Tomlinson, The Labour Governments, pp.51, 97, 204. Martin Daunton, Just 
Taxes: The Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1914-1979 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), chapter 9. Richard Whiting, The Labour Party and 
Taxation: Party Identity and Political Purpose in Twentieth-Century Britain 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp.159-62. Ann Robinson and 
Cedric Sandford, Tax Policy-Making in the United Kingdom: A Study of 
Rationality, Ideology and Politics (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 
1983). 
334  Hugh Pemberton, Policy Learning and British Governance in the 1960s 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), chapter 6. 
335 Mervyn King, Public Policy and the Corporation (London: Chapman and Hall 
Ltd, 1977), p.44. 
336 Pemberton, Policy Learning; James Callaghan, Time and Chance (London: 
Collins, 1987), chapter 6.  
337 Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, p.161.  
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for managing the UK foreign reserves and currencies.338 However, as it will be 
detailed below, Labour’s original plan for corporation tax, aimed partly at 
pacifying the trade unions for tightened incomes policy, faced significant political 
backlash from the Bank as a representative of the interests of the financial 
market. This contributed to the deviation of corporation tax and capital gains tax 
from Labour’s original proposal. This inevitably leads to the question of why the 
Bank, which strongly insisted on incomes policy, opposed the introduction of a 
corporation tax designed to reconcile the trade unions to accept incomes 
policy.339 
     Reconsideration should also be made of the evaluation of the 1965 Labour 
budget as an attempt to tackle tax avoidance and to achieve ‘fair’ distribution of 
wealth. The tax reform of the 1965 budget saw a reduction in corporate taxation, 
continuing the trend evident since the end of World War II for the shrinkage of 
its proportion of whole tax revenue.340 Of great importance here is to solve the 
puzzle of why and how the ‘socialist’ taxation of the 1965 budget preserved the 
longevity of reduction in corporate taxation. Therefore it is necessary to revisit 
the introduction of corporation tax and long-term capital gains tax through 
analysis of the discussion of the period revealed in governmental and Bank 
documents. 
                                                       
338 It is highlighted that in August 1965 Henry Fowler, US Secretary of the 
Treasury, strongly advised Callaghan that a wage freeze was necessary to curb 
inflationary pressure and restore the credibility of sterling. See Schenk, The 
Decline of Sterling, p.165. 
339 Cairncross, Managing the British Economy also delineates the influence and 
resistance of the Bank concerning the tax reform. Pemberton also considers 
this aspect. See Pemberton, Policy Learning, chapter 6. 
340 For the reduction of the corporation tax rate, see King, Public Policy, pp.258-
9. For the proportion of corporate taxation in the overall tax receipts, see Hugh 
Pemberton, ‘A Taxing Task: Combating Britain’s Relative Decline in the 1960s’, 
Twentieth Century British History, Vol.12, No.3, 2001, p.358. 
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     Prior to this, it is useful to describe the difference in arguments amongst 
historical, political and institutional approaches. In the context of politics or 
historical institutionalism, numerous commentators have mentioned that the 
political structure of the UK, in particular ‘adversarial’ politics, represented a 
significant driving force behind Labour’s fiscal policies, including the various 
taxation measures.341 Pemberton argued that:  
 
 Britain’s tradition of adversarial politics made both the Conservative and 
 Labour parties extremely wary of specific commitments on tax. This 
 wariness translated into a reluctance publicly to discuss tax policy and, in 
 the case of Labour even inhibited internal discussion within the party.342 
 
However, in contrast to the assertion of Pemberton, Whiting argued that ‘party 
competition, in so far as it was based on the Labour Party claiming to do better 
what the Conservatives had acknowledged to be necessary, therefore paved 
the way for the 1965 budget’.343 In line with Whiting, Daunton stated:  
 
 the adversarial nature of the two-party system meant that during the 
 period of alternative governments of the 1960s and 1970s policy was 
 incoherent rather than consensual […] As a result, the fiscal system 
                                                       
341 For an examination of adversarial politics, see S. E. Finer, ‘Adversary Politics 
and Electoral Reform’, in S. E. Finer (ed.), Adversary Politics and Electoral 
Reform: Collected Essays (London: Wigram, 1975), pp.3-34. Finer’s 
examination of adversarial politics has influenced research that focuses on the 
link between political structures and policy outcomes. 
342 Pemberton, ‘A Taxing Task’, p.373. In line with Pemberton, Steinmo quotes 
David Butler and Richard Rose: ‘the Labour Party had shied away from making 
any specific tax pledges in the run up to the election of 1964 because, it was 
believed, their tax promises had cost them votes in the 1959 election’, David 
Butler and Richard Rose, The British General Election of 1959 (London: 
Macmillan, 1969), pp.61-62, cited in Steinmo, Sven, Taxation and Democracy: 
Swedish, British and American Approaches to Financing the Modern State 
(London: Yale University Press, 1993), p.152. 
343 Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, p.155.  
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 which once seemed a source of stability and national pride now seemed 
 a source of inflexibility and a cause of low growth compared with other 
 countries.344 
  
Furthermore, Prasad focused on the international divergence and convergence 
of fiscal policies in the neoliberal era, arguing that ‘these adversarial structures 
opened a space for an electoral appeal based on neoliberalism in the United 
Kingdom and United States when the socioeconomic transformation of the post-
war period moved the majority of voters from one side of the adversarial divide 
to the other’.345  
     While Pemberton’s arguments are permeated with the idea of adversarial 
politics fostering almost identical policy on both sides of the chamber, Prasad 
insists that the very same adversarial politics encouraged parties to produce 
ambitious, diverse policy. On the other hand, according to Whiting, ‘party 
competition’ encouraged and forged the ideology of Labour’s taxation, while 
Daunton assessed that adversarial politics caused ‘incoherent’ policy and 
‘inflexibility’. These incongruent arguments can be summarised as reflecting 
differences in understanding of the transitional period from Butskellism, which 
refers to the contiguity between the Conservative reformers under the influence 
of Rab Butler, and the right wing of Labour, to the emergence of Thatcherism 
rebelling against Labour and the old Conservatives. To re-examine both 
arguments it is necessary to shed light upon, and add to, the understanding of 
historical continuity and disconnection in the process of taxation policy 
formation under the Labour government in 1965.  
                                                       
344 Daunton, Just Taxes, p.17. 
345 Prasad, The Politics of Free Markets, p.33.  
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     To clarify the above continuity and disconnection, and to investigate the 
objectives of 1965 tax reform in the context of currency management, the fabric 
of the budget formation process requires untangling, and light should be shed 
on the inextricable link between the management of sterling and the 1965 
budget. Pemberton has already examined the historical process of introducing 
corporation tax and long-term capital gains tax, however, his research lacks the 
perspective of currency management which can be gleaned from analysis of 
documents held by the Bank. 346  Therefore, this chapter will focus on the 
interconnection between the management of the currencies and fiscal 
measures, describing how their principal aims were distorted and driven in the 
dynamic political process. In addition, this chapter also examines the 
connection between the corporation tax and direct capital controls, which were 
focused upon by government officials in the process of 1965 tax reform. 
 
4.2    The scale of the 1965 budget, and corporation tax under the 
balance of payments crisis 
 
The initiative for the formation process of corporation tax was taken by James 
Callaghan, Chancellor of the Exchequer.347 On 4 January 1965, Sir William 
Armstrong, Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, reported that Callaghan 
would make tax proposals, and emphasised that tax reform arrangements were 
                                                       
346 Pemberton, Policy Learning, chapter 6. Pemberton, ‘A Taxing Task’. Hugh 
Pemberton, ‘Taxation and Labour’s Modernisation Programme’, in Glen O’Hara 
and Helen Parr (eds.), The Wilson Governments 1964-1970 Reconsidered 
(London: Routledge, 2006), pp.118-35. 
347 TNA, T171/1340, Note of a Meeting held in Sir William Armstrong’s room, 
Monday 4 January 1965, 3:00 p.m. 
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under the Chancellor’s ‘centralized’ personal control. 348  The consultation 
surrounding many outstanding issues such as corporation tax, capital gains tax, 
the exemption of gilt-edged securities and the treatment of overseas income 
was delegated to the Treasury. The main objectives of corporation tax publicly 
stated by Callaghan were to modernise the tax system, remove anomalies and 
incentivise the reversal of overseas investment outflow.349 The latter objective is 
marginalised in existing research. Pemberton considered this tax reform in 1965 
as affected by the ‘growth advocacy network’, placing significant pressure on 
the government to create policy that could achieve economic growth with higher 
government expenditure, without raising taxes.350 However, as it will be proven 
below, the fact that the deep-seated sterling crisis significantly affected 
corporation tax formation cannot be neglected. 
     On 16 February 1965, the forecast of the balance of current and long-term 
capital deficits was estimated at £350 million for the next full year, with several 
optimistic assumptions, including a sound international financial condition and 
effective fiscal and monetary measures.351 Furthermore, in the Chancellor’s 
meeting on the domestic economic outlook, it was assumed that this deficit had 
                                                       
348 Ibid. 
Steinmo argued that this British feature, the concentration of decision making-
power, was one of the significant causal factors of failure to accomplish 
institutional reforms. Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy, p.145. 
349 Hansard, Written Answers (Commons) of 27 November 1964, Series 5, 
Vol.702. TNA, PREM13/273, Chancellor’s answer to Lubbock’s question, 
attached to Ian P. Bancroft to Derek J. Mitchell, 27 November 1964.  
350 Pemberton, Policy Learning, chapter 6. 
351 TNA, T171/ 801, E. A. C. (65) 4, Economic Assessment Committee, Balance 
of Payments Prospects to end 1966, 16 February, 1965. These assumptions 
were as follows: (1) The import surcharge would be reduced to 12.5 per cent at 
the end of March, and then decrease to 10 per cent during 1966. (2) The Bank 
would cut the Bank Rate to 5 per cent by the beginning of 1966. (3) The 
credibility of sterling would return to a neutral position. (4) The long-term 
measures would exert a revitalising impact on economic performance. (5) 
Incomes policy and reviews of government expenditure would not have a great 
impact on the balance of payments in 1965. (6) Allowance was not made for 
corporation tax effects on overseas investment and earnings. 
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the potential to expand to £400 million in 1966 without the import surcharge.352 
Following this estimation, however, scepticism of the heavy demand growth of 
investment was expressed. Within this meeting it was suggested that fixed 
investment would surge over the next year, and would swallow approximately 
40 per cent of augmentation in output. Consequently, the committee put forward 
an increase in the tax rate to abate escalating demand as the ‘best solution’, 
targeting the consumer goods market.353 It was then suggested in the meeting 
that the additional tax of £250 to £300 million, this figure placed ‘economic 
effect’ at £200 million and regulator at £100 million, would be collected as motor 
vehicle duties, National Insurance contributions and higher duties on tobacco 
and alcohol. This can be understood as presenting similar measures to ‘stop-go’ 
policy.354 
     The above measures were deemed necessary to improve the balance of 
payments deficit. On 23 February, the government was urged to take immediate 
action to eradicate the deficit.355 Sir Alec Cairncross’ paper, with revisions by 
the Economic Assessment Committee, asserted that a wide range of measures 
to improve the balance of payments had been exhaustively considered over the 
preceding months. These measures had targeted the capital balance, focusing 
on encouragement of export and hindrance of demand through raising costs. 
The paper asserted that these measures ‘have had to be rejected and others 
                                                       
352  TNA, T171/ 801, C.M (65) 11, Chancellor’s Meetings, the Domestic 
Economic Outlook in 1965 and 1966, 17 February 1965. This meeting 
concluded that although the import surcharge was still effective, the effects of 
the measures of the previous autumn to raise direct tax rates and National 
Insurance contributions remained unclear. 
353  TNA, T171/ 801, C.M. (65) 13, Chancellor’s Meetings, The Scale of 
Budgetary Action, 19 February 1965. 
354 Ibid. 
355 TNA, T171/ 801, C.M (65) 12, Chancellor’s Meetings, Revised Paper on the 
Economic Outlook Note by the Secretaries, 23 February 1965. 
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seem unlikely to make a substantial contribution.’356  In addition, this paper 
pointed out the impact of eventual debt repayment on Labour’s policy and there 
was concern over whether further international bailout would come forth. The 
paper concluded that ‘if we wish to avoid devaluation, we can hardly avoid 
policies of a harsher and less acceptable kind’, and the import surcharge 
combined with higher taxation was considered imperative due to uncertainty 
surrounding the effect of corporation tax on the capital account.357 At this stage, 
the Chancellor’s meeting showed perception of the necessity to mobilise fiscal 
measures in order to tackle the balance of payments deficit, with schemes such 
as raising tax rates and checking aggregate demand. 
     In line with the above conclusions, Sir William Armstrong advocated tax 
increase. 358  According to the estimate of Sir Alec Cairncross, the import 
surcharge would reduce the balance of payments deficit by £150 million in 1966. 
However, Sir William Armstrong still considered an increase in taxation of 
between £200 and £300 million necessary, with £250 million thought most 
appropriate.359 Armstrong also expressed his concern over potential borrowing 
from the IMF in the summer of 1965 to re-finance the short-term credits. He 
asserted, 
 
 we cannot ignore the views of creditors and the I.M.F. itself. The 
 Chancellor is aware that the conclusion of Working Party No. 3 - in effect 
                                                       
356 Ibid. 
357 Ibid. 
358 TNA, T171/ 801, Sir William Armstrong to Ian Bancroft, 25 February 1965. 
359  The proposed fiscal and monetary measures were as follows: (1) An 
increase in the top rate of purchase tax to between 30 per cent and 30 and one 
third per cent, with the effect predicted at between £70 to 100 million. (2) An 
increase in vehicle excise duties from £15 to £25 a year, abolishing tax 
allowances for National Insurance contributions, tobacco and alcohol duties. (3) 
Hire purchase restrictions. (4) Cuts in military expenditure. 
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 of our creditors - is that further action to restrain internal demand to the 
 extent of “several hundred million pounds” is required360  
 
It is clear that the Labour government faced a significant challenge to determine 
taxation policies that would satisfy the demand of international organisations 
such as the IMF and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) for a deflationary budget. 
     Labour was also exposed to direct pressure from the IMF. On 3 February 
1965, Callaghan met Pierre-Paul Schweitzer, Managing Director of the IMF, 
whose attitude was described as ‘undeniably firm’.361 Schweitzer insisted that 
the reduction in the import surcharge should be accompanied by deflationary 
measures such as hire purchase restrictions, credit squeezing and a tougher 
budget, while he valued the progress on incomes policy as an effective 
measure and did not regard devaluation as a feasible solution.362 Schweitzer 
also warned that the UK required a tough deflationary budget to obtain a further 
fund drawing of a £1,000 million ‘play safe’, and that it would be difficult to 
secure funds prior to the announcement of the budget.363 Consequently, he 
urged Callaghan to send a ‘nice little letter’ to the IMF about the UK’s policies to 
increase the chances of further borrowing.364 Derek Mitchell, Principal Private 
Secretary, reported Schweitzer’s warning that  
 
                                                       
360 TNA, T171/ 801, Sir William Armstrong to Ian P. Bancroft, 25 February 1965. 
361 TNA, PREM13/239, Derek J. Mitchell to Ian P. Bancroft, 3 February 1965. 
362 TNA, T171/ 801, Note for the Record of discussion on 3 February 1965 
between the Chancellor and Managing-Director of I.M.F by Ian P. Bancroft, 3 
February 1965. 




 there was little chance of any success with an initiative on international 
 liquidity this year. This was partly because of the reluctance of the United 
 States to move during the period when Dillon’s successor and Roosa’s 
 would be finding their feet. But he mentioned European resistance also 
 and added that there was no hope in the near future of any conceivable 
 increase in liquidity that could help the United Kingdom. At this point the 
 Prime Minister and the Chancellor emphasised strongly that H.M.G. were 
 looking to long-term needs and were not motivated by self-interest.365 
 
     The Labour government faced a similar demand not only from the IMF, but 
also from Working Party No.3 of the OECD. Emiel van Lennep, Chairman of 
Working Party No.3 of the Economic Policy Committee, urged Sir Denis Rickett, 
Second Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, to remove the temporary import 
surcharge and take other forms of deflationary measures. As his conclusive 
remark, Lennep stated: 
 
 The Working Party urges upon the United Kingdom the importance of 
 using the occasion of the coming budget to present in public a policy for 
 the balance of payments, which would show how a surplus would be 
 restored without the surcharges, so that medium-term international 
 support could be repaid within a reasonable term of years [...] The room 
 for manoeuvre is very narrow, and it is essential to avoid any risk of the 
 measures taken to correct the balance of payments proving, in the event, 
 insufficient.366 
 
It is evident that the IMF, OECD and Cairncross held a similar notion to prompt 
a deflationary budget in order to secure and retain accessibility to the IMF 
drawing and its fund. 
                                                       
365 Ibid. 
366 TNA, T171/ 801, Emiel van Lennep, Chairman of Working Party No.3 of the 
Economic Policy Committee to Sir Denis Rickett, 18 February 1965. Working 
Party No.3 was an organisation of the OECD, which dealt with monetary 
matters such as foreign exchange, and sought international arrangement for the 
balance of payments issue. 
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     Internal and external pressure surrounding the budget intensified when, on 
15 March, Callaghan held an informal meeting with Chief Secretary of the 
Treasury John Diamond, Sir William Armstrong, and Economic Advisor Robert 
Neild to discuss the budget.367 In this meeting, Callaghan rebuked Armstrong 
and Neild’s assertion that the scale of the tax increase in the 1965 budget 
should be more than £200 million for a full year. Callaghan insisted that their 
argument underestimated the impact of a budget rise of £200 million on 
business confidence, stating that ‘the effects of such action on a Party which 
was dedicated to economic growth might be far reaching’ and he, with the 
Prime Minister, reached the conclusion that it would yield £180 million in a full 
year and approximately £135 million in 1965-66.368 Concerned with possible 
discouragement of business investment, Callaghan attempted to refuse large-
scale budget cuts or tax increase. Regarding cuts in fiscal spending, Callaghan 
had stated his commitment to the cancellation of the TSR2 aircraft project 
before announcement of the budget, and made clear the necessity to take 
measures to provide a convincing demonstration that the government was 
taking meaningful steps to tackle the balance of payments deficit. 369  He 
concluded that ‘all related to a determination to grip the capital account by 
means of the corporation tax and the other measures which were now in 
process of agreement, could be regarded as presenting a credible programme’, 
and he was prepared to run the risk of possible difficulties in consultation with 
the IMF when it came to securing funds.370  
                                                       
367 TNA, T171/ 801, Note for the Record of the Chancellor’s informal meeting, 
15 March 1965. 
368 Ibid. 




     It is apparent that whilst under pressure from the international financial 
market, the Chancellor attempted to reduce the balance of payments deficit 
without significant tax increases or a stringent budget, which might erode 
Labour’s ‘socialist’ raison d'etre. It is also clear that Callaghan relied on 
corporation tax to keep Labour distanced from a deflationary budget, and 
considered this taxation a measure to prove to the international financial 
community that the UK was embarking on the formation of effective schemes to 
tackle the balance of payments deficit. In this respect, the corporation tax can 
be understood as an appeal to the international monetary field, standing within 
Labour’s 1965 budget as a bulwark against fierce demand for a deflationary 
budget. In addition, it should be noted that what the Labour prioritised in the 
field of fiscal policies was income transfer, including public expenditure on 
social security.371 
 
4.3    Corporation tax and double taxation 
 
Corporation tax, which was a main component of tax reform for Chancellor of 
the Exchequer James Callaghan and economist Nicholas Kaldor, was designed 
to be separate from income tax and to be a single flat rate tax on the profits of a 
company.372 Corporation tax replaced profits tax, and income tax was imposed 
on individuals. Previously, company profits had been subject to income tax at 
41.25 per cent and profits tax at 15 per cent, with dividends taxed at 2.5 per 
cent. In contrast, under corporation tax, company profits would be taxed at a flat 
corporation tax rate of 40 per cent. In addition, distributions in the form of 
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dividends would also be taxed at a flat corporation tax rate without ‘franking’, a 
practice at the time known as ‘non-franking’. ‘Franking’ meant that dividends 
paid by a company had the label of tax having been paid which eliminated 
further tax on the recipient of the dividends. The ‘non-franking’, double taxation 
on inter-company dividends in the proposed corporation tax system, was 
described by Whiting as a Labour tax principle forged by Nicholas Kaldor, that 
aimed to ‘modernise’ taxation and lead to: ‘fairness, equality and redressing the 
balance between rich and poor.’373  
     Whiting details a valid point, as affirmed in a letter from Kaldor to Hartle, that 
many in Britain in fact favoured the adoption of a corporation profits tax of the 
US type in place of the existing income and profits taxes. The letter states:  
 
 I [Kaldor] personally do not regard the arguments that this involves 
 “double taxation” of company profits as valid. Clearly unless the 
 companies were taxed as such, the undistributed part of their profits 
 would escape taxation altogether.374  
 
It is clear that during the early stages of corporation tax policy formation, Kaldor, 
who had a great impact on Labour’s taxation policy, did not consider any 
concessions. Kaldor recognised this undistributed part of companies’ profits as 
a product of a loophole within the tax system, which should be closed.  
     Whiting and others describe the stance of Kaldor as ‘purist’ in its attitude to 
taxation policy, while the Treasury played the part of a ‘brake’ and Callaghan 
balanced the claims of both sides, conducting a form of ‘brokerage’. In his 
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‘brokerage’ role, Callaghan was exposed to a backlash from the financial 
market amidst concerns that corporation tax would depress share values and 
hinder the capital market.375 It will be proven below that it was within this 
dynamic of purity, caution and concern that corporation tax was born, and took 
the form of a flat corporation tax rate on company profits and untaxed inter-
company dividends. One of the most significant objectives of the ‘socialist tax’, 
the ‘non-franking’ of Labour’s original proposal, would be discarded. Therefore, 
this tax reform introduced in 1965 can be considered somewhat of a ‘pseudo-
socialist’ tax reduction on companies. Curiously, although this proposed 
corporation tax encompassed an aim to reconcile the trade unions to accept 
incomes policy as mentioned above, it remains unclear in existing research as 
to why financial institutions, which had previously strongly urged incomes policy, 
opposed corporation tax. Due to the lack of clarity in this area, this chapter 
moves on to examine Bank of England documents in order to shed light on the 
conflict between the Labour government and financial institutions, a conflict 
which is widely considered the most significant political backlash of the Labour 
taxation policy formation process. 
     Labour insisted that corporation tax would discourage the distribution of 
profits in the form of dividends and encourage investment activities.376 However, 
corporation tax formation provoked debate regarding dividends, double taxation 
and direct investment, with controversy surrounding the taxation of inter-
                                                       
375 Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, p.162, and Daunton, Just Taxes, 
p.292. 
376  The other potential benefit of corporation tax given by the Labour 
government related to the incomes policy. The below report considered the 
corporation tax thus: ‘Psychologically this would help in the creation of an 
atmosphere favourable to an incomes policy, partly because of its very 
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increases in share values: more concretely, it would stimulate growth by inciting 
companies to plough back profit’, in TNA, T171/ 806, Sir Alexander Johnson to 
the Chancellor: Corporation Tax, 6 November 1964, p.4. 
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company dividends quickly arising.377 In the early stages, Labour held that ‘the 
most important effect of the change would be to benefit companies which 
distributed a smaller proportion of their profits than average and to penalise 
companies which distributed a greater proportion.’378 On 6 November 1964, the 
corporation tax proposal set out that company profits would be taxed at a flat of 
40 per cent, and distribution in the form of dividends would also be taxed at the 
same rate. Thus, companies which distributed a smaller proportion of dividends 
would retain greater earnings.379  
     However, this corporation tax proposal triggered a significant political 
backlash. On 25 January 1965, the New Taxes Proposal of the Bank insisted 
that the rate of corporation tax should avoid causing uncertainty in the market. 
Moreover, concerning the possibility of reduced relief for overseas tax and 
withholding tax on dividends paid from the UK to overseas investors, it was 
detailed that imposition of corporation tax on ‘such companies must be 
mitigated if damage is not to be done to the balance of payments and if 
London’s role as a centre of international commerce is not to be impaired’.380 
Furthermore, the Bank added that if corporation tax were to be imposed on 
dividends, most companies would face the need to ‘re-arrange their capital to 
eliminate preference shares and replace them with loan stock.’381 The Bank 
expressed its concern that the proposed corporation tax would cause 
disturbance within the financial market and impact companies’ financial strategy 
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structure. Within the Bank there were concerns that this would inevitably have a 
detrimental effect on the City’s presence in the global market. However, the 
Bank considered that many companies could not alter their capital structure, 
and that ‘a change to a Corporation Tax may throw the whole burden of that tax 
on to the ordinary shareholder.’382 From these files, two points are clear: firstly, 
that the Bank warned that corporation tax on dividends would affect 
shareholders, and secondly that it criticised corporation tax from the perspective 
of international financial matters, such as double taxation, which would affect 
the balance of payments and the City’s high profile position in the arena of 
commerce. 
     Further to the above, Cromer, then Governor of the Bank, highlighted the 
importance of the balance of payments problem. On 22 January 1965, the 
governor asserted to Sir Denis Rickett that  
 
 the attitude of the foreign central bankers was that they did not want to 
 get into an argument with us about the sufficiency of our measures or in 
 any way hold the pistol at our head.383 
 
The Bank warned the Treasury that other central banks shared the reins of the 
management of sterling. On the other hand, Italo de Lisle Radice, Under 
Secretary of the Treasury, informed the Bank that the Treasury was in favour of 
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mitigating the effects of corporation tax for companies trading overseas, 
although ministers might be inclined to listen to Kaldor who would argue against 
any mitigation.384 From the above communication it is evident that the Bank and 
the Treasury sought to amend Labour’s original corporation tax proposal. 
However, the Bank considered that although it had to ‘argue a number of 
special cases of possible hardship’ surrounding corporation tax, it could 
‘counterbalance the defensive approach that this has involved by a positive 
approval of the underlying aims of modernity, simplification and equity’.385 
     To support its argument that corporation tax would cause cases of ‘hardship’, 
the Bank collected statements from financial institutions and large companies 
arguing against the proposal, particularly statements against taxation on 
dividends. Moreover, arising from uncertainty concerning future corporation tax 
rates, the Bank was under pressure to push the government to decide the tax 
rate. Insistence was made that uncertainty would produce volatility in business 
and have an adverse effect on the UK’s export trade and the balance of 
payments.386 
     In the midst of this political backlash from financial institutions and the Bank, 
on 10 February 1965, the Chancellor took the position that ‘non-franking’ was 
not the primary aspect of Labour’s taxation policy, repealing the taxation on 
inter-company dividends:  
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 the new taxes as a whole were bound to create political difficulties, which 
 must be faced for the sake of a more equitable and modern taxation 
 system. But when so much was being achieved it would be a pity to risk 
 a major political row and to slow down the Bill in Committee, by a tough 
 decision on franking which was not one of the issues on which it was 
 most important to make a stand.387  
 
Despite the Chancellor’s words, doubt surrounding this concession remained 
within the Cabinet.388 Prime Minister Harold Wilson understood the Chancellor’s 
attempt to avoid political difficulties in forming the Finance Bill. However, Wilson 
was ‘impressed by the economic arguments in favour of taxing portfolio 
investment while franking income from dividends from subsidiary companies.’389 
Wilson also understood the risk associated with the Chancellor’s decision, 
which would encourage portfolio investment and a restrictive monopoly as 
opposed to rationalisation of the industrial structure.390 
     Although the non-franking of dividends presented a difficult debate, by 
contrast, agreement regarding international double taxation was reached with 
comparatively limited resistance. During the opening phase of discussions, on 
21 January 1965, a paper was dispatched to the Prime Minister from Thomas 
Balogh, Economic Advisor, on the issues of double taxation, ‘non-franking’ and 
overseas investment. 391  This paper asserted that the present system was 
working with the wrong incentive by encouraging capital outflow and therefore 
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having a negative effect on the balance of payments through double taxation 
relief. The new corporation tax system would inhibit overseas investment by UK 
companies and bring in direct foreign investment, since these companies would 
not obtain relief on excess, and dividends would be deducted at the full 
standard rate. It is clear that Balogh considered a corporation tax with ‘non-
franking’ and double taxation an effective measure to tackle the matters of the 
balance of payments deficit and capital outflow from the UK.392  
     However, OECD guidelines influenced the issue of double taxation within 
corporation tax. Under the OECD Fiscal Committee it was identified that the tax 
rate on dividends payable abroad should not exceed 5 per cent if the recipient 
owned 25 per cent of the capital of the paying company. In other cases the 
maximum rate was recommended at 15 per cent.393 This limit, recommended by 
the OECD, influenced the decision on the issue: Cairncross noted in his 
Treasury diary, ‘We can't put withholding tax above 5% (OECD code). Quite a 
bombshell!’394 Later, in addition to this guideline, double taxation relief and the 
balance of payments presented a significant discussion point in a telegram from 
Washington to the Foreign Office, in which the US demanded the UK settle the 
matter of double taxation.395 The Bank’s attitude toward tax evasion arising from 
double taxation relief was thus: ‘non-resident investment is of such importance 
to us that we can not afford to take too rigid or legalistic a line for the sake of 
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stopping a negligible amount of tax evasion.’396 Officials within the Bank were 
mindful of the flow of funds of non-resident investment into the UK. This, with 
OECD guidelines and foreign pressure, affected the decision to avoid the issue 
of international double taxation. 
     Thus, it emerged as outlined above, that when Labour faced political 
difficulties, the proposal of ‘non-franking’ was discarded and the idea of 
international double taxation within corporation tax collapsed, causing the 
policies to deviate significantly from the original proposal. Following these 
concessions over the matter of corporation tax, the Chancellor stated: 
 
 Without a strong balance of payments our ability to carry out an effective 
 independent policy in such critical fields as economic affairs, foreign and 
 defence affairs, and overseas aid would be fatally impaired. We could not 
 continue indefinitely to borrow short in order to lend long. The imposition 
 of the corporation tax would bring a significant relief to the balance of 
 payments, since it would remove a bias in favour of overseas investment 
 which was built into the present taxation system.397  
 
It cannot be denied that the objectives of corporation tax were to modernise the 
tax system, encourage business investment and export through inhibiting the 
distribution of profits as dividends, to achieve a fairer tax structure, and reduce 
the balance of payments deficit. However, it is necessary to develop this 
argument to include the use of corporation tax for avoidance of a deflationary 
budget. The above objectives were not embodied into the established 
corporation tax due to the removal of ‘non-franking’ and the inclusion of double 
taxation relief. These changes were the product of OECD guidelines and 
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pressure from the Bank, which, as representative of the City and keen to avoid 
disturbance in the financial market, was in pursuit of the interests of financial 
industries.  
 
4.4    Capital controls, acquisition of investment currency and 
reduction in foreign investment 
 
As detailed above, the Labour government was forced to change the course of 
its corporation tax, which was designed to tackle the balance of payments 
deficit. To compensate, at least partially, for the concessions made concerning 
the corporation tax and the resulting shrinkage of its tax base, or to bolster the 
foreign reserves, Labour endeavoured to adopt a different scheme using direct 
capital controls and acquisition of investment currency. 
     On 23 February 1965, the exchange controls proposal was discussed and 
the agreement to take steps in this direction was reached.398 The concrete 
scheme that was considered, firstly, identified the need to tighten up the criteria 
for official exchange in order to encourage capital inflow into the balance of 
payments. In addition, any investments by enterprises that satisfied the new 
criteria should have ‘100 per cent, and not some smaller proportion, of their 
requirements met from official exchange’.399 Also, ‘accruals to the investment 
currency market from exempted assets […] should be diverted to the official 
reserve.’400 Moreover, the agreement was reached that the Bank and Treasury 
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‘should consult together on the possibility of the Government entering the 
investment currency market to purchase dollars for the reserves.’401 Finally, 
consultation was also required on ‘the possibility of the imposing of a non-
discriminatory tax either on purchases of foreign securities or on income flowing 
from such purchase.’402 This scheme is reminiscent of the ‘Tobin tax’ idea that 
arose after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971: the imposition of 
tax on foreign exchange transactions in order to suppress speculative 
transactions.403 
     Cromer presented harsh criticism of the proposal for exchange controls.404 
Cromer indicated that net overseas income from foreign investment was at 
£670 million, therefore opposing imposition of exchange controls, which would 
potentially harm capital inflow from foreign investment. He added that he 
considered such measures of using taxation to control the balance of payments 
as ‘exceedingly rash’ and he expressed his doubt over 
 
 whether enough thought has been given to the practical consequences 
 of embarking on a regime of discriminatory taxation which (and this is not 
 entirely incidental) would involve one of the most intrusive acts of 
 Government into the individual’s management of his own affairs yet seen 
 in peace time.405 
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Cromer concluded that ‘no steps should be taken, as part of any exchange 
control and taxation “package”, which would close, or effectively dry up, the 
switch dollar market’, referring to the investment currency market.406 Cromer 
further stated that he saw this proposal as a ban on ‘dealings between U.K. 
residents in the switch dollar market, and only to allow switches in existing 
portfolios’, which he suggested would harm foreign opinion, as the UK would be 
perceived as selling sterling at a discount in order to purchase expensive 
dollars.407 He continued that this would inevitably provoke speculation around 
the exchange parity, and would cause a decrease in dollars coming into the 
switch market. Conclusively, in this correspondence with Armstrong, Cromer 
utterly rejected the proposal for exchange controls and reduction in foreign 
investment, expressing his view that the switch dollar market had a significant 
role in keeping international earning power in the City.408 It was recorded that 
Cromer expressed his concern ‘about any policy decision to bring private 
overseas assets into reserves’ and remained ‘strongly against discriminatory 
taxation against overseas investment though he saw nothing against removing 
the present anomaly under which such investment was specially favoured’.409  
     In response to Cromer’s outright rejection of the proposal for exchange 
controls, Sir Denis Rickett of the Treasury sought to reconcile the Bank by 
detailing two possible schemes that could be taken by the government.410 Firstly, 
acquisition of investment currency by discretionary intervention in the 
investment dollar market, or 25 per cent of the proceeds of sale of all non-
sterling securities, would be ‘surrendered’ to the reserves. The second scheme 
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410 TNA, T171/ 801, Rickett to Sir William Armstrong: Overseas Investment, 12 
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consisted of the introduction of a ‘specific tax’, which would be imposed on 
income from overseas securities at a rate of 15 per cent. Rickett expressed his 
preference for the former scheme, and deemed the latter a somewhat 
dangerous measure. He stated that ‘the Corporation Tax and withdrawal of 
relief for underlying tax will in themselves have very substantial effects both on 
direct capital flows and on the willingness of the U.K. investor (especially 
investment trust and insurance companies) to hold overseas securities’, and 
asserted that if such a ‘specific tax’ were to be introduced it should be entwined 
with corporation tax.411 Repeated concessions over the corporation tax by the 
Chancellor, who faced political backlash from the Bank, reveal corporation tax 
as distanced from the original proposal. Given that a taxation which would affect 
foreign investment was not a politically practical choice, an alternative proposal 
to directly control capital movement was made.412  
     The proposition for exchange controls was discussed in the Chequers’ 
meeting, attended by Kaldor, at which the Bank and Inland Revenue were 
represented. It was concluded that if such measures were introduced, the ‘EEA 
[European Economic Area] should intervene in the switch dollar market and buy 
switch dollars at a premium for putting into the reserves.’413 This argument was 
‘violently opposed’ by Roy Bridge, Adviser to the Governors of the Bank, on the 
grounds that that the ‘market reaction could be catastrophic’.414  Moreover, 
regarding the diversion to the reserves a proportion of the proceeds of overseas 
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sale of foreign securities, known as the ‘surrender scheme’, Roy Bridge 
asserted that the scheme would lead to doubts over whether sterling ‘is not a 
currency to get shot of.’415 Despite these objections, Cromer expressed in a 
letter to Armstrong that a temporary measure to re-enforce the existing 
restraints on new capital investment overseas was necessary. Consequently, 
he compromised to ‘agree with the suggestion of equalising the level of taxation 
as between home and overseas investment’ and understood the need for 
‘measures which are being proposed to diminish substantially new accruals to 
the switch dollar market.’ 416 Cromer noted that should these measures be taken, 
the UK financial market would be unable to maintain the prestigious expertise 
which was known to underpin the UK’s balance of payments, regarded as a 
source of influence in international affairs. 
     The Chancellor and the Treasury reconsidered the scheme and, despite the 
harsh opposition from the Bank, reached the conclusion that 25 per cent of the 
proceeds of sales of all non-sterling securities should be surrendered to the 
reserves.417 On 17 March 1965, the Chancellor and Cromer directly discussed 
the issue. 418  Five days later, the Chancellor and the Bank reached the 
agreement to put in place the 25 per cent surrender scheme.419  
     The shrinking of the taxation base of corporation tax on dividends in order to 
avoid double taxation and ‘non-franking’ on intercompany dividends, chiefly 
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because of the political pressure from the Bank, was considered an effective 
measure to tackle the balance of payments deficit by curbing foreign investment. 
It has been shown that after these concessions, the Chancellor via the Treasury, 
in particular Denis Rickett, demanded employment of an alternative measure to 
control the balance of payments deficit. The resulting proposed scheme of 
exchange controls was strongly opposed by the Bank. However, because 
alternate measures offered by Radice to Cromer were drastic and threatening to 
the presence of the City, the Bank conceded to accept the 25 per cent 
surrender scheme. Despite the opposition from the Bank and the evisceration of 
the principles of corporation tax, such as ’non-franking’, the Chancellor 
successfully proceeded with the implementation of direct exchange controls. 
 
4.5    Conclusion 
 
Financial history and the history of fiscal policies describe the budget of 1965 as 
‘mildly deflationary’. The corporation tax, one of the most significant policies of 
this 1965 budget, is considered to have encompassed a number of objectives, 
such as providing an incentive effect to tackle the balance of payments deficit, 
foster economic growth, modernise the British tax system, prompt increase in 
tax revenue, encourage business investment and export, increase equality, and 
accomplish a fairer tax system which was a prerequisite measure to reconcile 
the trade unions to accept incomes policy. The accounts in existing research 
hold credence as the official documents clearly express these objectives. 
However, if focus is placed upon the link between the corporation tax and the 
incomes policy, this connection was not a prominent feature in the formation 
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process of the corporation tax. In negotiations between the Chancellor and 
financial institutions, the Bank showed little enthusiasm for the prospect that the 
corporation tax that would encourage the concession of the unions over 
incomes policy. Rather, the Bank devoted itself to defence of the interests of the 
City and avoidance of potential risks associated with corporation tax which 
might disturb the market and unduly provoke change in the capital structure of 
companies. 
     It should not be ignored that the corporation tax functioned as a bulwark 
against the domestic and international pressure that insisted the government 
implement stringent fiscal policies and a deflationary budget. Labour faced 
resistance from the Bank, which attempted to defend the status of the City, and 
from the Treasury (accompanied by the Bank) in its pursuit of a deflationary 
budget in order to meet the requirements of the other central banks, the IMF 
and OECD. Labour sought to eschew a deflationary budget by brandishing the 
potential beneficial effects of corporation tax which would encourage export and 
in turn reduce the balance of payments deficit. 
     In terms of technical matters, the corporation tax proposal was exposed to a 
political backlash that demanded double taxation relief and feared the jeopardy 
of the balance of payments deficit, regardless of Labour’s explanation that the 
corporation tax would be remedial to the foreign reserves position. It has been 
detailed in this chapter that concerning the effects of corporation tax on the 
balance of payments deficit, the perceptions of the Chancellor and the Bank 
were far reaching. This conflict changed the course of corporation tax policy: via 
rejection of non-franking on intercompany dividends, in effect, companies were 
subject to a reduction in corporation tax, a far cry from Labour’s ’socialist’ aims. 
On the other hand, the issue of international double taxation was amended 
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according to OECD guidelines and demand from the Bank, which was aware of 
potential harmful effects on foreign investment. These conflicts and pressures 
existed behind the decisions that saw the ‘socialist tax’ pushed by the ‘growth 
advocacy’ groups resulting in a corporation tax that was favourable to 
corporations and the interests of financial institutions. 
     Having lost the levy on intercompany dividends, which was considered by 
the Chancellor and Kaldor as a key principle of Labour’s taxation policy, and 
having faced further necessity to control capital flow, the Chancellor took steps 
to find alternate measures to tackle the balance of payments deficit. This 
measure took the form of direct exchange and capital controls, dubbed the 
‘surrender scheme’, and downscaling of the tax relief on the earnings from 
abroad. Though the Bank strongly opposed the exchange controls measure, it 
finally accepted the ‘surrender scheme’ rather than the radical measures of 
direct capital controls proposed by the Treasury. Thus the Chancellor was able 
to successfully proceed with the exchange controls plan.  
     Through analysis of the 1965 budget with a focus on corporation tax policy 
formation, this chapter has highlighted that the argument based on political 
structure, the so-called adversarial party system, alone is insufficient to explain 
Labour’s taxation in the 1965 budget. There is no doubt that, although adjusted, 
the tax strategy or ideology of the Labour government remained in the taxation 
of 1965. However, great importance also lies in the interrelation between the 
factors of concentrated political power in the Treasury and the Bank, and the 
international political economy, such as the political and economic transactions 
with the IMF and the other central banks. Furthermore, how politicians and 
decision makers conducted political transactions at this institutionalised 
foundation of international and domestic financial political structure cannot be 
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overlooked. Through clarification of the political process and the development of 
ideas and objectives around taxation, in the context of currency management 
and domestic economic purposes, the influence of foreign sectors and the 
internal institutional power balance can be graphically described, as can the link 










Chapter 5: Revisiting the capital gains tax of 1965: Sterling and 
debt management 
 
5.1    Introduction 
 
In the 1965 budget the Labour government initiated major tax reform, the main 
components of which were corporation tax and capital gains tax. After this tax 
reform, capital gains earned by companies were subject to corporation tax. 
Realised gains earned from long-term (identified as over one year) assets 
retained by individuals, trustees and personal representatives became subject 
to capital gains tax, at a 30 per cent flat rate. Other short-term gains remained 
subject to income tax and surtax as under the previous scheme.420  
     Existing research has analysed these main components of Labour’s tax 
reform, however, further clarification is necessary in several areas. From the 
perspective of currency management, the 1965 budget is considered as ‘mildly 
deflationary’ in light of the ‘quantity’ or valuation amount. It is assessed that 
Labour was confronted with the sterling crisis that emanated from the balance 
of payments deficit, which arose from insufficient deflationary measures.421    
                                                       
420 There were several tax exemptions and deductions. For example, the capital 
gains earned on pension funds were exempt from any tax. In addition, owner-
occupied properties and goods worth less than £1,000 were not subject to 
capital gains tax. Moreover, double taxation relief was implemented between 
the investment and unit trusts, in current terminology open-ended or close-
ended mutual funds, and the shareholders.  
421 Oliver, ‘The Management of Sterling, 1964-1967’, p.589, and Newton, ‘The 
two sterling crises of 1964 and the decision not to devalue’, pp.73-98. 
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     However, arguments in existing research focusing on currency management 
can be assessed as lingering on superficial description of the budget. As seen 
in chapter four of this thesis, analysis focusing on interrelation between the 
management of currencies and fiscal measures is important. Corporation tax, 
which was initially granted the function of tackling the balance of payments 
deficit, was mobilised by the Labour government in order to meticulously 
circumvent external pressure to implement a deflationary budget. Hence, it can 
be assessed that corporation tax was partly for managing sterling, and that both 
of the above functions were inextricably intertwined and mutually affected in the 
budgeting process. This leads to necessity for further exploration of another 
facet of Labour’s 1965 budget, capital gains tax, in the context of fiscal and 
monetary policies, so as to clarify and deepen understanding of Labour’s 
sequence of demarches as dynamically linked with the management of sterling. 
     There is also the issue in existing research of focus on the ideological and 
functional aspects of Labour’s ‘socialist tax’. Labour’s 1964-5 tax reform is 
perceived as an approach geared towards achievement of fairness, 
modernisation and the rebalancing between rich and poor.422 Regarding capital 
gains tax, the existing research has mainly focused on the incentive effects to 
distribute retained profits into business investment, and the ‘socialistic’ aspect, 
which targeted closure of the loophole that had allowed income through untaxed 
capital gains, so as to achieve ‘fairness’. Additionally, according to Pemberton, 
the 1965 budget, major aspects of which were capital gains tax and corporation 
tax, was the product of the attempt to achieve modernisation of the UK 
economy and its growth, and to create favourable political milieu for tougher 
                                                       
422 Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, p.172. 
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incomes policy. 423  Meanwhile, according to documents which detail the 
discussion within the Labour Party, capital gains tax had embraced other 
potential functions and objectives, which consisted of three elements. Firstly, 
capital gains tax would ‘prevent profits not distributed in dividends from being 
realised as income in the form of untaxed capital gains’.424 The second element 
was to aim to increase ‘the price of affected shares’ through the postponement 
of sale.425 Thirdly, capital gains tax would restrict dividends and encourage 
physical investment financed through the increase of retained profits, ‘to ensure 
that the higher dividends were channelled into the public purse to the required 
extent’.426  
     Therefore, there are numerous intrinsic objectives and functions described 
for capital gains tax, which overarched fiscal, social, and monetary fields. How 
these various aims were co-ordinated and changed in the budgeting process 
requires exploration. For this purpose it is imperative to analyse the capital 
gains tax from wider perspectives, especially from the monetary point of view. 
Moreover, existing research has tended to focus on ‘socialist tax’ though 
combined analysis of corporation tax and capital gains tax. As seen in chapter 
four of this thesis, and from the above clarification, both taxes had separate 
purposes and functions. Therefore, in order to clarify the facet of Labour’s 
‘socialist tax’, it is necessary to reconsider what components of both taxes 
changed and remained, and what components Labour prioritised in the 
budgeting process. This inevitably requires the comparison of the historical 
                                                       
423  Hugh Pemberton, ‘Taxation and Labour’s Modernisation Programme’, 
Contemporary British History, Vol.20, No.3, September 2006, pp.425. 
424 Kaldor Papers, NK11/1/47-48, Labour Party, Taxation Working Party, Minutes 
(4), 31 January 1964. 
425 Kaldor Papers, NK11/1/58-59, Labour Party, Taxation Working Party, RD 




process of corporation tax, as explored in the previous chapter, with capital 
gains tax. Thus, this chapter attempts to untangle the intertwined intrinsic 
objectives of capital gains tax, which partially configured Labour’s ‘socialist tax’, 
from fiscal and monetary perspectives, and aims to provide further 
understanding of the interrelations between Labour’s fiscal and monetary 
measures.    
 
5.2    Capital gains tax formation process in the 1965 budget 
 
The following section provides analysis of the development of capital gains tax 
and the disputes and concessions within the decision-making process. 
 
5.2.1    The inner-Labour discussion surrounding capital gains tax  
 
The capital gains tax established in 1965 saw a 30 per cent flat rate tax 
imposed on realised gains from disposable assets of individuals. Short-term 
gains of less than one year were subject to income tax and surtax. In addition, 
all short-term and long-term company capital gains were subject to the 40 per 
cent corporation tax. Prior to this scheme, capital gains tax, which was first 
introduced in 1962 under then Chancellor of the Exchequer Selwyn Lloyds’ 
initiative, only covered the short-term gains of individuals and companies. Thus, 
the capital gains tax reform of 1965 broadened the tax base to include long-
term capital gains. 
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     In early 1964, the Labour Party forged the proposal for a new capital gains 
tax. Although Labour initially considered implementing expenditure tax, it was 
given up because it was not deemed ‘practical politics’, and modification of the 
existing capital gains tax was considered the most ‘down-to-earth scheme’.427 
Moreover, value added tax (VAT) was also considered by the Richardson 
Committee, however, the idea was rejected due to the following three reasons. 
Firstly, VAT would be ‘politically impossible because, it is too revolutionary, 
appears too crackpot'.428 Secondly, this VAT would produce ‘an administrative 
nightmare, both for the taxation authorities and for business – we found plenty 
of difficulties in a universal value added tax in the Richardson Committee, 
especially if, as seems likely, things like food were exempted from the tax for 
political reasons.’429 The final reason stated was that VAT could be perceived 
internationally as ‘equivalent to a devaluation’ and if it were considered ‘too 
crackpot to last’ it could prompt capital flight.430 With the options of expenditure 
tax and VAT exhausted, Labour focused on reforming taxation, including capital 
gains tax. 
     Labour’s intention behind the series of tax reforms was clearly summarised 
as below by the Party’s Working Party on taxation:  
                                                       
427 Kaldor Papers, NK/11/1/25-31, Labour Party, Working Party on Taxation, 
Draft Report on Taxation and Incomes Policy, RD 695, February 1964.  
428 Ibid. 
429 Ibid. 
430 Kaldor Papers, NK/3/110/83, The Board Room Inland Revenue Somerset 
House, 29 Oct 1964. In accordance with the estimation of MacDougall at the 
Richardson Committee, purchase tax was considered a more efficient scheme 
to collect revenue. See MacDougall, Don and Mandarin, p.147. The reason the 
Labour Party saw the potential of VAT to cause capital flight was perhaps 
related to its export rebate or remittance on export goods. However, this effect 
is not yet empirically exemplified in existing research. For the recognition of the 
effects of VAT on the level of exports of the succeeding Edward Heath 
government, which introduced VAT in 1973, see Command Papers, 4621: 





 All general tax reforms proposed in our report are designed to bring 
 about a fairer tax structure and they may accordingly be expected to help 
 an incomes policy by creating a more favourable climate of opinion.431  
 
The Working Party on taxation also recognised the importance of reconciling 
the unions: ‘whether this would prove acceptable to the unions as a quid pro 
quo would remain to be seen.’432 As existing research has pointed out, it is clear 
that one of the aims behind the tax reform, including capital gains tax policy 
reformation, was to broaden the tax base to include long-term gains. 
Furthermore, the achievement of Labour’s aim of ‘fairness’ would have a 
significant role in reconciling the unions to accept the incomes policy, which was 
considered a prerequisite scheme for dealing with the balance of payments 
deficit. 433  In summary, reforming capital gains tax was one of Labour’s 
remaining options after expenditure tax and VAT were deemed not politically 
realistic in early 1964. In addition, the purpose of Labour’s capital gains tax with 
corporation tax was not only to eradicate the tax loophole, but also to pave the 
way to an incomes policy acceptable to the unions, to bolster stock prices, and 
                                                       
431  Kaldor Papers, NK11/1/13-19, Labour Party, Working Party on Taxation, 
Report on Taxation and Incomes Policy, RD 742, April 1964. 
432 Kaldor Papers, NK11/1/47-48, Labour Party, Taxation Working Party, Minutes 
(4), 31 January 1964. 
433  On 22 January 1965, the Chancellor explained to the Trades Union 
Congress (TUC) how corporation tax and capital gains tax related to incomes 
policy. TNA, T171/803, Summary Note of a Meeting held in the Chancellor of 
Exchequer's room, Treasury Chambers, Friday 22 January 1965, 2.45 p.m. 
Kaldor also asserted a similar view. See TNA, T171/804, Kaldor to the 
Chancellor: First Memorandum on Tax Reform, 29 October 1964. For the link 
between Labour’s taxation and incomes policy, see Pemberton, ‘Taxation and 
Labour’s Modernisation Programme’, p.425. Also see, Daunton, Just Taxes. 
Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, pp.159, 168. Callaghan, Time and 
Chance, p.169, and Brandon, In the Red, p.52.  
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expand foreign investment, strategies perceived to aid the amelioration of the 
balance of payments deficit.  
 
5.2.2    Capital gains tax proposal formation 
 
When Labour leapt into government in October 1964, it was forced to take steps 
to manage the sterling crisis. Speculation surrounding sterling emanated from 
the announcement of the balance of payments deficit and the autumn budget 
speech. Labour was forced to solicit solvency from foreign central banks. 
Economic Adviser to the Treasury Robert Neild stated his doubts in a letter to 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, James Callaghan:   
 
 Already before the election stock brokers were producing circulars 
 calculating possible effects of a Corporation Tax, or a Capital Gains Tax 
 and thus they were encouraging investors to take account of the 
 unknown changes that lay ahead […] this kind of uncertainty has a bad 
 effect on sterling by upsetting foreign investors […] Foreign confidence 
 really depends upon the success of the Government’s policies to handle 
 the domestic economy and the balance of payments as well as upon the 
 economic justice and efficiency of the changes we make in taxation.434 
 
Thus, the Labour government had to arrange its own economic ideology with 
the demand placed upon it to implement effective domestic economic measures 
in order to tackle the balance of payments deficit. The financial market focused 
particularly on the potential reform of corporation tax and capital gains tax in the 
upcoming 1965 budget. 
                                                       




     On 8 December 1964, the Chancellor of the Exchequer stated the need to 
broaden the tax base to be covered by capital gains tax, including on individuals 
and companies who would be liable to tax on realised gains. As an exception, 
the Chancellor planned that non-residents, including individuals and companies, 
would not be subject to capital gains tax.435 This proposal incurred a significant 
political backlash from the financial market including the Bank. Prior to this 
statement, Cromer, then Governor of the Bank, criticised the government’s tax 
proposal in a letter to Sir William Armstrong, Joint Permanent Secretary to the 
Treasury, on 2 December 1964. Regarding the governmental consideration of 
variable rates of capital gains tax, Cromer argued that, 
 
 The smooth functioning of the gilt-edged market depends in part on the 
 ability of analysts to make firm comparisons among yields on 
 Government stocks and between these and yields on other fixed interest 
 securities. A variable rate of tax would make such comparisons 
 uncertain…which could have very damaging effects. I would therefore 
 urge strongly that a flat rate should be adopted.436  
 
Cromer clearly required the Treasury make efforts to limit the potential 
uncertainty and disturbing effects on the financial market, which would be 
produced by the capital gains tax, and to adhere to the flat rate tax due to its 
simplicity, efficiency and neutrality. 
     The dispute over the exemption of the gilt-edged market was inflamed when, 
on 11 December 1964, the Governor cast doubt on the imposition of capital 
gains tax upon it.437 Taking the same line as the Bank, Fred Catherwood, Chief 
                                                       
435 TNA, T171/804, Chancellor’s Statement of 8th December on the new taxes, 
8 December 1964. 
436 TNA, T171/805, Governor to Sir William Armstrong, 2 December 1964. 
437 TNA, T171/804, Governor to Sir William Armstrong, 11 December 1964. 
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Industrial Advisor at the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA), summarised 
the comments from industries and the City, stating that they had pointed out 
‘that the yield on gilt-edged is basic to the whole market structure of interest 
rates and that it has the widest international repercussions’, demanding that ‘the 
Government must make a statement exempting gilt-edged securities from the 
capital gains tax as soon as possible’.438 The Bank and the DEA were highly 
concerned with the potentially disturbing effects of the capital gains tax on the 
gilt-edged security market, which would likely influence financial assets and 
debts. 
     Conversely, the Chancellor recognised that there was ‘everything to be said 
for including gilt-edged within the ambit of the tax […] if gilt-edged were 
excluded there would be continuing agitation for the exclusion of all fixed 
interest stocks.’439 For the Chancellor, the capital gains tax exemption for gilt-
edged securities was an unpalatable choice as he perceived that this would 
inevitably lead to further exemptions, resulting in the continuation of tax 
loopholes, irreconcilable with Labour’s ideology. Despite the intent of the 
Chancellor, the political row surrounding the capital gains tax rates structure 
and the matter of exemption of the gilt-edged market intensified, with criticism 
from institutional investors such as life insurance companies. The original 
proposal for the coverage of capital gains tax on institutional investors is shown 
in the table below (Figure 5-1). Prior to the initial tax reform proposal of 1965, 
the long-term gains of life funds, building societies, Lloyds underwriters and 
investment and unit trusts were exempt from capital gains tax (Figure 5-2). 
Labour attempted to remove the capital gains tax exemption for these 
                                                       
438 TNA, T171/804, H. F. R. Catherwood to Sir Eric Roll, 18 December 1964. 
This minute was circulated to the Treasury. 
439 TNA, T171/804, Corporation Tax and Capital Gains Tax, 22 December 1964. 
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institutional investors and to impose tax on their net revenue. The figures below 
show that Labour’s initial proposal would see ‘Net Net’ Funds expand 
significantly. It is clear that the tax reform to include long-term capital gains 
encompassed the impact of broadening the tax base to include the institutional 
investors.440 
Figure 5-1: Institutional Funds by Proposed Taxation Class                        
(1965 Budget Initial Proposal) 
 
Source: BoEA, 6A319/3 A Background for Gilt Edged, March 1965.              
Note: Format and data taken from 6A319/3. ‘Life Funds’ in the 1965 Budget 
Initial Proposal moved from ‘Net’ to ‘Net Net Funds’ according to the initial 
proposal of the Labour government. 
                                                       
440 The proposal for the tax structure was highly complicated. In the category of 
‘Net Net’ funds of Labour’s proposal, net revenue (including capital gains of the 
banking sector), trustee saving banks (including special investment 
departments) and general insurance funds would be subject to corporation tax. 
On the other hand, in terms of building societies and investment and unit trusts, 
their income would be taxed under corporation tax, and realised capital profits 
would be subject to capital gains tax. Regarding Lloyds underwriters, its income 
would be taxed under income tax and realised capital profits would be subject to 
capital gains tax. 
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Figure 5-2: Institutional Funds by Present Taxation Class                            
(Pre-1964, before Labour’s CGT) 
 
Source: BoEA, 6A319/3, A Background for Gilt Edged, March 1965. 
 
 
5.2.3    Dispute over the concessions 
 
The issue of setting a specific and flat rate of capital gains tax, as demanded by 
Cromer, was settled in the Treasury and Inland Revenue (IR) at an early stage 
in the budget formation process. On 30 December 1964, Sir Alexander Johnson, 
Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue informed the Chancellor that a single 
flat rate capital gains tax would have a substantial administrative advantage in 
its avoidance of the complicated calculation of capital gains. However, 
Johnson’s consultation supported not a single flat rate, but rather two-tier tax 
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rates, which Johnson indicated would hinder tax evasion.441 He assessed that a 
single flat rate would be ‘easier to run’ and would ‘please the City’.442 However, 
in contrast to the argument of Johnson, McKean of the Inland Revenue 
presented his view that long-term capital gains tax should be formed with a flat 
rate.443 Sir William Armstrong criticised McKean’s line on this matter, presenting 
the Treasury’s preference for two-tier tax rates due to its effects on social 
equity.444 
     After the consultation between the IR, the Treasury and the Bank, the 
Chancellor agreed to separate the short-term capital gains tax rate from the 
long-term capital gains tax rate on individuals in a meeting at the Treasury on 
21 January 1965.445 In this meeting, in light of Labour’s pursuit of ‘fairness’ in its 
tax reform, it was argued that the rate of capital gains tax should mirror income 
tax and corporation tax rates.446 The intention behind this was to avoid setting a 
rate of capital gains tax much lower than rates of corporation tax and income 
tax, which ‘could jeopardise the achievement of effective incomes policy if 
income in the form of capital gains were taxed at a lower rate than wages and 
                                                       
441 TNA, T171/805, Alexander Johnson to the Chancellor: Capital Gains Tax, 30 
December 1964. 
442 Ibid. 
443 TNA, T171/805, McKean to the Chancellor: Capital Gains Tax, 31 December 
1964. 
444 TNA, T171/805, Sir William Armstrong to A. J. G. Issac: Capital Gains Tax, 8 
January 1965. 
445 TNA, T171/804, N.T. (65) 1st Meeting, Note of a meeting in the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer’s room, H.M. Treasury, Thursday 21 January 1965, 3.00 p.m. 
446 The Bank also considered Labour’s tax principles. On 11 February 1965, 
Jeremy Morse, Executive Director of the Bank, in a letter to Jasper Hollom, 
Chief Casher of the Bank, stated that the aim of this tax reform was to 
modernise and simplify the tax system, and to achieve an equitable distribution 
of the tax burden. This letter described the pre-1964 system as ‘deadwood of 
past theory and practice’. Morse concluded that the Bank ‘must be in favour of 
these objectives. How far are the present proposals for corporation tax and 
capital gains tax likely in practice to further them?’ BoEA, 6A319/2, Jeremy 
Morse to Jasper Hollom, 11 February 1965. 
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salaries’.447 In addition, in this meeting, it was concluded that short-term gains 
of individuals should be subject to full income tax and surtax rates, and that 
short-term capital gains tax should cover gains made within one year from any 
source. 448  It was provisionally agreed that the capital gains tax rates on 
companies’ long and short-term gains should be taxed at the same rate as 
corporation tax. From this discussion, it is clear that the Chancellor held 
concerns about the links between ‘fairness’, incomes policy and capital gains 
tax. 
     The political conflict surrounding the proposed capital gains tax that emerged 
over the exemption of gilt-edged securities would prove the most bitter. On 21 
December 1964, Cromer sent a note to the Chancellor detailing the Bank’s view 
on capital gains tax and urged the government to make exempt the gilt-edged 
market from capital gains tax. In this note, Cromer stated that ‘the most 
compelling argument’ was the increasing difficulty of financing the ‘over-growing 
public sector on fixed interest securities against the competition of equity 
shares’. In addition, Cromer further detailed,  
 
 If exemption is not given, the result will be not merely a loss of a potential 
 advantage but the infliction of positive damage. Turnover in gilt-edged 
 will inevitably drop sharply, robbing the market of the breadth and 
 resilience which make it unique amongst the fixed interest capital 
 markets of the world […] In such a narrowed market the possibility is that 
 the Government would ultimately pay more for its borrowing, particularly 
 at long term. Further, in the absence of a broad market and without the 
 volume of switching that has become customary, the Bank of England’s 
 technique of feeding out new issues of Government stock to the market 
 would be appreciably hampered and the result might well be some 
                                                       
447 TNA, T171/804, N.T. (65) 1st Meeting, Note of a meeting in the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer’s room, H.M. Treasury, Thursday 21 January 1965, 3.00 p.m. 
448 Ibid. 
Previously, the gains from land owned less than three years, and stocks and 
shares owned less than six months were considered short-term taxable gains. 
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 reduction in total sales of stock in any given circumstances and hence an 
 increase in unfunded debt.449 
 
The Bank stated the possible difficulty of debt management without exemption 
for gilts and the risk of shrinking London’s fixed interest capital market. In stark 
contrast to Labour’s initially optimistic view on the effects of capital gains tax on 
stock markets, in that it would encourage investors to hold securities longer and 
lead to postponement of the sale of securities, which would increase stock 
prices, the Bank expressed that a capital gains tax without exemption of gilt-
edged securities would have a harmful effect on the financial market. 
     On 5 January 1965, the Working Group investigating the exemption of gild-
edged, dubbed Goldman’s Committee, was held and conflict ensued. During the 
discussion in this committee, the Bank and the DEA advocated exemption, 
while the IR and Treasury opposed exemption.450 The arguments that emerged 
were classified by the Bank into the categories of the ‘moral argument’ and the 
‘practical argument’.451  The moral argument referred to the matter that the 
capital gains tax might encompass discriminatory influence on investors with 
low-coupon fixed interest stocks, possibly affecting the market as a whole. 
Conversely, the ‘practical arguments’ were detailed as follows. Firstly, it was put 
forth that capital gains tax would lock in investors, reducing activity and making 
it more difficult for the Bank to ‘peddle out’ new stocks, since the Bank usually 
                                                       
449 TNA, T326/412, The case for the exemption of gilts from capital gains tax, 
attached to letter from the Governor to the Chancellor, 21 December 1964. 
450  BoEA, 6A319/1, Jeremy Morse to Leslie O’Brien, 7 January 1965, and 
BoEA, 6A319/1, Jeremy Morse to the Governor: Exemption of Gilt-Edged from 
Capital Gains Tax, 12 January 1965. Catherwood of the DEA and Sir Alec 
Cairncross supported the view of the Bank. Kaldor suggested a compromise 
and ‘the exemption of all holdings acquired before the date the tax was 
announced’. 
451 BoEA, 6A319/1, Arguments for Exemption of Gilt-Edged from Capital Gains 
Tax by Jeremy Morse, 12 January 1965. 
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depended upon a ‘chain of deals which frees certain investors to take up slightly 
more attractive new stocks.’452 The Bank saw the possibility that ‘new stocks 
would have to be made more attractive, thus increasing the cost of borrowing to 
the Government.’453 Secondly, the Bank argued that the capital gains tax would 
have a destabilising effect on the market. It perceived that increases in price 
would ‘be accentuated because holders will not wish to realise taxable gains, 
and falls will be accentuated because holders will want to realise tax losses.’454  
     The Bank proceeded to explain the potential fluctuation and sluggish 
transactions of the financial market which were considered a cause of 
uncertainty that may be produced by the capital gains tax, highlighting that 
forecasts showed:  
 
 the price adjustments in various low-coupon stocks that might follow the 
 announcement of a 35% or 25% capital gains tax, on the basis of the 
 yield relationship between low- and high-coupon stocks which existed 
 before the announcement about taxation last October […] it seems that 
 initially turnover was considerably reduced455 
 
Conversely, the Bank concluded that its analysis on the institutional investors 
showed that switching had ‘not been affected to any great extent, as most of the 
big switchers, including insurance companies, were unaffected by the tax.’456 
The Working Group’s report recognised that capital gains tax would reduce 
dealings in gilt-edged securities including issue and redemption, and have a 




455 TNA, T326/413, Paper by Bank of England, Circulated at the Meeting of 




‘de-stabilising effect’ on the prices of the market.457 In addition, it was stated 
that the capital gains tax would hinder the Bank’s smoothing operations. Then, 
the Group compared the pros and cons of the exemption: ‘the market was of 
very great size, the maturity structure was very well spread, and the general 
volume of transactions was very large […] The effect of the tax upon 
management of the debt could therefore easily be exaggerated’. 458  As a 
disadvantageous aspect, the Group suggested that ‘Gilts have long suffered by 
comparison with equities, as the result of inflation and the rise in interest rates’, 
however, exemption of gilts from the capital gains tax would improve the 
‘marketing of government bonds.’459 The report issued by the Working Group 
summarised that a great proportion of gilt-edged market transactions would be 
unaffected by capital gains tax, and there would be a risk of excessive 
borrowing from the banking system. However, capital gains tax ‘may itself tend 
to enhance the attraction of fixed interest securities compared with ordinary 
shares and exemption from the tax might not be very effective as a stimulus to 
demand for gilts.’ 460  From these discussions, both advantageous and 
disadvantageous predictions were expressed, however, the scepticism over the 
effects of the capital gains tax on the gilt-edged market would not be abated. 
     On 25 January 1965, the Treasury responded to the Bank’s suggestions.461 
The Treasury pointed out that government securities were widely distributed in 
the market. This was according to statistics indicating that £8,000 million of a 
                                                       
457 TNA, T326/413, Her Majesty’s Treasury, Working Group on Gilt-Edged and 
Capital Gains, 11 January 1965. 
458 Ibid. 
459 Ibid 
460 TNA, T326/413, Capital Gains Tax and Gilt-Edged Securities, 25 January 
1965. 
461 BoEA, 6A319/2, Capital Gains Tax and Gilt-Edged Securities, Note by the 
Treasury, 25 January 1965, attached to letter from Jeremy Morse to the 
Governor, 2 February 1965. 
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total £14,400 million, or 56 per cent of total market holdings, was held by 
institutional investors. The Treasury concluded that such institutional investors, 
especially insurance companies, would not be affected by capital gains tax, 
because those capital gains would be taxed under corporation tax, therefore 
their capital gains would be out of range of capital gains tax. It further detailed 
that the affected holdings such as commercial and industrial companies that 
owned £300 million, individuals that owned £3,200 million and building societies 
that owned £300 million, must be considered from a different point of view.  
Moreover, regarding the above ‘moral’ argument, a note by the Treasury 
detailed, 
 
 If it is complained that a tax on capital gains would penalise the holder of 
 a low-coupon stock in comparison with that of a high coupon stock, then 
 it must be remembered that changes in Bank Rate tend to have a 
 differing effect upon the market value of stocks according to their 
 maturity; and the long rise since the war in the level of interest rates has 
 imposed far greater penalties on the holders (many of them small savers) 
 of undated and long dated Government stocks.462  
 
In other words, the Treasury asserted that the monetary policy had a greater 
disruptive effect on the gilt-edged market than taxation, and exemption of gilts 
would have only minor impacts on the market, therefore attempting to vindicate 
the capital gains tax. 
     With respect to debt management policies, the Treasury stated the ‘main 
effect on debt management would be to make it more difficult for the Issue 
Department to “peddle out” stocks to the market, and to buy in the next 
securities’. The Treasury concluded that inflation and ensuing distrust of fixed 




interest securities, and recurrent balance of payments crises, in short ‘economic’ 
causes rather than ‘technical’, had been and would likely continue to be a major 
factor in the difficulties of market management.463 It is clear that the Treasury 
denied the negative effects of capital gains tax on the securities market, and 
perceived that should the gilt-edged securities market be disturbed the cause 
would be the economic situation. Moreover, the Treasury stressed that the 
impact of the capital gains tax on the fixed interest securities market would be 
limited: 
 
 the new tax should in any case tend to shift the balance of preference 
 from equities to fixed interest securities in that capital appreciation is a 
 larger component of the expected return on equities. Moreover, if a 
 stimulus to gilt investment is required, the exemption from capital gains 
 tax is unlikely to be very effective to that end, since the tax will only have 
 a comparatively small effect on net yields.464  
 
In sum, the Treasury declined the proposals of the Bank, which required the 
exemption of gilts. It is evident from analysis of Bank sources in conjunction 
with Treasury sources that the dispute over the exemption of gilt-edged 
securities demonstrates the conflict that arose between monetary and fiscal 
policies over debt management and the taxation base, including revenue. It is 
somewhat surprising that the Treasury, responsible for issuing government 
bonds, did not significantly take account of the influence of the capital gains tax 
on debt issuing policies. Meanwhile, it was the Bank that was concerned with 
the gilt-edged securities market, including the primary and secondary markets.  
                                                       
463 Ibid. 
464 BoEA, 6A319/2, Capital Gains Tax and Gilt-Edged Securities, Note by the 
Treasury, 25 January 1965. 
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     Despite the report from the Treasury, officials at the Bank continued their 
defiant stance. The rationale behind the Bank’s opposition to the capital gains 
tax is made clear, and so, perhaps, are the intentions and reasons behind the 
Treasury’s stance against the exemption of gilts, in a letter from Cromer to the 
Chancellor, dated 4 February 1965: 
 
 we have been obliged to buy more than we could sell; and over the last 
 ten years as a whole we have raised in all by sales of stocks only about 
 £150 million towards a total Exchequer financing requirement of about 
 £1,800 million.465  
 
Cromer further stated that if  
 
 we are to be able to get the long-term rate as low as possible when 
 circumstances warrant, either we must substantially and visibly reduce 
 the Exchequer’s need to borrow or we must enhance the appeal of Gilt-
 edged to all investors. The exemption of Gilt-edged from the Capital 
 Gains Tax affords a practical opportunity to do just this.466  
 
It is clear that the misgivings of the Bank concerning capital gains tax related to 
fiscal finance and the independence of the institution itself.467 Cromer stressed 
                                                       
465 TNA, T326/413, Governor to the Chancellor, 4 February 1965. 
466 Ibid. 
467 The topic of the independence of central banks and its effect gathered 
academic attention. Cukierman insisted that the level of inflation depends on the 
extent to which the central banks achieve independence from politics. See Alex 
Cukierman, Steven B. Webb and Bilin Neyapti, ‘Measuring the Independence of 
Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes’, The World Bank Economic 
Review, Vol.6, No.3, September 1992, pp.353-98, and Alex Cukierman, Central 
Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence 
(Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1992), chapters 19 and 20. Guy Debelle and 
Stanley Fischer categorised this independence into ‘goal independence’ and 
‘instrumental independence’. The former refers to central bank discretion in 
setting policy targets. The latter refers to governments setting the policy target 
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his refusal to be forced to purchase gilt-edged securities in order to finance the 
government. Cromer was particularly wary that the capital gains tax would put 
the Bank in the role of providing fiscal finance, obstructing ‘instrumental 
independence’, in terms of central bank independence, hence prompting the 
necessity for the Bank to seek to minimise the impact of the capital gains tax on 
the gilt-edged securities market. Moreover, it can be reasonably argued that the 
Treasury’s intransigent stance against the exemption of gilts was based on the 
Bank’s debt management operations for the Treasury’s debt finance policies. 
     The Chancellor showed an uncompromising stance in a later meeting, 
stating that ‘the tax would not significantly diminish the fluidity of gilt-edged 
market, and that demands for the exemption of profits on dealing in and 
redemption of gilt-edged securities had been misguided.’468 This attitude of the 
Chancellor had been maintained throughout the discussion thus far, as evident 
in an earlier discussion in which he had stated ‘nevertheless, as the Governor is 
very properly concerned with the Gilt-Edged market, could we not tell him in 
confidence that we hope, in connection with Corporation Tax, to be able to 
remove the present disadvantage from which Gilt-Edged suffers’.469  
                                                                                                                                                                  
and central banks having discretion to implement measures in order to achieve 
the policy target. See Guy Debelle, and Stanley Fischer, ‘How Independent 
Should a Central Bank be?’ in Jeffrey C. Fuhrer (ed.), Goals, Guidelines, and 
Constraints Facing Monetary Policymakers (Massachusetts: Federal Reserve 
Bank of Boston, 1994), p.197. On the other hand, former Governor of the Bank 
of Japan Shirakawa emphasised the concept of ‘target independence’, or policy 
target setting in the democratic process, with central banks independently 
mobilising their measures to meet their policy target. Masaaki Shirakawa, 
Gendai no Kinyu Seisaku: Riron to Jissen (Tokyo: Nikkei Publishing Inc., 2008), 
pp.100-2. 
468 TNA, T171/805, Note of a meeting in the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s 
room, H.M. Treasury, Friday 19 March 1965, 11.00 a.m. 
469 TNA, T326/413, A. J. G. Issac to Goldman: Capital Gains Tax and Gilt-Edged 
Securities, 5 February 1965.  
198 
 
     However, the attitude of the Treasury and the Chancellor began to oscillate 
in the face of change in the gilt-edged securities market. On 17 March 1965, in 
a letter to Jasper Hollom, Chief Cashier of the Bank, Italo de Lisle Radice, 
Under Secretary of the Treasury, reported that the article ‘Anatomy of the Gilt-
Edged Market’ which appeared in The Times, had attracted the attention of the 
Chancellor. 470  This article asserted that the present tax structure created 
different values for different holders, and this difference in values invigorated 
‘interplay’ and increased liquidity and prices. The article warned that a 
standardised tax structure on institutional funds would endanger liquidity and 
the prices of stocks.471 While the gilt-edged market was heavily focused on 
during the tax policy formation process, a decline in stock turnover came to light, 
as shown below (Figure 5-3).472 In March 1965, the volume of the turn over of 









                                                       
470 BoEA, 6A319/3, I de L. Radice to J. Q. Hollom, 17 March 1965. 
471 The Times, Anatomy of the Gilt-Edged Market, By City Editor, 17 March 
1965. 
472 BoEA, 6A319/4, Gilt-Edged Market Turnover, attached to letter from M. J. 
Thornton to Radice, 20 May 1965. 
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Figure 5-3: Gilt-Edged Market Turnover (£ Millions) 
 
Sources: BoEA, 6A319/4, Gilt-Edged Market Turnover attached to letter from M. 
J. Thornton to Radice, 20 May 1965.                                                              
Note: Daily average purchase plus sales in £ millions. 
 
     Following the release of these statistics, concerns over sterling and capital 
gains tax were raised. Radice stated his doubt that an improvement in 
confidence in sterling would come about that may boost the gilt-edged market, 
and asserted the importance of looking at short-term consequences that may 
arise from ‘continuing depression of the gilt-edged market’. 473  In addition, 
Radice gave the forecast of government borrowing at £100 million, and detailed 
his concern that the government may be unable to sell gilts at all if insurance 
companies ‘hold off the market’ since the private sector had been a net seller. 
Moreover, Radice stated concerns regarding the UK’s foreign creditors: 
 
                                                       




 In the letter of intent to the IMF we said that it was our aim to maximise 
 sales of Government debt to non-banks and that we did not expect the 
 banks to take up debt on a scale which would increase their liquidity to 
 an unacceptable extent. The IMF and members of Working Party 3 will 
 be quick to note any failure on our part to live up to these expectations 
 […] Excessive borrowing from the banking system could upset one of the 
 bases of the budget judgment and involve us in further difficulties with 
 the U.K.’s foreign creditors.474 
 
Radice’s remark shows recognition of the expectation of foreign creditors for the 
broadening of holdings of gilt-edged securities to non-bank sectors.475 Radice 
was evidently concerned that relationships with foreign creditors would be 
tarnished, which would increase difficulty in managing sterling. From this, it is 
apparent that the capital gains tax reform provoked a discussion surrounding 
the gilt-edged market as inextricably connected to the management of sterling. 
     An argument suggesting the connection between the tax reform and 
currency management can also be seen in documents of the Bank. On 26 April, 
in a letter to the Chancellor, Cromer mentioned the obligation to the IMF that the 
UK would limit the increase in bank advances within 5 per cent until March 
1966.476 Cromer stated that the central bankers abroad would be able to ‘judge 
whether the United Kingdom has made any effort to keep within the 5% growth 
of deposits and advances put forward to the I.M.F.’477 In addition, if this figure 
were exceeded, ‘the exchange markets would treat the excess as a very poor 
                                                       
474 Ibid. 
Regarding the further report of Radice, see also 6A319/4, Radice to Sir Denis 
Rickett, 21 May 1965. 
475 Within the banking structure, credit expands according to legal limits on the 
ratio of deposit to lending. Expanding the volume of gilt-edged securities held by 
the banking sector leads to the increase in its liquidities and potentially 
produces an inflationary force. 
476 BoEA, G1/260, Governor to the Chancellor: Undertakings to the International 




omen.’478 Cromer connected this matter to capital gains tax on 6 July. He 
predicted that the seasonally adjusted annual rate of bank deposits would 
increase by between 6 and 8 per cent, while the gilt-edged market was still in a 
‘demoralised condition’.479 These factors were highly important in the foreign 
exchange market and a ‘central determinant of the supply of money’.480 Cromer 
deemed this situation complex. He asserted that this situation was brought 
about mainly by the reform of capital gains tax, the threat of steel nationalisation, 
high interest rates and expansion of government borrowing. In closing, Cromer 
again recommended the exclusion of the gilt-edged market from the provisions 
of capital gains tax.481  
     Despite the Bank’s efforts, major exemption of gilts was not accepted. 
However, on 24 May 1965, the Bank reported that the Chancellor did ‘want to 
make a concession, partly for political reasons and partly to help Government 
borrowing’.482 At this meeting, Kaldor outlined his proposal. To begin with, he 
identified the price difference between the issue and redemption of stocks as 
accrued gains. This would be taxed at an even rate, reducing the holder’s 
selling price for the purpose of capital gains tax. Kaldor indicated that he would 
be willing to make a limited concession if the price difference between issue and 
redemption were large. However, in this meeting it was agreed that the 
following proposal would be made to the Chancellor: ‘gains occurring within the 
range between the price of issue and redemption price should be disregarded 
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for tax purposes, the sale price being taken as either the actual sale price or the 
price of issue, whichever was the lower.’483  
     After this meeting, while Armstrong, Hollom and Radice were making a draft 
of the proposal to the Chancellor, the IR intervened via telephone. Alexander 
Johnson informed the officials that the ‘Revenue could not tolerate the proposal’ 
because it would not only mean that gains occurring within the range of issue 
and redemption prices would be tax free, but also losses could be used to 
counter-act the calculation of gains.484 The IR urged that ‘neither losses nor 
gains should be taken into account’.485 This was then incorporated into the 
revised proposal.  
     In the new proposed scheme, in cases where the buying price was below the 
‘neutral zone’ and the selling price was within the zone, the taxable gains would 
be the difference between the buying and issuing price. On the other hand, if 
the buying price was in the neutral zone and the selling price was above this 
zone, the taxable gains would be the difference between the redemption price 
and selling price. It was reported that this scheme would ‘create a tax-exempt 
zone of varying size for most existing stocks’ and the larger this zone, the 
greater the effect.486  
     On 26 May 1965, the Chancellor asked Deputy Governor of the Bank, Leslie 
O’Brien, for an overview of the market reaction to this proposed concession on 
capital gains tax. Cromer’s successor responded that ‘it would be quite 
favourable and the concession would be easily understood’, with Armstrong’s 







opinion being that ‘it was the best could be produced.’487  In addition, it is 
recorded that the Chancellor stated he ‘would quite like to give a full exemption 
for gilt-edged from capital gains tax if it would give gilt-edged a real boost’, to 
which Kaldor ‘intervened vehemently’, asserting that full exemption would lead 
to the loss of income tax due to ‘bond washing’.488 Evidently, the Chancellor 
could not ignore the market response and held concerns regarding the effect of 
capital gains tax on the market. In this meeting, the Chancellor accepted that 
issuing price would apply not to the average price of various tranche of stock 
issue but to the lowest price because it would prove more equitable. In this way, 
a new tax loophole was created to mitigate pressure from the Bank and City 
through accepting its logic in which the concessions would stabilise the gilt-
edged market and create favourable conditions for government funding. 
 
5.3    Reconsidering capital gains tax and corporation tax 
 
In light of the history of monetary policy, the 1965 tax reform can be assessed 
as a trial introduction of a new scheme to tackle the balance of payments deficit. 
As Pemberton has delineated, in the formation of capital gains tax and 
corporation tax, Labour aimed to encourage physical investment by increasing 
retained profits and suppressing the distribution of companies’ profits. 489 
According to Tomlinson, this can be described as ‘industrial modernisation 
policy,’ which was intended to bring an end to the ‘stop-go’ dichotomy and 
                                                       
487 BoEA, 6A319/4, Note for the Record, Capital Gains Tax and Gilt-Edged, 27 
May 1965. A handwritten exclamation mark on O’Brien’s comment perhaps 
indicates some surprise. 
488 Ibid. Handwritten on this statement is the comment, ‘I hope we shall not 
neglect any opportunities this attitude may give us’. 
489 Pemberton, Policy Learning, p.161. 
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increase exports.490 In addition, existing research has rightly detailed that the 
capital gains tax, which aimed to broaden the tax base, was formed in order to 
achieve an effective incomes policy and reconcile the unions that sought a more 
equitable tax system.491 From the analysis presented in this chapter, another 
dimension can be added to the understanding of the intentions behind the tax 
reform: Labour initially held expectations that the capital gains tax would 
increase stock prices through its encouraging effects on investors to hold stocks 
for a longer term and contribute to the increase in tax revenue. However, this 
function was harshly criticised by the Bank on the grounds of its potential 
disturbing effects on the financial market. 
     When it comes to the negotiation process between the Labour government 
and the Bank, the analysis presented in this chapter has shed light on links 
between taxation, management of sterling, the presence of the financial market, 
debt management and the independence of the Bank. The proposed capital 
gains tax, which was supposed to be vital for tougher incomes policy and 
encouraging exports, stirred up a significant political backlash from the Bank 
and City, although the intentions of achieving an effective incomes policy and 
increase in exports were not explicitly contradictory to the aims pursued by the 
Bank. Behind this opposition, officials at the Bank held concerns regarding three 
possible negative repercussions of the new capital gains tax that would be 
inflicted upon the financial market, the Bank’s debt management policies in 
relation to its independence, and management of sterling.  
     Firstly, the Bank perceived that the imposition of tax on capital gains would 
disrupt capital formation and discourage market transactions, especially in gilt-
                                                       
490 Tomlinson, The Labour Governments, p.52. 
491 Pemberton, Policy Learning, chapter 6. 
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edged securities, which would result in a reduction in market turnover. Secondly, 
the Bank considered that due to the potential shrinking of the gilt-edged 
securities market, capital gains tax would lessen the effectiveness of Bank’s 
debt management policy, particularly concerning the operation of tight monetary 
policies. Moreover, the Bank was concerned that this would inevitably lead to its 
involvement in fiscal finance. The Bank attempted to limit or remove the 
obstacle which would lead it to be stuck in the mire of propping up the prices of 
gilt-edged securities for a favourable market milieu for public finance. On the 
other hand, the non-exemption of gilts was predicted to hamper the Treasury’s 
bond issue, however, the Treasury itself opposed its exemption. It can be 
reasonably assumed that the reason behind this contradictory policy preference 
was the Treasury’s reliance on the Bank’s indirect support for its debt finance. 
In this respect, the conflict over the exemption of gilts between the Bank and the 
Treasury with the Chancellor, was partially over the independence of the Bank.  
     The third major concern of the Bank was that it saw capital gains tax as a 
potential hindrance for the further financing of the balance of payments and 
refinancing of foreign borrowing. The foreign creditors, such as central banks 
and the IMF, paid considerable attention to Labour’s tax reform and demanded 
the UK meticulously implement the taxation policies. In the related area of 
capital gains tax, these foreign creditors required the UK government diversify 
the holders of gilt-edged securities, to refrain from causing disturbances in the 
capital market and from significant increase in bank advances through liquidity 
expansion. In this sense, capital gains tax without exemption of gilts would 
potentially contravene the requirement to achieve a more diverse gilt-edged 
structure and to check bank advance growth. However, it should be noted that 
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these external aspects were less emphasised in formation of capital gains tax 
than corporation tax.  
     Although the negotiations over the exemption of gilts from capital gains tax 
amongst the Chancellor, the Bank, IR and the Treasury encompassed these 
bitter political transactions, major exemption was not made. Conversely, the 
Chancellor actively created a loophole within capital gains tax through change 
in the calculation of realised gains in May, ‘partly for political reasons and partly 
to help Government borrowing’.492 Hence, the loophole in capital gains tax was 
created in the field of company taxation, not in the individual taxation structure.  
     Here, consideration is given to the aspect of taxation ideology in the 1965 
tax reform. There is no doubt that Labour’s ideology of ‘social justice’ was 
present in the proposal of capital gains tax and corporation tax.493 However, 
from the analysis in this thesis of capital gains tax and corporation tax, it is 
possible to add further layers of understanding to the current comprehension of 
these policies.  
     Firstly, as existing research has delineated, the Labour government 
emphasised the capital gains tax as a ‘fair’ measure to gain support for incomes 
policy. Meanwhile, through analysis of the discussions during the formation 
process of corporation tax and capital gains tax, it has become evident that this 
emphasis on reconciling the unions to accept incomes policy was seen more 
clearly in the discussions over capital gains tax. In line with this, Labour made 
several concessions in the field of corporation tax and tax on capital gains 
earned by companies along the interests of the City and partially for the 
                                                       
492 BoEA, 6A319/4, Note for the Record: Capital Gains Tax and Gilt-Edged, 25 
May 1965. 
493 Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation; Daunton, Just Taxes: Pemberton, 
Policy Learning.  
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purpose of currency management, however, regarding capital gains tax on 
individuals Labour did not make significant changes within the budgeting 
process, resulting in broadening the tax base with a loophole for company 
taxation. Here, it can be assessed that in the budgeting process, Labour sought 
‘fairness’ not mainly in company taxation but chiefly in the taxation on capital 
gains earned by individuals. At the very least the embodied taxation showed a 
less stringent stance on company taxation. In this sense, Labour’s ‘fair, socialist 
tax’ was espoused with or incorporated into liberal aspects, driven by the issues 
of currency management, debt management, and the interests of the Bank and 
City. Therefore, analysis of the political economy of 1965 taxation implies that 
Labour’s ‘socialist tax’ should be also reconsidered from the perspective of the 
balance between company and individual taxation, with the context of currency 
management, in which Labour’s tax objectives and priorities can be observed.  
     The above argument can be enhanced by the perspective of tax principles: 
that capital gains tax was wrought from the maxim of ‘social justice’ or ‘socialist 
tax’, compatible with the principles of taxation raised in neoclassical synthesis, 
such as that by Richard Musgrave. His tax principle emphasised the removal of 
disturbing effects and excessive incentive effects of taxation on the market, 
favouring simplification and neutrality over the achievement of ‘fairness’.494 In 
line with the emphasis on neutrality and simplification, the capital gains tax and 
                                                       
494  Principles of taxation can be categorised into German fiscal policies, 
classical British thought on political economy, and American public finance or 
public choice and classical economics. In the maxim of Adam Smith, four 
principles of taxation are set: fairness in the context of benefit principles and the 
‘nightwatchman state’; certainty; convenience for taxpayers; and minimising the 
cost of tax collection. See Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes 
of the Wealth of Nations (London: Methuen, 1922), originally published 1776, 
Book 5. On the other hand, Musgrave emphasised the neutrality of taxation on 
the economy, fairness in the distribution of the tax burden, and stabilisation and 
growth of the economy. See Richard A. Musgrave, and Peggy B. Musgrave, 
Public Finance in Theory and Practice, Fifth Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1989), originally published 1973, chapter 15.  
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corporation tax were adjusted within the formation process. Thus, it can be 
considered inappropriate to place emphasis on Labour’s ‘fairness’ alone, rather, 
the liberal aspects should also be highlighted.  
     Finally, it has been shown that delineation of fiscal aspects, such as the 
capital gains tax and corporation tax of the 1965 budget, should be combined 
with analysis of the management of sterling. With respect to the arguments 
concerning the budget in the early stages of the Labour government from a 
currency management perspective, Schenk has asserted that in order to 
receive support from foreign creditors, the Labour government ‘was forced to 
accept a range of deflationary measures to which it had little ideological 
commitment.’495 Conversely, from analysis combining fiscal policy and currency 
management, it is clear that Labour put its own tax ideology of fairness, though 
it was diluted, into its ‘mildly deflationary’ budget and attempted to blend it with 
the purpose of currency management. Moreover, Labour sought not to be 
trapped in a deflationary budget, which it strived to meticulously circumvent 
through the introduction of new and reformed taxation. In addition, Labour 
clearly anticipated that this taxation would contribute advantageously to the 
balance of payments and gain the confidence of foreign creditors. On the other 
hand, Schenk has argued that the governments of the 1950s and 1960s were 
not promoting the interests of the City by supporting a strong sterling exchange 
rate.496 In contrast to this argument, this tax strategy, partially for bolstering the 
confidence in sterling, was amended to reconcile and reflect the City’s interests. 
In this respect, a perspective combining fiscal policy and currency management 
is effective for delineating the multifaceted and dynamic aspects of economic 
management. 
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Chapter 6: Devaluation and ‘British social democracy’: 




This chapter aims to investigate correlation between the 1967 devaluation and 
fiscal policies in the 1968 budget. Over three parts, this chapter will also assess 
to what extent the devaluation affected the failure to reduce selectivity in social 
security aspects of the budget. Firstly, examination will be made of conflict in 
existing historical assessment of the 1967 devaluation: the main dispute is in 
the evaluation of the decision to devalue, and whether it was for preserving 
‘British social democracy’ or represented Labour’s failure in terms of economic 
policy. 
     If analysis of how far Labour’s devaluation preserved ‘British social 
democracy’ is to be made, it is crucial to narrow down this concept. There is 
little doubt that social democracy, if it can be said to be applicable to 
characterisation of 1960s British politics, encompassed numerous aspects such 
as parliamentary democracy, Keynesian economic management, industrial 
relations, consensus or adversarial politics, redistributive fiscal policies, and so 
on. In order to discern the extent to which the devaluation affected Labour’s 
fiscal policies as embodied within the 1968 budget, the second part of this 
chapter distils the multi-tiered, protean concept of ‘British social democracy’ 
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under the Labour administration into the terrain of the selective or universal and 
redistributive aspects of Labour’s social security system. 
     In the third section, this chapter delineates the decision-making process 
surrounding the devaluation. Reinvestigation is made of Labour’s budgetary 
policies, with a focus on the scale and the family allowances, in which selectivity 
was unquestionably encapsulated. Through examination of the historical 
process, it is apparent that the outline of Labour’s draconian budget following 
devaluation had been fortified in the course of idea development while drafting 
possible accompanying measures to the devaluation. Additionally, in the 1968 
budgeting process, exponents of reduction in selectivity in the social security 
system were at odds with advocates of cuts in public expenditure who sought to 
make devaluation effective. The room for manoeuvre in the Labour 
government’s 1968 budget was narrowed due to pressure from the Bank of 
England as a messenger conveying external demands, which sought further 
fiscal tightening: pushing for increases in income tax with concomitant reduction 
in public expenditure. Through political transactions, in exchange for 
relinquishing increase in income and corporation tax, the pressure to minimise 
public outlays fell to the family allowance and led to its inclusion of more 
selective aspects.  
     Finally, this chapter suggests the paradox of Labour’s success and failure in 
the 1968 budget. While successes were evident in protecting some level of 
redistributive effects in the ‘draconian’ budget, the 1967 devaluation 
represented a defeat for Labour in its attempt to reduce the presence of 
selectivity. In closing, this chapter makes connections between this perspective 
and the previously discussed ‘British social democracy.’ 
211 
 
6.1    Introduction 
 
Immediately after Labour gained a hair’s breadth majority in the general election 
of 1964, the perennial speculation around sterling intensified. Despite Labour’s 
strife to quell this speculation by gaining international monetary support and 
mobilising fiscal measures with industrial and incomes policies to defend the 
parity, sterling was devalued in November 1967.  
     Academic and journalistic attention has long been drawn to the efforts made 
to defend sterling over the two decades from the end of World War II, and the 
dispute over the devaluation of sterling under the Harold Wilson government 
between 1964 and 1967. Numerous works have explored this period from the 
perspectives of economic theory, politics, and historical analysis.497 In one of 
these works, Eichengreen has emphasised that analysis encompassing 
intertwined political aspects is crucial to delineate the decision and ‘non-
decision’ behind the devaluation of sterling.498 In line with this argument, Bale 
focused on the political aspect, arguing that the suspension of devaluation was 
in order to avoid dismay, disruption of the international financial system, and the 
destabilisation of Labour’s electoral position based on its public expenditure 
strategy, which relied on international monetary support and long-term and 
                                                       
497 From the economic theoretical perspective, Thirlwall and Gibson deepened 
the theoretical understanding of the issues around the balance of payments. A. 
P. Thirlwall and Heather D. Gibson, Balance-of-Payments Theory and the 
United Kingdom Experience, Fourth Edition (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), 
originally published 1980. From an international economic perspective, Mundell 
and Swoboda delineated the link between international economic and fiscal 
matters. In addition, economic theory such as the J-curve effect was applied to 
explain the deterioration of the trade of deficits in the aftermath of sterling’s 
devaluation in 1967. Mundell and Swoboda, Monetary Problems of the 
International Economy. 
498 Barry Eichengreen, ‘Three generations of crises, three generations of crisis 
models’, Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 22, 2003, pp.1092-4. 
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structural measures including taxation and economic modernisation.499 Since 
then, a number of commentators have revealed the historical developments 
behind the delay and decision of devaluation from economic and political 
perspectives. In one critical work, Oliver has shed light on discussions within the 
Labour government and the Bank by exploring how the Labour government, the 
Treasury and the Bank considered possible devaluation and what contingency 
planning was made.500  
     In development of research on Labour’s economic policies, some have 
attempted to revisit and vindicate Labour’s ‘non-decision’ to devalue sterling 
and its management of currency. Newton has argued that the Wilson 
government faced two successive sterling crises and successfully withstood the 
first shock in 1964. Furthermore, Newton held that the decision by the Labour 
government not to devalue but to seek external support was partially effective, 
unavoidable and justifiable.501 This argument can be considered as drawing on 
Schenk’s comprehensive work assessing that, because the US was ineluctably 
compelled to support the weak sterling so as to underpin the Bretton Woods 
system, the UK held bargaining power in international monetary relations and 
Anglo-American strategic relations, through which the UK successfully obtained 
external support.502 In these assessments, there existed an inextricable link 
between the two reserve currencies, which was indispensable to maintain the 
values of both currencies in order to ensure their mutual defence.503 This view is 
                                                       
499 Bale, ‘Dynamics of a Non-Decision’, pp.192-217. 
500 Oliver, ‘The Management of Sterling, 1964-1967’, pp.582-613. 
501 Newton, ‘The two sterling crises of 1964 and the decision not to devalue’, 
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502 Schenk, The Decline of Sterling, p.204. 
503 This was an arbitrage transaction between sterling and the dollar. Once 
sterling held by foreign investors, the so-called sterling balance, was converted 
to dollars because of the decline in confidence in sterling, these accumulated 
dollars would potentially be converted into gold in the US Treasury gold window. 
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reinforced and used in other commentators’ analysis of Anglo-American 
defence policy, financial policy, and, of broader international relations.504  
     In contrast, however, Oliver has emphasised that the Labour government 
took less effective measures during not dual but the ‘unitary crisis’ in 1964, 
ascribable to absence of felicitous external strategy. 505  Bordo’s work with 
MacDonald and Oliver also revealed flaws in Labour’s measures when it faced 
the inadequate level of UK foreign reserves.506 These two groups of contrasting 
arguments lead to the question of why scholarly assessments raised in existing 
research diverge greatly. It should be noted that one of the causes behind the 
above divergence is that both arguments overlook fiscal aspects, which has left 
ambiguity regarding what Labour sought to defend in the terrain of economic 
policies. In other words, the questions are: did the Labour government attempt 
to defend sterling and/or protect its fiscal objectives; and what did it achieve 
through devaluation? As delineated in chapters four and five of this thesis, the 
fiscal measures of corporation tax and capital gains tax coalesced with not only 
the countermeasures for the balance of payments deficit but also with Labour’s 
broader sense of economic strategy and ‘ideology’. Therefore, the ‘delayed’ 
decision to devalue should be reinvestigated with a perspective that combines 
fiscal and monetary aspects.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
Therefore, maintaining the value of and confidence in sterling was a 
prerequisite for bolstering the dollar position. 
504 For example, see Kevin Boyle, ‘The Price of Peace: Vietnam, the Pound, 
and the Crisis of the American Empire’, Diplomatic History, Vol. 27, No.1, 2003, 
pp.37-72. Kunz, The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis. Diane B. Kunz, 
‘‘Somewhat mixed up together’: Anglo-American Defence and Financial Policy 
during the 1960s’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol.27, 
No.2, 1999, pp.213-32. Dumbrell, ‘The Johnson Administration and the British 
Labour Government’, pp.211-31. 
505 Oliver, ‘The Management of Sterling, 1964-1967’, pp.611-3. See also, Oliver, 
‘The two sterling crises of 1964: a comment on Newton’, pp.314-21. There is 
discrepancy between Oliver and Newton, who dispute whether single or double 
sterling crises occurred in autumn 1964. 
506 Bordo, MacDonald and Oliver, ‘Sterling in Crisis, 1964-1967’, pp.437-59. 
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     It is also necessary to mention the difference in foci of existing research: 
concentration on either ‘crisis management’ or the ‘crisis’ itself provides 
divergent assessments. On one side, research focusing solely on sterling’s 
position or the balance of payments deficit, the ‘crisis’, is naturally led to the 
ineffective measures taken by the Labour government. On the other side, 
research focusing on crisis management, such as negotiation of international 
financial support, fiscal policy and strategic relations, emphasises multifaceted 
assessment of the reaction to the sterling crisis. In order to resolve this conflict 
arising from perspectives taken, it is necessary to also look into the political 
process and dynamics in which Labour faced ‘crises of crisis management’. 
This does not refer to the concept raised by Offe of ‘deficiencies and limitations 
of the stabilizing activity of the state’ arising from the systematic and internal 
conflicts of capitalism.507 Rather, in order to provide clear analysis, here, the 
political process embroiled in ‘crises of crisis management’ should be revealed 
in the context of political economic turmoil with ineffective existing crisis 
management schemes, potentially entailing erosion of political legitimacy, thus 
provoking unexpected dynamic institutional and policy shifts. Continuity and 
discontinuity within the development of ‘crises of crisis management’ can 
highlight the essence of policy direction at the time due to the clarity of political 
priorities. 
     It is broadly held that the Labour government had several aims behind its 
economic policy, including defending government expenditure against external 
pressure, bolstering the international financial system and maintaining an 
electoral majority. These diverse aims produced a complicated fabric of 
countermeasures including fiscal schemes, attempts to draw upon international 
                                                       
507 Offe, Contradictions of the Welfare State, p.36. 
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support, and incomes policy with tax reforms to placate both the financial 
market and unions. Once the path to devaluation was unavoidable in 1967, 
schemes to manage the crisis, including efforts to ameliorate the balance of 
payments deficit, became obsolete and the government embarked on revision 
of measures in order to restructure its favoured fiscal and monetary measures 
with fresh internal and external pressures. Thus, it is indispensable to look into 
what the government attempted to defend or change surrounding the existing 
institutions and policy schemes during the process of these ‘crises of crisis 
management’, where the priorities of the government can be graphically 
observed. 
     Adding to the significance of scrutinising fiscal policies and currency 
management during the ‘crises of crisis management’, here, the argument of 
‘British social democracy’, extracted from the work of Newton, provides a useful 
schematic view for analysing the priorities of the Labour government faced with 
devaluation in 1967. Newton has put forward that the 1967 devaluation was the 
Labour government’s reaction against the shift in international power, by which 
Newton refers to the growing Eurodollar offshore market that international 
institutions and central banks could not effectively regulate.508 Furthermore, 
Newton asserted that this devaluation was the ‘middle way’ between 
deflationary economic policies and economic expansionism. Finally, Newton 
concluded that Labour’s devaluation accompanied by ‘concerted international 
action’ was a life-prolonging treatment for the ‘liberal socialist synthesis’ that 
consisted of the ‘Keynesian synthesis of full employment and an open 
international trading system’, which Newton eventually connected with ‘social 
democracy’.  
                                                       
508 Newton,‘The Sterling Devaluation of 1967’.  
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     Although Newton did not clarify the definition of the synthesis of ‘Keynesian’ 
economic policies with the international free market post-World War II, this 
should be understood as the ‘embedded liberalism’ of John Ruggie.509 To be 
more precise, this ‘embedded liberalism’ can be interpreted as the expansion of 
the role of social policies with functional public finance, and the movement for 
the removal of trade barriers led by the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) or the OECD. In Newton’s argument, this embedded liberalism, 
particularly the Keynesian aspect, was combined with, or incorporated into, 
‘liberal socialist synthesis’, and eventually, ‘social democracy’.  
     However, reinvestigation should be made of Newton’s schematic argument. 
The critical point here is that in this research, ‘British social democracy’ is not 
given any definition or characterisation. This issue can also be observed within 
the work of Whiting and Davis, in which ‘British social democracy’, without the 
clarification of what is meant by this, is applied for analysing the monetary and 
fiscal policies in the 1960s.510 To address this, and for application to analysis of 
this thesis, the next section reconsiders and narrows down the concept of 




                                                       
509 Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity, pp.62-76. 
510  A similar argument to Newton, linking social democracy and monetary 
policies of Labour government in the 1960s, can be seen in Aled Davies, The 
City of London and Social Democracy: The Political Economy of Finance in 
Britain, 1959-1979 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp.215-7. 
Regarding the argument of Whiting, see chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis.  
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6.2    For analysis of British ‘social democracy’ 
 
Even if limited solely into politics, ‘British social democracy’ was undoubtedly a 
multi-faceted concept linked with a variety of policy objectives and measures. 
However, to begin with, consideration will be given to a significant aspect 
extracted from Newton’s analysis: the ‘Keynesian’ economic policies of the 
1960s. 
     For investigation of ‘Keynesian’ policies in the 1960s, Jim Tomlinson’s 
argument must be taken into account. Tomlinson has pointed out that the 
‘Keynesian revolution’, demand management through a substantial sum of 
budgetary deficit as a means of achieving full employment, did not exist.511 So 
how can the influential ‘Keynesian economics’ over the two decades following 
World War II be classified? As seen in chapter three of this thesis, a great 
methodological distance lies between the original general theory of Keynes and 
Keynesian economics, or neoclassical synthesis.512 This metamorphosis of the 
original theory of Keynes into ‘timeless’ neoclassical synthesis, which Robinson 
repeatedly termed the ‘bastard Keynesian’, arose from the concept of the IS-LM 
arbitrary composed by Hicks, which incorporated microeconomic 
assumptions.513 This shift led to, at least academically, demand management 
                                                       
511 Jim Tomlinson, ‘Why was there never a ‘Keynesian Revolution’ in economic 
policy?’ Economy and Society, Vol.10, No.1, February 1981, pp.72-87.  
512 For the reinvestigation of the economic theory of Keynes, see Minsky, John 
Maynard Keynes.  
513  For the critique on uncertainty within neoclassical synthesis, see Joan 
Robinson, ‘What Has Become of the Keynesian Revolution?’ Challenge, Vol.16, 
No.6, 1974, pp. 6-11. The other significant element of ‘Keynesian’ or neo-
classical economics was no doubt the Phillips curve, see Paul A. Samuelson 
and Robert M. Solow, ‘Analytical Aspects of Anti-Inflation Policy’, American 
Economic Review, Vol.50, 1960, pp.177-84.  
In the eyes of post-Keynesian economists, Hicks’ theory metamorphosed the 
General Theory of Keynes into the timeless general equilibrium theory, which 
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with fiscal and monetary policies without any emphasis on budget deficits. This 
also gave rise to the dogmatic discipline of the supply of public goods such as 
by Samuelson, which is determined by marginal cost and marginal utility based 
on rational individuals, and the ‘parable’ production function.514  
     As a result, this inevitably produced the policy implication of demand 
management with a restrained scale of functional public finance, increase in 
capital stock and theory of human capital, and ‘efficient’ provision of public 
goods, which limits the governmental role on the basis of correction of the 
market and government failure, with no strong commitment to budget deficits.515 
Consequently, the role of public deficits was restricted, along with the penchant 
for sound finance within the discipline of neo-classical economics and school of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
negates the intrinsic interdependence amongst monetary aspects, consumption, 
production and employment. See Hyman P. Minsky, ‘The Essential 
Characteristics of Post Keynesian Economics’, in Ghislain Deleplace and 
Esward J. Nell (eds.), Money in Motion: The Post-Keynesian and Circulation 
Approaches (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), p.71.  
Regarding the significance of Keynes’ General Theory, it is considered a 
critique on classical economics with incorporation of the concepts of time, 
uncertainty and the non-neutrality of money, then finding involuntary 
unemployment at the point of equilibrium. See Paul Davidson ‘What are the 
Essential Elements of Post Keynesian Monetary Theory?’ in Deleplace and Nell 
(eds.), Money in Motion, p.49.  
514  For the theory of Samuelson, see Paul A. Samuelson and William D. 
Nordhaus, Economics, Thirteenth Edition (New York: McGraw Hill, 1989). The 
term ‘parable’ production function was used by Samuelson over the so-called 
Cambridge capital controversy. Paul A. Samuelson, ‘Parable and Realism in 
Capital Theory: The Surrogate Production Function’, The Review of Economic 
Studies, Vol.29, No.3, 1962, pp.193-206. This dispute was raised by Robinson 
in 1953. Joan Robinson, ‘The Production Function and the Theory of Capital’, 
Review of Economic Studies, Vol.21, No.2, 1953-1954, pp.81-106. As this is out 
of scope of this chapter, for explanation of this controversy see G. C. Harcourt, 
Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1972). 
515  Neoclassical production function refers to the output of commodities 
determined from the quantity of labour and capital. This implies that capital 
formation and technological innovation would foster economic growth on the 
capital side. On the labour side, it mainly emphasises the theory of human 
capital to improve its productivity because this function deems population 
growth as an exogenous variable. 
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rational expectations. 516  This subsequently expanded to form a theoretical 
foundation for arguments ardently denying the efficacy of fiscal deficits: that 
public deficits and the issuing of bonds would prompt individuals to anticipate 
future increase in taxation, forcing them to reduce their current consumption.517 
The effects of public deficits would be counterbalanced, eventually leading to a 
theoretical foundation of the neutrality of its effects on the market economy.518  
     Of course there was significant distance between UK and US ‘Keynesian’ 
economics. However, it cannot be denied that the reflection and impact of 
‘Keynesian’ economics on the policy side embodied into the functioning role of 
not only budget deficits but also fiscal and monetary policy in the UK. This 
chapter continues with the assumption that ‘Keynesian’ economics significantly 
influenced practical policy-making, despite the non-occurrence of a ‘Keynesian 
revolution’, in other words, the original work of Keynes underwent a significant 
metamorphosis.  
     Here, it must be emphasised that the ‘Keynesian’ economics of the 1960s 
should be considered as mixture of various policy measures for achieving a 
practicable level of full employment. Therefore, the complex interrelations 
among economic policies should be scrutinised. Investigation of, in particular, 
                                                       
516 For explanation of the notable theories including life-cycle hypothesis by 
Modigliani and permanent incomes hypothesis by Milton Friedman, which 
provides the theoretical foundation for sound finance, see Richard E. Wagner, 
Deficits, Debt, and Democracy: Wrestling with Tragedy on the Fiscal Commons 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2012), pp.6-8. 
517 In the context of the three decades following the second World War, this 
criticism was directed towards functional finance. This concept was forged by 
Abba P. Lerner in the 1940s. For the renewal of academic interest and a brief 
explanation of this concept, see L. Randall Wray, Modern Money Theory: A 
Primer on Macroeconomics for Sovereign Monetary Systems, second edition 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp.199-200. 
518 James M. Buchanan, ‘Barro on the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem’, Journal 
of Political Economy, Vol.84, No.2, 1976, pp.337-42. Robert J. Barro, ‘Are 




the fiscal side in the context of the devaluation presents a means of analysis 
neglected in Newton’s argument on the devaluation, ‘liberal socialist synthesis’ 
and ‘social democracy’. 
     The next step is to identify the liberal aspect or tradition within post-World 
War II ‘British social democracy’ or ‘liberal socialist synthesis’. It is generally 
agreed that the origin of British socialism can be traced back to the work of 
Robert Owen and David Ricardo. It is also broadly held that Owen was 
influenced by the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham, or the ‘greatest happiness 
of the greatest number’, so-called ‘cardinal utility’.519 In the realm of political 
thought the British liberal tradition was forged through the espousal of this 
utilitarianism attacking aristocratic government, and British ‘classical’ liberalism 
which advocated laissez-faire and a limited governmental role while seeking 
general welfare.520 The work of Bentham laid the groundwork for the ‘marginal 
revolution’ of the 1870s, which became the dawn of ‘modern economics’, 
however, the Great Depression and two World Wars exacerbated social issues 
such as poverty and contributed to transformation of the British liberal 
tradition.521 This created the path toward the rise in collectivism based on 
democracy as laissez-faire dwindled, while individualism, one of the foundations 
of British liberalism, remained.522 Turner’s account holds that, in this new British 
liberalism and reflected in the Beveridge Report, ‘the collectivists [...] adopted a 
policy of “liberal socialism” or the “middle way”, which subsequently became the 
                                                       
519 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 
(New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1996), originally published 1789. 
520 Turner, Neo-Liberal Ideology, pp.24-5.  
521 This marginal revolution set the historical lineage to the theories of William 
Stanley Jevons, Carl Menger, Léon Walras, and Vilfredo Pareto. 
522 Ibid., pp.36-8. 
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foundation of the Butskellite post-war consensus’ during the buoyant era of 
‘Keynesian’ economics.523  
     While the collectivist aspect was subsumed into British liberalism, as a 
critique on ‘modern economics’, Keynes created a theoretical foundation to 
combine effective governmental macroeconomic intervention and liberal 
economic theory. Keynes focused on the concept of uncertainty within its 
theoretical framework and evinced that insufficient market forces could reach 
equilibrium, meaning markets easily reach equilibrium despite unemployment. 
This prepared the theoretical foundation for active government intervention and 
demand management within and through the market. This ground-breaking 
theory can therefore be placed in the lineage of the development of economic 
theories and liberal ideology. In sum, as seen above, it is evident that ‘British 
socialism’ inevitably encompassed liberal aspects, which in the post-World War 
II era were influenced by Keynesian economics. In this sense, Newton’s term 
British ‘liberal socialist synthesis’, insofar as it refers to the mixture of Keynesian 
economics subsuming aspects of liberalism and individualism, and ‘British 
socialism’, including facets of collectivism, in the context of the three decades 
following World War II (excluding the international factors) might be considered 
an adequate description. 
     However, this espousal of the liberal, socialist and collectivist ideologies in 
Britain cannot be considered to directly reflect in the post-World War II British 
‘social democracy’ in the context of the emergence of welfare states. Emphasis 
should not only be placed upon the global trend of quantitative ‘Keynesian’ 
economic management or the expanding scale of public finance, but also on 
qualitative aspects pertaining to economic policies, particularly in the social 
                                                       
523 Ibid., p.57. 
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security field.524 As Richard Titmuss and Thomas Marshall have suggested, 
social reform or social policies in the post-World War II era were different in 
quality and quantity from the origin of socialist movements in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries.525 In a more comprehensive characterisation of 
the welfare state after World War II, Titmuss emphasised the redistributive and 
non-discriminatory objectives of social policies and Marshall stressed the 
evolution of social citizenships, which would resolve class conflict.526  
                                                       
524 There are numerous explanations regarding the driving force behind the 
global trend of expansion of public finance. For example, Wilensky suggested 
that the trend of welfare expenditure depended not on socio-political factors but 
on economic growth, which created the convergence. Harold L. Wilensky, The 
Welfare State and Equality: Structural and Ideological Roots of Public 
Expenditures (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975). Hayek 
emphasised monetary phenomena, suggesting that inflation and growing public 
expenditure mutually affect one another and are a cause of public expenditure 
expansion. See Friedrich A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (London: 
Routledge, 2006), originally published 1960, chapter 21. 
525 In monetary terms, the ‘welfare state’ began to grow in the inter-war era 
however, it no doubt gained momentum through World War II. Titmuss, 
Problems of Social Policy. Titmuss emphasised social solidarity in the context of 
the British welfare state, which emerged amidst the bombing in World War II. 
Richard M. Titmuss, ‘War and Social Policy’, in Richard M. Titmuss, Essays on 
‘The Welfare State’ (London: Allen and Unwin, 1958), pp.75-87. Peacock and 
Wiseman argued that the expansive governmental expenditure during the war 
could not be reduced swiftly and dramatically, resulting in governmental 
expenditure being kept high after the end of World War II, dubbed the Peacock 
and Wiseman (displacement) effect. Alan T. Peacock and Jack Wiseman, The 
Growth of Public Expenditure in the United Kingdom (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1961). However, there are also arguments to explain the 
emergence of social policy with socio-cultural factors in the inter-war era. See 
Thane, Foundations of the Welfare State; and Susan Pedersen, Family, 
Dependence, and the Origins of the Welfare State: Britain and France, 1914-
1945 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
526  According to Titmuss, the two major objectives of social policies are 
redistributive, and non-discriminatory objectives which refer to national 
insurance, education, medical care, housing and so on. Titmuss, ‘The Role of 
Redistribution in Social Policy’, p.16. Titmuss stressed the social integrative 
movement and sentiment during World War II as the causal force behind the 
modern British welfare state. See Richard M. Titmuss, Problems of Social Policy 
(London: HMSO, 1950), chapter 15. For the argument of Marshall, see Thomas 
H. Marshall, ‘Citizenship and Social Class’, in Thomas H. Marshall, Citizenship 




     Therefore, the socialist movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries cannot be analysed as continuing directly into the post-World War II 
era. Of great importance here is to delineate the feature of ‘British social 
democracy’ in the 1960s as expansion or maintenance of redistributive 
economic measures and non-discriminatory social security provision, which 
gradually transformed or oscillated along political lines. However, focusing 
solely on equality and redistribution is insufficient because measures and their 
effects varied according to a range of factors. For example, consideration of 
equality requires reference not only to distribution of income and consumption 
but also to family structures, age cohorts, capability and so on. Moreover, 
redistributive effects vary according to increase in passive and unintended 
public expenditure with the advancement of an aging society, economic 
circumstances and interaction within the policy structures.527 
     In this sense, as emphasised by Titmuss, the non-discriminatory or universal 
aspects of social policies in the post-World War II era should be considered for 
delineating the priorities of the complex policy objectives, and evaluating ‘British 
social democracy’. As Michael Hill observed, one of the primary objectives of 
Wilson’s first Labour government was not only to achieve mitigation of inequality 
but also to reduce the significance of selectivity in the social security field, and 
                                                       
527 As a notable example, the Thatcher government attempted to reduce fiscal 
deficits through the sale of council housing, however, this provoked rising rent, 
causing increased expenditure on housing benefit, perhaps bringing about 
unexpected redistributive effects within the housing benefit scheme.  
Reduction in council housing costs accounted for more than 75 per cent of the 
decrease in public expenditure, however, the cost of housing benefit largely 
offset it. See David Mullins and Alan Murie, Housing Policy in the UK 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p.53. Overall, attempts to reduce the 
scale of fiscal deficits are considered to have failed due to the increase in public 
outlays caused by the rise in unemployment. See Helen Thompson, ‘The 
Thatcherite economic legacy’, in Farrall and Hay (eds.), The Legacy of 
Thatcherism: Assessing and Exploring Thatcherite Social and Economic 
Policies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp.33- 68. 
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attempt to move towards a more universal social security system.528 Therefore, 
in terms of social securities, ‘British social democracy’ or ‘liberal socialist 
synthesis’ and devaluation under the first Wilson government should be 
analysed through the interaction amongst policy aims, redistributive economic 
policies, qualitative aspects of social securities, and the forces that moved 
towards or upheld the liberal market, especially within the international 
monetary field. This requires reinvestigation of the link between the devaluation 
and the fiscal policies, including their objectives.  
     Prior to delineating the decision-making process surrounding devaluation, 
the limits of this chapter should be noted. Although it is imperative to consider a 
wider range of factors such as the parliamentary democratic process, 
nationalised industries and consensus politics in order to provide a more 
comprehensive picture of ‘British social democracy’, this chapter focuses on the 
link between devaluation and budgetary policies.529 Moreover, this section has 
                                                       
528 Michael J. Hill, ‘Selectivity for the Poor’, in Peter Townsend and Nicholas 
Bosanquet (eds.), Labour and Inequality (London: Fabian Society, 1972), 
pp.235-45. 
529 The parliamentary democratic process and the nationalised industries are 
out of scope of this chapter. However, it is worthwhile to mention research on 
the ‘consensus’ or ‘compromise’, and continuity of nationalisation and 
parliamentary democracy after World War II. As a leading advocate of the 
consensus theory, Paul Addison asserted that given the Conservative and ‘non-
socialist intelligentsia’ had accepted Labour’s demand, which was to advance 
the welfare state and a Keynesian management of the economy, Labour could 
achieve a ‘peaceful revolution’. See Paul Addison, The Road to 1945: British 
Politics and the Second World War (London: Cox and Wyman, 1975), p.278. In 
contrast to this, Helen Mercer revealed that the Conservative Party aimed to 
remove monopolies in the industrial sector, whilst Labour recognised the 
significance of private profit seeking activity for the national economy. This 
political circumstance espoused with the support of the US in the context of the 
Cold War, and under the influence of civil servants led to the preservation of 
private companies or limited nationalisation. In this sense, Mercer concluded 
that the chain of compromise forged the post-World War II consensus. Helen 
Mercer, ‘Industrial Organisation and Ownership, and a New Definition of the 
Postwar “Consensus”,’ in Harriet Jones and Michael Kandiah (eds.), The Myth 
of Consensus: New Views on British History, 1945-64 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1996), pp.139-56. Michael Kandiah also criticised the consensus theory and 
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attempted to provide characterisation of ‘British social democracy’ focusing on 
its intrinsic liberal aspects and non-discriminatory redistributive factors, and to 
bridge ‘British social democracy’ with ‘liberal socialist synthesis’. However, it 
should be noted that ‘British social democracy’ might reasonably be distanced 
from ‘liberal socialist synthesis’ and further comprehensive analysis required, 
particularly concerning the extent to which liberal aspects are concentrated into 
these concepts. This section has attempted to narrow down the concepts of 
‘British social democracy’ and ‘liberal socialist synthesis’ in order to deepen 






                                                                                                                                                                  
revealed a more adversarial and ‘polarised’ facet in politics with an analysis on 
the politicians’ level, detailing that there was a significant distance between 
Conservative and Labour in the fields of the welfare state and capitalism for 
economic growth. Michael Kandiah, ‘Conservative Leaders, Strategy - and 
‘Consensus’? 1945-1964’, in Jones and Kandiah (eds.), The Myth of 
Consensus, pp.58-78. Regarding parliamentary democracy, Jim Tomlinson 
argued that Labour’s attitude toward the reform of parliamentary democracy or 
sovereignty after 1945 was ‘minimalist’ due to the experience of 1920s and 
1930s anti-communism and anti-fascism movements. Tomlinson, Democratic 
socialism and economic policy, pp.290-305. This paved the way for the later 
half-baked planning policies by the Labour government. In contrast to the 
corporatist view of Keith Middlemas, that the industrial sector, such as trade 
unions, got involved in the government decision making process, Tomlinson 
revealed that tripartism ‘did not mean the sharing of decisions by government, 
but was basically a mechanism of trying to secure consent for decisions made 
by ministers.’ Ibid, p.296. Keith Middlemas, Politics in Industrial Society: The 
Experience of the British System since 1911 (London: André Deutsch, 1979). 
For the critique on the argument of UK corporatism, see Peter A. Hall, 
Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986). 
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6.3 The dispute over fiscal measures during preparation for 
devaluation 
 
In the wake of the sterling crisis in the autumn of 1964, the Labour government 
prohibited open public discussion of the matter of devaluation. However, within 
the government and on an official level, the possibility of devaluation was 
considered alongside various other schemes.530 One of the prominent groups 
assigned to these matters was the FU (Forever Unmentionable) Committee, 
which examined monetary arrangements and fiscal measures. In this section, 
particular focus is placed upon fiscal measures. 
     In April 1965, the FU Committee sought a devalued parity to follow the 
possible devaluation and accompanying measures.531 Regarding the new rate, 
it was emphasised that the parity would need to avoid provocation of a negative 
reaction from other countries and ought to have a positive effect on the balance 
of payments deficit. This committee predicted that devaluation of sterling to 
$2.50 would improve the balance of payments current account by £330 million 
in the first year and £600 million after three years. The calculation taking into 
account the delay of the effects of devaluation on the balance of payments, the 
so-called J-curve effect, and possible removal of the import surcharge, put the 
estimated figures at £50 million over the following year and £230 million in the 
event of devaluation of sterling to $2.40.532 Contrary to the potential effects of 
                                                       
530 Oliver, ‘The Management of Sterling, 1964-1967’, pp.582-613. Newton, ‘The 
Sterling Devaluation of 1967’.  
531 TNA, T312/1398, The Choice of a Rate and Accompanying Measures, Note 
by Economic Section, F.U. (65) 22 (Revise), 23 April 1965.  
532 Ibid. 
The general agreement to remove the import surcharge alongside devaluation 
was reached on 19 July 1965. T312/1401, Note of a meeting held in Sir William 
Armstrong’s room, Treasury Chamber, Great George Street, SW1, Monday 19 
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the devaluation on the balance of payments deficit, it was recognised that these 
two parities would place a ‘rough magnitude’ of deflationary effects on home 
demand through decrease in the real wage and increase in living costs. These 
deflationary effects were predicted at £170 million and £330 million 
respectively.533  
     Although the effects of the devaluation were expected to make British living 
standards vulnerable, a further £200-250 million worth of deflationary measures 
reducing home demand were required on the grounds of the improvement of 
the balance of payments and enhancement of confidence in sterling. In line with 
the requirement of further deflationary measures, the report suggested a variety 
of measures such as increase in motor vehicle license duties and purchase tax, 
freezing increases to personal allowances, reduction in investment allowances, 
and a rise in both income tax and the reduced rates.534  
     With prediction of a decline in real wages, in July 1965, concern over the 
possible effects of further deflationary measures on the economy was on the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
July 1965, 3.30 p.m., F.U. (65) 9th Meeting. 
The J-curve effect refers to the phenomenon that devaluation or depreciation of 
currency produces trade deficits in the short run. This is created by the 
behaviour of ‘rational individuals’, who can calculate their own marginal utility 
and transaction costs. They would increase imports in order to minimise the 
costs prior to the increase in import prices caused by devaluation. In the 
explanation of Krugman, ‘confidence’, which causes fluctuation of the risk 
premium, played a significant role on the above effects. The loss of confidence 
increases the risk premium which widens trade deficits, however, this would 
gradually return as real exchange rates drop and capital inflow increases. 
According to Krugman, fire sales would be one of the causes of capital inflow 
after devaluation or depreciation. See Paul R. Krugman, Currencies and Crises 
(Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1995), pp.33-9. The apprehension that the 
replacement of the import surcharge with the devaluation would be recognised 
as the introduction of an import surcharge disguised as devaluation was 
reported in November 1965. TNA, T312/1398, Import Surcharge & Export 
Rebate, by Sir Denis Rickett, F.U. (65) 15, 2 April 1965. 
533 TNA, T312/1398, The Choice of a Rate and Accompanying Measures, Note 
by Economic Section, F.U. (65) 22 (Revise), 23 April 1965. 
534 TNA, T312/1398, Domestic economic policy in the event of devaluation, by 
Sir Alec Cairncross, F.U. (65) 13, 2 April 1965. 
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agenda. 535  The paper circulated in the FU Committee pointed out that if 
incomes policy or a wage freeze were imposed during a period of decline in real 
wages, this ‘would seem highly inequitable’.536 However, it also asserted that if 
real wages were allowed to increase, this would ‘accentuate the wage-price 
cycle’.537 A potential policy course that was proposed aimed at maintaining 
incomes wherever possible during price adjustment, with increases limited for 
certain periods:  
 
 This might mean taking powers to confirm increase in wages and 
 salaries for a period of, say, six months to exceptional cases approved 
 by the Prices and Incomes Board and limiting increases for the ensuing 
 six months to, say 4 per cent.538 
 
With this, freezing dividends for a year was considered alongside a rise in 
company profit taxation in order to ‘prevent any marked shift in the distribution 
of income in favour of equity capital’.539 Other fiscal measures associated with 
this argument are summarised in Figure 6-1. It is clear that one line of argument 
within the committee focused on hampering the wage increase in the wake of 
any devaluation while attempts were made to block this squeezed sum, which 
potentially would be added to the incomes of workers, to be distributed as 
dividends.540 It should be noted that this idea was derived entirely from the 
introduction of corporation tax in 1965.  
                                                       
535 TNA, T312/1399. Prices and Incomes Policy, by Sir Alec Cairncross, F.U. 





540 However, it should be pointed out that this idea was essentially conflictive 




Figure 6-1: Accompanying Measures Considered, 1965 
 
Source: TNA, T312/1399. Accompanying Measures, Note by Economic Section, 
F.U. (65) 44 (Revise), 1 September 1965. 
 
     While the idea of further deflationary measures unfolded, ministers detailed 
their scepticism of such measures.541  Devaluation, which was predicted to 
increase the inflation rate by between 3 and 4.5 per cent, was criticised from an 
egalitarian point of view. As the dispute over deflationary measures continued, 
incomes policy became a key focus point. For further measures to be 
implemented with an anti-inflationary effect, it was suggested that adjacent to 
devaluation there ought to be some propaganda campaign:  
 
 At the very least it would be essential to mount a major propaganda 
 campaign against wage and price inflation. There would perhaps be 
 more chance of this succeeding in an emergency situation than at other 
 times. And it could be backed with the threat of further disinflationary 
 action in the event of failure.542  
                                                                                                                                                                  
allowances. 
541 TNA, T312/1401, Note of a meeting held in Sir William Armstrong’s room, 
Treasury Chamber, Great George Street, SW1, Thursday 29 July 1965, 2.45 
p.m., F.U. (65) 10th Meeting. 
542 TNA, T312/1399. Accompanying Measures, Note by Economic Section, F.U. 




In order to achieve successfully deferment of existing agreements that 
regulated pay increases, reduction of working hours, and pay award 
implementation suspension, a propaganda campaign to provoke fear of inflation 
and further deflationary measures was considered propitious. In addition, a 
dividend freeze for a year with higher taxation of company profits was proposed 
to prevent the shift in the distribution of income in favour of equity capital. The 
initial concern surrounding devaluation involved not only the matters of sterling 
and financial position of the UK, but also equality and equity. In addition, the 
use of potential inflation and demand suppression measures as tools of 
propaganda to ease the introduction of tougher incomes policy was also 
explored. 
     In the autumn of 1966, discussions broadened the scope of potential 
measures. This included a rise in income tax and national insurance 
contributions (NICs) or selective employment tax (SET), cuts to the investment 
in nationalised industries and house building, and reduction in investment 
grants.543 Conclusively, a variety of restrictive measures were considered to 
accompany devaluation, including regressive cuts in government expenditure 
and tax increases. Curiously, following this, there was little discussion over 
                                                       
543 TNA, T312/1636. F.U. – 1966 Revisions, Accompanying Measures, Note by 
the Economic Section, Treasury, F.U. (66) 8, 1 September 1966. Introduced in 
1966, SET was tax imposed on employers. The burden of this tax varied for 
men, women, boys and girls, and was classified into three categories. The first 
category was mainly for manufacturing and employers in this industry received 
the tax paid plus a premium. The second category mainly applied to 
nationalised industries, local governments, transport and agriculture, under 
which employers received a tax refund. The third category applied to service 
industries, the employers of which did not receive any refunds. Basically, the 
amount of SET refund was highest for men, descending for women, boys, and 
girls. Moreover, there were many reliefs and concessions within SET, such as 
for mitigating the tax burden of employers who hired part-time workers and 
encouragement of business in certain areas. 
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accompanying measures, particularly in the FU Committee, until the decision to 
undertake devaluation in 1967. However, as it will be shown below, these 
components resurfaced in the accompanying measures and 1968 budget. While 
the draft of various schemes was being completed, with the break out of the 
Arab-Israeli Six Day War in June of 1967, pressure was placed on the foreign 
exchange market. Moreover, in September 1967, hire-purchase relaxation put 
pressure on the foreign reserves, and the dock strikes in Liverpool and 
Manchester on 18 September spread to strikes in Hull and London, causing a 
drain on the UK foreign reserves.544  As crisis loomed, devaluation and its 
accompanying measures arrived abruptly in November 1967. 
 
6.4  The accompanying measures to the devaluation and preparation 
for the 1968 budget 
 
Although the situation surrounding the balance of payments was gradually 
worsening, the estimate of economic growth in real terms of GDP, which was 
approximately 4 per cent, provided the Inland Revenue and the Treasury with a 
sanguine outlook in October 1967.545 During this respite, in a meeting chaired 
by the Treasury’s Sir William Armstrong, it was considered that rather than tax 
reduction, an increase would be required. It was noted that the 
                                                       
544 Blackaby pointed out that the British application to join the EEC prompted 
expectations of possible sterling parity rearrangement within the financial 
market, potentially also strengthening speculative pressure on sterling. F. T. 
Blackaby, ‘Narrative, 1960-74’, in F. T. Blackaby (ed.), British Economic Policy 
1960-74: Demand Management, NIESR Students’ Edition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979), p.40. 





 present high level of public sector deficit was only tolerable in a real 
 balance of payments situation. The other remedy of cutting public 
 expenditure significantly was in practice not available.546  
 
This meeting also discussed increase in various means of taxation for the next 
annual budget. Officials perceived great difficulties in the field of income tax.547 
The meeting considered the simplification of the personal allowance structure 
with abolition of the scheme of dependent relatives and other ‘secondary 
allowances’, which it was highlighted ‘could save a substantial sum’.548 However, 
the situation was further complicated since there existed conflictive pressure to 
reduce income tax burden at the £20-25 per week level, a measure dubbed 
‘give and take’.549  
     Immediately prior to devaluation, in November 1967, the Inland Revenue 
(IR) assessed a possible increase in direct taxation consisting of an increase in 
the standard income tax rate and reduced rates, corporation tax and adjustment 
of personal allowances.550 With respect to income tax, the IR considered the 
following options: increase by 2.5 per cent in the standard rate; increase by 2.5 
per cent in standard and reduced rates; increase by 5 per cent in the standard 
rate and 2.5 per cent in reduced rates (Figure 6-2).551  
                                                       
546 Ibid. 
547 Other attempts to raise taxation also faced difficulties. Excise duties such as 
those on alcohol and tobacco were opposed by ministers, and fuel tax was not 
a favourable scheme while the Suez surcharge was on. Therefore increase in 
the burden of vehicle excise and SET was considered. 
548 TNA, T171/1414, Note of a meeting held in Sir William Armstrong’s room, 26 
October 1967. 
549 Ibid. 
550 TNA, T171/1414, Possible Increase in Direct Taxation Note by the Inland 
Revenue, 2 November 1967. 
551 The highest surtax was 50 per cent, and the marginal tax rate on the highest 
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Figure 6-2: Estimation of the impact of an increase in Income Tax, 1967 
 
TNA, T171/1414, Possible Increase in Direct Taxation Note by the Inland 
Revenue, 2 November 1967. 
 
     Regarding personal allowances, the IR considered two schemes to finance 
the cost of increases in family allowances (FAM), which were gradually 
increased throughout the late 1960s. 552  Firstly, the IR estimated that the 
reduction of £15 per year in child allowance for second and subsequent children 
would yield £24 million in the first year and £30 million in a full year.553 The 
second scheme considered was a reduction of £30 in the first reduced rate 
band at 20 per cent to the first £70 taxable income, with an increase of £10 in 
the single and married allowances. This was estimated to save £19 million in 
the first year and £24 million in a full year. The first and second schemes 
                                                                                                                                                                  
income bracket was over 90 per cent. 
552 The family allowance was 40 pence a week for the first and second child, 
and for the third and subsequent children was 50 pence. In October 1967, a 
temporary increase to 75 pence a week was made for the fourth and 
subsequent children. In April 1968, the amount of family allowance for the 
second child was increased to 75 pence a week and to 85 pence a week for the 
third and subsequent children. In October 1968, further increases were made to 
90 pence a week for the second child and 1 pound a week for the third and 
subsequent children. There was no statutory obligation to increase the family 
allowance, for which primary legislation was required. These figures were the 
increases set in legislation. See House of Commons, Social Security Fourth 
Report: Child Benefit, printed on 4 March 1999, Appendix 1 and Annex 1: 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmsocsec/114/11401.
htm, (accessed on 27.7.2018.) 
553 TNA, T171/1414, Possible Increase in Direct Taxation Note by the Inland 
Revenue, 2 November 1967. 
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combined would save £43 million in the first year and £54 million in a full year. 
This clearly shows that the IR considered financing the costs of increasing 
family allowances through expansion of the income taxation base.  
     Regarding corporation tax, the IR considered a possible change in the rates, 
with increases to 42.5 per cent or 45 per cent.554 However, the report pointed 
out the difficulties associated with an increase in the corporation tax rate. Firstly, 
Chancellor James Callaghan declared that the introduction of corporation tax at 
a rate of 40 per cent in 1965 was not intended to put extra burden on 
businesses, and that its reform in 1966 was a ‘transitional factor’ so that even if 
rates were maintained in 1968 it would be recognised as a tax increase within 
businesses. Therefore, an increase in the rate of corporation tax was regarded 
with scepticism. Secondly, the IR estimated possible dividend levels under 
potential corporation tax rates. It was put forward that a company would be 
better off with 39 per cent gross dividends in its profits under a 42.5 per cent 
corporation tax rate and 27 per cent gross dividends under a 45 per cent 
corporation tax rate. These figures were well below the average distributed 
profits in dividends, 52 per cent, thus the report concluded that this increase 
would create an ‘even greater disadvantage’ for companies.555 Thirdly, officials 
at the IR were mindful that an increase in corporation tax would aggravate the 
balance of payments deficit, discouraging the inflow of foreign investment, 
especially from the United States which had an 8 per cent higher company 
taxation than the UK. Finally, an increase in the corporation tax rate was 
predicted to encourage companies to switch their means of finance from equity 
capital to loan capital (debt), which would ultimately lead to a drought of new 
equity issues and the erosion of the corporation tax base. It is clear that the IR 





demonstrated reluctance to implement a higher burden of corporation tax in the 
1968 budget.556 
     In another field, the Chancellor aimed to gain extra revenue with SET 
through abolition of the additional payments to manufacturers and excise duty 
on vehicles.557 However, the IR asserted that the change would be recognised 
as ‘vacillation by the Government’ and would provoke disbelief from 
‘industrialists’. 558  With respect to purchasing tax, discussion was made 
surrounding possible rates increase and the widening of the tax base. The 
Chancellor was in favour of widening the tax base as he considered it useful for 
accession to the EEC, bridging the gap in taxation between the UK and EEC.559 
Therefore, at the stage immediately before the devaluation, the IR considered 
extra burden through income tax with expansion of its taxation base, alongside 
increase in purchasing tax and excise duties. Purchasing tax amendments were 
backed by the Chancellor, who was mindful of possible future accession to the 
EEC. 
                                                       
556 Ibid. 
557  TNA, T171/1414, Possible sources of extra revenue: SET and Vehicle 
Excise Duties, 2 November 1967. 
558 Ibid.  
In the field of customs, excise duties and purchasing tax, consideration was 
given to the increase of tax on a variety of goods, which presented a range of 
difficulties. Firstly, further increase in tobacco duty was predicted to yield little 
additional revenue. Secondly, the adjustment of taxation on alcohol was 
regarded with concern. The increase in the general rate by 10 per cent would 
produce £45 million, however, if taxation yielding just £10 million on spirits were 
excluded, it would provoke political issues, presenting as an increase in the 
burden on ‘working men’s beer’ and not the ‘the director’s spirits’. More 
significantly, duty on oil was regarded as difficult to increase due to additional 
taxation that had been imposed during the conflicts in the Middle East. See 
TNA, T171/1414, Customs and Excise Taxation Prospects 1968-69, 2 
November 1967. 




     Contrary to the preference of the IR for increase in direct taxation, the 
Secretary to the Budget Committee, Robin Butler, reported that the Chancellor 
was keen to retain the ‘light and shade’ on direct taxation in the 1968 budget.560 
A fiscal package consisting of an increase in the corporation tax rate, reduction 
in standard rates, reduced rates or an increase in personal allowances was 
considered. However, this was recognised by the IR as ‘a re-distribution of 
taxation from distributed to retained profits and thus contrary to the policy 
underlying the 1965 Finance Act’, which aimed to switch resources from 
dividends to investment.561 Butler justified the reduction of income tax rates in 
order to mitigate the impact of the bracket creep caused by increase in money 
income. Butler then compared the possible effects of reduction of the burden of 
income tax, with an increase in the corporation tax rate to 45 per cent, and 
concluded that this arrangement would produce a ‘fairly substantial increase in 
revenue’.562 It is clear that key issues leading up to devaluation in late 1967 
were the arrangement of the tax burden, the scale of the budget, which ought 
not hamper the balance of payments deficit, and protecting business interests 
by not increasing corporation tax rates. This dispute fed through to the 
measures that accompanied the devaluation in November.  
     The above considerations of fiscal measures were significantly affected by 
the devaluation. In the wake of the decision to devalue, accompanying 
measures were announced on 16 November. However, the documents 
regarding the decision process are not present in archives, hence the following 
is partly drawn from the account of Sir Alec Cairncross. 563  According to 
                                                       




563 Cairncross, Managing the British Economy, pp.183-91. 
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Cairncross, the most prominent dispute was over the scale of the 
accompanying measures. He recognised that £600 million in budget saving was 
prerequisite to make devaluation effective. Contrary to this, the Chancellor 
opposed this scale of accompanying measures owing to his concern over the 
loss of backing for the Labour Party. The Prime Minister and the Chancellor 
were against increases in income tax in particular, and sought to reduce the 
income tax rate by 2.5 per cent, opposing the line taken in previous 
consideration of accompanying measures. The package that the Prime Minister 
and Chancellor favoured included doubling the duty on fuel oil to protect the 
coal-mining industry, trebling betting duties, and raising the corporation tax rate 
or imposing a tax on dividends.564 On 15 November the Chancellor presented a 
£500 million package which consisted of £200 million worth of cuts in public 
expenditure; the withdrawal of £100 million in SET premia except in the 
Development Areas; a £100 million reduction in export rebates; an increase in 
the corporation tax rate by 2.5 per cent; the tightening of hire purchase 
restrictions on motor vehicles; an increase in the Bank Rate; and credit 
restrictions. 
     However, the Chancellor faced a significant backlash over the proposed 
accompanying measures. The most prominent opposition was from the Bank.565 
Governor of the Bank of England, Sir Leslie O’Brien, stated that ‘defeat’ had 
come after three years of strenuous efforts by the Labour government to 
maintain the parity. O’Brien asserted that the accompanying measures would 
be ‘insufficient’ and placed ‘unfavourable impact’ on exchange markets via 
                                                       
564  Regarding the dispute over corporation tax on dividends in 1965, see 
chapter 4 of this thesis. 
565 BoEA, G41/2, Governor to the Chancellor, 17 November 1967. 
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provocation of a sceptical view from foreign observers. 566  He was mostly 
concerned with looming inflation after the devaluation, which would occur 
through increase in import prices. The Governor therefore urged the Chancellor 
to introduce measures to reduce aggregate domestic demand. O’Brien’s ardent 
proposal consisted of a 2.5 per cent increase in income tax and cuts in 
government expenditure, singling out the spending programmes. In addition, he 
urged the government to defer the announcement of ‘an increase in social 
benefit for the worst off’. 567  Moreover, the intention of the Bank was 
communicated unambiguously in a letter dispatched on 12 December 1967, 
after the devaluation had taken place. O’Brien wrote to the succeeding 
Chancellor, Roy Jenkins, that £400 million in budgetary saving would ‘have a 
very much smaller effect on real demand’.568 He also criticised the increase in 
corporation tax, stating that: 
 
 Taken together with the increase in corporation tax and the monetary 
 measures, they mean the bulk of the expected deflationary effect of the 
 devaluation package bear in the first instance on companies. Very little 
 indeed is to come from reduced claims on resources from actual public 
 sector spending and none at all from consumption directly financed by 
 the public sector through unselective social services.569 
 
O’Brien conclusively urged cuts in public spending, including the ‘sacrosanct’ 
house building, and tougher incomes policy. As his rationale for backing 
reduction in public spending instead of taxation, he explained that direct 
                                                       
566 Ibid. 
567 Ibid. 




taxation would have disincentive effects and indirect taxation would create 
inflationary pressure. 
     It is clear that O’Brien favoured regressive fiscal measures in order to avoid 
disturbing effects on the exchange market, taking a line which was significantly 
conflictive with the Prime Minister and the previous Chancellor. The Bank 
strenuously urged its own package of accompanying measures at the time of 
the devaluation. Contrary to the requirements of the Bank, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer James Callaghan and the Prime Minister had been keen to defend 
the level of fiscal spending.570  On 17 November, Callaghan had made an 
‘indignant’ reply to the expression of disappointment by O’Brien with the size of 
accompanying measures that ‘flatly refused’ to reconsider the package within 
the Cabinet and suggested ‘we could perhaps choose a lower or float.’571 It is 
clear that what Callaghan attempted to defend was the fiscal spending, and he 
used further devaluation or floating as a threat or bulwark against the pressure 
for spending cuts.  
     The implemented measures were tighter hire purchase restrictions on motor 
vehicles, restrictions on bank lending to the private market excluding the 
exports business, and the increase in the Bank Rate from 6.5 per cent to 8 per 
cent.572 The package agreed is detailed below in Figure 6-3. 
                                                       
570 The intention of the Prime Minister to defend the level of public expenditure 
can be seen in numerous accounts. MacDougall reminisced that the Prime 
Minister had attempted to refuse cuts in public expenditure, which led him to 
consider floating under the sterling crisis in November 1964. MacDougall, Don 
and Mandarin, p.155. 
571 Cairncross, The Wilson Years, p.248. 
572  TNA, T331/36, telegram from Hubback to Maude, 22 November 1967. 
Regarding hire purchase restrictions, the minimum required deposit on vehicles 
was raised from 25 per cent to 33 and one third per cent, and the maximum 
repayment period reduced from 36 to 27 months. Regarding restrictions on 
bank lending, guaranteed finance for exporters and the shipbuilding industry 
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Figure 6-3: Accompanying Measures (agreed on 16 November 1967, £ mil.) 
 
Source: TNA, T227/2452, from P. R. Baldwin to Rampton, 16 November 1967. 
 
 
6.5    From devaluation to the ‘draconian’ 1968 budget 
 
In the aftermath of devaluation, various concerns were raised surrounding the 
budget regarding inequality, inflation, and encouragement of exports. Peter 
Shore, Parliamentary Private Secretary, was concerned that cuts in government 
expenditure without reduction in defence expenditure would ‘prove to be 
counter-productive’.573  In line with Peter Shore, Thomas Balogh, Economic 
Adviser to the Prime Minister, also asserted the importance of defence cuts, 
and the formation of a social package on a ‘strictly selective basis’.574 While 
                                                                                                                                                                  
were excluded.  
573 TNA, PREM13/2066, Peter Shore to the Prime Minister and Roy Jenkins, 2 
January 1968. 
574 TNA, PREM13/2066, Economic Strategy and the Short and Medium Term 
Appreciation, Thomas Balogh to the Prime Minister, 3 January 1968. This paper 
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opinions regarding cuts in defence expenditure were widely shared within the 
government, social expenditure and taxation became a topic of contention.575 
Balogh emphasised that the incomes policy would not be conflictive with the 
budget, and highlighted that tax reform targeting selected fields in order to 
tackle the demand-pull and cost-push inflation was required to avoid a 
‘disastrous’ result from the devaluation.576 Prime Minister Harold Wilson also 
expressed his concern regarding the effects of inflation, which would potentially 
dilute the effects of devaluation, and he remained an advocate of tougher 
governmental policies to check inflation.577 It is evident that while there existed 
a mire of conflict over social policies and taxation reform, it was a priority to 
construct a budget that would ensure the devaluation was effective. 
     While conflict over the budget intensified in the cabinet, the initiative was 
taken by James Callaghan’s successor, Roy Jenkins, the new Chancellor of the 
Exchequer. Jenkins, generally considered a key player in the formation of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
covered a wide range of measures such as increase of the tax rate on unearned 
income and excessive dividends. The Treasury also urged cuts in defence 
expenditure by over £130 million between 1968 and 1970, in T227/2453, F.U. 
(67) 19 (4th Revise), Accompanying Measures: Public Expenditure, 14 
November 1967. 
575 While the 1968 budget was formed, on 16 January 1968, the Prime Minister 
announced cuts in defence and civil expenditure by over £200 million, 
accelerated withdrawals of defence forces from the Persian Gulf and Far East, 
implementing the so-called East of Suez decision, postponement of raising the 
school leaving age, reintroduction of prescription charges, cuts in expenditure 
on council housing and road improvement, and a rise in the rate of corporation 
tax to 42.5 per cent. See, TNA, T171/719, Economic Report on 1967 (London: 
HMSO, 1967). 
576 TNA, PREM13/2066, Economic Strategy and the Short and Medium Term 
Appreciation, Thomas Balogh to the Prime Minister, 3 January 1968. 
577 TNA, PREM13/2056, Copy of Minute by the Prime Minister, December 28 
1967. Wilson made clear his aim to continue to check inflation, continuing the 
policies set by the White Paper, Prices and Incomes Policy (Cmnd. 3235: Prices 
and Incomes Policy after 30th June 1967). Concomitantly, Peter Shore 
expressed the governmental attitude toward the incomes policy which declined 
a ‘norm’ of a 3.5 per cent increase for earnings. TNA, PREM13/2056, Prices 
and Incomes Policy, Note of a meeting between Ministers and Leaders of the 
CBI held in the room of the Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 16 January 
1968, 11.00 a.m. 
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Labour’s ‘draconian’ budget, initially urged a £1,000 million total increase in 
taxation and cuts in expenditure.578 However, Jenkins was mindful that the 
possible expenditure cuts and increase in direct taxation would put harmful 
effects on the economy through reduction in savings and working incentives, 
and increase in industrial costs, while indirect taxation would have 
repercussions on wage movement through the increase in living costs. This 
provoked consideration of structural arrangements in taxation and social 
security expenditure. 
 
6.5.1    Selectivity in the family allowances, direct taxation and external 
pressures 
 
Although Chancellor of the Exchequer Jenkins recognised the potential 
negative impact of regressive economic policies on the political climate, he 
strongly urged cuts in public outlays. Jenkins estimated that the cuts in public 
expenditure on the civil side would be £327 million in 1968-69 and £372 million 
in 1969-70, and considered making further savings through ‘give and take’ 
adjustments to offset increased family allowances (estimated public expenditure 
for 1967-1969 is indicated in Figure 6-4).579  
                                                       
578 TNA, PREM13/2066, Cabinet: Public Expenditure, Annex A, 3 January 1968. 
579 TNA, PREM13/2066, Cabinet: Public Expenditure, Annex D, 3 January 1968. 
In terms of the social security package, the Chancellor was concerned with the 
suspension of uprating national insurance benefits. See TNA, PREM13/2066, 
Cabinet: Public Expenditure, Annex D, 3 January 1968. On the other hand, 
various business associations urged the Chancellor to select a similar scheme 
of selectivity and cuts in expenditure rather than increase in taxation. See 
T171/1407, Her Majesty’s Treasury Chancellor’s Meetings, Treasury Summary 
on Budget Representations, Note by the Secretaries, C.M. (68) 21, 19 February 
1968. The Chancellor made cuts in capital expenditure on education and 
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Figure 6-4: Estimated Public Expenditure 1967-68 to 1969-70              
(£ Millions, 1967 Survey Prices) 
 
Source: Cmnd. 3515, Public Expenditure in 1968-69 and 1969-70 (London: 
HMSO, 1968), p.14. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
reduction in student grants. Alongside these cuts, there was the restoration of a 
prescription charge (2s. 6d.), which provoked marked criticism. Although, in 
particular, the prescription charge was exposed to condemnation as a 
‘specifically Conservative policy which is wholly alien to Labour’s concept’ and 
would provoke ‘maximum bitterness’, the Chancellor pushed to reintroduce the 
prescription charge. See TNA, PREM13/2066, Cabinet: Public Expenditure, 
Annex E, 3 January 1968. The Prime Minister faced a significant backlash from 
150 members of parliament against the reintroduction of a prescription charge. 
PREM13/2805, Petition to the Prime Minister, 15 February 1968. On 8 January 
1968, Jenkins stated the need to make concessions due to calls for extending 
the exemption of the prescription charge further than the previous system. See 
T331/129, Note for the record: Public Expenditure Cuts, 8 January 1968. 
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Jenkins’ drive for ‘draconian’ policies accelerated with the incessant and 
significant pressure from the IMF and Working Party 3 at the OECD. During the 
budget formation process, it was reported that the IMF ‘would no doubt be 
happier if as much as £500 million of the increase in taxation took effect in 
1968-69’. 580  Moreover, it was also reported that Working Party 3 held a 
pessimistic view on the estimated economic growth rate and its level of exports, 
thus it anticipated that a £400 million tax increase would be introduced, which 
would foster a ‘favourable impression.’581 In addition, Working Party 3 expected 
between £600 and £700 million in budget reduction, and it preferred cuts in 
expenditure over increase in taxation on the grounds that cuts would have less 
disincentive effects on the economy. 582  In the face of pressure from 
international institutions, the Chancellor broadly agreed with Sir William 
Armstrong concerning raising between £400 million and £600 million in 
additional revenue, with £500 million or above having a ‘psychological 
advantage’.583 Moreover, external influence was felt when determining the scale 
of the budget: in the eyes of George Brown, then Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, the scale of the budget was changed due to the announcement of the 
US economic measures on 1 January 1968. This figure, which had initially been 
£850 million, changed to £1,000 million due to further cuts in government 
expenditure at home and abroad and a ‘mammoth’ rise in taxation.584 
                                                       
580 TNA, T171/1425, Minutes of a meeting in the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s 
room, Thursday 29 February 1968, 4.30 p.m. 
581 T171/1409, Chancellor’s Meeting – Official Consultations C.M. (O)(68) 2nd 
Meeting, Minutes of a meeting in Sir William Armstrong’s room, Wednesday 24 
January 1968. 
582 TNA, T171/1425, Minutes of a meeting in the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s 
room, Friday 8 March 1968, 3.00 p.m. 
583 TNA, 171/1408, Budget 1968: R. T. Armstrong’s Minute to the Chancellor, 
Note by the Secretaries, C.M. (68) 23, 19 February 1968.  
584 TNA, PREM13/2066, Extract from record of meeting between the Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs and the US Secretary of State at the State 
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     Meanwhile, the use of ‘give and take’ as a means of reducing public 
expenditure presented one of the most challenging issues of the 1968 budget. 
On 8 December 1967, First Secretary of State Michael Stewart suggested to the 
Prime Minister that his work as co-ordinator of the social services should be 
based on ‘the determination of priorities within a block allocation of resources 
for the social services as a whole.’585 Stewart held that his co-ordination should 
be operated for ‘not only the maintenance of a coherent social policy and the 
laying out of plans for the future with all studies that these involve, but also – in 
the context of limited sources – the establishment of priorities both within and 
between the departments to ensure that the most effective use is made of the 
resources that are available’ in the fields of family poverty, the elderly and the 
handicapped. 586  Discussion was made of ‘the efficacy and economic 
implications of benefits in cash as against benefits in kind’ and ‘the merits in 
different contexts of selectivity and the different forms which this can take’. 
Stewart wrote that the latter would ‘involve us in some study of income tax in 
reverse (if only to demonstrate finally its impracticability) and the possibility of 
other machinery to rationalise means-testing generally.’587  
     On 13 December 1967, a response from the Prime Minister to Michael 
Stewart stated his approval of the First Secretary’s approach, which to him 
represented ‘the first time an attempt has been made in this way to look at the 
social services as a whole.’588 The Prime Minister urged Stewart to proceed 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Department, 11 January 1968, 9.30 a.m. 
585 TNA, CAB 164/661, J. J. Nunn to the Prime Minister, Development of the 
Social Services, 12 December 1967. 
586 TNA, CAB 164/661, Michael Stewart to the Prime Minister, Development of 
the Social Services, and Memorandum by the First Secretary of State, 8 
December 1967. 
587 Ibid. 
588 TNA, CAB 164/661, R. J. Dawe to Michael Stewart, 13 December 1967. 
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before the Chancellor made moves with his ‘cancellorian [sic] pressure’.589 On 
15 December, Michael Stewart informed the Chancellor, mentioning that 
ministers were considering reductions in the expenditure but that he wished to 
discuss with the Chancellor how he ‘could best be associated’ with the potential 
decisions that loomed before him.590  Evidently, a line in contrast with the 
initiative of the new Chancellor, emphasising the significance of social spending, 
was raised by Stewart, and backed by the Prime Minister. 
     While the reconsideration of social expenditure commenced, a paper sent by 
Kaldor to the Chancellor resonated with those who supported cuts in public 
expenditure. On 15 December, Kaldor suggested that any family would qualify 
for either the taxable family allowance or income tax child allowance.591 Under 
this, families would lose the benefit of 8 shillings a week under the existing 
allowance for the second child and 10 shillings a week for the third and 
subsequent children. This scheme meant that the greater the income of a family, 
the less allowance would be received, with amounts tapering-off according to 
incomes and the standard rate tax payers not receiving the allowances.592 
Kaldor calculated that this scheme would reduce costs of £273 million by £60 
million a year and asserted that it ‘would make one important form of welfare 
payment selective instead of universal and do it in a way that fully protects the 
                                                       
589 Ibid. 
Dawe remarked that some may oppose Stewart’s approach, stating that such 
‘pressure will certainly come and the approach suggested by the First Secretary 
will mean that the problem can be looked at as a whole with proper regard for 
priorities.’ 
590 TNA, CAB164/661, Michael Stewart to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 15 
December 1967. 
591 TNA, T171/831, Family Allowances, Nicholas Kaldor to the Chancellor, 15 
December 1967. 
592 Ibid. 
The consideration over how to finance or offset the increase in the family 
allowances expenditure was raised by Sir Alexander Johnson, Chairman, Board 
of Inland Revenue. TNA, T171/831, Family Endowment: Possible Tax Change, 
Sir Alexander Johnson to the Chancellor, 8 September 1967. 
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most vulnerable members of the community’.593 It should be noted that the 
concept of Kaldor’s claw-back scheme was akin to child tax credit with the 
absence of a means test and the requirement to be in work.594 Contrary to the 
IR’s judgment that Kaldor’s scheme would simply lead to a decrease in income 
tax child allowance, this scheme would actually provide a fixed amount of 
allowance for non-income tax payers and the amount for reduced rate income 
tax payers would taper within the income tax structure, with no payment for 
standard rate tax payers. This meant that the income groups below the 
standard tax rate qualified to receive tax credit. The amount of this tax credit 
would be the amount of tax imposed on those in receipt of the first step of 
reduced rates, plus family allowance. Conceptually, this tax credit would be 
offset at the point of the standard income tax rate.595 
     On the other hand, Michael Stewart proposed a different scheme which 
would reduce income tax child allowance for recipients of the family allowance, 
thus enabling a ‘recoup in tax from standard rate taxpayers the net (after tax) 
                                                       
593 TNA, T171/831, Family Allowances, Nicholas Kaldor to the Chancellor, 15 
December 1967. 
594 The procedure for payment of the allowance differs. Current tax credits are 
paid on the basis of means testing, however, family allowances in 1968 were 
paid weekly and then clawed back through income tax payments. 
595  Later, this concept gathered public attention both under the Thatcher 
government, which considered Milton Friedman’s breed of negative income tax, 
and under the Blair government with its introduction of tax credits. The Labour 
government began to consider the possible introduction of negative income tax 
in 1968. Several disadvantageous points were raised, one of which was similar 
to those raised surrounding the family allowances: the complexity of the tax 
system and administrative difficulties. In addition, it was held that negative 
income tax would incur potential harmful effects on saving and the willingness 
and incentive to work. Odgers, of the Cabinet Office, wrote that a ‘Negative 
Income Tax would indeed mean taking a sledgehammer to crack the admittedly 
hard nut of the family poverty of the low wage-earner or the wage-stopped men,’ 
CAB164/441, Working Group on Negative Income Tax, from P.R. Odgers to 
Richard Crossman, Secretary of State, 15 April 1969. For the Conservative 
Party’s consideration of negative income tax, see Florence Sutcliffe-Braithwaite, 
‘Neo-liberalism and Morality in the Making of Thatcherite Social Policy’, The 
Historical Journal, Vol.55, No.2, 2012, pp. 497-520.   
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benefit they would otherwise derive from the family allowances increases of 7s. 
per FAM child in April.’596 This calculated the reduction in income tax child 
allowance by £30 a year.597 It is clear that Kaldor’s scheme, the original claw-
back, would remove the benefit for standard rate taxpayers from family 
allowances, and Michael Stewart pushed a ‘give-and-take’ scheme which would 
recoup the amount of increase in family allowances from standard rate 
taxpayers without reducing or excluding them from the family allowances.  
     Behind Stewart’s proposal, there existed concern over the arrangement of 
supplementary benefits and the family allowances. Stewart suggested an 
increase in supplementary benefits, and the increase in the family allowances to 
be accompanied by ‘counter-balancing tax adjustments’.598 Here, there were 
concerns that the increase in supplementary benefits would not be beneficial for 
low-wage earners and those in the wage-stop. In this sense, expansion of social 
expenditure, particularly increase in family allowances complemented by 
supplementary benefits, was also considered a prerequisite measure in order to 
maintain sound incomes policy, within the 3.5 per cent ceiling.599 The report on 
the Trades Union Congress conference put forth the argument that both 
schemes would mitigate pressure on incomes policy and family allowances 
                                                       
596  TNA, T171/831, FAMILY ALLOWANCES, Note by the Board of Inland 
Revenue, (A) Professor Kaldor’s Scheme, 22 December 1967. 
597 Ibid. 
598 TNA, PREM13/2066, Cabinet: Public Expenditure, Annex E, 3 January 1968. 
Michael Stewart emphasised the importance of family allowances, stating that 
the ‘poorest families consist mainly of low wage earners in full time employment 
with children. To help them some increase in family allowances would need to 
be considered’. See T227/2453, Devaluation, Social Security Consequences: 
Memorandum by the First Secretary of State, 22 November 1967. 
599 PREM13/2057, Prices and Incomes Policy (C (68) 45, 46 and 50), Sir Burke 
Trend, Cabinet Secretary, to Prime Minister, 28 February 1968.  
On 16 November 1967, Kaldor also warned the Treasury of the ineffectiveness 
of supplementary benefits on ‘ordinary wage earners’. See T227/2452, 
Accompanying Measures: Family Allowances, Nicholas Kaldor to Sir William 
Armstrong, 16 November 1967.  
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would cover low-paid families that were out of range of supplementary benefits, 
and an increase in supplementary benefits would mitigate hostility surrounding 
the ‘unpopular’ unselective family allowances.600 Therefore, Stewart’s proposal 
can be considered propitious to gain concessions from the TUC, and to prevent 
uneven distribution of benefits and allowances. 
     Meanwhile, Jenkins stated that ‘it would be impossible to avoid some form of 
selectivity in payment of family allowances’. 601  This notion was shared by 
officials of the Treasury, with Sir William Armstrong asserting the need for 
benefit selectivity to reduce public expenditure. Armstrong also stated that 
should a ‘means test (which would not have led to very different results in the 
case of substantial groups) been acceptable the Inland Revenue could have 
taken no exception to it.’602 It was also seen to be an opportune moment to 
adjust policy, evident in Kaldor’s remark that ‘universal payment of family 
allowances was an anomaly from its inception and the present was a good 
moment to make a change.’603 
     It should be also noted that there existed significant pressure for a more 
selective social security package from the Bank. While the Labour government 
considered arrangement of the social policies, on 11 January 1968, the Bank 
put further pressure on the Chancellor to make tax increases.604 The Governor 
of the Bank of England, Sir Leslie O’Brien, informed the Chancellor that the 
repayment by the UK for foreign short-term debt, to the IMF and other central 
banks, would start within the same year. In addition, O’Brien warned that 
                                                       
600 PREM13/2057, Prices and Incomes Policy (C (68) 45, 46 and 50), Sir Burke 
Trend to the Prime Minister, 28 February 1968. 
601 TNA, T331/38, Record of a meeting held in Chancellor of Exchequer’s room, 
Wednesday 20 December, 6.45 p.m. 
602 Ibid. 
603 Ibid. 
604 BoEA, G41/2, Governor to the Chancellor, 11 January 1968. 
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concerning the prospects of the UK balance of payments, some estimates 
indicated no surplus, which would ‘give us no reason to believe we shall get any 
assistance during this year in paying off our debts’.605 On this occasion, O’Brien 
assessed that the ‘only hope of getting through 1968 without drifting into chaos 
rests on restoring fully and without delay the world’s confidence in our 
willingness and ability to grapple with our problems’.606 O’Brien foresaw that 
failure to do this would lead to the international monetary system falling into 
chaos. For this reason, he wrote to the Chancellor of the challenges of the cuts: 
 
 I know, however, that some of the cuts which you have been resolutely 
 examining are especially difficult, partly because of administrative 
 complications and partly for political reasons.  
 
O’Brien elaborated on the necessity for increased selectivity in the family 
allowances for mitigating external pressure: 
 
 This I know applies especially to the selective restriction of family 
 allowances. Nevertheless, I believe that this, which could save so much 
 money straight away, is a vital part of your package and should make all 
 the difference to its acceptability throughout the world. Whatever the 
 administrative difficulties or political dangers, they must pale into 
 insignificance beside the catastrophic result of failing at this late hour to 
 win the battle of confidence.607 
 
O’Brien then added, therefore that ‘a mere marginal tinkering with family 
allowances will not be enough […] I strongly advise that your package should 






be reinforced by some instant announcement of tax increases to be included in 
your forthcoming Budget’.608 
     Despite motions in the government for introducing selectivity into the family 
allowances, Kaldor’s scheme faced a political backlash. On 22 December 1967, 
Judith Hart, Minister of Social Security, expressed the view that this scheme 
would cause ‘real political difficulties,’ arising from the disturbance of relativities 
between families with dependent children and single people.609 In addition, Hart 
highlighted that reducing family incomes with the exception of the poor and 
‘asking better off families (alone) to pay for FAM for poor families’ would require 
some adjustment of the structure of income tax and increase in income tax child 
allowance to ‘redress the balance’.610 In line with this critique on his scheme, 
Kaldor amended his proposal.611 He suggested that the claw-back system ‘is 
the best combined with a £20 increase in the income tax child allowances 
financed by 3d rise in the standard rate.’612 In addition, regarding the potential 
rise in the number of taxpayers through the increase in taxable income of the 
family allowances, Kaldor recommended the removal of one million taxpayers 
from tax liability and the reduction of the tax burden for an additional four million 
taxpayers, with a minimum income relief of £107.613 Kaldor demonstrated his 
concern that both schemes would not be beneficial for standard rate tax payers, 
whom the Chancellor suggested might be encouraged with some financial 
incentive. Kaldor conceded to avoidance of a full claw-back and considered 
burden sharing amongst taxpayers as a whole. 
                                                       
608 Ibid. 
609 TNA, T171/831, Family Allowances, Comments on Kaldor paper, Minister of 
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611 TNA, T171/831, Selective Family Allowances – the Present State of Play, 
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     This increase in family allowances also became an issue within the income 
tax field, which became gradually less progressive due to the widening of 
reduced rate bands, and bracket creep in conjunction with inflation without 
increase in personal allowances. The increase in family allowances, as taxable 
income, was expected to increase the number of taxpayers. Kaldor proposed 
introducing a minimum earned income relief of £143 (this figure was later 
changed to £137) for single men, which would increase by two sevenths of 
additional personal allowances for a wife and children, reducing the personal 
allowance for single persons by £40, and a reduction in the personal allowance 
of married men by £20.614 This structure would push up the personal income tax 
exemption limit for single men up £34 from £283 to £317. That for married men 
would be pushed up by £60. This scheme was projected to benefit 4.5 million 
taxpayers and lead to the exemption of a further 900,000 people from tax 
liability. The objective of this was not related to revenue but ‘to counteract the 
undesirable side-effects of the family allowance scheme in lowering the starting 
points of liability’ and ‘to relieve others who have been brought into tax liability 
as a result of inflation’.615 The Inland Revenue repeatedly criticised Kaldor’s 
amended proposal of minimum earned income relief, citing administrative 
difficulties and its potentially complicated structure, proposing a ‘modest 
increase in the income tax rates, coupled with an increase in the single and 
married personal allowances and a reduction of the first reduced rate band.’616  
                                                       
614 TNA, T171/1411, Minimum Earned Income Relief, Nicholas Kaldor to the 
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616  TNA, T171/1411, Personal Taxation, Sir Alexander Johnson to the 
Chancellor, 1 February 1968. Kaldor again criticised the scheme proposed by 
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     On 8 February, the Chancellor showed his support for the possible increase 
in both standard and reduced income tax rates, which would see an increase in 
the 30 per cent reduced rate to 31.25 per cent, and standard rate to 42.5 per 
cent.617 However, mitigation of the impact of this increase in the standard tax 
rate with the necessary earned income relief was estimated to cost between 
£150-210 million, and to be mired in administrative difficulties.618 Moreover, the 
Chancellor faced pressure from the Prime Minister to achieve an increase in the 
corporation tax rate and reduction in the standard income tax rate 
simultaneously, in accordance with suggestions by the CBI (Confederation of 
British Industry) made before the devaluation.619  
     However, the Prime Minister’s advocacy of increase in corporation tax had 
faced both domestic and international constraints, prompting reiteration of 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Jenkins’ predecessor’s de facto promise to limit 
the increase to 42.5 per cent. In addition, at the stage of devaluation, the UK 
government had sent its Letter of Intent to the IMF on 23 November 1967, 
which clearly stated that the corporation tax rate would be increased from 40 to 
42.5 per cent. It was considered that this statement was ‘crucial’ to pin the rate 
at 42.5 per cent as opposed to 45 per cent.620 On 29 February 1968, Jenkins 
                                                                                                                                                                  
the IR due to his view that this scheme would be insufficient to offset the larger 
burden on low-income FAM recipients through the process of bracket creep, 
and would have redistributive effects not from standard rate taxpayers to the 
poorest but from the better-off to the poorest taxpayers. TNA, T171/1411, 
Personal Taxation, Nicholas Kaldor to the Chancellor, 5 February 1968. 
617  TNA, T171/1407, C.M. (68) 15, Chancellor’s Meetings, Budget 1968, 8 
February 1968. TNA, T171/831, Personal Taxation, Sir Alexander Johnson to 
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618 TNA, T171/831, Personal Taxation, Sir Alexander Johnson to the Chancellor, 
12 February 1968. 
619 TNA, T171/1411, Robert Armstrong to Sir William Armstrong, 20 February 
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620 For the Letter of Intent sent to the IMF on 23 November 1967, see Hansard, 
House of Commons Debates, 30 November 1967, Vol.755, cc. 643-52. 
T171/1411, Corporation Tax, D. B. Andren to Robin Butler, 29 February 1968. 
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held that in light of the previous announcement by Callaghan on 18 November 
1967 to fix the corporation tax rate at 42.5 per cent, relations with the City would 
be harmed should an increase to 45 per cent take place.621 
     With a rise in the corporation tax rate limited, pressure was then placed on 
the Chancellor to avoid an income tax increase. As discussion continued on the 
plan for income tax and family allowances, the Chancellor clarified his opinion. 
Firstly, he would accept heavier tax increases on bachelors and spinsters than 
on married men.622 Secondly, he backtracked and stated that he did not want to 
increase the standard income tax rates and reduced rates.623  Thirdly, the 
Chancellor was committed to using a claw-back scheme to recover the increase 
in family allowances from standard rate tax payers, and showed his awareness 
that this ‘would have the effect of bringing a considerable number of people into 
tax, or into a higher rate band’.624 He did however express his desire to ‘go as 
far as possible in taking people of this kind out of tax again [...] it might well not 
be possible to go the whole way.’625 Fourthly, the Chancellor was ‘impressed’ by 
the possibility of an increase of £15 in the single allowance, while showing a 
preference for an increase of £25 or more in the married allowance, if this were 
possible without ‘too great a narrowing in the reduced rate bands.’626 This was 
                                                                                                                                                                  
On the other hand, it was reported that Jenkins seemed not to have any 
intention to manipulate the corporation tax rate: ‘Spoke to Mr. McConnachie and 
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Robin Butler 1 March 1968 on T171/1411, R. I. McConnachie to Robin Butler, 1 
March 1968. 
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C.M. (68) 3rd Meeting, Thursday 29 February 1968. 
622 TNA, T171/1411, Robert Armstrong to Sir William Armstrong, 5 February 
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considered provision of a ‘self-balancing’ structure. Finally, the Chancellor 
emphasised that these schemes should not result in the loss of any net 
revenue.627  
     Although the Chancellor discarded the option to raise income tax, he 
attempted to co-ordinate finance with an increase in the family allowances, 
accompanied by tax base expansion that would place additional burden on the 
worse-off, and increase in personal allowances. However, Kaldor and the IR 
criticised this scheme, citing that worse-off single men and married persons 
without children would face a significant burden.628 Meanwhile, as mentioned 
above, Kaldor’s main scheme of a claw-back with minimum earned income 
relief was repeatedly criticised for its potential cost and administrative difficulties. 
In fact, the matter of simplification of taxation was also related to the 
relationship with the City. It was reported that the Chancellor stated his line that  
 
 his own disposition was to aim for a Finance Bill which was not too 
 complicated. He thought it would be a mistake in the post-devaluation 
 phase to contemplate a long Finance Bill. He was conscious of the City 
 objections to frequent changes and regarded it as of importance to 
 improve the relationship between the Government and the City.629 
 
                                                       
627 Ibid. 
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From this it is clear that after devaluation, for a strong relationship with the City, 
the Chancellor needed to ensure that tax and expenditure within the 1968 
budget did not present as complicated. The Chancellor at this stage concluded 
that the 1968 budget would include ‘a number of unpalatable steps’, making it 
unwise to undertake large tax reform simultaneously. 630  With significant 
objections against the possible schemes, the Chancellor did not introduce any 
major change in the field of income tax within the 1968 budget.631 On 6 March 
1968, the Chancellor ‘was very anxious to avoid an increase in the standard 
rate if possible. It was a key note of the budget that he was leaving this area 
alone.’ 632  In addition, for children who qualified for family allowances, the 
Chancellor put into place a reduction in income tax child allowance of £36 in 
order to claw-back the amount of increase in family allowances. Moreover, the 
Chancellor decided to take no further action to reduce the number of income tax 
payers. Akin to Stewart’s proposal, this £36 income tax child allowance 
reduction was designed to recoup the amount of increase in family allowances 
from standard rate income tax payers, tapering off for the reduced rate income 
tax payers.633 
 
                                                       
630 Ibid. 
631 T171/1425, Minutes of a Meeting in the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s room, 
C.M. (68) 5th Meeting, Wednesday 6 March 1968.  
In the income tax field, increase in the age related income tax exemption limits 
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6.5.2    The impact of the 1968 budget 
 
The overall redistributive effects of the budget of 1968 are difficult to assess 
here because factors such as age cohort, family structure, and capability must 
also be considered. Moreover, as detailed by Korpi, targeted and flat rate 
benefits can be less efficient in improving equality and poverty than 
‘universalistic’ earning-related benefits including high-income groups.634  This 
suggests that the more ‘targeted’ family allowance and its increase in 1968 
budget cannot necessarily be judged as progressive or regressive, or as having 
improved inequality and poverty. In addition, Junko Kato has revealed that 
regressive taxation such as consumption tax and VAT upheld stable public 
expenditure, which created the path dependence of ‘welfare states’.635 The 
implication here is that increase in indirect taxation would not inevitably result in 
regressive fiscal schemes and that focus must be placed on both revenue and 
public expenditure.  
     Concerning assessment of expenditure and revenue surrounding the family 
allowances, Atkinson’s analysis has revealed that the increase had little impact 
on the level of income because the family allowances increase was offset by the 
rise in national insurance and the claw back scheme.636 With respect to 1968 
budget, while the effective rates of direct and indirect taxes with contributions on 
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personal income increased from approximately 27 per cent to 31 per cent, the 
total amount of reduction in public expenditure on goods and services reached 
£500 million for the two years following devaluation.637 Thus, there is no doubt 
that tax increase and the 1968 reduction in public expenditure enhanced 
deflationary pressure. 
     In terms of overall effects, as has Tomlinson argued, the 1968 budget can be 
considered mildly regressive.638 This is clear in the simple data presented below 
in Figure 6-5.639 Although this budget, including the regressive factors such as 
increase in direct taxation, was expected in the government to be more 
progressive in terms of the Gini coefficient, predicted to reduce from 0.25 to 
0.2465, the actual outcome of income distribution became regressive.640 The 
below Figures 6-5 and 6-6 detail historical statistics of the Gini coefficient and 
the relative poverty rates (50 per cent of the median income) of different types 
of household. It should be noted from this data, that while the 1968 budget had 
a regressive impact, various poverty rates and income distribution historically 
improved under the Labour government in the 1960s. Here, the decrease in 
poverty rates supports the argument that the Labour government made efforts 
to increase targeted spending for the unemployed and pensioners.  
 
                                                       
637 For fluctuation in public expenditure, see Blackaby, British Economic Policy 
1960-74, p.45. For the effective tax rates, and detailed out-turns with planned 
expenditures, see R. W. R. Price ‘Public Expenditure’ and ‘Budgetary Policy’, in 
Blackaby (ed.), British Economic Policy 1960-74, pp.108-9, 161. 
638 Tomlinson, The Labour Governments, pp.208-9. 
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Figure 6-5: Gini Coefficient and Relative Poverty Rates (1961-1970) 
Source: Institute for Fiscal Studies: Living Standards, Inequality and Poverty 
Spreadsheet.                                                                                                   
Note: All incomes refer to household incomes and are measured net of direct 
taxes and benefits, after housing costs deduction. All data is derived from 













Figure 6-6: Gini Coefficient and Relative Poverty Rates (1961-2016) 
 
Source: Institute for Fiscal Studies: Living Standards, Inequality and Poverty 
Spreadsheet.                                                                                                   
Note: All incomes refer to household incomes and are measured net of direct 
taxes and benefits, after housing costs deduction. All data is derived from 











6.6    Conclusion: Devaluation and ‘British social democracy’ 
 
On 19 March 1968, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Roy Jenkins, announced 
the budget. This 1968 budget can be considered as expanding the ideas within 
accompanying measures that had been gradually established from 1965. The 
increase in both direct and indirect taxation, cuts in public expenditure including 
in defence and social security, and maintenance of incomes policy had already 
been confirmed before the devaluation of 1967. In the aftermath of the decision 
to devalue sterling, pressures for fiscal tightening intensified, due to influence 
from international and domestic monetary institutions such as the IMF, Working 
Party 3 at the OECD and the Bank of England.  
     Even though this pressure put significant constraint on the course of 1968 
budget, there were areas that the Labour government would not be moved on. 
This chapter has mainly focused on the political battlefields of corporation tax, 
income tax and the family allowances. Concerning corporation tax, it is clear 
that some in the Labour government sought further increase in the corporation 
tax rate, however, Jenkins discarded this option due to the potential harm such 
a move would inflict on the relationships amongst the government, the City and 
the IMF. As it faced the necessity to extend the international credit provision 
package while avoiding a fall into repayment for foreign short-term debt, officials 
of the Labour government, particularly Jenkins, were concerned with the 
potential outcome of an increase in corporation tax. This resulted in a limited 
increase in corporation tax without major reform. 
     In conjunction with the above negotiations, the fields of income tax, personal 
allowances and family allowances also created political conflict. The increase in 
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family allowances, which had been set on course before the devaluation, 
provoked dispute over how the costs would be financed. In the beginning, 
income tax reform was proposed as a means to finance this additional cost, 
however, this was criticised by Harold Wilson and James Callaghan, who 
insisted on reduction of income tax rates. With the option of income tax reform 
becoming increasingly unlikely, the need to finance the rise in family allowances 
pushed the idea of a more selective social security system into the discussion. 
In addition, as a fundamental political milieu and with strong demand from both 
the Bank and the international sphere, some kind of selectivity in the benefit 
system became an inevitable course in the wake of devaluation.     
     With this prerequisite, on one side Michael Stewart, with the political support 
of Harold Wilson, stood against the blockage of resources for social expenditure. 
Behind their stance, there existed concern over how to manage the interests of 
those in receipt of benefits and allowances, and how best to mitigate conflict 
with industries over the incomes policies, without a negative impact on electoral 
movement. Stewart promoted schemes to reduce the allowances for both 
standard rate taxpayers and reduced rate taxpayers evenly within the existing 
income tax rate structure. On the other side, Jenkins was significantly affected 
by the interests of financial markets and institutions, and keen to shrink public 
spending in the social security field, looking to raise revenue from mainly 
regressive fiscal measures relying on indirect taxation. This group, sharing the 
preference for a more selective social security system raised by Kaldor, pushed 
schemes to more drastically transfer income from high-income earners to low or 
non-income earners, in a full claw-back of the family allowances from high-
income earners with allowances tapering-off for reduced rate income tax payers. 
It was proposed that this should be accompanied by adjustment of the personal 
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tax allowances structure or a rise in the income tax burden, which was side-
lined by Wilson. Here, it should be noted that this proposal for a full claw-back 
was congenial to the demands of the Bank and international arena. An initial 
intention behind this selective full claw-back proposal, at least in the eyes of 
Jenkins and the Bank, was for it to act as a means to reduce public expenditure. 
In this respect, selectivity or targeted family allowances were inseparably 
entangled with the purpose of reduction in public expenditure.  
     However, as Tomlinson has already explicated, Kaldor’s scheme provoked a 
backlash due to its potential to create unfavourable burden sharing between the 
single and married with or without children.641 In addition, the justification of 
transferring a significant sum from the better-off to the worse-off was held to be 
difficult politically, with elections in mind. With the IR and City at the forefront, 
concerns over complexity, administrative difficulties and financial costs were 
also raised. Kaldor then presented his amended proposal to claw-back with 
increase in income tax rates. In line with Kaldor, Jenkins re-kindled political 
debate towards possibly increasing income tax rates until just before the 
establishment of the budget, however, he faced pressure from Prime Minister 
Wilson to reduce, rather than increase income tax rates. Faced with this 
pressure, Jenkins discarded the option to make changes in income tax. At this 
point, the remaining option for Kaldor was to arrange the burden surrounding 
family allowances with a minimum earned income relief, however, this was also 
rejected due to its administrative difficulties.  
     Finally, the determined policy course was a less progressive but more 
universal scheme than the original proposal, without any requirement for new 
legislation. This resulted in the decrease in the child income tax allowance by 
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£36 in order to recoup the increasing sum of family allowances, a scheme 
originally advocated by Michael Stewart. It is evident that the resulting changes 
to the family allowances can be considered as more selective than the previous 
scheme but less selective than the original proposal for changes, and 
maintaining the planned increase of its overall expenditure. 
     With the above analysis of these historical developments, here examination 
can be made of Newton’s argument that the historical or political economic 
impact of 1967 devaluation prolonged ‘British social democracy’. Section two of 
this chapter has attempted to narrow down the concept of post-World War II 
‘British social democracy’, with the significant interest of this chapter being 
Labour’s era in the 1960s, identifying its characterisation as aspects of 
progressive fiscal policies mixed with universal or less selective social securities, 
and liberal economic thought, which embodied partially into the ‘Keynesian’ 
policies espoused with collective economic thought. If this understanding holds 
credence, Newton’s argument and the diverse assessment of devaluation 
require revisiting. 
     There is no doubt that the potential course of 1968 budget had already been 
constrained by both efforts to make the devaluation effective and pressure from 
monetary institutions such as the Bank and IMF. In this sense, increase in 
taxation and reduction in public expenditure had already been perceived as 
inevitable around the decision to devalue. Does this provoke the understanding 
that the Labour government accepted regressive measures? Important to note 
here is that this does not mean that the Labour government made full 
concessions. While the Prime Minister, Michael Stewart, the TUC, Butler and to 
some extent Callaghan, advocated increase in corporation tax, reduction in the 
income tax burden, and protection of public expenditure particularly in the social 
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security field, Jenkins attempted to push policy in the opposite direction in line 
with the Bank, City, IMF, Working Party 3 and to some extent the IR.642 
Therefore, with the notable exception of Jenkins, many Labour ministers can be 
seen as prioritising defence of the progressive aspects of its fiscal measures 
and a certain level of public expenditure, giving careful consideration to living 
standards after devaluation. Consequently, via the conflicts amongst them, the 
policy outcome was that the further increase in corporation tax was given up. 
Meanwhile, income tax was to be maintained, or at least not increased, as a 
quid pro quo for introduction of a more selective family allowance, however, its 
selectivity became less than Jenkins had sought (though in effect it was less 
progressive than the proposal). However, the whole budget had a regressive 
impact, at least mildly, but it is open to the interpretation that the Labour 
government contained the regressivity in the budgeting process.  
     Therefore, for Labour, both aspects of failure and partial success can be 
seen within 1968 budget. However, a defeat can be accentuated if one looks 
into the quality of 1968 budget and objectives of Labour government. As 
Michael Hill and Wilfred Beckerman have described, the Labour administration 
set out to reduce the presence of selectivity within the social security system, 
and to increase redistributive effects.643 If this assessment still holds credence, 
the 1968 budget contained partial defeat regarding reducing selectivity in the 
social security field, and concerning achievement of progressive fiscal 
measures, which simultaneously saw the expansion of regressive and liberal-
                                                       
642 Note that the TUC took into account the unpopularity of family allowances 
and its increase, however, it did not put forth its reduction but rather 
simultaneous increase in supplementary benefits in order to mitigate the 
hostility towards family allowances. 
643 Michael J. Hill, ‘Selectivity for the Poor’, pp.235-45, and Wilfred Beckerman, 
‘Objectives and performance: an overall view’, in Wilfred Beckerman (ed.), The 




leaning fiscal measures.644 Thus, it can be assessed that a change underwent 
in the components of ‘British social democracy’, say the universal and 
progressive facets, and there occurred a rise of liberal aspects within it, 
triggered ultimately by the devaluation. In this sense, even if, as argued by 
Newton, the devaluation was for prolonging ‘British social democracy’, it did not, 
in fact, have great impact on maintaining it, rather it fostered its change, at least 
from short-term and fiscal perspectives.645 Hence, rather than prolonging ‘British 
social democracy’, the 1967 devaluation can be considered to have, in terms of 
the liberal aspects of taxation, targeted or selective social securities and a 
regressive 1968 budget, somewhat modified its quality and increased the liberal 
aspect within itself. 
          
 
           
 
 
                                                       
644 Here, liberal-leaning fiscal measures refer to indirect taxation, an expanding 
taxation base, and targeted provision of social security.  
645 It should be noted that if Newton emphasised ‘liberal socialist synthesis’ 
solely as ‘embedded liberalism’, which refers to the harmonisation of domestic 
Keynesian economic management and the tendency towards international free 
markets, then the 1967 devaluation no doubt had a prolonging impact, at least 
until 1971. This is because the devaluation did not usher in the immediate 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system, and Keynesian fiscal policies 
theoretically survived in the de facto fixed exchange rate system, at least in the 
short-term. However, this chapter refers to the issue in Newton’s argument that 
the 1967 devaluation prolonged not only this ‘embedded liberalism’, but also 




Chapter 7: From the Nixon shock to the decision to float: The 
international political economy of monetary co-operation in the 
British political reality 
 
‘…have our cake in Europe and to eat it in America.’ 646 
 
7.1    Introduction 
 
In the aftermath of the devaluation of sterling in 1967, and the gold crisis of 
1968, inflationary pressure surged from intensification of industrial action and 
growing public expenditure, increasing turmoil in the international monetary 
system.647 On top of this, the US inflation rate neared 6 per cent in 1969, then 
remaining over 4 per cent even in the summer of 1971, contributing to further 
speculative pressure on the US dollar. Between 1970 and 1971 the US 
experienced the first trade deficits since World War II. This accelerated the flow 
of the US dollar overseas particularly into West Germany, creating inflationary 
pressure in Europe. Contrary to the objectives of tightening measures pursued 
                                                       
646 TNA, PREM15/1278, United States Annual Review for 1971, Cromer to Sir 
Alec Douglas-Home, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 
5 January 1972. 
647 For a quantitative assessment of the influence of the devaluation of sterling 
in 1967 on the gold pool, see Michael D. Bordo, Eric Monnet and Alain Naef, 
‘The Gold Pool (1961-1968) and the Fall of the Bretton Woods System: Lessons 
for Central Bank Cooperation’, NBER Working Paper, No. 24016, November 
2017. This work quantitatively corroborated the account that the sterling 
devaluation in 1967 contributed to the succeeding gold crisis and the 
dysfunction of the gold pool.  
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to offset such capital movement, these measures ironically fostered further 
capital inflow to Europe from the US, proving ineffective.648  
     In Britain, following the draconian budget of Wilson’s Labour government, 
the Conservative Party won the general election in June 1970, a surprising 
result after earlier opinion polls had suggested voters were not in their favour. 
Under Prime Minister Edward Heath’s Conservative government, international 
monetary affairs would significantly differ from the preceding Labour 
government. During this period, the UK pursued accession to the EEC, and saw 
the decline of the US dollar in contrast to the rise of the momentum of European 
monetary integration. This chapter focuses on UK foreign economic diplomacy 
during the period from the Nixon shock in August 1971 to the decision to float 
sterling in June 1972, via the Smithsonian agreement, the Anglo-American 
Bermuda meeting and the ‘snake in the tunnel’. 
     In the context of international monetary relations, it is broadly held that the 
early 1970s was a turning point from the Bretton Woods system to a floating 
exchange rate system, heralding the rise of European monetary integration. In 
parallel, British foreign economic policies and currency management 
metamorphosed, and its relations of mutual reliance with the US in the ‘special 
relationship’ gravitated, at least in the short-term, towards the EEC. Thus, the 
change in the balance of Anglo-American and Anglo-EEC relations, while 
drastic international monetary reform was ongoing, is a key perspective for 
exploration of British foreign economic relations.  
     From the perspective of Anglo-American relations, Dumbrell has argued that 
under Prime Minister Heath, Anglo-American relations were a 
                                                       
648 Bordo, Humpage and Schwartz, Strained Relations, pp.198-9. 
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‘transmogrification’ of the ‘special relationship’ in which Heath harboured 
reservations about the US arrogantly wielding its diplomatic influence, and 
strived to avoid any misgivings that EEC member countries, particularly France, 
might hold that the UK would bring US interests into the EEC.649  Dobson 
echoed this account, assessing that Anglo-American relations between 1970 
and 1974 were ‘rather barren’.650 This group of arguments have emphasised 
Heath’s proclivity towards the EEC having a detrimental or at least inhibiting 
effect on Anglo-American relations.  
     However, new accounts have been provided on Anglo-American relations in 
the early 1970s. For example, Brummer focused on the Bermuda meeting as an 
opportunity for re-kindling close Anglo-American co-operation, and highlighted 
its role for reformation of the international monetary order.651 In line with this 
argument, Rossbach detailed that although the efforts of Heath to join the EEC 
made Anglo-American relations vulnerable, this paradoxically provoked the 
rebirth of the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’.652 Andrew Scott has also 
attempted to shed new light on historical continuity in the context of the British 
policies of the Macmillan and Wilson governments, emphasising Heath’s efforts 
                                                       
649 John Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the 
Cold War and After (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2001), p.73. Ovendale also 
expressed a similar view, see Ritchie Ovendale, Anglo-American Relations in 
the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), p.133. Geir 
Lundestad, “Empire” By Integration: The United States and European 
Integration, 1945-1997 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp.103-4.  
650 Dobson, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century, p.140. 
651 Justin A. Brummer, Anglo-American relations and the EC enlargement, 1969-
1974 (unpublished PhD thesis, University College London, 2012), pp.180-94. 
652  Niklas H. Rossbach, Heath, Nixon and the rebirth of the Special 
Relationship: Britain, the US and the EC, 1969–74 (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009), chapter 7. 
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to ameliorate relations with the US, and the effect of Nixon’s high-handed policy 
decisions on the UK.653  
     In sum, these contrasting arguments share the consensus that British 
accession to the EEC had a significant impact on Anglo-American and Anglo-
European relations, however, both arguments drew different interpretations in 
which the former stressed an unproductive and futile hiatus, and the latter 
focused upon abeyance which invigorated revival.  
     In order to break this dilemma in the existing research, focus should be 
placed on, firstly, how Britain attempted to achieve its objectives and maximise 
economic or political benefits from dormant or ‘non-special’ barren Anglo-
American relations and Anglo-EEC relations, and secondly, what strategies 
Britain leaned towards to achieve its objectives. This provides clarity in order to 
resolve the ambiguity arising from the above conflictive views: whether Britain 
kept Anglo-American relations ‘non-special’, or attempted to re-construct or re-
kindle the ‘special relationship’. In other words, the question is how Anglo-
American economic relations, which were not in crisis and catastrophe but 
stalemate and barren, survived without the need for a ‘special’ relationship, 
under the fluid co-operation between the two reserve currencies. 
     From this perspective, this chapter will re-investigate foreign economic 
relations between 1971 and 1972, focusing on the UK attitude towards 
international monetary co-operation over the snake in the tunnel measures in 
the period of the Smithsonian agreement, until the decision to float sterling in 
June 1972.  
                                                       
653  Andrew Scott, Allies Apart: Heath, Nixon and the Anglo-American 
Relationship (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), chapter 1. 
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7.2    The Nixon shock and the preparation for Smithsonian 
 
On 15 August 1971 at Camp David, President Richard Nixon declared the 
closure of the gold window, which suspended the convertibility of gold by the 
US Treasury, with the temporary imposition of a 10 per cent import surcharge, a 
10 per cent Job Development Credit, and a 90 day wage-price freeze.654 
Various accounts exist surrounding this decision, including emphasis of the 
British purchase of gold in early August as the trigger behind the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system: in the early summer over 4.7 billion dollars in gold and 
reserve assets outflowed from the US, in spite of foreign central banks 
forbearing sale of their dollars.655 An official at the Japanese Ministry of Finance, 
Yusuke Kashiwagi (then Special Adviser to the Minister of Finance) in charge of 
negotiations for international monetary affairs, reminisced in his testimony that 
the UK demanded the US convert 1 or 2 billion of its dollars into gold, causing 
the Nixon shock.656 However, Paul Volcker, Under Secretary of the US Treasury 
for International Affairs, denied this account, writing that demand for gold of 
countries with relatively small economies affected the international monetary 
situation.657 Contrary to this, Robert Solomon acknowledged that the UK and 
                                                       
654 At this stage, Nixon proposed cuts in Federal spending including foreign aid 
by $4.7 billion. In addition, he also proposed abolition of the Federal excise tax 
on automobiles (7 per cent), and an increase in personal income tax exemption.  
655 Bordo, Humpage and Schwartz, Strained Relations, p.200. Coombs, The 
Arena of International Finance, pp.215-6. Reasons behind this British purchase 
of gold are opaque. However, it may indicate continuity from Macmillan’s 
government of the preference for gold accumulation over dollar holdings in 
order to avoid risks associated with devaluation or depreciation of the dollar. 
656 For the account of foreign officials who held that the conversion of dollars to 
gold by the UK triggered the closure of the gold window, see Honda and Hata, 
Kashiwagi Yusuke no Syougen, p.44. 
657 Paul Volcker and Toyoo Gyohten, Changing Fortunes: The World’s Money 
and the Threat to American Leadership (New York: Times Books, 1992), p.77. 
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the US agreed to draw 750 million dollars on 13 August 1971.658 In line with 
Solomon and Kashiwagi, Paul McCracken, Chairman of the CEA between 1969 
and 1971, stated thus: 
 
 …anybody who wanted gold would get quite a discussion out of it and 
 would settle, we hoped, for a nominal amount. Then in early July, I think, 
 the British indicated they might want some massive sum. And I recall 
 Paul Volcker, who was in my office one day in July, saying, ‘Well, the 
 question is not whether we’re going to close the gold window. The 
 question is whether we do it this weekend or next weekend or maybe 
 one or two after that, but that's about what we now face.’659 
 
From this, it can be suggested that the attempt by the UK to purchase gold was 
one of the major factors, at least in the eyes of the CEA, in pushing US officials 
to close the gold window. 
     Meanwhile, under the influence of John Connally, US Secretary of the 
Treasury, Nixon emphasised the importance of the domestic economy and 
attempted to reduce the unemployment rate prior to the upcoming election, 
rather than focusing on the international monetary field. 660  For political 
advantage and expansion of the domestic economy, the Federal Reserve was 
                                                       
658 Solomon, The International Monetary System, p.185. However, he did not 
emphasise that this gold transaction significantly affected the decision to close 
the gold window.  
659 Hargrove and Morley (eds.), The President and the Council of Economic 
Advisers, p.345. 
660 James, International Monetary Cooperation Since Bretton Woods, p.233. 
James quoted a note from Camp David, implying that Nixon emphasised 
budgetary policies over the maintenance of exchange rates. See also, Gowa, 




side-lined from the decision making process surrounding the closure of the gold 
window.661  
     Although diverse accounts exist surrounding the decision to close the gold 
window, there is no doubt that the Nixon shock fostered the reform of 
international monetary co-operation. One of the most important agreements 
was, of course, reached in the Smithsonian in December 1971. However, the 
UK would later become the first country to act in breach of this agreement, 
taking the decision of a temporary floating of its currency. One of the key 
arrangements made for the rearrangement of international monetary co-
operation was termed the ‘snake in the tunnel’. The decision, partially made at 
the Smithsonian agreement, allowed fluctuation of currencies within 2.25 per 
cent against the dollar, however, this range would allow 9 per cent of fluctuation 
between currencies. This was deemed insufficient to cushion against the 
fluctuation and speculation around currencies, especially sterling. Therefore, 
discussion over narrowing the margin ensued, which limited the range of 
fluctuations of currencies at 2.25 per cent.  
     The Nixon shock, which spurred international monetary reform, is recognised 
as the decline of US hegemonic economic power that was underpinned by the 
dominant power of the US dollar, and had a significant impact on Anglo-
American and Anglo-European relations in the context of the beginning of 
European monetary integration. According to Harold James,  
 
                                                       
661  Paul Volcker wrote that he was invited to Camp David, however, the 
President did not take up the Fed’s suggestion to maintain the official gold 
parity, see Volcker and Gyohten, Changing Fortunes, p.78. See also Coombs, 
The Arena of International Finance, p.204-5. 
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 Finance Minister Valéry Giscard d’Estaing termed this [the US political 
 economic benefits from the Bretton Woods system] the ‘exorbitant 
 privilege’ in 1965; President Charles de Gaulle explained to Alain
 Peyrefitte that ‘no domain escapes from American imperialism. It takes 
 all forms. The most insidious is that of the dollar.’ [...] And later, as 
 president of the French Republic, Giscard, together with German 
 Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, saw politics as the major reason why 
 Europeans needed to act in the monetary sphere. As Schmidt told 
 Giscard: ‘The Americans need to stop believing that if they whistle, we 
 will obey.’ [...] The European Commission president, Roy Jenkins, 
 replying to Callaghan, stated: ‘I think we might move to a substantially 
 more coordinated European monetary position which could help to create 
 a better world monetary position’.662 
 
It is clear that the rise and fall of the dollar surrounding the declaration of the 
suspension of dollar convertibility with gold in 1971 marked a turning point in the 
UK’s leaning toward European monetary co-operation with EEC entry, while this 
co-operation was accelerated by the Nixon shock.  
     In the wake of the Nixon shock, the UK government set the two below 
objectives: 
 
 For the longer term we should take advantage of the fact that the 
 international monetary system was now in the melting point and try to 
 remould it into a new system which was not dependent on the United 
 States. For the shorter term we should try to bring about a re-alignment 
 of parities which did the least possible damage to our competitive 
 position. In working towards these objectives we should concert our 
 strategy with the Six. Among the Six we might expect a difference of view 
 about whether the re-alignment of parities should be brought about by 
 changing the dollar price of gold or, as the Americans preferred, by the 
                                                       
662  Harold James, Making the European Monetary Union: The Role of the 
Committee of Central Bank Governors and the Origins of the European Central 
Bank (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2012), pp.27-8. James quotes 
three documents. Alain Peyrefitte, C’était de Gaulle: Tout le monde a besoin 
d'une France qui marche (Paris: Gallimard, 2002), pp.603, 663. For the remark 
of Schmidt, see Jonathan Story, ‘The Launching of the EMS: An Analysis of 
Change in Foreign Economic Policy’, Political Studies, Vol.36, No.3, 1988, 
p.397. For the statement by Jenkins see TNA, PREM16/1615, Couzen’s note 
for Wicks, 31 March 1978, and PREM16/1641, Prime Minister’s conversation 
with Roy Jenkins, 31 March 1978. Words in brackets added for clarification. 
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 re-valuing of other major currencies in terms of the dollar. It might be 
 easier for us to achieve the sort of re-alignment of currencies which 
 we wanted in a situation where currencies were re-valued in terms of the 
 dollar…663 
 
     After these British objectives were agreed, Paul Volcker visited the UK, 
meeting with Alan D. Neale of the Treasury. Discussions here were reported to 
Prime Minister Heath, Chancellor of the Exchequer Anthony Barber, and Sir 
Leslie O’Brien, Governor of the Bank of England.664 In this meeting, Volcker 
expressed the necessity to make new parities that would provide a surplus to 
the US and achieve benefits from trade in order to repeal the import 
surcharge.665 Neale and Volcker agreed to push Japan to revalue by at least 15 
per cent, the Dutch and Germany by 10 per cent and France by between 3 and 
4 per cent. If this were achieved, Volcker and Neale recognised that the UK 
would either stay at the same parity or at least avoid significantly revaluing 
sterling.666 Prime Minister Heath expressed his view of the necessity to improve 
sterling’s position in relation to other currencies. He sought to avoid ongoing 
expansionary economic measures causing deterioration to the balance of 
payments, and to circumspect potential obstacles to accession to the EEC. The 
Prime Minister emphasised the need to focus on achieving a surplus from the 
                                                       
663 TNA, PREM15/309, Note of a meeting held at 10 Downing Street, Monday 
16 August 1971, 11.20 a.m. Attendees of this meeting were Prime Minister 
Edward Heath, Chancellor of the Exchequer Anthony Barber, Second 
Permanent Secretary to the Treasury Alan D. Neale, Chief Economic Adviser Sir 
Donald MacDougall, N. F. Cairncross, and Private Secretary to Prime Minister 
Heath, Peter L. Gregson. 
664 TNA, PREM15/309, Note of a meeting held at 10 Downing Street, Monday 
16 August 1971, 7.50 p.m. 
665 This line to put significant pressure on Japan was adhered to by John 
Connally. In conversation with Pierre-Paul Schweitzer, the IMF’s Managing 
Director, Connally urged the IMF to liberalise the Japanese market and 
threatened to revise the relations of national security with Japan and Germany, 
see James, International Monetary Cooperation Since Bretton Woods, p.217. 
666 TNA, PREM15/309, Note of a meeting held at 10 Downing Street, Monday 
16 August 1971, 7.50 p.m. 
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total visible and invisible balances in order to maintain effective expansionary 
economic measures.667 This led to the suggestion that if the EEC Finance 
Ministers set a package of new parities, the UK would join the agreement, 
however, the possible revaluation of sterling should not exceed 4 per cent (up to 
£1=$2.50) against the dollar. Moreover, it was determined that if other EEC 
countries decided to float, the UK would consider floating sterling.668 It was 
recognised that these new parities would become widening margins against the 
dollar and ‘produce a sufficient “coloration Communautaire” for the future’.669 It 
is evident that the UK considered the new parities or widening margins as not 
solely for rearrangement within the turmoil of the Bretton Woods system, but 
also as a significant step towards European monetary harmonisation.  
     These prerequisite conditions were set by the UK, mindful of both its 
potential relationship with the EEC and domestic economic measures, and 
movements were made to foster awareness of the need to put pressure on 
Japan. It was reported that the Chancellor saw great weight in the ‘Japanese 
position’ and expressed his view towards ‘putting pressure on the Japanese 
jointly with the E.E.C. and perhaps the United States to be examined in 
preparation for further international discussions’.670 Behind these discussions, 
officials became aware of shifts in the power balance. Former Governor of the 
Bank, the Earl of Cromer, now British Ambassador to Washington, summarised 
the ongoing situation as ‘by no means confined to monetary affairs, the 
Americans no longer consider it necessary to consult with the UK as an imperial 
                                                       
667 TNA, PREM15/309, from Peter L. Glegson, Private Secretary for Economic 
and Home Affairs to Edward Heath, to William S. Ryrie, Principal Private 
Secretary to the Chancellor, 17 August 1971. 
668 TNA, PREM15/309, Meeting with EEC Finance Ministers, date unknown. 
669 TNA, PREM15/309, Note for the record, International Monetary Crisis, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer’s Visit to Brussels on 19 and 20 August 1971; for 
Consultations with EEC Finance Ministers, Appendix A. 
670 TNA, PREM15/309, W.S. Ryrie to Peter L. Gregson, 23 August 1971. 
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or World power.’671 Moreover, he further mentioned the change in the standing 
of the two reserve currencies: 
 
 the old concept that the dollar and Sterling should stand together as the 
 two major world trading currencies is now obsolete. Sterling is not of the 
 importance that it used to be; the dollar alone really matters. With the 
 dissolution of the Sterling Area, the power and the influence which went 
 with being the centre of it has disappeared. It is perhaps a back-handed 
 compliment to HMG that Sterling is currently so strong that the 
 Americans evidently had no fear of precipitating a Sterling crisis by their 
 measures. All this contributes powerfully to the argument of a need of a 
 European monetary bloc of a scale that signifies.672  
 
In this, Cromer clearly pointed out the shift in the influence of the currencies and 
the change in the international political climate. He continued to remark on 
possible future dealings with Japan: 
 
 The American measures in their international implications have clearly 
 been designed to shock ‘illiberal Japan’ and ‘rich Europe.’ […] Dealing 
 first with Japan, the Americans have much to complain about. The 
 Japanese with skill, pertinacity and a highly integrated system of 
 financing exports have virtually taken over the lion’s share of certain 
 sectors of the American domestic market and the threat to others has 
 been increasing […] We in Europe have scarcely begun to feel the 
 Japanese thrust, but our turn will come. There is little doubt in my opinion 
 that it would be in our own interests in Europe for us to align ourselves 
 with the Americans in bringing pressure on Japan to liberalise her trade 
 policies and to re-value sufficiently the Yen. We might save ourselves 
 much future pain by doing this at this time rather than to wait for later and 
 then act without American support or in a less favourable situation 
 wherein the Americans had done some bilateral deal with the Japanese. 
 In our various negotiations it might prove possible to tie our support to 
                                                       
671 TNA, PREM15/309, International Monetary Situation, Earl of Cromer to Sir 
Alec Douglas-Home, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 




 obtaining a satisfactory undertaking from the Americans on the abolition 
 of import surcharge.673 
 
Cromer suggested that the UK take a course which would not deviate from ‘the 
logic that we have pursued over the years’ and that the UK should ‘attempt 
through all our Missions to minimise the concept of “an American defeat”.’674  
     Before the negotiation over the new parities, the fundamental course of the 
UK and the US had already been set, although various conflictive issues 
remained. The international monetary reform ostensibly stalled between 
October and November. Under the initiative of Rinaldo Ossola, Chairman of 
G10 and Deputy Director General of Banca d'Italia, the issues to be settled 
were limited.675 However, preference for the course in which the UK would co-
operate with France and the US to jointly put pressure on Japan to liberalise its 
trading regulations and revalue the yen was widely shared. The UK attempted 
to avoid the harmful effects of new parities on domestic economic measures 
and accession to the EEC. To achieve these objectives, Japan proved the 
easiest target in the context of international monetary reform.  
     As endorsement of pro-European lines and gradual disengagement from the 
US dollar surrounding monetary issues was growing within the UK government, 
Prime Minister Heath expressed his view on the international monetary reform 
                                                       
673 Ibid. 
674 TNA, PREM15/1271, Cromer to Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Secretary of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 2 November 1971. 
675  These were (1) whether the dollar would devalue or not, and how the 
devaluation would be introduced, against gold or other currencies, or SDRs; (2) 
concerning the range of wider margins which had been set at 1 per cent; (3) 
removal of the US import surcharge; (4) burden sharing of military expenditure 
and trade deficits. Office of Historical Studies, Ministry of Finance, Japan (ed.), 
History of Fiscal and Monetary Policies in Japan, 1952-1973: Volume XII, 
International Finance and External Economic Affairs Part II (Tokyo: Tokyo Keizai 
Inc., 1992), p.401. 
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to German Chancellor Willy Brandt.676 Heath attempted to reconcile Brandt to 
the establishment of new fixed parities with a change in the dollar price of gold. 
Heath asserted that this alignment should be with removal of the US import 
surcharge which had been introduced on 15 August 1971, and reductions of 
tariffs. In addition, Heath insisted on the reduction of use of the national 
currencies, particularly the US dollar, as international reserve assets by the 
achievement of gradual conversion of the US reserve currencies into an 
‘acceptable form of international asset’. He also suggested urging the US to 
apply ‘a satisfactory process of adjustment’ to finance its deficits. Heath 
recognised that  
 
 The danger of accepting a limited settlement - for instance, a 
 realignment of parities agreed with the United States in exchange for 
 the elimination of their surcharge and of the fiscal discrimination 
 introduced on 15 August - would be that we should weaken the 
 incentive on all concerned to reach a broad solution, and perhaps also 
 weaken the bargaining position of Europe in subsequent negotiations.677 
 
Although Heath expressed this along European interests, he also mentioned 
that ‘the essential requirement’ would be elimination of the US surcharge and 
tax discrimination introduced on 15 August accompanying the settlement of new 
parities. In order to achieve this fundamental objective, Heath argued that 
Europe should have ‘agreed objectives and common positions’, and ‘a view to 
harmonising our objectives and our positions to the greatest extent possible.’678 
                                                       
676 TNA, PREM15/326, Heath to Willy Brandt, 26 November 1971. The same 
content was sent from Heath to Pompidou, in TNA, PREM15/326, Heath to 





     On 30 November 1971, the Group of Ten (G10) met in Rome. In this 
meeting, the US raised the agenda of an average increase in the new exchange 
parities against the US dollar by 11 per cent, taking the rate of 1 May 1971 as 
the starting point.679 Volcker did not deny the possibility of changing the gold 
price. Connally made known his intention for a 10 per cent devaluation of the 
dollar against gold, after which ensued a ‘long silence’, followed by Connally’s 
complaints on the delay of trade issues. However, Switzerland, France and the 
UK raised the issue that should the dollar devalue at 10 per cent, they would 
also need to devalue their currencies. Meanwhile, Karl Schiller, German 
Finance Minister and Minister of Economic Affairs, attempted to reconcile the 
European side to accept the deal if they wanted to remove the US import 
surcharge. On the following day, Connally maintained his stance of ‘no currency 
settlement, no trade talks.’680 The Japanese side insisted they would not accept 
a 20 per cent revaluation, however devaluation between 10 and 15 per cent 
would be acceptable. Giscard took the stance that a 7 or 7.5 per cent 
devaluation of the dollar would be acceptable. However, Volcker stayed with the 
US requirement, stating that an 8 per cent devaluation of the dollar would not be 
acceptable. No agreement was reached at this stage. 
     On 3 December 1971, there was considerable speculative pressure on the 
dollar. Heath permitted the Bank to allow a rise within a limit of $2.52 from $2.50. 
Behind this decision, Heath 
                                                       
679 PREM15/812, Record of Restricted Sessions (i.e. Finance Ministers and 
Governors only) of Meeting of the Group of Ten and of EEC Ministers in Rome 
on 30th November 1971 and 1st December 1971. In this meeting, Volcker's 
suggestion was recognised as revaluation as follows; 9 or 10 per cent for 
France, Sweden, Italy, UK, 13 or 14 per cent for the Netherlands, Belgium, 






 feared that the United States Government were succeeding in their 
 objective by encouraging the pressures of speculative movements to 
 work. The further we allowed our rate to rise, the more we should be 
 playing their game. Moreover, the further our rate rose, the more 
 difficult it would be in any eventual settlement to ensure that sterling 
 remained on level terms with the French franc and the Italian lira. The 
 only way in which we could stop the Americans from playing this game 
 was for the EEC countries and ourselves to say that, if the dollar price 
 of gold was raised by more than a certain amount, other currencies 
 would follow the dollar all the way down.681 
 
It was also agreed in this discussion that ‘there might come a time, if the United 
States pushed matters too far, when the EEC and we had to break with them 
[...] if President Pompidou and Herr Brandt had reached some kind of 
agreement when they met, it ought to be possible to reach some kind of 
agreement in the Group of Ten.’682 It is clear that the UK attempted to show its 
uncompromising stance and unwillingness to make concessions in the face of 
US demands, placing or allowing speculative pressure on the dollar. 
     While the conflict between both sides of Atlantic remained, Arthur Burns, 
Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, showed his 
scepticism of Connally’s role: 
 
 if Connally was allowed to play the hand on his own, no solution 
 would be found before the Presidential elections, and we should then 
 all be in serious trouble. Burns had expressed [...] his confidence that 
 President Nixon himself wanted an early settlement; but he equally 
 feared that the President was not taking a close enough interest in the 
 matter at present because of the confidence he placed in Connally. 
 Burns had told Schaetzel that it was really essential for Europe to play 
 a more active part and particularly for the Heads of European 
 Governments to try to get through to the President and bring him to a 
                                                       




 greater sense of urgency, as a means of ensuring that he in turn kept 
 greater control over Connally.683     
 
This suggested that even the Federal Reserve required British officials at the 
Foreign Commonwealth Office to put pressure on Connally and to settle the 
international currency issues. In this way, the Federal Reserve attempted to 
bypass domestic political conflict through drawing on the international political 
domain as a buffer in order to change the domestic political power balance and 
policy course, via the influence of the UK and EEC. 
     On 12 December 1971, Prime Minister Heath and Christopher Soames, 
British Ambassador to France, met Maurice Schumann, French Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, and Geoffroy de Courcel, French Ambassador to the UK.684 
They shared the recognition that the ‘key’ would be Japan. The officials were 
concerned whether Japan would accept significant revaluation of the yen to 
persuade the US to change the dollar price of gold. Heath agreed with the line 
of this argument and considered that: 
 
it was very important that anything agreed between the United States 
 and Japan should be multilateral in its consequences. Otherwise, there 
 would be a danger that the United States administration, having picked 
 off the Japanese, would try to pick off the European countries one by 
 one.685  
 
     While the UK, France and Germany shared the consensus for avoidance of 
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any unacceptable burden that might arise from impending rearrangement of 
new parities, the US put significant pressure on Japan. On 12 November, 
Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and Connally held a meeting in Tokyo. At 
this meeting, Connally urged Japan to accept a 24 per cent revaluation of the 
yen accompanied by the revaluation of the mark at 18 per cent and the franc at 
13 per cent, which would swing $13 billion into the US balance of payments.686 
Sato was surprised at Connally’s suggestion. Connally asserted the US stance 
that lifting its import surcharge would come ‘with adequate revaluation’. 
Regarding the UK, Connally stated that ‘France had its problems, and that the 
UK would probably follow the French lead, at least until it obtained full 
membership in the EEC.’687 Sato responded that ‘the UK could probably play a 
useful role in the EEC vis-à-vis France in view of its special relationship with the 
United States.’ However, Connally showed his dim view that ‘one would think so, 
but these days, with its membership in the EEC pending, the UK could hardly 
be called helpful.’688 
     Prior to the opening of negotiations at Smithsonian, on 13 and 14 December 
1971, Nixon and French President Georges Pompidou held a meeting at the 
Azores. At this meeting, the leaders secretly reached the decision that France 
would agree to the new gold price of one ounce at $38, and both countries 
looked to the establishment of a new margin of currencies within 2.0 (that the 
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French required) and 2.5 per cent (that the US preferred) in exchange for 
repealing the US import surcharge.689 This was a concession warmly received 
by Pompidou, as one month prior to this meeting, Volcker had aimed to devalue 
the dollar by 11 per cent and set the exchange rate margins within +/−3.0 per 
cent.690 Nixon suggested acceptance of a 5 per cent revaluation of the mark 
and 5 per cent more than that for the yen. Pompidou was willing to accept this 
level of devaluation of the dollar without devaluing the franc, the Italian lira and 
sterling.691  
     On 17 and 18 December at the Smithsonian, in line with the meeting in the 
Azores, the US devalued the dollar with the increase in the price of gold to $38 
per ounce (an 8.57 per cent increase), and other currencies also revalued and 
devalued along the Smithsonian agreement. In this situation, the 
representatives of Japan, consisting of Mikio Mizuta, Minister of Finance, 
Tadashi Sasaki, Governor of the Bank of Japan, and Yusuke Kashiwagi did not 
have any power to negotiate over the new parity. Kashiwagi testified that Karl 
Schiller, German Finance Minister, required Japan set the revaluation of the yen, 
and then the other European countries would set their parities. 692  At the 
Smithsonian, the US side urged Japan to revalue the yen at 19 per cent against 
the dollar, 10 per cent against the franc and 5 per cent against the mark.693 The 
Japanese side reluctantly suggested they would be able to accept revaluation 
between 14 and 15 per cent against the dollar. However, the most ferocious 
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critique was raised by Germany. Karl Schiller maintained the intransigent stance 
that Germany could only accept a 4 or 5 per cent gap of revaluation of the yen 
against the mark, in line with discussions at the Azores meeting. At this stage, 
Connally high-handedly set the gap between the yen and mark at 3.3 per cent.  
     Meanwhile, the Okinawa Reversion Agreement created a challenging 
situation for Japan to navigate: in exchange for the reversion, the US demanded 
Japan settle trade conflicts over the textile industry, threatening the Trade with 
the Enemy Act passed in 1917, make payment for the reversion of 320 million 
dollars, and provide circulated dollar currency in Okinawa to the Federal 
Reserve Bank.694 In this situation the Japanese representatives were able to 
withdraw a minor concession of the rate of revaluation from 17 per cent to 16.88 
per cent.695 Japanese Minister of Finance Mizuta stated his concern following 
                                                       
694 Okinawa was occupied by the US from the end of World War II until 1972. 
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the tragedy of former Japanese Minister of Finance, Jyun-nosuke Inoue. Mizuta 
stated ‘because Jyun-nosuke Inoue was assassinated after he made a decision 
to revalue the Yen by 17 percent, 17 percent is not good. I don’t want to die.’696 
After the rate of revaluation of the yen was set, the parities of other currencies 
were determined.697  
     Once the new parities had been set, the ‘crisis’, dubbed the ‘dirty float’, 
between the Nixon shock and Smithsonian agreement was temporarily settled. 
The exchange rate margin against the dollar was determined at +/−2.5 per cent 
from +/−1 per cent. This represented a compromise between the French and 
the US preference. However, this margin - the so-called ‘tunnel’ - was 
problematic as it eventually allowed the currencies to fluctuate up to 9 per cent 
against each other. This led to the argument over narrower margins, known as 
the ‘snake in the tunnel’, prompting European monetary co-operation. With this, 
the UK faced dealing with the EEC, which was in the early stages of European 
monetary integration. 
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7.3 The development of foreign economic relations after 
Smithsonian 
7.3.1    Anglo-American Bermuda meeting  
 
Immediately after the settlement of the new exchange parities at the 
Smithsonian, the UK and the US held a meeting in Bermuda on 20 and 21 
December 1971. This meeting covered a broad range of topics, including the 
balance of power between the USSR and China, however this section focuses 
on international monetary reform and international economic relations.  
     At this meeting, Prime Minister Heath explained that the UK expected it 
would achieve EEC entry and further political co-operation within the larger 
EEC. 698  Concerning objections against the accession to the EEC, Heath 
reported the balance of payments could be an issue, although the Smithsonian 
agreement was predicted to have a favourable impact on it. Heath complained 
about the sluggish handling of monetary issues by the IMF and expressed his 
view, which was shared by President Pompidou, that the UK would need to 
‘progressively run down’ the obligations of sterling balances. In order to achieve 
this gradual deposing of sterling’s reserve currency role, Heath desired 
substitution of the SDRs for sterling and dollars, and maintenance of 
convertibility or relations between gold and the dollar. Nixon did not disagree 
with this, however, regarding convertibility of the dollar, he took the line that it 
should not be clarified, mentioning that he ‘would wish to keep “fuzzed up a 
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bit”.’699 With respect to the convertibility of gold, Connally cast doubt on the 
sustainability of an exchange rate system without the support of a powerful 
political entity, the vulnerable centripetal force of IMF and the effectiveness of 
SDRs, and expressed his preference for the floating exchange rate system, at 
least for two years.700 Chancellor of the Exchequer, Anthony Barber, asserted 
that ‘pure’ floating might not work effectively, and even the narrower margins, 
which were pursued by EEC members, would be difficult to achieve. The 
Chancellor therefore favoured maintenance of the fixed exchange rate system, 
with greater flexibility. 
     Heath also emphasised the need to maintain close Anglo-American relations, 
stating that ‘Britain did not intend to pursue a “pro-European” policy; she 
intended to pursue the policy which best served British interests and these 
included maintaining the closest links between the two sides of the Atlantic.’701 
He added, ‘We should seek to develop common credit policies, common 
policies in response to unilateral expropriations and so forth; and we should try, 
at the same time, to rationalise policies - e.g. in relation to regional development 
- within the EEC itself.’702 Concerning foreign relations and British entry into the 
EEC, Nixon’s sentiment was reported thus: 
 
 The President replied that President Pompidou had struck him as more 
 self-confident than at their earlier meetings and more evidently in 
 charge of French policy. In the monetary discussions he had adopted a 
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 pretty tough attitude. At the same time he had been less parochial in his 
 outlook and had been concerned that the discussion should deal not 
 merely with technical monetary problems but also with wider political 
 issues. He was evidently anxious to play a world role; and in this 
 context the British entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) 
 could be helpful. The United States Government favoured British 
 membership of the Community precisely because they were convinced 
 that it must comprise at least one member who was capable of taking a 
 world view of events. At present neither the Germans nor the French 
 nor the Italians were equipped to do so, whereas, for historical reasons, 
 the British were an outward-looking people by contrast with the French, 
 whose understanding of world affairs was even less than that of 
 Japanese. At the meeting at the Azores he had made it plain to 
 President Pompidou why the United States Government endorsed 
 British entry into the EEC, even though it was not likely to be to 
 American advantage in commercial terms. But it would help to make of 
 the Community a new centre of political unity (with certain military 
 implications in the longer term); and the United States were counting on 
 the British to seize the opportunity for leadership within the enlarged 
 Community and to encourage Europe to develop greater internal unity 
 and cohesion.703  
 
     This Bermuda meeting is recognised as one of the turning points in the 
movement to improve the Anglo-American relationship by both sides. It can 
certainly be said that it was an opportunity to thaw the frosty Anglo-American 
                                                       
703 TNA, PREM15/1268, Record of a Meeting at Government House, Bermuda, 
Monday 20 December 1971, 1.30 p.m., in Talks between the Prime Minister and 
the President of the United States at Bermuda, 20-21 December 1971. It is 
detailed that Nixon also considered that the US and UK ‘took a world view of 
affairs to an extent which others - even the French and Germans - did not. He 
had been greatly encouraged to hear from the Prime Minister an account of the 
role which Britain would play in the new Europe. There might be a temptation 
for Europe to play the role of a third force in the world. It would indeed be a third 
force. But it was essential that Europe and the United States should co-operate 
closely. He would be less than candid if he did not admit that there were 
growing feelings of isolationism in the United States. These came from labour, 
from people in industry who saw their trade threatened by competition from 
Europe, and from those who thought that the United States was bearing too 
great a share of the defence burden in the Western world. If Europe were to 
develop as an inward-looking, isolationist regional grouping, this would have a 
very unfortunate effect on these trends in the United States. For this reason it 
was essential to establish a kind of relationship which would enable the close 
co-operation to continue.’ TNA, PREM15/1268, Record of a Meeting between 
the United Kingdom and United States Delegations, Led by the Prime Minister 
and President Nixon, at Government House, Bermuda, Tuesday 21 December 
1971, 2.30 p.m., in Talks between the Prime Minister and the President of the 
United States at Bermuda, 20-21 December 1971. 
290 
 
relationship, even if it was just within diplomatic courtesy. However, it should 
also be emphasised that in the context of economic relations, there remained 
significant conflicts, such as surrounding the reform of the IMF and 
sustainability of a fixed exchange rate system underpinned by the convertibility 
of dollars with gold. It should be added that as opposed to the account in which 
the UK was keen to avoid the role of passing US interests into the EEC, both 
the UK and the US, at least ostensibly, shared ‘common’ objectives to pursue 
within and for the EEC. This leads to the inevitable question of how to 
disentwine and understand the complex meaning of the Bermuda meeting. 
Cromer’s account provides a key understanding of the Bermuda meeting. While 
British Ambassador to the United States, Cromer evaluated the Bermuda 
meeting as having ‘cleared away some difficulties and irritations.’704 He further 
stated that regarding future negotiations, 
 
 There are bound to be strains from time to time as we pursue our 
 European vocation. I should be the last to suggest that we should not 
 work for common European policies and I believe that the Americans 
 will understand it when we do. On the other hand, we shall no doubt 
 want to avoid proclaiming our Europeanness vis-à-vis America when 
 there is no practical need for it, and thus reviving memories of the anti-
 American “Europe Européenne” of General de Gaulle.705 
 
Cromer, mindful of relations with the US moving forward, sought to avoid any 
backlash from the US in reaction to the UK’s relationship with Europe. He 
further added in his communication to Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Secretary of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 
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 As I understand it, Sir, it is your policy to go on enjoying the very 
 considerable advantages we still derive from our “natural” relationship 
 with America, in fact to have our cake in Europe and to eat it in 
 America.706 
 
In short, the UK did not solve the international monetary issues including dollar 
convertibility and reform of the IMF. However, the UK successfully circumvented 
confrontation with the US on accession to the EEC, and found its own position 
between the US and Europe in which the UK had the potential to gain what it 
saw as the maximum economic and political benefits from international 
economic relations. This was well matched with the objectives set by the UK on 
16 August 1971, which were to achieve maximum benefit from the 
arrangements of Anglo-American and Anglo-European relations in the period of 
reforming the international monetary system. 
 
7.3.2    Joining the snake in the tunnel 
 
Once the new parities had been set at the Smithsonian, and the UK and US 
saw on the horizon constructive relationships after British entry into the EEC, 
the UK embarked on joining the snake in the tunnel. This established a foothold 
for European monetary integration. As a first step towards this integration, the 
Werner Plan, initiated by Prime Minister of Luxembourg Pierre Werner, was 
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circulated on 8 October 1970.707 The objective of this plan was to achieve 
‘economic and monetary equilibrium’ and economic growth with high 
employment and stability. For these purposes, this report required 
establishment of a monetary union, so as to have an ‘irreversible convertibility 
of currencies’ and ‘irrevocable fixing of parity rates’. Margins of exchange rates 
would be removed, free capital movement would be complete, accompanied by 
the Community currency. This plan also targeted centralised, unified monetary 
policies and harmonisation of fiscal policies. As a first step, this plan 
recommended narrowing margins in January 1971 on an experimental basis, 
which would be de facto concerted action against the fluctuation of the dollar.708  
     After the Werner Plan raised the scheme for gradual but eventual European 
economic integration, EEC member countries pushed the UK to join the 
narrower margin scheme. When Anthony Rawlinson at the Treasury asked 
Ossola whether he assumed the UK would participate in the scheme with 
arrangements of mutual lending and borrowing within the EEC, Ossola 
responded that since the EEC members had provided support for sterling, they 
assumed the UK would take part in this operation. Furthermore, Ossola stated, 
‘if the IMF were to introduce a facility for wider margins [...] the EEC countries 
would “expect” the UK, as an applicant for EEC membership, not to avail itself 
of the new facility even though not yet a member of the EEC.’709 Rawlinson 
regarded participation in the narrower margin scheme as somewhat 
disadvantageous for the UK. However, he concluded that ‘the disadvantages 
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would be relatively small and far outweighed by the difficulty - probably 
impossibility of not joining in as a member of the Community.’710 Additionally, he 
reported that the Chancellor had stated in Copenhagen to push for preparation 
to join this scheme as a member.711 
     Meanwhile, technical problems with the snake were also focused upon within 
the UK government.712 At the time, maintenance of exchange parities among 
EEC member countries was conducted mainly in the dollar market due to lack 
of sufficient mutual holdings of currencies of the member countries. Hence, the 
member countries controlled their own currencies’ spot rates within the band of 
+/- 0.75 per cent against the dollar value. In this situation, there were two 
potential schemes that were proposed to achieve narrower intra-EEC margins: 
to intervene in the dollar market, or to directly intervene in each other’s 
currencies. The former risked provoking conflict between the central banks of 
EEC countries, which would experience uneven burden for supporting the other 
currency, arising from asymmetric values of currencies. This would inevitably 
urge the central banks to buy or sell more dollars. In addition, the Werner Plan 
did not sufficiently consider the forward market, in which operation was one of 
the pivotal roles to check speculative pressure. Meanwhile, direct intervention in 
one another’s currencies would allow the central banks to hold foreign 
currencies only for intervention purposes, which was recognised as a virtual 
guarantee given on the short-term swap facilities within EEC member central 
banks. 
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     Although technical issues remained, on 9 February 1971, the Council of 
Ministers approved the Werner Plan. Subsequently, EEC countries agreed to 
introduce the narrower margin scheme, which would reduce the band of 
fluctuations between Community currencies to 0.6 per cent from 0.75 per cent 
on either side of parities from 15 June 1971, while maintaining the 0.75 per cent 
margin with the dollar.713 However, when the German mark and Netherlands 
guilder were forced to temporarily float in May 1971, this decision was 
temporarily shelved.714 
     In the aftermath of the Nixon shock, on 19 and 20 August 1971, the 
Chancellor had held consultations with the EEC Finance Ministers. At this 
meeting, Benelux countries proposed limiting the fluctuations of the margins of 
the EEC to 1.5 per cent, which would be conducted by central bank intervention 
with short-term credits.715 Repayment would be settled not in dollars but in gold, 
SDRs and drawings on the IMF. This proposed method of repayment was 
harshly opposed on ‘political grounds as unduly provocative, and even more on 
strictly practical grounds’.716 No agreement was reached at this consultation as 
Italy and other members, who had acquired a large sum of dollars in their 
foreign reserves, could not accept this proposal. On the other hand, 
consideration was also given to widening the margins against the dollar in order 
to settle the turmoil over currency management that had been raging since 15 
August. However, the Chancellor emphasised the importance of co-operation 
with the EEC, stating that ‘we had to avoid a situation which would damage our 
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competitive and trade position and our balance of payments in the medium term, 
so we should not wish to see our margins against the dollar widened 
substantially.’717 This demonstrates consideration of the issue of margins from 
the European perspective. 
     In late December 1971, after the Smithsonian agreement, the momentum to 
establish EEC narrow margins - the 1.5 per cent snake in a 4.5 per cent tunnel - 
began again under the chairmanship of Marcel Théron, Director General for 
Foreign Services at the Banque de France.718 On 7 and 8 January 1972, in the 
UK, sentiment was against the 1.5 per cent ‘serpent’ in a 4.5 per cent tunnel, in 
a line shared by Italy. The UK also urged acceptance of intervention in both 
dollars and EEC currencies, which should be settled in dollars. Moreover, it was 
argued that the discretion of each country to change its central rate ought not 
be impaired.719 Richard Hallett at the Bank of England reported that in contrast 
with ‘the Germans at the limit of rigidity - no intervention except at margins’, the 
UK was ‘at the other end, flexibility - complete freedom to intervene in dollars or 
community currencies subject in the first case to ex post facto concertation and, 
in the latter, the agreement of the counterpart country only.’720 On 10 January, 
at the Basle meeting, Sir Leslie O'Brien attacked the proposed reduction of 
margins from 4.5 to 1.5 per cent as not the ‘best solution’ and urged change 
towards ‘the best and most acceptable’ scheme. 721  However, the 
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Nederlandsche Bank Governor Jelle Zijlstra insisted the 1.5 per cent margin 
had previously been in operation and return to this margin could ‘eliminate or 
simplify the complex system of levies and subsidies at present in application’ 
surrounding the Common Agricultural Policy (henceforth, CAP). Moreover, he 
emphasised the salient point that narrowing margins by intervention in EEC 
currencies would ‘entail a weakening of the dollar’s monopoly as an intervention 
currency and thus of its very role.’722 
     Jeremy Morse, Executive Director of the Bank of England, reported on this 
meeting to the Treasury. It was reported that Raymond Barre, French European 
Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs, proposed a 2 per cent band 
rather than 1.5 per cent, and it was recognised that ‘any system of intra-E.E.C. 
settlements must make some provision for the use of dollars’.723 Regarding the 
conflict over the use of the dollars, Rawlinson, of the Treasury, asserted that 
‘We want our dollars, which are by far the largest element in our reserves, to be 
usable.’724 
     While there remained significant divergence amongst member countries, the 
narrower margin scheme was strongly preferred. Behind this, it was considered 
that narrower margins would not only mean a step towards European monetary 
integration, but would also reduce the strain on the CAP via stabilising the 
fluctuation of currencies and common agricultural price, which would contribute 
to the removal of border arrangements conducted in periods of floating. This 
                                                       
722 Ibid. 
723 TNA, T312/2992, Jeremy Morse to Alan D. Neale, 12 January 1972. 
724 TNA, T312/2992, Anthony K. Rawlinson to Alan D. Neale: Narrowing EEC 
Margins, 12 January 1972. Rawlinson reported that the Dutch and Belgians 
tried to reduce the influence of the dollar due to a lower proportion of dollars in 
their foreign reserves. 
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scheme was also predicted to foster intra-EEC trade.725 British Ambassador to 
West Germany Sir Roger Jackling’s analysis of the adherence to narrowing 
margins by France and Germany was made clear in correspondence within the 
Treasury: 
 
 …there would be strong political pressure to do this. He supposed that 
 the French would be keen on it, and that the Germans would feel a 
 strong political compulsion to go along with the French. Because of the 
 criticism within Germany of alleged preoccupation with Ost-politik, 
 Brandt would feel it of high importance to make a success of the 
 forthcoming EEC summit.726 
 
It was reported that Germany, Italy and the UK supported a 2.25 per cent snake, 
while France, the Netherlands and Belgium preferred 1.5 per cent, marking a 
clear divide within the Six.727  Germany attempted to set rigid rules on the 
intervention conducted in EEC currencies for the snake, and in dollars for the 
tunnel, without any intervention except at limits. This was unacceptable for the 
UK, since it would potentially lose its discretion to buy in the EEC currency 
market, except in periods requiring intervention. 
     On 3 February, Raymond Barre notified Michael Palliser, UK Ambassador 
and Permanent Representative to the European Communities, that the ‘broad 
consensus’ was in favour of margins at 2.25 per cent, without any difficulties 
                                                       
725 TNA, T312/2992, Anthony K. Rawlinson to Mrs. Hedley-Miller: Narrowing 
Intra-EEC Margins, 17 January 1972. Raymond Barre expressed his view that 
exchange rate spread wider than 2 per cent would potentially damage CAP, see 
TNA, T312/2993, C. V. Peterson to Robson, 8 February 1972. 
726 TNA, T312/2992, Anthony K. Rawlinson to Alan D. Neale: Visit to Bonn, 21 
January 1972. 
727 TNA, T312/2992, Anthony K. Rawlinson to Alan D. Neale: The snake in the 
tunnel, Date Unknown (between 21 and 27 January 1972). 
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predicted.728 However, he pointed out that the ‘agricultural directorate’ realised 
that margins wider than 2 per cent would jeopardise the CAP and make it 
‘unworkable’. He stated that this was ‘why the Commission’s paper had 
proposed 2 per cent.’ The UK Treasury began to consider setting margins at 
around 2 per cent.729  
     This situation changed when accord over the margins was reached between 
Brandt and Pompidou. The UK Treasury and the Bank were still concerned with 
potential disadvantages arising from narrower margins that could provoke 
speculative pressure on sterling and lead to loss of discretion over foreign 
exchange intervention. Concerns also existed as to whether they could use 
dollars for interventions. However, while holding these misgivings, the Treasury 
and Bank reluctantly reached the consensus to join the scheme.730 On 14 
February, general agreement over the margins at 2.25 per cent was reached 
under the chairmanship of Guido Carli, Governor of the Banca d’Italia, at the 
meeting in Basle of the Committee of the Governors of the EEC.731 On 21 
March, the resolution was reached that the Council would request member 
central banks conduct intervention for maintaining their currencies within the 
2.25 per cent margins against the bilateral parity, while keeping their parities 
against the dollar within 2.25 per cent.732 The intervention for maintenance of 
                                                       
728  TNA, T312/2993, Note of a talk with the members of the European 
Commission Responsible for Economic and Financial Affairs, 3 February 1972. 
729  TNA, T312/2993, Alan D. Neale to A.M. Bailey: European Monetary 
Committee, 9 February 1972. 
730  TNA, T312/2993, Note for the Chancellor of the Exchequer: Narrowing 
Margins, attached to letter from Anthony K. Rawlinson to Sir Alan D. Neale, 11 
February 1972. 
731 TNA, T312/2993, Jeremy Morse to Alan D. Neale, 15 February 1972. See 
also TNA, T312/2993, Leslie O'Brien to Guido Carli, 18 February 1972. 
732 TNA, T312/2995, Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the 
Governments of the Member States of 21 March 1972 on the application of the 
Resolution of 22 March 1971 on the attainment by stages of economic and 
monetary union in the Community.  
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currencies within the 2.25 per cent margin through intervention was termed the 
‘snake’, which moved within the ‘tunnel’, set according to the Smithsonian 
agreement. Moreover, the Council requested the central banks use Community 
currencies and dollars for the intervention, and to settle balances arising from 
intervention within one month. On 10 April, central banks reached the Basle 
agreement, which settled the technical issues and arrangements, and the Six 
embarked on this intervention on 24 April 1972.733 On 26 April, the UK decided 
to join the scheme from 1 May 1972.734 However, on 23 June 1972 when 
sterling began to float, the UK walked away from this fixed parity scheme with 
narrower margins. 
     Under the narrower margins scheme, the spot exchange rates of member 
currencies would not fluctuate more than 2.25 per cent against each other. 
Regarding the rates, each central bank set the limit of rates at which the 
intervention began. This intervention was conducted in dollars and Community 
currencies when the spot rates reached the limit rates, however, dollar 
intervention would be subject to initial consultation or ‘concomitant consultation’ 
amongst member central banks.735 Obtaining other Community currencies for 
intervention was to be financed by swaps with other central banks, while one 
central bank’s purchase of member currencies in their market was to sell the 
resulting holding forward to the central bank. Therefore, the weaker currency 
held in the reserves of creditor countries was a guaranteed amount. The 
member currencies obtained for the purpose of intervention would earn interest 
at the arithmetical average rate of discount rates in the member countries. For 
                                                       
733  TNA, FCO 59/788, Narrower exchange rate margins in the European 
Economic Community, 22 May 1972. 
734 TNA, T312/2995, Narrower exchange rate margins in EEC by A.R.H. Glover, 
22 May 1972. 
735  TNA, FCO 59/788, Narrower exchange rate margins in the European 
Economic Community, 22 May 1972. 
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conducting intervention when the spot rates were within the limits, whether in 
dollars or Community currencies, consultation among member central banks 
was required. In the situation of one central bank holding insufficient amounts of 
member currencies for intervention, each central bank would need to agree to 
arrange for the intervention. Each currency could change its parities in order to 
correct fundamental disequilibrium under this scheme, however, it was 
necessary to make initial consultation with the IMF. The debt was required to be 
settled on the last working day of the following month, however, it would be 
renewable if both central banks agreed. The settlement should be paid initially 
from the debtor’s reserves in the creditor country’s currency, if sufficient 
reserves did not exist, it should then be paid in the debtor’s gold or gold related 
assets.  
     From this chronological process of the formation of and UK’s entry into a 
narrower margin scheme, it is clear that the UK, initiated by the officials of the 
Treasury and the Bank, realised the significance of narrower margins for 
fostering favourable Anglo-EEC relations before EEC accession was made. 
However, UK officials and the Chancellor, and perhaps Prime Minister Heath, 
shared the consensus to set margins as wide as possible in order to gain 
economic benefit or minimise the disadvantages from the scheme. In this sense, 
the UK did not share the enthusiasm held by EEC member countries for their 





7.3.3    Snake, floating, and the development of international monetary co-
operation 
 
The gradual advance of the ‘experimental’ step towards the economic and 
monetary integration heralded the shift in international economic relations. On 3 
March 1972, French Finance Minister Valéry Giscard d'Estaing unambiguously 
conveyed a signal in his speech to European and American bankers against US 
external monetary policy. He predicted that the use of enlarged EEC currencies 
for settlement would lead to the arrival of ‘the beginning of a real economic and 
monetary union in Western Europe - experimental and gradual to begin with, 
but soon irreversible’.736 He continued that he saw ‘no chance of finding a stable 
monetary order again if the USA continues its present disappointing and 
perplexing external monetary policy.’737 He declared thus:  
 
 the era of European floating and of European revaluation as a group is 
 over. You have only to look at the difficulties in some of our partners to 
 see that any suggestion of collective acceptance of a further concerted 
 revaluation of European currencies at present is completely 
 unacceptable. Moreover, the era of massive central bank purchases of 
 dollars is over. This is not a statement of preference but of widespread 
 political reality.738 
 
After this recalcitrant and defiant statement, Giscard d’Estaing urged the 
member countries jointly advance the international monetary reform for the 
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Commonwealth Office, 11 March 1972. This telegram was circulated to the UK 





purpose of replacing the reserve currency with SDRs, in a move he termed 
‘objective liquidity’. 
     The reform of the international monetary system also gathered the UK’s 
attention. A significant point that concerned UK officials was economic relations 
with the US and EEC. Cromer’s argument on this attracted the interest of Prime 
Minister Heath. Concerning the UK confronting the US over international 
monetary reform, Cromer discerned that the UK’s actions would raise, 
 
 …the question whether we are really friends of America or of the 
 French et al. I have no doubt in my mind that the Americans will exploit 
 this if it suits them. We for our part need to act in our own interests 
 which may well be to contain French extremism but obviously cannot 
 be to side with the Americans against our European partners.739  
  
Although this argument did not resonate with the Chancellor, Prime Minister 
Heath commented, ‘I agree with everything Lord Cromer says in his telegram. 
This is vital.’ 740  At this point, Heath’s aim showed some resemblance to 
previous Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s aim to exert British ‘leadership’ in the 
                                                       
739  TNA, PREM15/812, telegram from Cromer to the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, 8 May 1972. 
740 TNA, PREM15/812, Robert Armstrong to A.M. Bailey, 10 May 1972. There 
was conflict over foreign economic relations between the Chancellor and 
Cromer. Cromer expressed his concern in handwritten communication to Robert 
Armstrong that the Chancellor was not approaching Connally in an effective 
manner during negotiations, and that this approach alone would be ineffective 
in bridging between Europe and the US. Cromer reported that ‘The Ch: of the 
Exch: has clearly not grasped the EEC opportunity in the situation and is 
approaching the negotiations on the basis that if he personally is nice to 
Connally that he will be able to bridge the gap between Europe and the US. I 
personally think that this would end up by us falling into the gap between both. 
Knowing all the personalities as I do, I think that this could be the worst of every 
world. This is I fear what will happen unless the PM engages himself in the 
matter’. TNA, PREM15/812, Cromer to Robert Armstrong, 2 May 1972. This 
letter was handed to Heath. 
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EEC.741 It is evident that the realistic political course for the UK was not to go in 
line with the US, nor to become a docile partner of the EEC, or to become stuck 
in the gap between the US and EEC, but to achieve a favourable international 
monetary system through fostering monetary reform with or from within the 
EEC.742  
     However, the UK’s monetary co-operation with the EEC was suddenly 
suspended with the decision to float sterling on 23 June 1972. In the UK, 
ministers, and officials of the Treasury and the Bank had started to consider 
floating as ‘the policy of last resort’.743 Catherine Schenk has already delineated 
the chronological process behind the decision to float between 15 and 23 June 
1972. This section therefore briefly describes the decision, focusing mainly on 
international monetary relations.744  
     On 15 June 1972, it was reported that the Royal Group of Docks and 
Merseyside Docks would go on strike, and on the same day the sterling parity 
                                                       
741 For Wilson’s aims behind the application for joining the EEC, see Helen Parr, 
‘Britain, America, East of Suez and the EEC: Finding a Role in British Foreign 
Policy, 1964-67’, Contemporary British History, Vol.20, No.3 September 2006, 
pp.403-21. 
742 In line with Cromer and Prime Minister Heath, Governor of the Bank of 
England Leslie O’Brien communicated his advice to the Chancellor. In 
September 1971, in the aftermath of the Nixon shock, O’Brien stated, ‘If the 
Americans stand pat [...] we must play our part in trying to create the maximum 
possible area of stability [...] The nucleus of such an area of stability is most 
likely to originate from the E.E.C. [...] We should of course have to protect our 
own interests as best we may but not to the point of standing out [...] we have 
long played a leading role in the international monetary field and, against the 
background of our present strong balance of payments position, I believe the 
time has come for us in some measures to reassert ourselves. [...] I believe we 
should even at some risk, and indeed sacrifice if necessary, be prepared to give 
a lead towards developing an orderly and outward-looking association of major 
countries, assembled not in hostility to the U.S.A. but, on the contrary, with the 
object of taking some of the heat and confusion out of the present situation.’ 
BoEA, G41/2, the Governor to the Chancellor, 7 September 1971. 
743 Michael J. Oliver and Arran Hamilton, ‘Downhill from devaluation: The battle 
for sterling, 1968-72’, The Economic History Review, Vol.60, No.3, 2007, 
pp.509-10. 
744 Schenk, The Decline of Sterling, pp.329-40. 
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began falling.745 This prompted the UK, France and Belgium to embark on 
intervention according to the narrower margin scheme, with the Federal 
Reserve also joining the intervention.746 On 19 June, Denis Healy, Opposition 
Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer, mentioned possible impending 
devaluation, which had the effect of pulling down gilt prices.747  
     On 21 June, Prime Minister Heath, somewhat reluctantly, and Barber agreed 
to increase the Bank Rate from 5 to 6 per cent from the following day.748 At this 
meeting, they discussed whether to devalue or float. It became apparent that 
floating sterling, even temporarily, would breach the narrower margins scheme 
and obligations to the IMF. However, Barber favoured floating, as devaluation 
would need to be accompanied by deflationary measures. Moreover, Barber 
was confident that the UK could reconcile EEC counterparts to accept a 
temporary float by showing intention of returning to the fixed parity.749  
     At the meeting held at 2.30 p.m. on 22 June, attended by the Chancellor, 
officials of the Treasury and Jeremy Morse, Executive Director at the Bank of 
England, it was reported that capital outflow continued. The figure had reached 
                                                       
745 TNA, T312/2995, Anthony K. Rawlinson to A. M. Bailey, 15 June 1972. The 
other causes behind intensification of the speculation around sterling were 
considered thus: inflation in the UK would potentially deteriorate the trade 
balance; the Chancellor’s statement in Parliament provoked concern over 
whether the UK would defend the parity or not; the reversal of the ruling by the 
National Industrial Relations Court on the Chobham Farm container dispute; the 
rise in money stock arising from the strong demand for bank credit partly 
caused by property boom.  
746 The UK spent $500 million to support the exchange rate for two days from 
15 June 1972. 
747 TNA, PREM15/812, Note for the Record of a meeting at 10 Downing Street 
on 21 June, 4.30 p.m., by Robert Armstrong, 3 July 1972. 
748 Ibid. The Prime Minister initially showed his reluctance to raise the Bank 
Rate. He preferred the special deposits scheme and to have the Bank of 
England require clearing banks to keep part of their assets in gilt-edged 
securities. 
749 Ibid. In this meeting, it was argued that statutory prices and incomes policy 
might restore confidence, however Heath doubted the credibility of such a 
scheme due to the ineffectiveness of this experienced in the 1960s.  
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$1,000 million, the cumulative total including the previous week was predicted 
at between $2,500 and $3,000 million.750 In this meeting, closure of the foreign 
exchange market was agreed. Further consideration was given to devaluation 
or floating sterling. Barber showed his preference for floating due to ‘some 
domestic political advantage’, and a message from Sir Alan Neale reported that 
the European countries would prefer floating.751 In this meeting, Barber agreed 
a temporary float with a declaration of intent to return to a fixed exchange rate 
system. The floating rate would be allowed to fall to around $2.40 without 
further substantial support. At the 4:15 p.m. meeting later the same day, the 
Prime Minister approved the proposal for a temporary float, with closure of the 
exchange market on 23 and 26 June.752 Although the UK ‘still had considerable 
reserves and without having to borrow’, the decision to float was taken.753 
     Gaining the acceptance of EEC countries for floating, with the avoidance of 
the need for accompanying deflationary measures, were key factors in the 
decision to float sterling. This decision forced the UK to step away from the 
narrower margins scheme. Regardless of this, the UK had not been keen to 
stay in this scheme. Leslie O’Brien evaluated that the decision to float was ‘right’ 
because he saw the governors of the EEC central banks as ‘friendly and 
understanding’, with no signs of ‘recrimination’ against the UK. O’Brien detailed 
the ‘risk of escalation of the crisis, and a breakdown of the Smithsonian 
                                                       
750 TNA, T354/275, Note of a meeting in the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s 
room, 22 June 1972, 2.30 p.m., by A.M. Bailey. 
751 Ibid. It was pointed out that the US would prefer floating, and the message 
from Sir Alan Neale reported that rather than devaluation, floating would prove 
more acceptable to Europe. 
752 TNA, PREM15/812, Note for the Record on a meeting at 10 Downing Street, 
22 June, at 4.15 p.m., by Robert Armstrong, 3 July 1972.   
753  TNA, PREM15/812, Note of a meeting held in two parts in the Prime 
Minister's room at the House of Commons on Thursday 22 June 1972. In these 
two meetings at 6.00 p.m. and 10.00 p.m., the Prime Minister and the 
Chancellor informed the ministers of the approved decision. 
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Agreement’, and it was reported that it ‘was the Governor’s hope that these 
events would lead to the abandonment of the experiment in narrower margins 
for Community currencies (“the snake”).’754 In this sense, it can be assessed 
that the decision to float was not just a systematic change but also gave the UK 
and the Bank pretext to escape from the ‘snake’, a prelude to European 
monetary integration.  
     Finally, settlement of narrower margin intervention should be noted. By the 
end of July, the UK needed to settle the balance of $2,562 million debt to EEC 
member countries (Figure 7-1). Due to the relatively small proportion of gold in 
its reserves, UK officials sought to settle in a different method for the payment 
of $630 million in gold-related debt (Figures 7-1 and 7-2). 
 
Figure 7-1: Debt and its Breakdown, End of June 1972 ($ Millions) 
 





                                                       




Figure 7-2: UK Reserves End of June 1972 ($ Millions) 
 
Source: BoEA, 6A103/2, Richard Hallett to Jeremy Morse: EEC Settlement, 17 
July 1972. 
 
The Bank proposed drawing $630 million from the IMF, of which up to half 
would be SDRs and the rest in EEC currencies. Repayment would then be 
made to the EEC creditors.755 This would reduce the IMF holdings of EEC 
currencies and be transferred to the creditors’ reserve positions. Thus, this 
scheme would avoid significant reduction in the ‘ultimate reserve’ - gold - and 
gold-related assets, from the UK foreign reserves. On 19 July, Sir Alan Neale 
and Jeremy Morse explained this scheme to Heath and Barber. Morse argued 
that the gold prices would rise significantly, and the SDRs would hold their gold 
value for two years. Prime Minister Heath accepted this argument and 
suggested that ‘we might take this opportunity to join our E.E.C. partners in 
including our reserve positions in the Fund in our published reserves’.756 On 26 
July 1972, the means of settlement for the narrower margin intervention was 
determined. It was agreed to settle the balance in member currencies, gold, and 
gold-guaranteed assets, which were SDRs and IMF reserve positions. In line 
with this agreement, the UK used IMF reserve positions including the gold 
                                                       
755  BoEA, 6A103/2, Draft Minute to the Prime Minister, EEC Settlement: 
Drawing on IMF Reserve Position, 14 July 1972.  
756 BoEA, 6A103/2, Jeremy Morse to the Governor: End-July Settlement, 20 
July 1972. Barber shared the opinion of the Prime Minister, urging exploration of 
the possibility of making such a change by the end of July. 
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tranche for settling $630 million.757 From the perspective of the settlement for 
the intervention, the UK’s attitude towards the international monetary scheme 
can be clearly observed. Accumulation of gold, or at least avoidance of 
reduction of gold and gold-related assets, was still of high priority, with less 
heed paid to international monetary relations, particularly with the EEC. 
 
7.4    Conclusion 
 
The international monetary system of the early 1970s entered a new phase, 
contrasting to that of the 1960s. The Nixon shock was the de facto collapse of 
the Bretton Woods system in which the dollar had underpinned the numeraire of 
exchange rates. On the other hand, the decline of the prestige of the dollar as a 
reserve currency heralded the rise of European monetary co-operation and 
provoked international monetary reform. According to the survey of existing 
research, as seen above, during this transitional era, the Anglo-American 
relationship might be termed barren or heading towards the rekindling of a 
further ‘special relationship’. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the UK 
gradually deviated from US monetary influence towards Anglo-EEC monetary 
co-operation. This chapter has focused on how the transition of the UK 
approaching the EEC was achieved, without provocation of a significant US 
backlash, and without being incorporated into EEC regionalism striving against 
US dominance in the monetary field.  
     It should be emphasised that in the period of the Nixon shock and 
Smithsonian agreement, the UK utilised Japan as a common target during the 
                                                       
757 BoEA, UK Settlement for Exchange Market Intervention, 26 July 1972. 
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multilateral negotiations over the resetting of exchange rates. Manoeuvring the 
US and EEC countries into placing additional burden on the Japanese yen was 
a key strategy employed by the UK, enabling it to successfully circumvent 
confrontation with the US. This avoided the creation of additional obstacles for 
the achievement of UK accession into the EEC, with the UK forging its own 
position between the US and Europe. In this way, the UK secured and 
maintained bilateral monetary relations (Anglo-American) and its regional 
aspirations (Anglo-EEC) through using a multilateral aspect (Japan). 
Subsequently, the UK attempted ostensibly to establish favourable foreign 
relations with the US at Bermuda. However, behind this decision, the UK had 
unambiguous but complex objectives. Firstly, the UK was keen to gain 
maximum economic benefits from the process, with the outcome of on-going 
reformation of the international monetary system. It also pursued minimising the 
cost and risk placed on sterling from joining the overture of European monetary 
integration, i.e. snake. In this situation, the UK strived not to be a bridge, but to 
achieve a position not deeply integrated in the EEC, from which it could put 
influence on the US via its half-hearted European stance.  
     These objectives directly reflected the attitude and strategy of the UK within 
the formation process of snake. The UK showed its hesitation to join this 
integrated monetary scheme, aiming to achieve minor reformation. After 
participation in the snake, the UK paradoxically succeeded in its escape from 
the serpent by its failure to defend sterling in June 1972. Moreover, during the 
negotiation over the settlement of intervention under the snake, the UK’s 
propensity to reinforce its reserves position was exposed even if the means 
were potentially conflictive with EEC countries. The overarching objective of the 
UK was not to be the transatlantic bridge in relations, but to achieve 
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international monetary reform according its own interests backed by political 
power drawn from Anglo-American and Anglo-European relations. In this sense, 
Cromer’s words can express the UK’s foreign economic strategy of this period 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
 
8.1    Interactions between monetary and fiscal policies in the late 
Bretton Woods system  
 
There can be no doubt that the Bretton Woods system underpinned the post-
World War II international economy. Its demise arose, it could be argued, from 
the ‘success’ of international economic reconstruction and from what has been 
called the ‘golden age’ of capitalism. While overall growth of the international 
economy was achieved, uneven growth amongst the Anglo-American, Western 
European and Japanese economies eroded the foundation of the post-World 
War II economic regime: principally, the confidence in the dollar, and, partially, 
sterling (which had its own, separate problems). For the UK and US, this 
unequal economic growth paved the way to international monetary ‘co-
operation’ to defend the parities, and ‘competition’ to achieve as much as 
possible of the ‘ultimate’ reserve of the Bretton Woods system: gold. In the 
wake of the gold crisis and amid growing scepticism surrounding the dollar, 
various supranational financial safety nets were gradually consolidated in the 
early 1960s. 
     During the negotiation process of the establishment of the gold pool and 
Federal Reserve swap lines, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan sought to hold 
gold and restore the position of sterling to greater prestige, while endeavouring 
to avoid the risk of devaluation or depreciation of the dollar, which the UK held 
as a large part of its foreign reserves. However, these attempts faced significant 
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backlash from both the UK Treasury and Bank of England.759  Behind the 
decision to participate in the gold pool, Prime Minister Macmillan held 
reservations that the US side was keen to accumulate gold, and that the UK 
must not see significant depletion in its gold reserves.  
     Formation of and participation in the gold pool was intrinsically linked with 
fiscal policies and domestic political climates. The establishment of the gold 
pool was highly focussed on in the US political sphere due to the strife amongst 
the Federal Reserve, US Treasury and CEA in taking initiative over fiscal 
policies. The Federal Reserve and US Treasury faced the necessity to establish 
co-operative international monetary schemes to steer currency management 
and fiscal policies, circumventing Congressional influence. Thus, political strife 
of vying to take the reins of economic policies in the fields of domestic politics 
and international bargaining aggregated in the process of forming co-operative 
international monetary schemes. There is a clear distance between this 
argument and those which have been put forward by Schenk. In Schenk’s 
account, the gold pool was held as a defining step in international monetary co-
operation, forged in pursuit of a prosperous, stable economy.760 It is detailed 
that at this stage, sterling was a source of bargaining power for the UK in 
establishment of the international monetary co-operative scheme. However, it is 
clear from analysis in chapter two of this thesis that the gold pool, a watershed 
scheme in international monetary co-operation, was established within complex 
political calculations and efforts to bypass domestic political conflicts over the 
reins of the co-ordination of fiscal and monetary policies.  
                                                       
759 TNA, PREM11/4203, Prime Minister to the Chancellor: The Almighty Dollar, 
22 May 1962, and TNA, PREM11/3302, Gold Exchange Standard: A danger to 
the West, 7 July 1962. 
760 Schenk, The Decline of Sterling, pp. 417-20. 
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     It is also apparent that Anglo-American monetary relations depicted a very 
different facet of relations between the two countries when compared to the 
‘special’ relationship which is usually considered by scholars and other 
commentators. The economic relations between the two states were structured 
by sobering and different political and economic realities confronting each 
country. Here, conflict over initiative in the context of international monetary 
schemes was partially mitigated or obscured by the political calculations of both 
governments; in this sense, the gold pool and swap lines were products of 
economic and political compromise. Recent research has depicted the gold pool, 
one of the notable examples of central bank co-operation of the era, as 
‘technical rather than political’, without sufficient capability to absorb the shock 
that emanated from the 1967 devaluation, paving the way to its collapse.761 
However, from the analysis presented in chapter two of this thesis, it should be 
emphasised that behind the launching of the gold pool were political 
calculations with conflictive ambitions to hold gold, and struggles to take the 
reins of international monetary reform and domestic economic policies; in this 
sense political fissures were already embedded at the establishment of the gold 
pool. Although this thesis does not cover the end of gold pool, it prompts the 
question not of why the gold pool ended, but why the member countries and 
central banks were not keen politically to maintain it. 
     It is necessary to point out that the matter of monetary co-ordination also 
infiltrated into the field of diplomacy. A notable example in the 1960s was the 
issue of the UK’s application for accession to the European Economic 
Community. At this stage, the EEC was discerned as one of the principle 
obstacles for the US in pursuit of its economic objectives. As David Ormsby-
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Gore, British Ambassador to Washington, suggested, the US sought successful 
British accession to the EEC, intending to exert influence on the economic 
policies of member countries of the EEC by way of the UK as a Trojan horse.762 
However, it is widely known that the UK’s first application for accession to the 
EEC was thwarted by French President Charles de Gaulle, and further schemes 
for the management of currencies were explored in the international monetary 
field.763 
     While pressed to support the position of the dollar, the UK was also 
preoccupied with domestic economic policies and economic reform in order to 
manage its own currency. The Radcliffe Committee report had particular impact, 
at least academically, on the debate over monetary policy. This report included 
a similar concept to the liquidity preference theory originating in the work of 
Keynes, which de facto suggested the effects of mobilisation of interest rates 
policies through portfolio adjustment or rebalancing transactions. The proposed 
economic policies relating to this report represented an attempt to mobilise 
long-term interest rates in a similar manner to Operation Twist introduced in the 
US in the early 1960s. In the political sphere, through the direct and indirect 
manipulation of long-term interest rates, which resonated with the discussion in 
the Radcliffe Committee, Prime Minister Macmillan endeavoured to mitigate the 
burden of financing local authorities, to encourage mortgage finance during 
promotion of home ownership and deregulation of the private rental market, and 
                                                       
762 John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Lord Harlech Oral History Interview, 
1965, p.51. 
763  Prime Minister Macmillan offered co-operation in the field of nuclear 
technology as a means of appeasement to France and attempted to propitiate 
de Gaulle to accept British accession to the EEC. However, the main concern of 
de Gaulle was the growing presence of the US within the EEC should the UK 
enter. Thus, de Gaulle is considered to have vetoed the application. See Ellison, 
The United States, Britain and the Transatlantic Crisis, Introduction. 
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to tackle the balance of payments deficit through the promotion of business 
investment and exports.  
     However, due to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade rules on 
manipulation of interest rates through government-subsidised schemes, the 
initiative for the reformation of interest rates policies was gradually taken by the 
Bank of England. Consequently, the Bank’s demand for the control of inflation 
and a sound gilt-edged market led to the collapse of Macmillan’s proposal. It is 
apparent that paradoxically, Macmillan failed to pursue his favoured policy 
course due to the rules of international institutions, of which the UK was a 
proactive advocate. Moreover, the UK was unable to mobilise the change in 
interest rates structure to tackle the balance of payments deficit, because the 
government could not successfully exert control over the Bank of England and 
seize the reins of international schemes to manage currency. This led the UK to 
remain focused on selective credit controls, Bank Rate manipulation, and 
counter-cyclical fiscal measures oscillated along the level of the balance of 
payments deficit and unemployment. The UK therefore failed to break the 
fetters of the stop-go dichotomy in the context of monetary policy. 
     While multilateral international monetary schemes expanded, the UK and US 
entered a bitter phase in adjustment of their currencies. This conflict emerged 
unequivocally during negotiations over the change of short-term interest rates in 
early 1964. Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Chancellor of the 
Exchequer Reginald Maudling sought to increase the Bank Rate by 1 per cent 
in order to expand fiscal spending within the approaching fiscal budget. The UK 
government was keen to avoid the drain of its foreign reserves with the increase 
in fiscal spending. However, the US side held concerns that this increase in the 
UK Bank Rate would foster capital flight from the US, and thus would potentially 
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cause damage to the value of and confidence in the dollar. The Johnson 
administration demanded that the UK not raise the Bank Rate, or if a raise were 
to occur it would need to contain the increase within 0.5 per cent. Concerns 
were also held amongst US officials that increase in the UK Bank Rate would 
affect US fiscal steering and direction through aggrandizing the political 
influence of ‘hard currency men’.764 It can be understood that there existed 
growing cleavage between the UK and the US, not only over defence of the 
balance of payments, but also surrounding the political strife of the 
implementation of preferred fiscal policies. Here, domestic issues ascended or 
were exported to the international political arena in order to mitigate internal 
political conflicts or achieve domestic political objectives. Therefore, the 
international management of currency was indeed an arena of co-operation and 
conflict, in which domestic interests, in particular the tug-of-war of power over 
fiscal policies, were reflected and arranged, providing certain political groups 
with the means to extract the political resources and power to self-enhance or 
debilitate the opposing group.  
     This dispute over the management of the currencies was inherited by Harold 
Wilson’s succeeding Labour government, though it differed in quality from that 
under the Macmillan government. During the complex navigations of the 
monetary and political issues, both the UK and US administrations strengthened 
co-operative relations over not only exchange rates but also interest rates 
policies. Soon after becoming Prime Minister, Wilson sent a cable to Johnson 
declaring that the UK would adjust its short-term interest rates according to US 
                                                       
764 TNA, PREM11/4772, Note for the Record, 27 February 1964. Despite the 
dispute between UK and US officials, the Douglas-Home government increased 
the Bank Rate by 1 per cent. 
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economic conditions so as to minimise impact on the US economy.765 Differing 
to the battle to gain and hold gold during the Macmillan government, it is evident 
that management of sterling and the dollar under Wilson was gradually 
consolidated through collaboration between both governments, even though 
collaborative momentum vacillated within the political balance and economic 
condition. 
     While negotiating schemes for interest rates adjustment and safeguarding of 
the value of the currencies, the UK was hit by grievous speculation surrounding 
sterling in the autumn of 1964. The Bank played a significant role in securing a 
rescue package of $3,000 million of credit lines from sixteen central banks, and 
the UK government increased the Bank Rate from 5 to 7 per cent, then 
introducing the import surcharge.766 The UK outrode the storm of the currency 
crisis with its fiscal measures and the international rescue package. However, 
this sterling crisis and international monetary support would overshadow and 
limit the succeeding fiscal policies of the Labour government. 
     The reform of tax measures under Wilson’s Labour government has been 
appraised as formation of a ‘socialist tax’.767 The overall essence of this reform 
had ostensibly been pursuit of ‘fairness’ by closing tax loopholes and enhancing 
redistributive functions.768 However, since the UK faced foreign pressure to 
promptly repeal the import surcharge and implement a deflationary budget, 
Labour’s tax reform was gradually forced to deviate from its original proposal. In 
addition to foreign pressure, domestic politics also placed the Labour 
                                                       
765 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-68, Vol. VII, Doc.233, Message 
from Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson, November 19 1964.   
766 Regarding the link between the import surcharge and the management of 
sterling, see Roberts, ‘Unwept, unhonoured and unsung’, pp.209-29. 
767 Whiting, The Labour Party and Taxation, p.172.  
768 For the loopholes in taxation, see Kaldor Papers, NK3/19/294, Kaldor to 
D.G. Hartle, Royal Commission on Taxation, 26 October 1964.  
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government under strain.769 The Bank highlighted the attitude of other central 
banks that strongly demanded the UK implement or reform fundamental 
measures in order to enhance the position of its foreign reserves. The Bank 
showed its recognition that in this situation, the central banks held ‘the pistol at 
our head’.770 Thus, it is evident that the Labour government faced a surge in 
demand to introduce schemes for managing currencies on both domestic and 
international fronts.  
     In the process of tax reform, Labour’s ‘socialist’ tax proposal resulted in 
reduction of taxation on companies’ profits, failed to close the loophole in long-
term capital gains tax, and did not change the trend of shrinking the proportion 
of tax revenue from companies’ profits. A notable backlash that the Labour 
government faced in this political process came from the Bank which voiced the 
concerns held in the international sphere and financial market, and of 
institutional investors that held vast gilt-edged securities. Wilson’s government 
was confronted with the demand to maintain the attractiveness and prices of the 
gilt-edged securities and equities in order to protect the global reputation of the 
City and to achieve sound financial markets, without compelling the Bank to 
take such responsibilities, principally for the avoidance of fiscal finance by the 
Bank and ensuing detrimental effects on its independence.771 Meanwhile, in the 
context of currency management, it should also be emphasised here that the 
                                                       
769 TNA, T171/801, Record of discussion on 3 February 1965 between the 
Chancellor and Managing-Director of IMF. 
770 BoEA, G1/556, Conversation with Sir Denis Rickett, 29 January 1965. 
771 This friction between the government and financial markets invoked the 
signs of a fall in the prices of gilt-edged securities, in a similar situation to the 
emergence of the buyer’s strike of 1976 under the IMF crisis. Burk and 
Cairncross, Goodbye Great Britain, p.52. The buyers’ strike put pressure on 
worldwide financial intermediaries not to purchase or invest in UK gilt-edged 
securities. This is considered as one of the causes of the increase in the 
minimum lending rate from 9 to 11.5 per cent. It is evident that the City 




Labour government used corporation tax to promulgate in the international 
monetary field that the reform of taxation was an effective measure to tackle the 
balance of payments deficit, and to avoid pressure from abroad for deflationary 
fiscal policies. As Bale argued, the Labour government sought long-term 
strategic measures in order to deal with the balance of payments deficit, and 
from the analysis of this thesis there is no doubt that the tax reform contained 
complex domestic and international political objectives.772  
     Moreover, the reinvestigation of 1965 tax reform in this thesis can add a 
fresh perspective to the argument of Schenk who stressed that demands to 
manage the value of sterling forced the Labour government to introduce 
deflationary measures regardless of its ideology.773 It is clear from analysis in 
chapters four and five of this thesis that Labour’s tax objectives were not 
completely changed but adjusted, to a degree that would not be conflictive with 
the original ideas, in order to mobilise tax reform for mitigation of the external 
and internal pressure on the Labour government. Hence, it can be argued that 
economic strategy and ideology at least partially remained as intrinsic aspects 
of Labour’s fiscal policy objectives and currency management. Furthermore, it 
will be summarised below, that when the tax reform of 1965 and the budget of 
1968 are analysed together, it is evident that the Labour government prioritised 
defending its own budgetary policies subsuming its economic strategy and 
ideology, and used its own fiscal methods against the staggering confidence in 
sterling. 
     In sum, it is clear from the analysis of chapters four and five of this thesis 
that in the formation process of the corporation tax and capital gains tax, fiscal 
                                                       
772 Bale, ‘Dynamics of a Non-Decision’, pp.192-217. 
773 Schenk, The Decline of Sterling, pp.157-85, 204-5. 
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policies reflecting tax ideology, monetary policies, currency management, and 
domestic and international financial sectors’ interests were intrinsically 
intertwined and mutually influenced.  
     In the later 1960s, while tension surrounding the Vietnam War grew 
increasingly high, contributing to worldwide inflationary pressure, international 
management of the currencies entered into a new phase. Inflation and increase 
in US governmental spending jeopardised the position of the dollar. To alleviate 
this, in addition to the co-operative monetary schemes pursued during this 
period, the US government also took coercive measures as a means to 
encourage other governments to change the course of their policy. This was 
evident when the US urged the UK to send troops to Vietnam in exchange for 
support to defend the value of sterling. The US deemed this exchange 
beneficial for the reduction in US military spending. Although Prime Minister 
Wilson was keen to secure US financial support to bolster sterling, he also 
emphasised the necessity for reduction of UK government spending, especially 
overseas spending. This led Wilson and the UK Foreign Office to pursue secret 
diplomacy against the US government beyond the reach of President Johnson 
and the Counselor of the United States Department of State, Walt Rostow. This 
secret diplomacy, codenamed SUNFLOWER, aimed at mitigating the conflict in 
Vietnam in order to avoid the deployment of UK troops and loss of accessibility 
to US financial support arising from conflict over the military support. 774 
However, despite the UK government’s efforts, the Vietnam War raged on, 
inflation rates surged due to wartime economic boom, and the dollar became 
mired in speculation. 
                                                       
774 Boyle, ‘The Price of Peace’, pp.37-72. 
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     Meanwhile, the situation surrounding the UK balance of payments deficit 
deteriorated. In 1967, the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli Six Day War and 
escalation of industrial action, such as the dock strikes, accelerated rapid 
depletion of the foreign reserves and speculation around sterling intensified.775 
This was a significant blow for the Labour government, and so it took the 
decision to devalue sterling in November 1967.776 Concomitantly, the Labour 
government was forced to present deflationary fiscal and monetary measures, 
however, the UK was unable to swiftly recuperate its trade deficits through J-
curve effects.  
     In the immediate aftermath of the decision to devalue, the Labour 
government embarked on formation of the 1968 budget. During this process, 
conflictive requirements were presented. On one side, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer Roy Jenkins and the Bank sought drastic cuts in public expenditure 
and increases in taxation, including income tax, but mainly indirect tax. On the 
other side, Prime Minister Wilson, Michael Stewart, and to some extent James 
Callaghan, were keen to protect a budget consisting of decrease rather than 
increase in income tax, maintenance of the level of public expenditure, and a 
                                                       
775 Cairncross, Managing the British Economy. Other measures taken in the 
summer of 1967, such as relaxation of hire purchase regulations, increased the 
rate of inflation and caused deterioration of the balance of payments through 
trade deficits caused by the worsening purchasing power parity. Also see 
Blackaby, ‘Narrative, 1960-74’, in Blackaby (ed.), British Economic Policy, p.40. 
776 Newton, ‘The Sterling Devaluation of 1967’, pp.912-45. Newton emphasised 
that the expanding Eurodollar market, which was regulated and controlled by 
states, caused a change in the balance of international power. He assessed that 
the determination of the UK government to devalue sterling was an adjustment 
to this change. For the emergence and the rapid expansion of the Eurodollar 
market, see Schenk, The Decline of Sterling. It is also outlined that the French 
government, under the influence of politicians such as de Gaulle, Prime Minister 
Georges Pompidou, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Maurice Couve de Murville, 
demanded the UK devalue sterling and dissolve the sterling balance as a 
prerequisite for accession to the EEC. 
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relatively less selective social security system than that sought by Jenkins.777 In 
this negotiation process, both sides reached a compromise under which, in 
exchange for various cuts in public expenditure, income tax rates would 
undergo no change and de facto increase in the corporation tax rate would be 
limited. Amidst political conflict over budget making, the family allowances 
presented a divisive political battlefront. It can be argued that constraints or 
demands from domestic and international spheres, that had already been 
embedded in the budget to bolster devaluation, led to the family allowances, 
one of the symbolic ‘universal’ welfare aspects of the 1968 budget, becoming a 
somewhat more selective scheme. Meanwhile, external pressure narrowed 
Labour’s potential policy course towards increases in both direct and indirect 
taxation, with reduction in public expenditure. Here, connections can be made 
between the reduction in public expenditure and the failure to reduce selectivity 
in exchange for protection of the rates of both income and corporation tax in 
order to make devaluation effective. In this sense, the change in the financing of 
family allowances in the 1968 budget resulted from complex interactions and 
political strife reflecting democratic or pluralistic social interests, an uneven 
institutional power balance, actors’ ideas or ideology, currency management 
mindful of external pressure, and constraints arising from administrative 
feasibility.  
     Despite assurances by Prime Minister Wilson that the devaluation would not 
affect disposable income and purchasing power, accompanying measures and 
the 1968 budget triggered suppression of real wages. The increase in effective 
rates of taxation combined with the drastic reduction in public expenditure 
                                                       
777 The TUC also backed maintaining or increasing public expenditure in the 
field of family allowances and supplementary benefits. For a more detailed 
account, see chapter 6 of this thesis. 
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enhanced deflationary pressure.778 It has been highlighted in existing research 
that this became one of the contributing factors behind the resurgence of 
industrial action and its militancy.779 Hence, although the delay to devaluation 
had obscured political conflicts over fiscal policies, a torrent of contradictions 
magnified by the devaluation were exposed in the political arena, and in the last 
instance, in wider social relations. 
     In the aftermath of devaluation, the succeeding gold crisis paved the way to 
the two-tier gold market, divided into official and private markets. This 
foreshadowed the collapse of the Bretton Woods system.780  According to the 
account of Cairncross and Eichengreen, the failure to avoid devaluation of 
sterling caused de-legitimisation of the dollar and inevitably contributed to the 
demise of the Bretton Woods system. 781  On the US side, the civil-rights 
movement and anti-Vietnam War demonstrations intensified and confidence in 
the dollar became gradually more vulnerable with the increasing inflation.782 In 
                                                       
778 Blackaby, British Economic Policy 1960-74, p.45; and R. W. R. Price ‘Public 
Expenditure’ and ‘Budgetary Policy’, in Blackaby (ed.), British Economic Policy 
1960-74, pp.108-9, 161. 
779  Colin Crouch, ‘The Intensification of Industrial Conflict in the United 
Kingdom’, in Colin Crouch and Alessandro Pizzorno (eds.), The Resurgence of 
Class Conflict in Western Europe since 1968, Volume 1: National Studies 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1978), pp.207-13. As Crouch suggested, 
there were various factors contributing to the intensification of industrial 
disputes and the ‘wage explosion’, which became prominent in 1969. These 
factors consisted of inflation caused by devaluation, mitigation of the incomes 
policy which provoked the demand for a rise in pay, the growing frustration and 
dissatisfaction over the series of tax increases and the reduction of disposable 
income caused by deflationary fiscal policies. See also Wilfred Beckerman, 
‘Objectives and performance: an overall view’, in Wilfred Beckerman (ed.), The 
Labour Government’s Economic Record 1964-1970 (London: Duckworth, 
1972), p.63. 
780 Bordo, Monnet and Naef, ‘The Gold Pool (1961-1968)’. For the process of 
the establishment of the two-tier gold system and the UK economic strategies 
during the gold crisis of 1968, see Arran Hamilton, ‘Beyond the Sterling 
Devaluation: The Gold Crisis of March 1968’, Contemporary European History, 
Vol.17, No.1, 2008, pp.73-95. 
781 Cairncross and Eichengreen, Sterling in Decline, p.224. 
782 For a general account on the development of the political strife within and 
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the aftermath of the emergence of the two-tier gold price system, various 
measures were taken in order to sustain the Bretton Woods system.783 Despite 
these efforts, international currency speculation did not dissipate. On 15 August 
1971, US President Richard Nixon declared the closure of the US Treasury gold 
window, which de facto heralded the end of the Bretton Woods system. 
Although there is no conclusive evidence that the UK influenced this decision to 
close the gold window, the UK’s demand for gold held by the US provided 
impetus behind Nixon’s determination, at least in the eyes of CEA officials. 
     This event presenting the decline of US dollar hegemony provoked 
international monetary reform, influencing international relations. Immediately 
after the Nixon shock, between the US and UK there were numerous conflictive 
issues surrounding IMF reform, management of gold and the dollar as major 
foreign reserves components, and the setting of new parities. The UK’s strategy 
was to avoid any further conflict with the US and the Six immediately before 
accession to the EEC. Hence, the UK conducted economic diplomacy over the 
issue of the new exchange parities in order to minimise potential burden on its 
economy and position within international politics arising from the revaluation 
and devaluation. Here, Japan was a useful target for revaluation as a means for 
reconciling the EEC and US to mitigate their diverged preferences for the new 
parities. After setting the new parities at the Smithsonian meeting in December 
1971, the UK attempted to restore the Anglo-American relationship while 
approaching the EEC. The UK’s ambiguous course was driven not by 
sentimental international relationships, but by meticulous political calculation, as 
                                                                                                                                                                  
amongst the US government and Federal Reserve and its causal relations with 
surging inflation under the Nixon administration, see Allen J. Matusow, Nixon's 
Economy: Booms, Busts, Dollars, and Votes (Kansas: University Press of 
Kansas, 1998). 
783 These measures included the devaluation of the French franc, revaluation of 
the West German mark, and arrangement of a border tax in West Germany. 
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vividly seen in the process of joining ‘snake’. The ultimate objectives of the UK 
were to achieve maximum economic and political benefits for itself, and to push 
international monetary reform through and within the EEC, and the Anglo-
American relationship. 
     By delineating the history of the international monetary and domestic fiscal 
and monetary policies under the late Bretton Woods system, it is apparent that 
these aspects, under the super-imposed political structures, were 
interconnected and mutually affected, fostering institutional change. It should be 
noted that the UK, under Macmillan, prioritised highly the holding of gold and 
inflow of short-term capital. In continuity from Alan Milward’s description of 
1950s currency management, the Macmillan government sought to strengthen 
the sterling position.784 Chapters two and three of this thesis have explored how 
the Macmillan government tried to achieve this objective through schemes of 
international monetary ‘co-operation’ and manipulation of the interest rates 
structure. In contrast, the Wilson government placed focus on manipulation of 
its fiscal policies to restore confidence in sterling, and to defend the quantity and 
quality of the budget with tax reform and delayed devaluation of sterling. 
However, dispute over debt management and the gilt-edged securities market, 
with external pressures, forced this tax reform to deviate from its original 
proposal. It is clear that currency management, fiscal and monetary policies and 
international politics were mutually influenced and affected UK economic policy 
outcomes. 
     Subsequently, the Labour government faced a bitterly negative experience 
at the point of devaluation, where the political conflicts, which had been 
previously obscured by the delay of devaluation, became graphically exposed. 
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In this turmoil, Labour’s policy objectives were again adjusted, which reflected in 
social security reform. Following the political and economic dysfunction of 
international and domestic economic management of the currencies, such as 
the demise of the gold pool, and the eventual collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system, the new political arena was set for international monetary reform. In the 
process of forming the new international monetary arrangements, the UK’s 
economic strategy reflected in international relations, in which positions were 
manoeuvred so the UK could potentially maximise its economic and political 
benefits arising from Anglo-American and Anglo-Six relations.  
 
8.2    Converging the historical findings into theories of international 
political economy and state theory 
 
To conclude this chapter, comparison remains to be made of the history of the 
management of currencies, involving the co-ordination of fiscal and monetary 
policies under the late Bretton Woods system, and the application of theoretical 
frameworks of international political economy and state theory. As already seen 
in chapter one of this thesis, the main frameworks of international political 
economy and international relations can be categorised into realism, structural 
realism and the liberal international order. In this concluding chapter, attempts 
are made to investigate these three disciplines through historical perspectives.  
     The schema and assumptions of realism have presented a theory which 
sees the whole international system from the standpoint of the existence of an 
international equilibrium, with a presupposition of nation states as rational 
actors in pursuit of solely their own interests. With this assumption, realism has 
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argued that nation states reach equilibrium and are incorporated into the system, 
subserviently or willingly, then hierarchy is set according to the disproportional 
and asymmetrical power distribution amongst nation states. Analysis describing 
nation states subordinately incorporating into the system or world order, under 
the presence or hegemonic direction of the US economy backed by the key 
currency, the dollar, cannot be denied. However, through analysis of the history 
of fiscal and monetary policies, the credence of this view is called into question. 
The staggering dollar as a key currency was bolstered at least ostensibly by 
harmonised international monetary co-operation, forged by governments and 
international monetary institutions, without fostering significant challenge 
against the dollar supremacy. Management of the dollar and sterling was 
perceived as a cumbersome issue, however, co-operation and various 
concessions to support the two reserve currencies were made as a quid pro 
quo for the de facto guarantee to maintain the international monetary system, in 
this case the Bretton Woods regime.  
     This historical interpretation might be recognised as reinforcing the 
arguments of structural realism. One of the salient distinctions of structural 
realism is in the hypothesis that nation states are spontaneously embedded and 
integrated into the international system in order to extract some form of benefit 
from the membership of institutions, which might sympathise with the Nash 
equilibrium in economic terms. However, it is difficult to apply this structural 
realism comprehensively to the post-war international political economy. To 
take the British case as an example, it has been shown in this thesis that the 
UK perceived co-operative and passive measures for defending sterling and the 
dollar as potentially erosive of its own field of fiscal policies, and to some extent 
the sterling position. Moreover, as existing research has already detailed, these 
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measures to defend sterling led the UK down the path towards a controversial 
incomes policy, presented an obstacle for rejection of the deployment of troops 
in Vietnam, and hampered the UK’s smooth accession to the EEC. While 
navigating the complex management of sterling and striving to defend the 
international monetary system, UK government officials faced difficulties in 
calculating their own and their counterparts’ utility functions, due to the 
labyrinthine political process, international relations and institutional 
configuration.785 In a paradoxical result arising from the political uncertainty, the 
decision to devalue sterling temporarily extricated the UK from the burden of 
maintaining the parity, however, as a consequence of the intensification of 
industrial action that emanated from the decrease in the real wage, the UK 
faced fresh issues of wage inflation and a poignant backlash from the trade 
unions. Thus excessive focus on the benefits gained from membership of 
international monetary systems does not provide comprehensive analysis of the 
period. If the schema of structural realism is applied, it is useful to focus on the 
interrelations of ‘co-variable’ ‘domestic’ and ‘interdependence’ sovereignties, 
referring to governmental ability to exert control in both domestic and 
international spheres. This framework might provide insight into the 
interrelations of domestic economic policies and the international sphere. 
                                                       
785 Steinbruner took international relations from a cognitive and cybernetic point 
of view with nuclear and multilateral forces between the 1950s and 1960s as an 
example, and argued that the decision makers avoided an information overload 
and spontaneously limited their own capacity of information handling. 
Consequently, in the segmented decision-making process, the decision makers 
depended on empirically and historically accumulated knowledge, and 
institutional behaviours. See John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of 
Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1974). The influence of accumulated knowledge within organisational 
decision-making can be seen in the work of Oakeshott. His concept of 
‘deliberately learned’ practical knowledge identified the collective behaviour of 
decision-making. See Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other 
Essays (London: Methuen, 1962). 
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However, it should be noted that this framework does not possess explanatory 
means to describe mutual interactions between two sovereignties, because 
Krasner’s original framework does not provide account of any dynamic 
processes of ‘co-varying’, rather his work saw the structure of sovereignties as 
static and trade-off relations. In contrast, this thesis emphasises the aspect of 
somewhat mutual reinforcement, or schemes used in order to create a 
favourable balance of these ‘sovereignties’. It can be gleaned from analysis in 
this thesis that the UK and US attempted to extract a source from the 
international political arena for bolstering the ability to control foreign capital 
(international sovereignty), in order to enhance capability to conduct their own 
fiscal policies (domestic sovereignty). On the other hand, the UK attempted to 
reform taxation (domestic sovereignty) in order to indirectly control foreign 
capital, and to avoid the influence of the foreign sector (restoration of or 
increase in international sovereignty). It is clear that relations between 
sovereignties cannot be described in a solely static fashion. Therefore, this 
static structure of sovereignties should be revised with detailed historical 
research. 
     Further validation is required for the hypothesis of the theory of the liberal 
international order as driven by the benefits drawn from the international free 
market economy and membership of liberal international institutions based on a 
pluralistic, open-access democratic process. As detailed in chapter one of this 
thesis, this concept is in clear contrast with the argument of Rodrik, who 
delineated the trilemma composed of ‘hyper-globalisation’, independent national 
sovereignty and democracy.786  The theory of the liberal international order 
                                                       
786 This trilemma can be considered to present a reversal of Ruggie’s argument 
that domestic economic policies to satisfy social needs co-existed with the 
liberal international market under ‘embedded liberalism’. The trilemma leads to 
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potentially obscures the collision of domestic and international economic 
interests. As shown through exploration of the historical events investigated in 
this thesis, it is evident that the fiscal and monetary policies of the UK were 
redirected in their political course by the political process of the international 
management of currencies and the forces of the international market. Then, this 
obscured fissures within national sovereignty, however, these conflicts were 
eventually magnified in the wake of the malfunction of international monetary 
arrangements. In this sense, rather than focus on harmonisation, the analytical 
power of the liberal international order ought to also highlight the conflictive 
aspects within itself and the dynamic interactions between international and 
domestic political spheres. 
     These comparisons between history and the concepts of international 
political economy unavoidably lead to the question of how the late Bretton 
Woods system should be understood from the perspective of the management 
of currencies. Also, how does this understanding contribute to the theories of 
international political economy? This thesis can add to the perspectives that 
domestic economic policies are used for tackling international monetary issues, 
and that international aspects are a constraint on domestic politics and 
economic policies. An important aspect is that nation states, composed of multi-
layered organisations in which diverse interests are internalised, conducted 
management of the currencies and capitalised on various schemes as a buffer 
to alleviate conflicts between and within domestic policies and international 
factors, and externalised or exported domestic political conflicts into the 
international political arena. In other words, the international political arena was 
a means through which to steer the domestic economy. Of course, other 
                                                                                                                                                                  
re-interpretation of ‘embedded liberalism’ as a source of conflict in order to 
extend its analytical credence for the contemporary world. 
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aspects should also be noted, such as that domestic economic policies were 
driven in order to resolve international issues such as currency management, in 
the last instance for the benefit of the national economy. In this sense, external 
institutions or forces that act on the complex decision-making process within a 
state are not mere constraints, but are also a channel through which domestic 
political conflicts are mitigated, obscured or redirected. As seen in this thesis, 
not only fiscal and monetary but also diplomatic policies of the state were 
modified or regulated through negotiation of international monetary co-
ordination, by institutions on the outside or ‘periphery’ of parliamentary 
democratic processes, such as supranational monetary organisations and the 
network of central banks, leading nation states to reach equilibrium, albeit it a 
precarious, temporary one.787  
     While internal and external conflicts were mitigated, obscured or redirected 
in the international political arena, domestic fiscal and monetary policies were 
somewhat driven for the mitigation of the currency issues and for the 
achievement of other objectives. However, in the reciprocal political process 
where these components met with international politics, the proposed or 
existing policies underwent change. Here, emphasis must also be placed on the 
qualitative mutual adjustment process of the domestic and international political 
arena in which political ideology and ideas affected policy outcomes. The 
arguments of this thesis are distanced from the concept of an interstate system 
composed of a set of rules through which any states’ sovereignty is constrained 
                                                       
787 The Bank had been nationalised under the Bank of England Act of 1946. 
However, it is broadly held that this nationalisation did not constrain the Bank’s 
autonomy and it did not become subordinate to the government or the Treasury. 
See David Kynaston, ‘The Bank of England and the Government’, in Richard 
Roberts and David Kynaston (eds.), The Bank of England: Money, Power and 
Influence, 1694-1994 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp.29-30. See also 
John Fforde, The Bank of England and Public Policy, 1941-1958 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp.4-30. 
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and secured.788 Rather, focus should be placed upon the ceaseless spiraling 
process of mutual adjustments within domestic and international sovereignties, 
economic policies and politics.   
     The above leads to reconsideration of the political process and state theory. 
The question is how should the political process that emerged in the late 
Bretton Woods era be considered in order to deepen understanding of state 
theory? As seen in chapter one of this thesis, an aspect of state theory focusing 
on the political process emphasises the distribution of ‘power’, the effects of 
institutions, and the applicability of discerning the state as a web of social 
relations. It has been shown in the analysis of this thesis that incorporating the 
international aspect into state theory is of great importance. The international 
institutions providing the arena of transnational co-operation or competition not 
only operated in a mediation role to reach economic compromise and confine or 
determine the actors’ interests, but also functioned as a source of ‘power’ for 
representatives to influence or change domestic economic policies. This is 
because the components of states’ ‘infrastructural power’, if any, were managed 
in or mutually influenced by the international political field.789 Moreover, it is 
evident that the international political arena, where states and actors could 
extract political power to self-enhance, provided a source for state autonomy 
and sovereignty, while somewhat influencing decision-making, institutional 
configuration, and policy outcomes. In this sense, states are somewhat 
characterised and shaped by their relations with other states. Here, 
governmental policy objectives and domestic economic interests were at least 
partially changed by its relations with other states. This presents a 
                                                       
788  For explanation of the interstate system, see Immanuel Wallerstein, 
Historical Capitalism with Capitalist Civilization (London: Verso, 1995), pp.56-7. 
789 In this thesis focus is placed on money and taxation. 
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supplementary rather than an alternative view on state theory. For example, 
while Jessop identified states as a web of social relations, it is clear that in the 
late Bretton Woods era, international monetary relations and its politics also had 
great bearing on, and somewhat shaped the state through the provision of 
political resources and ideas, and sometimes via coercive power.  
     This account does not exclude the arguments of states as autonomous, self-
enhancing organisms or a set of institutions. International politics such as in 
management of the currencies, distanced from the parliamentary democratic 
process, provided or thrust political power unevenly unto the states or their 
actors, which might be seen as a source of state autonomy. There is also no 
doubt that political ideas, objectives and policy feasibility were constrained by 
institutions. When politicians, civil servants or economists sought to infuse their 
own ideas into actual policies, the existing institutions sometimes accelerated, 
sometimes hampered these ideas within the political process. In the late Bretton 
Woods era, ideas for economic policies and state strategy were bound to and 
sometimes constrained by the international monetary regime to preserve its 
longevity. Here, heed must be paid to the political process, where the actors, 
reciprocally influenced by cross-national and multi-layered institutions, 
competed to extract sources of political bargaining power, then navigating 
control, compromise and surrender until the point of outcome. 
     In the context of the late Bretton Woods era, the international aspects, such 
as the management of currencies, obscured the domestic economic conflicts. 
As the buffer of schemes to alleviate conflicts between domestic policies and 
international factors became mired in dysfunction or malfunction, a fissure in 
international and domestic fabric came to the surface. As the international 
financial situation changed and the unifying political force of the arena of 
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monetary harmonisation weakened, previously dormant conflicts reignited at 
domestic and international levels, leading to dynamic institutional and policy 
change. 
     This thesis has attempted to stress the significance of internalising the 
international monetary co-ordination and management of currencies, commonly 
conceived as an external factor. This thesis has also delineated the historical 
transition of and mutual interactions amongst currency management and fiscal 
and monetary policies, in contrast to existing research which has focused 
unevenly on these aspects.  
 
8.3    Reflection on the current climate 
 
The interrelations amongst domestic economic policies and international 
aspects explored in this thesis, which has focused on international ‘co-operative’ 
measures that buffered or drove conflicts in domestic politics, might provide a 
useful framework for analysis of the emergence of ‘neo-liberal’ states and the 
turbulent period after the 2008 Great Financial Crisis (GFC). In the wake of the 
GFC, central banks have extended their own schemes for ‘non-conventional’ 
monetary easing, such as Quantitative Easing, negative interest rates and 
various asset purchase programmes. This flood of liquidity has fostered a surge 
in asset prices, greater than the increase in real wages, leading to wealth 
inequality.790 Low interest rates have also caused the balances of consumer 
                                                       
790 Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2014), chapter 9. Piketty’s analysis of the development of 
inequality mainly distinguished wealth held by the top percentile, and defined 
the class structure as such: upper class (top 1 per cent), middle class (from 2 to 
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finance and real estate mortgages to balloon significantly, returning to levels 
evident prior to the GFC. 791  This ‘financialisation’ has resulted in the 
phenomena of ‘mountainous’ private debt, and nurtured further global economic 
instability.  
     Meanwhile, divisive socio-political and domestic economic issues have taken 
the spotlight, where they were previously obscured by arrangement of national 
interests within supranational organisations and international co-operation, 
which have injected global liberalisation or marketisation into the domestic 
sphere. This dominant notion is based on market discipline and justified in the 
name of the ‘Great Moderation’. With the rapid transformation of the ‘Great 
                                                                                                                                                                  
49 per cent) and low class (lower 50 per cent). Therefore, Piketty’s analysis of 
inequality cannot be considered to cover national characteristics of inequality 
such as generational inequality, and inequality of capability as analysed by Sen. 
Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1995). Piketty’s work is also distanced from the maximin principle (benefits 
received by ‘the least advanced’) and equality of opportunity with equal basic 
liberties as analysed by Rawls. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 
(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), p.302. As detailed by Piketty, 
inequality refers to concentration in the capital holding structure and the surge 
in labour income of some.  
For estimated distributional effects created by current non-conventional 
monetary easing, see Dietrich Domanski, Michela Scatigna and Anna Zabai, 
‘Wealth inequality and monetary policy’, BIS Quarterly Review, March 2016, 
and Stephanie Kelton, ‘The Failure of Austerity: Rethinking Fiscal Policy’, in 
Michael Jacobs and Mariana Mazzucato (eds.), Rethinking Capitalism: 
Economics and Policy for Sustainable and Inclusive Growth (Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2016), pp.28-46.  
791  Colin Crouch, ‘Privatised Keynesianism: An Unacknowledged Policy 
Regime’, The British Journal of Politics & International Relations, Vol.11, 2009, 
pp.382–99. Crouch argued that this debt is a by-product of privatisation of the 
governmental sector. This rising level of private debt, combined with the 
expansion of the financial sector is deemed the phenomena of ‘financialisation’, 
and one of the causes behind the austerity movement, by which governments 
face demand to manage sovereign debt so as not to ratchet up debt service 
costs. See Wolfgang Streeck, Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic 
Capitalism (London: Verso, 2014); Wolfgang Streeck and Daniel Mertens, 
‘Public Finance and the Decline of State Capacity in Democratic Capitalism’, in 
Armin Schäfer and Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), Politics in the Age of Austerity 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), chapter 2, pp.26-58. For financialisation, see 
Gerald A. Epstein, ‘Introduction: Financialization and the World Economy’, in 
Gerald A. Epstein (ed.), Financialization and the World Economy (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2005) pp.3-16. 
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Moderation’, concealed domestic conflicts have become magnified through 
inequality in distributed wealth and the rising level of debt combined with 
austerity and consolidated public finance, underpinned by a series of monetary 
easing schemes, significantly affecting society. Reminiscent of Eric Hoffer’s 
classical analysis seven decades ago that the driving force of mass movement 
is the shift from discontent to self-renunciation, social cleavage arising from 
inequality has deepened further since the GFC.792 This has incarnated into the 
strange espousal of economic nationalism favouring coercive trade 
protectionism, bilateralism, and isolationism accompanied by social and political 
change, and neoliberalism engaging in domestic free market policies. In this 
sense, a state of affairs is perceptible in which global financial crises are 
intricately intertwined with not only national fiscal and monetary policies but also 
social factors.793  
     Although further detailed, historical qualitative and quantitative research is 
essential, the approach taken in this thesis may provide a fresh perspective for 
analysing the current interconnection of overflowing financial markets triggered 
by deregulation since the 1970s, and fiscal and monetary policies which are on 
the cusp of change. 
                                                       
792 Eric Hoffer, The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1951). 
793  A notable example can be observed in the expanding housing finance 
market and household borrowing. The development of housing finance 
schemes has ushered households to incur historically unprecedented levels of 
debt. Jens Lunde and Christine Whitehead, ‘Introduction: Milestones in 
European Housing Finance since 1989’, in Jens Lunde and Christine 
Whitehead (eds.), Milestones in European Housing Finance (Chichester: John 
Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2016), pp.1-14. This trend had begun in the 1960s, later 
having significant impact on tenure structures. Kemeny observed that this 
change in tenures influences a household’s voting pattern, favoured political 
parties and policies, which would have an impact on housing markets. Jim 
Kemeny, ‘Home ownership and privatization’, International Journal of Urban and 
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